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Apuleius is often considered to be a Latin sophist, a master of narratological and hermeneutic games, with no
particular philosophical agenda. But complexity and playfulness are not necessarily synonymous with
intellectual or moral emptiness. Indeed, Apuleius’ self-proclaimed Platonism links him to a figure whose very
choice of medium, the dialogue, always plays philosophical games with the reader. This dissertation shows
that Apuleius engages with Plato on a deeper level than has previously been thought, framing both his own
texts and those of Plato in terms of a high-stakes choice to the reader in the spirit of the ‘choice of Heracles’. I
focus on Apuleius’ use of the mirror trope – a trope he inherits from Plato but refracts through the Roman
literary tradition. I argue that when Lucius looks into mirrors in the Metamorphoses, such as the mirroring
water of Byrrhena’s atrium or the catoptric hair of the maid-servant Photis, Apuleius invites the reader into a
complex game of identification and criticism. Lucius’ specular contemplation, though he attempts to fashion it
after idealized Platonic mirroring encounters, begins to appear more like the delusional mirror-gazing of
Ovid’s Narcissus or Seneca’s Hostius Quadra upon further analysis. Readers, who have been tricked into
participating in a shared voyeurism with Lucius, are compelled to see themselves at the same time as they see
Lucius in the mirror. At that moment, the reader is put into a kind of Platonic bind, whereby he or she is
forced to choose whether or not to continue following Lucius into voyeuristic delusion.
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ABSTRACT 
PLATONIC REFLECTIONS IN APULEIUS 
Jeffrey P. Ulrich 
Emily Wilson 
Apuleius is often considered to be a Latin sophist, a master of narratological and 
hermeneutic games, with no particular philosophical agenda. But complexity and 
playfulness are not necessarily synonymous with intellectual or moral emptiness. Indeed, 
Apuleius’ self-proclaimed Platonism links him to a figure whose very choice of medium, 
the dialogue, always plays philosophical games with the reader. This dissertation shows 
that Apuleius engages with Plato on a deeper level than has previously been thought, 
framing both his own texts and those of Plato in terms of a high-stakes choice to the 
reader in the spirit of the ‘choice of Heracles’. I focus on Apuleius’ use of the mirror 
trope – a trope he inherits from Plato but refracts through the Roman literary tradition. I 
argue that when Lucius looks into mirrors in the Metamorphoses, such as the mirroring 
water of Byrrhena’s atrium or the catoptric hair of the maid-servant Photis, Apuleius 
invites the reader into a complex game of identification and criticism. Lucius’ specular 
contemplation, though he attempts to fashion it after idealized Platonic mirroring 
encounters, begins to appear more like the delusional mirror-gazing of Ovid’s Narcissus 
or Seneca’s Hostius Quadra upon further analysis. Readers, who have been tricked into 
participating in a shared voyeurism with Lucius, are compelled to see themselves at the 
same time as they see Lucius in the mirror. At that moment, the reader is put into a kind 
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of Platonic bind, whereby he or she is forced to choose whether or not to continue 
following Lucius into voyeuristic delusion. 
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ................................................................................................ iv 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... vii 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 
The Mirror: Ancient Interpretation and Apuleian Innovations ..............................................................12 
Methodological Issues ..................................................................................................................................22 
Platonism in the Metamorphoses .................................................................................................................27 
The Embedded Choice in the Prologue of the Metamorphoses ................................................................36 
Chapter Structure ........................................................................................................................................45 
CHAPTER 1: THE DIDACTIC MIRROR OF THE APOLOGIA ............................ 50 
Literary History of the Didactic Mirror .....................................................................................................56 
The κάτοπτρον in Alcibiades I .....................................................................................................................78 
The Didactic Speculum of the Apologia 15-16 ...........................................................................................87 
CHAPTER 2: THE SEDUCTIONS OF EKPHRASIS: PLATONIC PSYCHAGOGIA 
THROUGH DECEPTION ........................................................................................... 115 
Lessing and Second Sophistic Aesthetics ..................................................................................................118 
The Courtesan-Mirror of Apologia 14: Erotic and Narrative Desire ....................................................130 
Metamorphoses 2.4: Turning “Bodies in Space” into “Actions in Time” ..............................................153 
Isis on the Pedestal, Reader at the Crossroads ........................................................................................174 
CHAPTER 3:	  THE	  MIRROR	  OF	  ἜΡΩΣ:	  PLATONIC	  EPIPHANY	  IN	  THE	  
HAARSPIEGEL	  OF	  THE	  METAMORPHOSES ............................................................... 185 
Hair in the Apologia ....................................................................................................................................188 
Platonic Misinterpretation in the Narrative Frame for the Haarspiegel ...............................................195 
The Platonic Mirror of ῎Ερως and its Nachleben in Antiquity ...............................................................206 
Close Reading of the Haarspiegel of Metamorphoses 2.9 ........................................................................215 
x
Metamorphoses 5.22-24: The Recognition Scene .....................................................................................222 
Isis’ Haarspiegel and Serio-Erotic Epiphany ...........................................................................................230 
Lucius’ Final Baldness: Closure? ..............................................................................................................240 
CHAPTER 4: EMBEDDED CHOICE IN THE PROLOGUE OF THE 
METAMORPHOSES .................................................................................................... 247 
Modes of Viewing, Hearing, and Reading in the Prologue .....................................................................257 
The εἰκόνες of Socrates in the Symposium ................................................................................................276 
Back to the Prologue: the εἰκόνες of Lucius .............................................................................................288 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 304 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 314 
1	  
INTRODUCTION: 
The last 30 years have been kind to Apuleius. He has experienced a renaissance 
paralleled by few authors in antiquity. Apuleius’ Metamorphoses – an Odyssean tale of 
Lucius, a man-turned-ass on a journey to a place he cannot call home – has undergone its 
own journey from the periphery of most Classics reading lists to becoming a central text 
for understanding the fascinating syncretism and intellectual culture of the Imperial Era 
and the Second Sophistic.1 Once a curiosity of North African descent, destined only for a 
few curious readers who were themselves on the periphery of academic circles, this text 
was transformed into a holy grail for post-modern interpretation in the wake of Jack 
Winkler’s 1985 aporetic, narratological reading.2 Apuleius himself underwent a 
metamorphosis from a not-so-astute Platonist, who could not help flaunting his education 
in bursts of unrestrained stylistic flourishes, to a highly adept player of hermeneutic 
games, whose “controlled gamesmanship” reveals the underlying un-interpretability of all 
1 See, e.g., the opening of Vincent Hunink’s BMCR review of Regine May’s commentary of 
Metamorphoses 1 (Hunink 2014): “The Metamorphoses by the second-century Latin author Apuleius of 
Madauros, once considered a curious work well outside the scope of the average classicist, has meanwhile 
gained the status of an all-time classic. The publication of Maaike Zimmerman’s long awaited OCT edition 
of the novel…in 2012 marks the end of this process”. 
2 The continued influence of Winkler 1985 on Apuleius studies can be seen not only in the outpouring of 
commentaries, translations, and texts produced since this seminal study (Groningen commentaries on 10 
out of 11 books of the Metamorphoses, a two volume Loeb of the Metamorphoses (Hanson 1989), four 
translations of the Metamorphoses into English (Walsh 1994; Kenney 1998; Relihan 2008; Ruden 2011), a 
Cambridge commentary on Cupid & Psyche (Kenney 1990), an Oxford Classical Text on the 
Metamorphoses (Zimmerman 2012), a forthcoming Teubner on the Metamorphoses, a new Aris and 
Phillips commentary on Metamorphoses 1 (May 2013), a forthcoming Teubner on the Apologia, a text and 
commentary on the Apologia (Hunink 1997), two texts and commentaries on the Florida (Hunink 2001; 
Lee 2005), and a forthcoming text, translation, and commentary on de Platone et eius Dogmate (Fowler 
2016)) or in the number of monographs on this previously fringe author (Sandy 1997; Finkelpearl 1998; 
Harrison 2000a; May 2006; Graverini 2007; Fletcher 2014; Tilg 2014, just to name a few), but also in the 
variety of interpretive lenses employed to illuminate the complexities of this author (cf. the list of Apuleius’ 
identities Fletcher notes in the scholarship (Fletcher 2014, 7 n. 17), of which Nũnez’s “Apuleius: Orator 
MetMetasophisticus” (Nũnez 2009) is perhaps the most creative). The 2015 SCS panel libros me futurum 
dedicated to Winkler’s memory and the sheer number of papers on Apuleius delivered at the 2015 ICAN 
conference further reveal Auctor et Actor’s far reaching effect. 
2	  
	  
texts.3 In lieu of the traditional literary-critical questions of unity and disunity of 
Apuleius’ masterpiece,4 Winkler taught readers to look at the Metamorphoses as a kind of 
detective novel, which lays about hidden clues for its readers to find, and by doing so, 
teaches them about the process of interpretation through retrospective reading. In the end, 
though, Winkler’s answer to the question “whodunit?”, which he raises as the detective 
novel parallel for the aporetic conclusion of the Metamorphoses, leaves criticism with a 
rather unsatisfying non-answer. That is, the main question that has long bothered 
interpreters of this text is the problem of how seriously one ought to read Lucius’ surprise 
conversion and life-style change in book 115; Winkler’s answer, which is characteristic of 
interpretation from the 80’s but which has nonetheless put Apuleius scholarship in a kind 
of double bind ever since, is essentially: ‘however seriously you like’. Thus, already 
hidden in Winkler’s aporetic reading was the cynical or satirical interpretation of the 
ending, which merely masqueraded as an “open” interpretation. 
 As a consequence of Winkler’s revolutionary (albeit noncommittal) model of 
retrospective reading, a number of treatments of Apuleius’ whole oeuvre were 
undertaken, including of philosophical works whose authenticity is still open to debate.6 
With an increasing cynicism toward any serious philosophical or religious meaning 
behind Apuleius’ words, the texts of the Florida and the Apologia were labeled the work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Winkler 1985, 170 for the phrase. 
4 A style of criticism for which the title of Gerald Sandy’s 1978 article, ‘Book 11: Ballast or Anchor?’, 
could be taken as representative. On pre- and post-Winklerian studies of the unity, disunity, and/or 
composition of the Metamorphoses, see Schlam and Finkelpearl 2001, 45-78. 
5 A previous formulation of this problem is that the Metamorphoses does not prepare the reader for Lucius’ 
conversion, as a proper Entwicklungsroman ought to. Rather, the narrative foists a newly transformed 
Lucius on the reader, even though he was happily indulging in bestiality just a few chapters prior in book 
10. For representative readings of this position, see Walsh 1968 and Sandy 1978.  
6 On questions of authenticity of de Platone et eius Dogmate, see n. 82 below. For the most recent 
discussion of de Mundo and its authenticity, see Fletcher 2014. 
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of a “Latin Sophist” exaggerating his παιδεία and cultural knowledge for personal 
advantage7; the philosophical works, on the other hand, such as de Platone, de deo 
Socratis, and even the possibly spurious de Mundo, remained the product of a middle-of-
the-road, hack philosopher, who only on occasion revealed a literary sensibility. Gerald 
Sandy, for instance, disregarding Winkler entirely in his attempt to situate Apuleius in the 
broader Greek context,8 seemed to land on a rather ambivalent and noncommittal stance 
of his own: Apuleius was the product of an era of mediocre scholasticism and “ossified 
conventions”, “slavishly adhering to the lessons of writing and speech manuals”9; and 
yet, at many moments in the Metamorphoses, “one finds…subtleties worthy of 
Alexandrian writers and their Roman disciples in the Augustan period”.10  
Stephen Harrison’s 2000 monograph, Apuleius: A Latin Sophist, which very 
quickly acquired a status verging on an introductory textbook for the state of Apuleius 
studies, took a similar approach to Sandy’s in attempting to situate Apuleius in the 
Second Sophistic. Harrison’s conclusion, though less ambivalent and more closely tied to 
textual exegesis than Sandy’s, is nevertheless equally dismissive of Apuleius’ intellectual 
abilities and philosophical commitment. In Harrison’s view, Apuleius’ self-description as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See, e.g., Stephen Harrison’s review of Gerald Sandy’s 1997 monograph (Harrison 2000b), in which there 
is talk of Apuleius’ “exaggerated” knowledge of Greek, “exaggerated” travels, etc. 
8 See the just criticism of Harrison 2000b. 
9 Sandy 1997, 63. For a harsher articulation of the same sentiment, see the rather condemning assessment 
of John Dillon, in which he manages to strike a blow against Middle Platonism and the Middle West of 
America at the same time: the period between 80 BCE and 220 CE in the history of Platonism “seems fated 
to remain in the position of those tedious tracts of the Mid-Western United States through which one passes 
with all possible haste, in order to reach the excitements of one coast or the other. In Platonism, likewise, 
one tends to move all too hastily from Plato to Plotinus, with, at most, a perfunctory glance at those vast 
tracts of Academic scholasticism that lie between the two, and which were of such basic importance in the 
intellectual formation of the latter” (Dillon 1977, xiii, quoted in Fletcher 2014, 38). This assessment is still 
generally held to be true; though for a recent attempt to recover the literary value of the somewhat dry texts 
of Apuleius’ corpus, see Fletcher 2014. 
10 Sandy 1997, 252. 
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a Platonicus philosophus in the Apologia and the Florida can be seen as a moniker he 
adopts merely for the purposes of sophistic display and self-fashioning. When Apuleius 
makes learned allusions to highbrow literature of the Greek and/or Roman past, 
moreover, he does so with the aim of adding a little literary flavor to his otherwise “low” 
text merely for the enjoyment of more well-educated members of his readership. 
Adopting a view of Apuleius that, like Winkler’s, makes him suspiciously similar to 
present-day academics with all the attendant anxieties of self-presentation and scholarly 
success, Harrison strips Apuleius of any serious purpose and transforms him into a 
modern satirist, mocking the religious elite in a manner one might expect from a 20th 
century talking head. Regine May, a student of Harrison, then took this assessment one 
step further by trying to connect Apuleius’ oeuvre to ancient comedy, particularly in his 
diction and his interactive relationship with the reader.11 Though a very valuable resource 
in terms of nuanced and studied intertextual readings, May’s monograph takes for 
granted the same basic premise as Harrison’s – a premise for which there is ample 
evidence to the contrary in antiquity: according to this school, comedy, whether in the 
ancient world or the modern, cannot also be serious.12 
Apuleius scholarship, however, has not remained in a state of unquestioned 
ἀπορία or complete cynicism. In a series of publications, beginning with Luca 
Graverini’s Le Metamorfosi di Apuleio. Letteratura e identità and continuing into the 
present with monographs and commentaries as recent as 2015, a new brand of “serio-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See May 2006. 
12 One may cite as evidence to the contrary the programmatic claim of the chorus in Aristophanes’ Frogs 
(391-2): καὶ πολλὰ µὲν γέλοιά µ᾽ εἰπεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαῖα (“Let me say many funny things, but also 
many serious things”). 
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comic” interpretation has been developed. Since Graverini pioneered a new way of 
looking at the Metamorphoses – as a kind of generic mixture of pleasurable and serious 
elements – the communis opinio has started to shift, with Apuleius scholarship making 
more room both for a serious interpretation of Lucius’ conversion and for Apuleius’ 
genuine philosophical commitments writ large across the corpus. In this vein, three 
publications from the last two years – two monographs published by Oxford and 
Cambridge, respectively, and a new Groningen commentary on the Isis book13 – 
demonstrate a general desire amongst Apuleius scholars to push back against the faux-
“open” reading of Winkler, which deceptively hid the ultimately cynical reading that was 
to be championed in the late 90’s and early 2000’s. However, a closer analysis of the two 
monographs with a particular focus on the type of “serious” interpretation they 
promulgate reveals just how large the ghost of Winkler looms in Apuleius criticism.  
Stefan Tilg initially tries to pass the religious ending of book 11 off on the 
Mεταµορφώσεις written by Lucius of Patrae, of which Apuleius’ Latin Metamorphoses is 
generally agreed to be a loose translation.14 The evidence for such a conjecture is 
speculative at best, and does not really manage to address the central concerns of 
Apuleius scholarship in contending with Winklerian ἀπορία. Then, when Tilg addresses 
the “serious” element of the “seriocomic” interpretation in chapter 5 – a feature he has 
already undercut by taking away Apuleius’ agency in constructing the Isis book – he 
quickly dispenses with his arguments in favor of a serious reading in “under two pages”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Tilg 2014, Fletcher 2014, and GCA 2015. 
14 See chapter 1 of Tilg 2014, “The Model: Religious Metamorphoseis”. For a fuller discussion of the 
issues of translation of Lucius of Patrae’s original Metamorphoseis, see Graverini 2012, 42-50 and Tilg 
2007. 
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As a reviewer justly complains, Tilg, while claiming to endorse a “serio-comic” 
interpretation, seems to land on “the deconstructionist interpretative tradition of the 
Metamorphoses that refuses definitive solutions”.15  
On the other hand, Richard Fletcher, whose study of Apuleius’ whole corpus 
explicitly eschews interpretation of the Metamorphoses as an end game for reading the 
oeuvre,16 takes a different tack to support the notion that Apuleius was a serious Platonist, 
namely, by arguing that Platonism in antiquity was as much an aesthetic movement as it 
was a set of doctrinal principles.17 However, while I certainly agree with the sentiment, 
this alone fails once again to address the questions scholars are asking when they 
investigate the serious philosophical or religious commitments of this notoriously elusive 
figure from antiquity.18 Interpreters do not wonder what Apuleius thought being a 
Platonist meant, but rather, whether he could be correctly categorized as one in a pre-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For the full quotation, see Andreadakis 2015, 4-5: “…the serious reading is seriously downplayed, in 
fact, as it is analyzed in under two pages…T[ilg] concludes by stating that the serious and the comic 
approaches to such a complex work are precarious when one considers the trickiness of such 
definitions…While this view is certainly well argued, it is not a solution to the question of what is the more 
appropriate reading mode for Apuleius’ Metamorphoses. In that sense then it would appear that T[ilg] 
associates with the deconstructionist interpretative tradition of the Metamorphoses that refuses definitive 
solutions.” 
16 See Fletcher’s criticism of other corpus-wide studies of Apuleius and their teleological approach to the 
Metamorphoses: “The Metamorphoses is the undisputed masterpiece of the Apuleian corpus. It is often 
read separately from Apuleius’ other works, and discussed in relation to other ancient novels and a range of 
traditions of Greek and Roman poetry and prose. Even when the other works of the Apuleian corpus are 
discussed, the shadow of the Metamorphoses looms so large that it demands to be not only the end-point of 
the discussion of the whole corpus, but also the rationale for discussion of the corpus. In many ways, the 
other works of the Apuleian corpus, and even the very idea of an Apuleian corpus, have been understood as 
acting as so many footnotes to the Metamorphoses” (Fletcher 2014, 3). Though, at p. 5, Fletcher 
acknowledges and responds to the potential criticism that he too concludes his survey of the corpus with a 
study of the Metamorphoses: “…if you read my table of contents, you see that I too conclude my study of 
the corpus with a discussion of the Metamorphoses. Yet, as my own scrupulous reader will ascertain, unlike 
other comparable corpus-wide surveys, this book positions the novel as neither providing a τέλος nor a 
legitimating rationale for my reading of the rest of the corpus; rather, Met. And its discussion act as a 
postscript or epilogue and, for my ideal reader, signal work still yet to come.” 
17 To demonstrate this idea, Fletcher brings in Walter Pater’s conception of Platonism (Fletcher 2014, 9-
12), a return to 19th century aesthetics reminiscent of Martindale 2005. 
18 For my fuller assessment of Fletcher’s Apuleius’ Platonism, see my forthcoming review in Gnomon. 
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existing taxonomy. So, while Fletcher’s approach of analyzing Platonism as a 
“methodology” helpfully calls into question the scholarly impulse to develop taxonomies 
and periodizations, his analysis also does not manage to escape the ἀπορία of Winkler, 
whom Fletcher drags in as a kind of deus ex machina in his last (and only) chapter on the 
Metamorphoses. Indeed, chapter 5, “A Narratology for Philosophy”, closes rather 
unsatisfyingly with four pages of large block quotations from Auctor et Actor 
(supplemented with a few endorsements from Fletcher between each),19 and with one 
final homage to Winkler, who started us down this aporetic journey. Thirty years later, 
therefore, Apuleius scholarship is still contending with the ghost of Winkler whenever 
people approach anything verging on a serious interpretation of Apuleius qua philosopher 
or of the Metamorphoses as a potentially didactic text. 
This dissertation takes its starting point from an idea that is latent in Richard 
Fletcher’s work, but one that I think could offer a different solution to Winkler’s “open” 
reading – a solution different in kind but not in underlying sentiment. At least part of the 
reason Apuleius scholars have failed to move beyond Winkler’s hermeneutic games, 
according to which readers see in the novel whatever they already wanted to see, is that 
we have simply left unquestioned the appropriateness – not to mention anachronism – of 
the analogy Winkler draws between the Metamorphoses and detective stories. Beguiled 
by the ingenuity of the comparison, scholars have refused to point out that, in an effort to 
make Apuleius a modern, Winkler turned him into a visionary, producing not merely a 
new genre, the novel, but a very specific sub-genre of the novel that would not recur 
again in the same form until the late 19th century. Rather than endorse such an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Fletcher 2014, 283-6. 
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anachronistic comparison, I would prefer to rework the idea of a “conversion to 
philosophy”, which Fletcher alludes to but does not fully develop when describing 
Plato’s choice in de Platone to follow Socrates rather than to pursue a life of poetic and 
literary success.20 Indeed, “conversion” becomes an implicit explanatory mechanism that 
drives Fletcher’s interpretation of the whole Apuleian corpus. “Conversion”, however, 
may strike a first-time reader of Apuleius’ Platonism as a tendentiously chosen concept,21 
especially given Fletcher’s claim to avoid an interpretation of the corpus that has the 
Metamorphoses as its τέλος. Thus, instead of retaining “conversion” for fear that it may 
point too conveniently to Lucius, I will argue in this dissertation that Apuleius poses to 
readers a high-stakes choice between pleasurable and serious lifestyles and modes of 
reading. This is essentially the choice implied by the word “conversion”; but to offer a 
truly “open” reading, it will be more useful to avoid such a religiously inflected term. 
Unlike detective novels (or conversion narratives, for that matter), high-stakes choice 
narratives, such as Hesiod’s “two roads” in the Works and Days or Prodicus’ famous 
“choice of Heracles”, have a rich philosophical and literary history in antiquity,22 and in 
fact, become an even more regularly invoked topos in Apuleius’ time.23 Thus, if we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Fletcher 2014, 65 (et passim): “The teleology of Plato’s conversion to philosophy at the feet of 
Socrates is further marked by Apuleius’ account of his youthful education” (my italics). 
21 The term “conversion” may also recall Nancy Shumate’s helpful reading of the novel in Crisis and 
Conversion in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses (Shumate 1996). Her monograph, however, falls prey to the same 
criticism of anachronism that I raised against Winkler’s analogy to detective stories. That is, she uses 
“conversion” narratives as a critical lens, even though Augustine’s Confessions, written significantly later 
than the Metamorphoses, is the earliest analogue. Otherwise, she relies heavily on William James’ analysis 
of Tolstoy’s Confession as well as on other modern crisis and conversion narratives. Again, if we rework 
the idea of conversion to represent a process – i.e., an initial choice and a subsequent series of choices – 
rather than a sudden transition from one state of being to another, it may approximate more closely what I 
am aiming for in appealing to “choice narratives” contemporary with Apuleius’ novel.  
22 See the discussion of Hunter 2014a on the Nachleben of Hesiod’s “two roads”. 
23 See, e.g., Plutarch’s Quo modo quis sentiat, Lucian’s Somnium, de Domo, pseudo-Lucian’s Amores, 
Maximus of Tyre’s Oration 18, just to name a few. I will discuss these at greater length below. 
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consider Apuleius’ oeuvre (with particular emphasis on the Metamorphoses) as a choice 
posed to the reader – a choice between virtue and pleasure, between serious and comic, 
between philosophy and satire – then we can claim the support not only of literary history 
but also of philosophical interpretations of literature contemporary to Apuleius. In this 
way, an “open” reading of Apuleius’ oeuvre begins to resemble a Platonic rather than 
Winklerian ἀπορία – a choice over which path one ought to pursue rather than a 
hermeneutic conundrum that reveals just how meaningless everything is. 
I take as the organizing principle of this dissertation one of the defining features 
of a true “philosopher” that Apuleius identifies in the Apologia. At the end of his defense 
speech, when addressing all of the charges against him in an impressive rhetorical 
display, Apuleius summarizes each charge in two words and then responds to each with a 
two-word answer. When he comes to the charge specula inspicis – “you look into 
mirrors” – Apuleius gives his pithy response: philosophus debet – “a philosopher ought 
to” (Apol. 103). Indeed, over the course of the whole Apologia, Apuleius attempts to 
portray himself as participating in a series of venerable philosophical pursuits – rather 
than suspicious activities associated with magic – which his accusers merely 
misunderstand due to their lack of education.24 Gazing into the speculum, a tool of self-
speculation, which can lead to self-knowledge and the acquisition of beautiful virtue, 
becomes the philosophical endeavor par excellence in his defense. It is for this reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 On the underlying magical implications of most of the subsidiary charges in the Apologia, see Hunink 
1997, 21 (et passim): “…many topics appear to be far less innocent and frivolous as they seem at first sight. 
In many cases a link with magic may be observed, although Apuleius takes great pains to deny or ignore 
this…” On Apuleius’ tactic of “Platonizing magic”, see Fletcher 2014, 199-218. 
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that he calls in a whole host of philosophers of ethics and natural science to legitimize his 
ownership and use of a speculum in chapters 15-16 of the Apologia. 
Indeed, the locus of choice in the Apologia is the mirror: whether or not to look 
into a mirror, how one ought to look into a mirror, and what it means to reflect and to 
respond to what is reflected there. As I discuss in the first chapter of the dissertation, 
Apuleius portrays his main accuser, Aemilianus, as one who has failed to read and to 
mirror-gaze, and therefore, as one who has not acquired virtue through the philosophical 
marvel inspired by the speculum. The series of life-choices that led Aemilianus to the 
wrong life all relate to mirroring (and reading). However, what is problematic with the 
speculum more generally is not only whether one chooses to mirror-gaze, but how one 
goes about looking. This device, which Apuleius so innocently portrays as a 
philosophical tool, actually had deeply ambivalent implications in antiquity, being a 
device used by women for erotic adornment and seduction, an implement of magical 
practice and metamorphosis, and only by extension of these first two associations, a 
philosophical tool for self-improvement.25 In literature, the κάτοπτρον (in Greek) or 
speculum (in Latin) proved to have a rich symbolic significance and was thus used to 
describe many phenomena in the ancient world – wine,26 poetry,27 time,28 Homer’s 
Odyssey,29 painting,30 exemplary viewing,31 self-knowledge32, etc.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 On the various symbolic associations of the speculum in antiquity, see McCarty 1989. Cf. the helpful 
taxonomy of Taylor 2008. Both works will be discussed in more detail below. 
26 See Aesch. fr. 393 Radt. 
27 See Pind. Nem. 7.12-7. 
28 See Eur. Hipp. 428-30. 
29 See Alcidamas apud Aristotle Rhet. 3.3. 
30 See the discussion of mimesis in Plato’s Republic 10; cf. Halliwell 2002 for further discussion of the 
comparison. 
31 See Terence’s Adelph. 415-7, on which, see below. 
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From the perspective of a Platonist, on the one hand, the mirror had the potential 
to be dangerous – to trap or ensnare viewers in a kind of distorted illusion that Plato 
likens to consorting with a courtesan33; but on the other hand, even in Platonic discourse, 
the speculum could provide to a viewer self-knowledge or a transcendent experience of 
the forms.34 From a thorough study of the catoptric tradition and Apuleius’ manipulation 
of it, we will see exactly what is at stake in looking into mirrors, and in viewing more 
generally. In the chapters that follow, we will see how the speculum’s polyvalent 
associations make it a perfect literary device to set up and establish a choice for the 
reader: when we look into the various mirrors Apuleius holds up for readers, do we see 
ourselves in them, as Plato’s beloved does in the eyes of his lover, or do we indulge in the 
delusions of a Narcissus or a Hostius Quadra figure? Perhaps most importantly, at a 
fundamental level, the mirror is a device that enables viewers to see sights from which 
they are normally barred. Thus, the speculum is a uniquely apt metaphor for voyeurism – 
arguably, the theme of the Metamorphoses – as it allows whoever looks into it to see the 
one sight to which s/he has not been granted access; in turn, the vanity, self-love, and/or 
delusion that mirror-gazing begets is very often akin to the harmful effects of voyeuristic 
curiosity. After deciphering Apuleius’ manipulation of various mirror traditions in the 
Apologia and in particular, analyzing his engagement with Platonic strands of these 
specular associations, we will turn to the mirroring scenes of the Metamorphoses and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Plato’s Phaedr. 255d3-5. Cf. Bartsch 2006 for an analysis of how the self-knowledge trope plays out 
in Latin literature. 
33 See Rep. 10.603a10-b2. On this passage and Apuleius’ engagement with it in the Apologia, see chapter 2. 
34 We will see versions of this kind of mirroring in chapters 1 and 3, when we analyze the mirror of another 
person’s eyes, as discussed in Alcibiades I and Phaedrus. 
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explore how the readerly experience of specular gazing is similar to and different from 
Lucius’. 
 
The Mirror: Ancient Interpretations and Apuleian Innovations: 
 
The mirror has long provided writers a tool that is good to think with, from the 
earliest discussions of mimesis and poetry in ancient literary criticism35 to 20th century 
theories in psychology, philosophy, and anthropology.36 Archaeological studies have 
uncovered important features of ancient mirrors that may or may not have influenced 
Greek and Roman conceptions of the trope (largely because it is very difficult to recover 
how ancient viewers experienced the objects themselves).37 And in the last 30 years, the 
cultural meanings of the mirror have become of great interest, as evidenced by Shadi 
Bartsch’s list of subject-specific monographs published on the mirror in this time period: 
…the history of catoptrics, mirrors in literature, mirrors in the history of science, 
Etruscan mirrors, the psychology of the mirror, the gendered mirror, mirrors in 
religious mysticism, mirrors in ancient, Neoplatonic, and early Christian 
epistemological theory, and mirrors in the conceptions of the self.38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Three important literary critical moments that will recur throughout the dissertation are: (1) Pindar’s 
claim to offer a ‘mirror of poetry’ to reflect the deeds of an athletic victor (Nem. 7.12-7), (2) the claim 
attributed in Aristotle to the sophist Alcidamas, namely that the Odyssey is ‘a beautiful mirror of human 
life’ (Alcidamas apud Aristotle Rhet. 3.3: Ὀδύσσεια...καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον), and (3) Plato’s 
famous recourse to the mirror in his broader criticism of mimesis in Republic 10. On these seminal 
moments for aesthetic criticism, see Halliwell 2002. 
36 For the different approaches, see the following source works: Psychology, Lacan 1978; Semiotics, Eco 
1986, Anthropology, Frontisi-Ducroux 1995; Philosophy, Rorty 1979. For an historical account, see 
Baltrusaitis 1978. 
37 For the archaeology of ancient mirrors, see de Grummond 1982; de Grummond 2002; Balensiefen 1990; 
and  DePuma 2013. One of the reasons for the difficulty of recovering ancient viewing practices is the fact 
that it is hard to say what kinds of ancient mirrors certain authors would have seen. For my purposes, would 
Apuleius have only seen Roman silver or glass mirrors, or would he have had access to some Etruscan or 
Greek mirrors? De Grummond 2002 seems to suggest some general knowledge of Etruscan mirrors in 1st 
century Rome, as she uses the mythological scenes on them to interpret the famous Villa of the Mysteries. 
But it is difficult to say with what types of mirrors Apuleius, in particular, would have been acquainted. 
38 Bartsch 2010, 327. And her list is not exhaustive, as Bartsch herself admits. She is missing, for instance, 
Moritz Schuller’s 1998 dissertation on mirrors and self-knowledge. 
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So, with this proliferation of treatments of the mirror, one might ask, as Bartsch herself 
does upon listing the various monographs on the mirror,39 where there is room for yet 
another dissertation on the speculum. But, unlike all of the previous treatments of the 
mirror in antiquity, this is not a dissertation about the mirror per se, but rather, about how 
the cultural, literary, and philosophical associations of the mirror are manipulated by one 
author. In fact, the procedure I am undertaking is rather the reverse of other studies. 
Whereas the scholarly treatments of the mirror to which Shadi Bartsch alludes take the 
mirror-as-cultural-symbol as their starting point, and then analyze how its symbolic 
power dictates, to a certain extent, how it gets used as a metaphor in different literary and 
visual texts, or how it represents broad-brush cultural ideologies, my project studies how 
one author used a rich cultural symbol to express philosophical, literary, and ideological 
issues in different genres. Thus, while these studies of the mirror can illuminate the 
symbolic valences and culturally embedded meanings of the mirror with which Apuleius 
may have been acquainted, most of them are only of oblique interest to the present study. 
 I except three seminal studies of the mirror, the main ideas of which it will be 
useful to restate here in order to establish the appropriate background to Apuleius’ 
mirror(ing) scenes. I begin with Willard McCarty’s ‘The Shape of the Mirror: 
Metaphorical Catoptrics’, as it represents the first systematic scholarly attempt to 
“describe a taxonomy of mirroring” and to define “the boundaries of the catoptric 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid.: “One might be excused for wondering where in this specular profusion there might be room for 
another monograph on the ancient mirror…” 
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metaphor” in the canon of ancient literature up to Ovid.40 He opens with a strict division 
of mirror metaphors into two overarching categories – ‘illusory’ and ‘visionary’ – though 
he maintains that many more instances of the metaphor fall in the ‘visionary’ category. 
He then subdivides ‘visionary’ mirroring into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ catoptric 
encounters: in the former, he classifies ‘mystical’ and ‘moral’ mirroring, which amount to 
transcendent encounters with divinity and virtue-exhorting, exemplary mirrors, 
respectively; in the latter category, he labels encounters with the mirror as ‘labyrinthine 
entrapment’, ‘Eros’, ‘catoptro-erotic entrapment’, and ‘amuletic repulsion’. The former 
categories are generally associated with male mirror-users in antiquity, and the latter with 
female. And the capacity for entrapment – whether in a metaphorical labyrinth or in an 
unhealthy erotic situation – is dependent, I would posit, on the fundamentally magical 
associations of the mirror.41  
 Important for my study of Apuleius are two points McCarty makes in passing: 
(1) …a mirror establishes a paradoxical relationship of correspondence and 
opposition between beholder and external things. On the one hand it involves 
him intimately in something not himself, on the other it separates his selfhood 
from himself and thus objectifies it.42 
 
(2) Two properties of the physical device are significant to the metaphor…: its 
responsiveness, mirroring the observer, change for change, in time; and 
objectification, capturing his changeable image in space and thus seeming to 
give it an almost independent being.43 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See McCarty 1989, 162 for the quotations. As McCarty explains, Ovid’s Narcissus is the τέλος of his 
study, though he does not himself deal with the scene in depth. 
41 Cf. Eisler 1966, 99 (quoted in McCarty at p. 173): “die zauberische Anziehungskraft des Spiegelbildes 
auf die Seele eines Wesens”. 
42 McCarty 1989, 165. 
43 McCarty 1989, 169. It should be noted that McCarty uses Apuleius’ laus speculi in the Apologia as one 
of the primary source texts for this point. 
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In regard to point (1), the boundaries of the self and their elasticity are of paramount 
importance for understanding the role of transformation – both within the novel and in 
the reader looking in from the outside – in the Metamorphoses. The reader is left asking 
how Lucius is involved or implicated in the events or actions he sees, whether he 
unwittingly becomes part of what he sees in the mirror, and what the reader’s role is in 
looking into the same mirror(s) as Lucius or looking at the world through Lucius’ eyes. 
This “paradoxical relationship of correspondence and opposition”, I will argue, is one of 
the interactive techniques of the novel, which involves the reader (perhaps against his or 
her will) in an experience of voyeurism. As to point (2), it is precisely the mirror’s ability 
to respond to and/or register change that makes it such a useful metaphor for 
metamorphosis, a point that segues nicely into Taylor’s helpful (if a bit overly 
systematic) taxonomy. 
 In his 2008 monograph on the speculum in Roman art, Rabun Taylor outlines five 
theoretical categories to define precisely ancient conceptions of the mirror: the speculum 
is (1) magical, (2) metamorphic, (3) metaphorical, (4) magnetic, and lastly (5) moral.44 
According to Taylor, all of these categories have positive and negative valences attached 
to them. The mirror is magical (1) in so far as it can both catch and trap souls or provide 
a portal to the dead and a prophetic vision of the future. On the other hand, it is 
metamorphic (2) in both bodily and spiritual senses; the mirror can serve as a catalyst for 
a bodily transformation, as in the case of Actaeon when he gazes into the reflective water 
in Metamorphoses 2.4, or it can represent a spiritual apotheosis. In both cases, it is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See Taylor 2008, 7-8.  
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threshold between two states of being. Contra Eco,45 Taylor argues that, whatever its 
modern associations, the mirror in Greco-Roman folkloric conceptions was notionally 
semiotic because the reflection in a mirror could stand in for the subject and adopt all 
manner of metaphorical (3) and metonymic associations.46 Apuleius certainly understood 
the magnetic and labyrinthine power (4) of the mirror: as we shall see in chapter 3, when 
I discuss Lucius’ encomium of the hair-mirror in Met. 2.9, Lucius becomes obsessed with 
the ‘reflection’ offered by mirror-like hair to the point that he is entirely captivated and 
compelled to eulogize its power. Finally, the moral mirror (5) – the mirror as a teacher, 
which exhorts a viewer toward self-knowledge and virtuous behavior – is one of the 
categories that Apuleius himself adopts from philosophical conceptions of the mirror in 
Apologia 15 – a passage that we will encounter in chapter 1. 
 These categories of the speculum’s symbolic associations will be useful to keep in 
mind as we sift through Apuleius’ various types of mirrors. It should be said, however, 
that Taylor’s strict categories often get blurred when one undertakes a more rigorous 
study of particular passages in the literature. For instance, the mirroring water in 
Byrrhena’s atrium (Met. 2.4) – a scene that will constitute the central study of chapter 2 – 
could be said to manifest all five of the categories almost interchangeably: the water 
shows Lucius-as-Actaeon (metaphorical), entraps him in obsession with magic 
(magnetic), transforms the scene from (among other things) a “Striding Diana” to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Eco 1986, borrowing from Stoic discussions of semiotics, notably elaborated on the ‘semiotics’ of the 
mirror, ultimately concluding that a mirror is not a ‘sign’ but rather a prosthesis that enhances our field of 
vision. 
46 See Taylor 2008, 8: “Anything that is an agent in a phenomenon may eventually become a metaphor of 
it, the sign vehicle of its own function. In essence the Roman mirror becomes, among other things, a 
signifier of metamorphosis – whether it be the banality of blossoming beauty, the pathos of loss, or the 
secret ways of achieving ecstasy in mystery cults”. 
17	  
	  
“Bathing Diana” (metamorphic), brings a still-life statuary scene to life (magical), and 
exhorts Lucius to behave differently through a negative exemplum, or what Alexei 
Zadorojnyi has referred to as “ethical therapy by deterrence”.47 Therefore, while I 
appreciate the heuristic value of a systematic taxonomy, I suspect (1) that some symbolic 
associations are not caught by this catch-all net – e.g., the male-female dichotomy in 
regard to mirror usage – and (2) that more than 2 or even 3 valences of the mirror could 
be at play in most of the scenes that Taylor wants to categorize strictly under one primary 
heading. I am not convinced that it would be useful for me to attempt to develop my own 
strict categorization of specular associations. Such an attempt would undoubtedly require 
a longer exposition and proof than I have room for here, and would inevitably fall prey to 
some of the same criticisms of boundary blurring and over-determinism that I have 
suggested here. 
The final study I would like to single out – and the one to which I am most 
indebted – is Shadi Bartsch’s The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-Knowledge, and the 
Gaze in the Early Roman Empire. Her approach essentially amounts to tracing the 
Nachleben of Greek and early Roman mirror scenes in later Roman literature with a view 
to offering a comparative history of sexuality in the two different ancient societies. 
Insofar as I am also tracing Greek ideas about the mirror in the literature of a 2nd century 
Latin author, one could easily pick out many affinities between Bartsch’s approach and 
my own. In particular, Bartsch’s readings of Roman mirror scenes – e.g., in Ovid and/or 
Seneca – as potentially ironic allusions to foundational Platonic mirroring scenes is in 
line with my own interpretive method; my focus on Apuleius is thus an extension and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Zadorojnyi 2010, 172. 
18	  
	  
amplification of one of the premises Bartsch takes largely for granted – namely, the 
omnipresence of Plato as a cultural authority for philosophical and literary models.48 
However, I diverge from Bartsch’s approach in a number of ways: for instance, I am not 
particularly interested in seeing the mirror strictly as a metaphor for different models of 
sexuality (although, models of sexuality, too, will become important in chapter 3). Thus, 
while I am indebted to Bartsch’s overall argument, my readings of Apuleius are less 
about how the mirroring scenes can be seen as political and cultural matters of identity, 
and more concerned with how they represent interpretations of Plato. That is, rather than 
focusing on the cultural and social history of an object and analyzing how it can offer 
general insight into ancient cultures, I prefer to trace the philosophical history of an idea 
in Apuleius and to see how its reception can help us develop a better interpretive 
framework for Apuleius’ corpus. 
Finally, it should be noted here at the outset that Apuleius’ obsession with the 
mirror has already received a certain amount of attention in the scholarship on specific 
scenes that I will treat in this study. As ownership of a mirror is one of the subsidiary 
charges laid against Apuleius – if we can take his defense in the Apologia to be a 
response to actual charges – he is referred to, at least in passing, in all of the 
aforementioned studies on the mirror, particularly as evidence for the speculum’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 It should be noted that Bartsch depends perhaps too heavily on Plato as a cultural authority in Greece, 
insofar as she takes Platonic ideas about sexuality as representative of Greek ideas about sexuality without 
allowing for any ingenuity or deviance on the part of Plato from Greek normative ideas. Again, as I am not 
attempting to make broadly cultural statements about something so universal as sexuality in this study, but 
rather, studying one author’s appropriations of Platonic ideas – no less, an author who claims to be a 
Platonicus philosophus – my dependence on Plato as a cultural/literary authority is of a different order. 
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association with femininity and magic.49 Most other treatments of the speculum in 
Apuleius briefly allude to his laus speculi from the Apologia to discuss the mirroring 
water in Byrrhena’s atrium in Met. 2.4. Niall Slater, in applying Laura Mulvey’s ‘Gaze’ 
theory from cinema studies to this ekphrasis, argues that the mirror offers a third point of 
view in the power dynamics of the Gaze between Diana and Actaeon in the atrium.50 No 
doubt, one can see the power of vision and the viewer’s control of the gaze as 
fundamental features of a novel about voyeurism. But instead of retrojecting modern 
theoretical models on an ancient text to make it seem cinematic, I am more interested 
seeing how issues of viewing and control can be viewed as aligned with Apuleius’ 
Platonism and more generally, with Platonic concerns about mirror-gazing. Michael 
Paschalis also addresses the mirror in his interpretation of space in the novel – again, like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 For McCarty, Apuleius’ defense proves the relative scarcity of mirror usage in antiquity: “The novelty of 
mirroring and the consequent intensity of its impact are suggested, for example, by the fact that Apuleius, 
in the middle of the second century A.D., felt the need to defend himself against the charge of possessing a 
mirror and to itemize in enthusiastic detail its virtues as a means of self-representation, hence self-
knowledge…His defense is not gratuitous; literary and archaeological evidence confirms that until quite 
late mirrors were conventionally restricted in their use, chiefly to women for erotic or related purposed…” 
(McCarty 1989, 167). Bartsch 2006, 19 only uses Apologia 15 to deduce the fundamental philosophical 
associations of the mirror: “Apuleius’ self-defense was merely a late manifestation of a distinguished 
tradition that united the ethicist and the mirror in the exhortation to virtue”. And though Raybun Taylor 
devotes a solid 3 pages (Taylor 2008, 86-8) to interpreting the mirroring water in Byrrhena’s atrium – very 
much in line with what other scholars have already done (on which, see below) – he also alludes to the 
speculum of the Apologia only in passing and only to show the masculine/feminine and philosophical/erotic 
divides between specular associations: “Among the evidence adduced against Apuleius in his celebrated 
trial for sorcery was the fact that he possessed a mirror. The orator defended his ownership of it by citing, 
among its other defensible uses, the philosophic function propounded by Socrates and its performative 
function as exemplified by Demosthenes…his was a true philosopher’s mirror, he implied – a tool for self-
improvement, but hardly complicit in effeminate self-admiration. No other passage in Roman literature so 
clearly establishes the carefully drawn divide between physiognomic (masculine) and cosmetic (feminine) 
uses of reflection” (Taylor 2008, 23). 
50 See, in particular, Slater 1998, 44: “The reflected image in the water flowing through the Diana-Actaeon 
sculpture reveals the possibility of the third point of view. Without this reflection the group resolves itself 
completely into a set of powerful binary oppositions: male voyeurs (Lucius and Actaeon) and female 
objects (the winged figures as well as Diana), inner scene (Diana and Actaeon) and outer scene (the female 
figures looking down on Lucius), but all pointing forward to a reversal of power in which the female gaze 
of Diana-Isis will dominate. The third viewpoint disrupts this strict economy, postulating an angle of 
observation outside the either/or of domination or subjection.” 
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Slater, in a brief treatment of the issue. In particular, he mentions the mirror of the 
Apologia in applying Lessing’s famous boundaries between the verbal and visual arts to 
Lucius’ ekphrasis of Byrrhena’s atrium.51 I do agree with Paschalis that Lessing offers an 
instructive model for interpreting this scene, as will become clear in my own treatment of 
this ekphrasis in chapter 2. But Paschalis, while espousing Lessing as a theoretical model, 
in fact, ends up saying little more than Winkler in his reading of the scene. That is, for 
Paschalis, this ekphrasis (and the novel in general) is all about the process of 
interpretation. Alluding to the title of Don Fowler’s seminal 1991 essay on ekphrasis – 
‘Narrate and Describe’ – Paschalis explains how the terms of this rhetorical practice have 
changed in Apuleius’ time: “…the game in the Second Sophistic is called ‘Description 
and Interpretation’.”52 My reservation with such an interpretation lies in the fact that, 
while Paschalis claims to offer an aesthetic reading of Apuleius according to the model of 
Lessing, “the game” in Apuleius studies continues to be, as it so often has been, merely 
bolstering Winklerian hermeneutics.53 I hope to use Lessing’s framework in chapter 2 as 
a way of reading Apuleius and not as a veiled theoretical model to restate Winkler’s faux-
“open” reading.  
Yun Lee Too is the only scholar to take Apuleius’ laus speculi on its own terms,54 
claiming that his obsession with the speculum in Apologia 14 may represent an authorial 
response to the inscription of a statue dedicated to Apuleius by the Madaurans:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See esp. Paschalis 2002, 137, on which there will be more discussion in ch. 2. 
52 Paschalis 2002, 134. 
53 A line from Paschalis 2002, 137 may be taken as representative: “It is the person who describes that steps 
in to interpret (his italics) and transform a visual text representing bodies in space into a verbal text 
representing actions in time.” 
54 See Too 1996. 
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[APVLEIO…, PH]ILOSOPHO [PL]ATONICO, [MA]DAVRENSES CIVES 
ORNAMENT[O] SVO D(ECRETO) D(ECVRIONVM) P(ECVNIA) [P(VBLICA)].55  
 
In response to the dedication of this statue, Too claims, Apuleius argues in his Apologia 
that the speculum is a better mimetic device because it allows the subject of the 
representation to retain control over the depiction. Thus, though she gives more space to 
the mirror in Apuleius per se, her analysis amounts to about the same claim that Slater 
makes in his ‘Passion and Petrifaction’, namely, that mirror-gazing can be reduced to a 
game of power. Rather than the power dynamics of viewing and voyeurism in Byrrhena’s 
atrium, Too’s concern is with control over representation, and in particular, how writing 
and mirrors, in Apuleius’ mind, achieve that better than the ‘plastic’ arts. 
 My analysis of the speculum in Apuleius is, no doubt, indebted to all of these 
treatments. The power dynamics of looking is always to a certain extent at play in 
specular scenes from antiquity, and Apuleius is no exception to this. Moreover, an 
author’s or artist’s control over their creation, or mimesis, is a concern of many ancient 
writers, one that can be found even in Plato. In fact, in chapter 2 of this dissertation, I will 
argue that the end of Apologia 14 – in which Apuleius prefers the speculum to other 
modes of representation on the grounds that the latter fix the viewer “in the manner of a 
corpse” (ritu cadaveris) – could be seen as an allusion to the conclusion of the Phaedrus, 
where λόγοι “stand still” and “signify only one and the same thing always” (275d7: ἕν τι 
σηµαίνει µόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί; on which, more below). But to interpret all viewing in the 
novel in terms of power dynamics – though very much in line with the cynical reading of 
the Metamorphoses most popular amongst Apuleianists and with most post-Foucauldian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 On the dedication of this inscription, see Winkler 1985, 277 and Tatum 1979, 105-8. 
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scholarship of the 90’s – is only one way of conceiving of Apuleius’ relationship to the 
mirror and/or his characters’ relationships to one another. As I suggested above, there is 
another way – a more serious way or, at the very least, a less cynical way – of looking at 
Apuleius’ appropriation of this Platonic metaphor. Shortly, I will give a fuller explication 
of my argument that viewing and voyeurism in Metamorphoses can be interpreted as 
what I am labeling a “high-stakes choice” that Apuleius poses to the reader: that is, 
Apuleius gives us a choice between the cynical/pleasurable and the sublime/serious 
modes of viewing (and reading), and we are compelled to decide. But first it will be 
useful to clarify my approach in relation to Apuleius studies more generally. 
 
Methodological Issues: 
 
 As I am analyzing how one particular trope is inherited from cultural, literary, and 
philosophical sources, I will depend on intertextual analysis throughout the dissertation. 
Latin literary studies saw an explosion of scholarly treatments of intertextuality and 
allusion in the late 80’s and 90’s, and “Apuleian studies” has developed its own particular 
brand of intertextuality, which takes reference and allusion to be phenomena that have an 
interpretive purpose unique to Apuleius. Some analyze intertextuality as a form of 
“parody”, such as Ellen Finkelpearl in her Metamorphosis of Language in Apuleius, one 
of the seminal pieces to use intertextuality for the study of this author: Finkelpearl reads 
reference and allusion in Apuleius as an attempt to negotiate a voice for the traditionally 
“low” genre of the novel.56 Others, such as Stephen Harrison, one of the other pioneers of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See Finkelpearl 1998. 
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intertextuality in Apuleius and in Latin studies more generally, employ terms such as 
“self-fashioning” to describe a phenomenon of creating insider readers through learned 
reference. As I discussed above, Harrison interprets all reference and allusion in Apuleius 
as attempts to display παιδεία and showmanship, as was characteristic of the Second 
Sophistic.57 In fact, Harrison, in developing his unique approach to intertextuality, even 
coined a theoretical term – “generic enrichment” – to explain how the phenomenon that 
Finkelpearl identifies in Apuleius works in Latin literature writ large.58 
More recent interventions in Apuleius’ studies, such as those of Luca Graverini 
and Stefan Tilg, have given more nuanced readings of Apuleius’ relationship to the 
purple passages of Greek and (especially) Latin literature. Whereas Finkelpearl’s and 
Harrison’s understanding of Apuleius’ allusive technique tend to reduce it to parody – or 
in the case of Harrison, satiric self-fashioning – champions of the “serio-comic” 
interpretation of the Metamorphoses are willing to grant Apuleius more intellectual 
ingenuity by assuming that there is an interpretive point to his method of allusion beyond 
display and self-representation.59  
Of particular interest to me in this project is how references to Plato fit into the 
intertextuality-and-allusion picture, given that Platonism in Apuleius is usually treated as 
a separate issue. Just as real disciplinary boundaries separate classicists and philosophers 
in general,60 so also is Apuleius’ Platonism often treated differently in different scholarly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See Harrison 2000a; see also Harrison 2013, where he largely reiterates his theory of intertextuality in 
Apuleius. 
58 See Harrison 2007. 
59 See Graverini 2012; Tilg 2014. 
60 An excellent one-liner from John Henderson is illustrative: “Apuleius didn’t know how Classics 
departments would compartmentalize the interface between literature and philosophy” (Henderson 2001, 
189). 
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circles. Scholars of Middle Platonism tend to use Apuleius’ rather dry Platonic handbook, 
de Platone et eius dogmate, and his slightly more literary philosophical lecture, de deo 
Socratis, as source texts to be mined for information about this period of Platonism that is 
generally considered to be rather uninteresting.61 In Middle Platonic studies of Apuleius, 
therefore, literary allusions to Plato in Apuleius’ rhetorical texts (i.e., the Apologia and 
the Florida) and his non-philosophical novel (i.e., the Metamorphoses) are treated much 
the same as the so-called non-philosophical passages of Plato, e.g., in the Phaedrus – that 
is, they are disregarded as unimportant.62 The question is one of doctrine and meaning, 
not of philosophical value or didaxis through literariness. On the other side of the 
disciplinary fence, classicists, I fear, are taking an equally dismissive stance when they 
suggest that Plato is only one of many authors to whom Apuleius alludes in order to 
sprinkle a little intellectual flavoring in for the tastes of his more learned readers. An 
allusion to Plato, as members of the Harrison school of reading would have it, merely 
serves to show off the παιδεία of the author and create a highbrow reference for smart 
readers to recognize. In this vein, Simon Swain describes Apuleius a bit tongue-in-cheek 
in his otherwise harsh review of Harrison’s monograph: 
[Apuleius] was a showman and a playboy, clever but shallow. He deserved to be 
condemned for seducing a rich widow, but had the temerity to ground his claim to 
innocence in the intellectual community between himself and the judge (the 
Apology). His egotism made him publish four books of highlights from his 
display speeches (the Florida). Intellectual vanity made him write a hack account 
of Socrates and his Deity. Finally his talents found a legitimate outlet in a comic 
novel about a man’s life as an ass (the Metamorphoses).63 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See again n. 9 above. 
62 Cf., e.g., Heath 1989 and Werner 2007 for this attitude towards Plato. Anecdotally, I was once asked by 
an ancient philosopher at a social gathering where I thought the Phaedrus began. Needless to say, I felt a 
little sheepish replying that I thought it began at the beginning. When he reiterated that, by his question, he 
meant something more like “where is Plato doing real philosophy?”, I knew that I was at the wrong party. 
63 Swain 2001, 269. 
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Perhaps the one thing that philosophers of Middle Platonism and classicists can agree on 
is the fact that Apuleius is a “hack” philosopher.64 But the enigmatic nature of Socrates 
has long been an authorizing force for other “playboy” philosophers who exhibit a similar 
strangeness and philosophical inconsistency.65 Moreover, analytic philosophers who 
study Plato have long complained of his philosophical “inconsistency”, implying in 
essence that he, too, is a hack philosopher.66 Maybe Apuleius is somewhat higher than 
Plato on the scale of being a hack. But an alternative interpretation of Apuleius’ doctrinal 
inconsistency – one that has been surprisingly absent from most treatments of Apuleius’ 
Platonism – is to say that Apuleius re-enacts a Platonic procedure in sprinkling his texts 
with hermeneutic ambiguity and problematic philosophical references.67 A noteworthy 
exception to this is Richard Fletcher’s recent treatment of Apuleius’ Platonism; but even 
he uses the phrase ‘the impersonation of philosophy’ to describe what amounts to a claim 
similar to Finkelpearl’s negotiation of a voice. That is, Fletcher’s book is more about how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Another line from Swain’s review further demonstrates this sentiment: “Dio Chrysostom is several times 
mentioned by H[arrison] in passing as a comparable ‘philosopher.’ He would turn in his grave” (Swain 
2001, 269). Though, I might respond that Swain is perhaps overstating Chrysostom’s philosophical 
credentials. 
65 See, e.g., Newmark 2012, 15-16, where he claims a Socratic heritage for Friedrich Schlegel’s “playboy”-
philosopher status. 
66 See, e.g., the work of Gregory Vlastos, which may be taken as representative the school of “analytic 
developmentalism”. This school, an offshoot of the Anglo-american analytic philosophical tradition, 
attempts to pick apart Plato’s inconsistencies and map them onto a chronological development of doctrines 
across the dialogues. A claim from Vlastos 1991, 45 will be illustrative: “I have been speaking of a 
‘Socrates’ in Plato. There are two of them. In different segments of Plato’s corpus two philosophers bear 
that name. The individual remains the same. But in different sets of dialogues he pursues philosophies so 
different that they could not have been depicted as cohabiting the same brain throughout unless it had been 
the brain of a schizophrenic. They are so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply with 
one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with Aristotle’s”. 
67 Contra “analytic developmentalism”, there is a continental-philosophical school of interpreting Plato in 
this way – one usually referred to as “literary contextualism” and associated with the work of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (see Gadamer 1980). 
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Apuleius conceived of himself as a Platonist rather than about how his procedure of 
allusion actually represents of a form of Platonism. 
One of the most important contributions of this dissertation, a claim that I hope 
will be borne out through close philological scrutiny, is that these two modes of reference 
in Apuleius – Roman intertextuality and Platonic allusion – which are traditionally 
treated separately due to disciplinary divides, ought to be viewed as related parts of a 
whole system of reference. In the Roman intertextuality camp, scholars use phrases such 
as ‘Ovid serves as a bridge to Vergil’ or ‘Apuleius’ allusions to elegiac poetry are 
mediated through Ovid’ to describe Apuleius’ intertextual relationship to Roman 
literature. In response, I would simply ask: why is Ovid the only bridge and the Roman 
poetic tradition the only literary entity on the other side of the chasm being bridged? 
Considering that Apuleius is a self-proclaimed Platonicus philosophus, my suggestion 
throughout this dissertation is that Plato can very often be seen as a third – and in my 
view, the most important – interlocutor in the genre and allusion dialogue that Apuleius 
has constructed in the Metamorphoses; and moreover, that Plato himself littered his 
dialogues with allusions and references to Homeric and lyric poetry,68 constructing his 
literary-philosophical texts in response to a literary tradition of which he was a 
beneficiary.69 Apuleius, because he is a “Platonist” writing in Latin, is situated in the 
Roman literary tradition. Thus, Ovid, Vergil, and Lucretius, and indeed, the whole Latin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Maximus of Tyre’s Dissertations 18 (to be discussed in more detail in ch. 4) demonstrates that this was a 
well-known way of reading allusion in Platonic dialogues in the Second Sophistic. 
69 A fact that Plato himself acknowledges, albeit begrudgingly, in Republic 10, when he describes the 
process of expelling Homer from the ideal state in terms of a bad break-up (Rep. 10.607e3ff.). In the 
opening of Socrates’ first speech in the Phaedrus as well, Socrates claims to have stolen the content of his 
speech, perhaps from a lyric poet – maybe Sappho or Anacreon – or from some “prose writer” (Phaedr. 
235c3). 
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literary tradition, make up the pillars of a bridge that leads back to Plato. This is not to 
say that Apuleius is some kind of doctrinaire Platonist, hiding the secret truths of Plato in 
learned allusions to Vergil, or something along those lines. Rather, Apuleius’ “talents 
found a legitimate outlet” – to use Swain’s phrase – in reenacting Plato’s stylistic, 
dialogic, and narrative techniques of engaging and incorporating the reader. In that sense, 
Apuleius does something quite similar to Plato in creating a multi-vocal, multi-generic, 
and hermeneutically ambiguous or aporetic text in a “low” conversational genre that 
incorporates many other “high” genres into itself.  
 
Platonism in the Metamorphoses: 
 
Since R. Thibau’s treatment of Platonism in the Metamorphoses,70 which is often 
considered to be an over-reading,71 the theme has received various kinds of treatments in 
the scholarship on the novel. Some, such as Carl Schlam, have merely noted Platonic 
allusions in the Metamorphoses, and extrapolated from them the idea that the novel 
unequivocally deals with Platonic themes at its core.72 In the wake of Winkler’s “open” 
reading of the novel, in turn, the intervention of Joseph DeFilippo provided a very 
welcome challenge to Winklerian ἀπορία by demonstrating a kind of studied use of a 
Plutarchan-inflected Platonism in the Metamorphoses.73 That is, Plutarch’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Thibau 1965. 
71 One may take as representative of Apuleian studies’ response to Thibau Stephen Harrison’s criticism of 
his Platonic reading of the Prologue: “I find the attempt to uncover philosophical significance [in the 
Prologue] by Thibau 1965, 92-101, vague and unconvincing” (Harrison 2000a, 255 n. 211). 
72 See Schlam 1970. We may also categorize Hijmans 1987 in this camp. Dowden 1982 goes a bit further in 
noting structural similarities between the Cupid & Psyche inset tale and moments of ascent and descent in 
Platonic dialogues. 
73 See DeFilippo 1990. Winkle 2014, it could be argued, performs a similar kind of interpretive operation. 
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personification of Plato’s tripartite soul – i.e., in the figure of Typhon in de Iside et 
Osiride – can be viewed as the appropriate intellectual background for Lucius’ 
metamorphosis, the ass being the preferred animal of Seth, who is the enemy of Isis and 
the Egyptian version of Typhon. And since DeFilippo, many scholars have focused on 
broader Platonic themes, particularly in Cupid & Psyche, such as vision.74 Maeve 
O’Brien attempted to bridge the gaps in these approaches in her 2002 monograph, 
Apuleius’ Debt to Plato in the Metamorphoses, by harmonizing rather than challenging 
Winklerian narratology with a Platonic reading. From Apuleius’ philosophical and 
rhetorical works, she developed a framework for discourse analysis – i.e., the Platonic 
theory of “lower” and “higher” discourses – which she then applied to the two parts of 
the Metamorphoses generally considered to be disjointed: books 1-10 are characterized 
by the “lower”, or “sophistic-rhetorical” kind of discourse, whereas book 11 aims at a 
“higher”, philosophical discourse, one in search of truth. 
Since O’Brien, there have been a number of minor contributions to the discussion, 
which tend to follow one of these two already well-trodden paths. In the most recent 
edited volume from the Groningen group, Ulrike Egelhaaf-Gaiser, using a similar 
approach to DeFilippo’s, interpreted Lucius’ baldness at the conclusion of the novel as a 
polyvalent allusion to the bald spectacle of Socrates at the end of the Symposium.75 
Jeffrey Winkle, also in the DeFilippo camp, interprets the opening narrative passage of 
book 1 in light of Plutarchan Middle Platonism.76 Ken Dowden’s contribution to the 
structure of the inset tales, on the other hand, represents what strikes me as an entirely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 I am thinking here primarily of Dowden 1998 and Panayotakis 2001. 
75 See Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012. 
76 Winkle 2014. 
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new methodology, one that is perhaps the closest antecedent to my own general approach 
to Platonism.77 In ‘A Tale of Two Texts: Apuleius’ sermo Milesius and Plato’s 
Symposium’, Dowden suggests, albeit implicitly, that Apuleius may have adopted the 
genre of the novel as a kind of dialogue form – a mode of indirect communication – 
taking his cue from the (possibly spurious) 7th letter of Plato, where Plato claims never to 
have written his thoughts about a matter down.78 Dowden then continues to elucidate how 
the inset narratives in books 1-4 of the Metamorphoses can be viewed as ego-narrative 
speeches similar to the early speeches of the Symposium. In line with Dowden’s structural 
approach to the Metamorphoses is the narratological methodology in the concluding 
chapter of Richard Fletcher’s Apuleius’ Platonism. Fletcher, falling victim to the same 
criticism he lays against of the field of Apuleius studies,79 analyzes what he labels the 
“impersonation of philosophy” in the whole oeuvre of Apuleius, with the Metamorphoses 
as the structural τέλος of his interpretive approach; and in his final chapter, “Narratology 
for Philosophy”, he reframes one of the major critical questions of the Met.’s Prologue – 
namely, who is the quis ille? (which, he translates a bit tendentiously as “who speaks?”) 
– to be merely “a rephrasing of basic issues of impersonation at the heart of philosophical 
writing and identity.”80 That is to say, he later clarifies, 
All Platonism must come to terms with Plato’s ‘creation’ of Socrates in the act of 
writing – his dressing up of philosophy with oratio.81 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Dowden 2006. 
78 See Epist. 7.341c-d. See Dowden 2006, 42-3 for discussion. 
79 See again n. 16 above. 
80 See Fletcher 2014, and particularly 267 for the quotation. 
81 Fletcher 2014, 291. 
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I take these last two interventions in Apuleius studies as jumping-off points for 
my study of the Metamorphoses. For the purposes of the present study, my own variation 
on Fletcher’s assertions amounts to the claim that scholars of Apuleius (and of Plato, for 
that matter) must come to terms with Platonism as a didactic mode of philosophizing 
rather than as a doctrinal system. I do not deny that Apuleius himself may have produced 
doctrinal, Middle Platonic treatises, though the debate about the authenticity of texts such 
as de Mundo and de Platone et eius Dogmate is still ongoing, with scholars leaning in the 
direction of authentic.82 However, pace Fletcher, rather than eschew a teleological 
reading of Apuleius’ corpus – i.e., one that sees the Metamorphoses as the crowning 
achievement of a mature Platonist and the work that all of Apuleius’ other works should 
be put in service of interpreting – I embrace the teleology. I do not consider the 
Metamorphoses to be the immature work of a rash, youthful Apuleius, who later found 
more legitimate outlets and genres for his philosophical pursuits; rather, I believe that 
there is a complex and Platonically inflected didacticism in the Metamorphoses in the 
way it traps, seduces, and corrupts the reader, and then subsequently, unmasks, reveals, 
and criticizes his or her involvement in the text. This is precisely why the mirror is such a 
useful philosophical metaphor to understand the reader’s engagement with Apuleius’ 
novel: as we saw above, the mirror is erotic and labyrinthine – a tool of entrapment and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The most recent treatment of the authenticity debate is the introduction of Fowler 2016. And though 
Harrison 2000a makes a strong case for Apuleian authorship of de Platone, and Fletcher 2014 almost takes 
it as given, Swain 2001 registers his legitimate concerns. See Swain 2001, 270 (on the authenticity of de 
Platone and de Mundo): “The obstacle is the work of Axelson on the use of accentual rhythms in these two 
works, which suggests a date too late for A[puleius]. This is honestly confronted by H[arrison] at pp. 178-
80, who argues that A[puleius] dumbed-down in these scientific works and felt no need to keep to 
Ciceronian rhythms. In one way the works are more interesting if they are not by A[puleius] (as seems on 
balance to be the case), though H[arrison] puts up a stout defence, since they then represent (along with the 
Peri Hermeneias, also attributed to A[puleius]) evidence of Middle Platonism in Latin”. 
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seduction; but it is also a tool that enables the viewer to engage in self-criticism, to see 
beneath the external self to the inner man, and to “look at a man naked, to see what sort 
of a man he is” (Seneca Epist. 76.32: qualis sit, nudum inspice).  
As the critical lens for this study, I am adopting a simple version of reader-
response criticism from a seminal article by Stanley Fish.83 In this piece, the basic 
interpretive question is not “what does the text mean?” or “what is it saying?”; rather, the 
questions are: “what does the text do?” and, “to whom?” The text is not a fixed object; 
the written words are not the λόγοι of Plato’s Phaedrus, which “stand as if living” 
(ἕστηκε µὲν ὡς ζῶντα) but “signify only one same idea always” (ἕν τι σηµαίνει µόνον 
ταὐτὸν ἀεί) when someone asks a question of them.84 But then again, neither is a Platonic 
dialogue, which is Plato’s preferred form, as he explains in the Seventh Letter, because 
real learning happens through conversation and constant question and answer. The 
question “what does the text do?” thus has a diachronic dimension, as the individual 
words, sentences, and chapters unfold over time. In reading dialogue such as the 
Phaedrus, the reader is compelled to adopt positions only to have the firm ground turn 
into quicksand, with the didaxis happening through the diachronic process of 
recalibration in the reader.85 So, too, the hermeneutic games that Jack Winkler so deftly 
uncovered in his magisterial Auctor et Actor happen to the reader over time. Thus, while 
the games for Winkler are about the process of reading and how pleasurable it can be to 
watch bad interpreters fumble their way through a series of events that require good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See Fish 1980, though Surprised by Sin and Self-Consuming Artifacts could also be considered useful 
interpretive models in the same vein. 
84 See Phaedrus 275d4ff. (to be discussed at length in ch. 2). 
85 I am adopting here an interpretation of the Phaedrus offered in Fish’s Self-Consuming Artifacts (Fish 
1972).  
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exegesis, I would posit that the interpretive games are not really games at all, but ways of 
incorporating readers into the world of the novel; that is, of making them sympathize 
with Lucius through shared voyeurism and scopophilia and then forcing them into the 
position of critics at the end of the novel. The narrator tricks us into expecting a 
pleasurable reading experience with the promise of mere divertissement, and then 
suddenly changes the terms of the text with the unforeseen reinterpretation of Isis’ priest, 
Mithras, in book 11. But Plato does much the same, e.g., in the Symposium, when he 
makes the reader into an audience member for a series of increasingly drunken encomia 
to ἔρως that wander (perhaps unexpectedly) into the territory of sublime transcendence, 
only to be rudely interrupted by another drunken rambler.  
In the case of Apuleius, my rather simple answer to Fish’s grandiose question 
about experiential reading is what I suggested in the opening of this introduction, namely 
that Apuleius forces the reader to make a high-stakes choice at the outset about what kind 
of book s/he would like to read and what kind of experience s/he would like to have. 
Winkler’s analogy to the detective novel full of hermeneutic “conundrums” is, I suggest, 
not only anachronistic – being based on a genre entirely unknown to antiquity – but also 
not à propos. A detective novel that answers the question “whodunnit?” at the end only to 
lead the reader to a state of pure ἀπορία upon a second reading would appear very strange 
indeed. In other words, Winkler’s answer to “whodunnit?” seems to amount to “whoever 
you like”, and I know of very few detective stories that end in that kind of hermeneutic 
ambiguity.86 Choice narratives, on the other hand, have many interpretive advantages for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Perhaps Murder on the Orient Express is the only exception, but even there, the answer to the question is 
not really up to the reader. 
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us. Not only are they a regular topos of the literature of antiquity, but they also make 
exegetical allowances for different readers and different reading experiences. By this 
second claim, I mean that the ἀπορία that choice narratives create is not the meaningless 
hermeneutic ambiguity of the 1980’s, in which every interpretation of a text is about 
challenging the act of interpretation; rather, it is a Platonic kind of ἀπορία – or, a 
confusion over which road to take.  
Choices between the pleasurable and the philosophical can be traced all the way 
back to Homer and Hesiod, with Odysseus’ choice to listen to the Sirens’ song and 
Hesiod’s ‘two-roads’ in the Works and Days providing the loci classici in antiquity. 
Hesiod’s passage, in particular, has a rich Nachleben, as Richard Hunter has recently 
shown,87 especially if we consider its relationship to Prodicus’ famous Choice of 
Heracles found in Xenophon.88 In regard to the Nachleben of choice in the Odyssey, we 
may consider Socrates’ reference to the Siren-esque cicadas in the Phaedrus to be itself a 
reworking of Odysseus’ choice; there, Socrates encourages Phaedrus to pick 
philosophical wakefulness over pleasurable listening.89 Moreover, Plato’s discussion 
about the teachability of students in the Seventh Letter – if it is indeed authentic – makes 
learning seem like a matter both of the character of the student and of a choice to undergo 
the rigors (πόνος) of philosophy.90 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See Hunter 2014a, 92-100. 
88 See Xen. Mem. 2.1.21-34. Cf. Hunter 2014a, 270: “As for the Hesiodic paths themselves, it is perhaps 
not without significance that, in Xenophon’s report of Prodicus’ ‘Choice of Heracles’ (Memorabilia 2.1.21-
34), a sophistic epideixis which is clearly an elaboration of Hesiod’s image, as Xenophon indeed suggests 
by citing the Hesiodic verses immediately before Socrates’ report of Prodicus’ work, the lady called 
Virtue…is described as… ‘fair to look upon and free in nature’ (2.1.22)”. 
89 See Phaedr. 258e7ff. 
90 It may be worth pointing out that πόνος is precisely what the lady Ἀρετή promises to Heracles at the 
opening of her speech at Xen. Mem. 2.1.28. 
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In Apuleius’ milieu, choice narratives, both serious and ironic, become an even 
more regularly invoked topos. For instance, Hesiod’s “two roads” passage acquires a new 
life of sorts – e.g., in the works of Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Proclus91 – to such an 
extent that Hunter even suggests Hesiod’s “long and steep and at first rough” path to 
virtue may have been considered by Middle- and Neoplatonists the antecedent to Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave.92 Of particular interest to me, though, is how Plutarch, in his 
Quomodo Quis suos in Virtute Profectus Sentiat, connects Hesiod’s “road to virtue” 
ultimately to a choice over how to read. At 79cff., the narrator speaks of reading as an 
activity for “improving one’s character” (79c8ff.: πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἤθους). Citing 
Simonides, he explains that, just as a bee makes honey from flowers while the rest of the 
world merely enjoys their color or fragrance, some men find and collect a sentiment 
“worthy of seriousness” (τι σπουδῆς ἄξιον) amidst literature that others read only “for the 
sake of pleasure or diversion” (ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα καὶ παιδιᾶς). This dichotomy between 
‘serious’ and ‘pleasurable’ is precisely what is at stake in Apuleius’ text, and many 
scholars have come up with different solutions to the ways in which Apuleius plays with 
the classic utilitas/dulcedo question about the value of literature.93 My contribution to the 
debate is to suggest that it is not one or the other, based on arbitrarily selected pieces of 
evidence, but that Apuleius’ text offers the reader a choice between the two. 
Beyond the serious allusions to Hesiod’s “two roads”, there is a parodic strand of 
choice narratives in the works of some of Apuleius’ contemporaries – one that even turns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 See, e.g., Plutarch Quomodo Quis suos in Virtute Profectus Sentiat 77d-e; How to Study Poetry 36e; 
Proclus’ Scholium, Hesiod, Works and Days 290-92; Dio Chrystostum Orationes 1, for a political 
reworking of Hesiod’s ‘two roads.’ 
92 See Hunter 2014a, 93-6. 
93 See Graverini 2012 for the most sensitive reading. 
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erotic at some points. Lucian’s Somnium, for instance, ironically dramatizes the choice 
between παιδεία and sculpture as life paths, alluding to another kind of “choice of 
Heracles”. But he reverses the terms of the choice, with παιδεία appearing beautifully 
seductive in the manner of vice and with sculpture showing off her calloused hands. In an 
erotic strand of choice narratives, pseudo-Lucian’s Amores humorously dramatizes the 
choice between boy-loving and girl-loving in a bifurcated viewing experience of 
Praxiteles’ famous statue of the Knidian Aphrodite: the girl-loving Charicles looks at the 
statue from the front and responds by showering her with kisses; the boy-loving 
Callicratidas does not see anything particularly seductive about the notoriously erotic 
representation until he views her from behind and chooses to imagine her as a young boy. 
A similar kind of choice between boy-loving and girl-loving occurs in Achilles Tatius’ 
Leucippe & Clitophon, when Clitophon debates with Menelaus about the virtues of 
loving women over men (Leucippe & Clitophon: 2.35-8). Similarly to pseudo-Lucian’s 
Amores, this scene ironically adopts the choice narrative motif, to which many Second 
Sophistic writers allude, but here we encounter the possible philosophical or Platonic 
terms of such a choice. For Menelaus, in explaining why boy-loving is better, resorts to 
the famous dichotomy between “heavenly” and “vulgar” forms of erotic love, which was 
first popularized in Pausanias’ speech in Plato’s Symposium. Moreover, if we combine 
the dichotomy of οὐράνιος and πάνδηµος ἔρως with the aetiology of erotic love that 
Aristophanes gives in the Symposium – namely, that humans cut from the stock of an all-
male original are the best and boldest94 – we get the terms for a correspondence between 
boy-loving as philosophizing and girl-loving as a more appetitive pursuit. Now, I am not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Symp. 192a1-3. 
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suggesting that these erotic choice narratives are strictly serious. Rather, I propose that 
they are ironic appropriations of Plato, which also may have an element of σπουδαῖον 
mixed in with the γελοῖον. 
That Apuleius himself conceived of philosophy as a choice is clear, especially if 
we take Richard Fletcher’s point about the “conversion” of Plato in the biography of de 
Platone being framed in terms of a choice to pursue philosophical rather than pleasurable 
literary pursuits.95 The dichotomy between “heavenly” and “vulgar” love, moreover, has 
already been recognized as one of the guiding principles of Apuleius’ Metamorphoses. 
As E. J. Kenney has observed, the Cupid & Psyche inset narrative dramatizes the 
conversion from the pursuit of πάνδηµος ἔρως to a reoriented desire for οὐράνιος ἔρως96; 
and some scholars even interpret Isis in book 11 as a “heavenly” corrective to the 
“vulgar” love of the early books.97 In chapter 3, I will suggest that Apuleius may be 
engaging with the pseudo-Lucianic choice narrative,98 as his depiction of Photis wavers 
between the boy-loving and girl-loving approaches to viewing the Knidian Aphrodite 
figure. But rather than endorsing the strictly Platonic reading of the Metamorphoses as a 
rewriting of Pausanias’ speech, I suggest that the choices between types of ἔρως and 
modes of viewing are made available to the reader. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 See pp. 7-8 above. 
96 Kenney 1990b. 
97 Krabbe 2003. 
98 The question of the authenticity and dating of the Amores is still open. But some recent critics have even 
suggested that the text is Lucianic (see, e.g., Elsner 2007b). For more discussion, see ch. 3 (p. 202-3 with n. 
429). 
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The Choice Embedded in the Prologue of the Metamorphoses: 
 
By way of introduction to my high-stakes choice model, I would like to focus on 
the opening line of the Prologue and analyze how one vision word – inspicere – 
encourages the reader to choose to take a deeper look into a text that foregrounds 
divertissement. The Prologue opens: 
At ego tibi sermone isto Milesio varias fabulas conseram auresque tuas benivolas 
lepido susurro permulceam, modo si papyrum Aegyptiam argutia Nilotici calami 
inscriptam non spreveris inspicere, figuras fortunasque hominum in alias imagines 
conversas et in se rursum mutuo nexu refectas, ut mireris. exordior. quis ille?  
 
But I will weave variegated tales for you in that Milesian style and I will charm 
your benevolent ears with pleasurable whispering, provided that you do not 
disdain to look into an Egyptian papyrus inscribed with the cleverness of a Nilotic 
reed, in order that you may marvel at figures and fortunes of men transformed into 
other images and turned back into themselves by a mutual knot. I begin my 
prologue. Who is that? 
 
The promise of charm for the ears and of marvelous visions seems to emphasize at the 
outset that this novel aims only to be a pleasurable distraction. Add to this the fact that 
the Prologue famously concludes with the phrase: lector intende; laetaberis (“reader, pay 
attention; you will be delighted”).99 Indeed, Michael Trapp says of the Prologue: 
Whatever other functions it may perform, the Prologue to Apuleius’ 
Metamorphoses strikes a thoroughly hedonistic note, from its fifth word, Milesio 
(‘Milesian’) to its last, laetaberis (‘you will revel in this’).100 
 
And Luca Graverini connects the “pleasurable whispering” (lepidus susurrus) and the 
“charming of the ears” (aures permulcere) to the bucolic topos of a locus amoenus and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Freudenburg 2007, 245 has even suggested (albeit implicitly) a word play here: if one flips the words 
lector and intende, one gets inten-de-lector, which Freudenburg then connects to Lucius, who describes 
himself as “taking pleasure” – delector – in Byrrhena’s atrium. I will return to this point in ch. 2. 
100 Trapp 2001, 39. 
38	  
	  
the age-old literary critical debate about the “utility” and “pleasure” associated with 
literature. Apuleus’ Prologue, he concludes, 
…offers us a ‘sweet’ and psychagogic kind of literature, apparently unconcerned 
with anything utile, and able to entice its reader with an almost magical and 
possibly dangerous power…101 
 
In fact, Graverini even connects the susurrus of the Prologue to the cicada song of 
Phaedrus 258e, which, I suggested above, represents a reworking of an Odyssean choice 
narrative. But unlike Socrates and Phaedrus, who choose philosophical dialogue over the 
pleasurable Siren song of the cicadas, Apuleius’ narrator appears to promote a decidedly 
inutile kind of poetics; or to phrase it differently, he seems, at least prima facie, only to 
offer one road to his reader, the pleasurable. 
However, if we look more closely at inspicere and its context, this whole 
assessment of the text begins to appear rather one-sided. It is indeed true that the horizon 
of expectation the Prologue establishes is reading for divertissement. But this type of 
looking that the text requests in a seemingly modest proviso clause is, in fact, a 
philosophical type of inspection unlike the strictly erotic and dangerously enchanting 
viewing we shall see Lucius enjoying throughout the novel. Maaike Zimmerman rightly 
elucidates the strangeness of this word when she notes: 
Remarkably, when the reader is asked not to decline to examine this papyrus, the 
verb inspicere is used…In his Apology…Apuleius uses inspicere frequently, 
always with the connotation of scholarly enquiry, close scrutiny, and 
philosophical curiosity. For even when Apuleius talks about inspicere in 
speculum (‘looking into a mirror’), he presents looking into a mirror as an 
eminently philosophical occupation. As actual readers we too are invited to carry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Graverini 2012, 25. 
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on our careful examination of the text of the Metamorphoses, reflecting on what 
we see reflected there.102 
When we, furthermore, consider what it is that we are asked to “look into” – “an 
Egyptian papyrus inscribed with the wit of a Nilotic reed” – we can see a further 
invitation to something more “serious”. Many commentators have noticed an allusion to 
the end of Plato’s Phaedrus in the collocation of Egypt – the home of writing –, the self-
conscious emphasis on the written-ness of this text, and the Nilotic calamus, an 
instrument that also appears in the same Platonic scene.103 However, if we are being 
asked to ‘look into’ a Phaedran kind of text – with λόγοι that are “sown” (σπείρειν)104 
only “for the sake of pleasure” (παιδιή) –, then why does the narrator request a more 
philosophical type of looking? 
 To address this question, it will be illustrative to consider three famous moments 
from Latin literature in which this philosophical type of “looking” (inspicere) is 
employed (two of them involve mirrors) and with which Apuleius would have been well 
acquainted.105 The earliest is a passage from Terence’s Adelphoi, in which the stern father 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Zimmerman 2001, 255. 
103 See Trapp 2001, who was the first person to draw out the allusion clearly. Though it should be said that 
for Trapp, “the Plato of the Phaedrus is here invoked not as an ally but as an adversary” (Trapp 2001, 41). 
Kirichenko 2008 falls into this same camp for the most part. I cannot say that I entirely agree with Trapp’s 
claim, as it seems to oversimplify the original Platonic moment into a kind of doctrinal statement against 
writing. In response, I would suggest that this moment of the Phaedrus is the final rug being pulled out 
from under the reader, as the experience of the whole preceding written dialogue was both pleasurable and 
didactic for the reader. 
104 On conserere as a translation of Plato’s σπείρειν, see Thibau 1965 and Dowden 2006. Separately, I am 
in the process of publishing a paper on the polysemy of the first two verbs – permulcere and conserere – 
both of which have dual meanings alluding to “pleasurable” and “serious” literature. 
105 Hunter 2014b demonstrates that a passage from de deo Socratis alludes to the Horace’s passage. May 
2006 convincingly shows that Apuleius had a thorough knowledge of comedy in general and of Terence’s 
Adelphoi in particular. While it is difficult to say for certain whether Apuleius had knowledge of Senecan 
texts, I propose that one could make a case that he did know de Clementia if one compares its preface to the 
introductory passage of book 2 of de Platone (2.1.1-5): Moralis philosophiae caput est, Faustine fili, ut 
scias quibus ad beatam vitam perveniri rationibus possit. Verum ut beatitudinem bonorum fine ante alia 
contingere putes, ostendam quae de hoc Plato senserit. 
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figure, Demea, exhorts his son to “look into” the mirror of other men’s lives to see 
exemplary behavior (Adelphoi 415-7):       
         denique      
 inspicere tamquam in speculum in vitas omnium      
 iubeo, atque ex aliis sumere exemplum sibi. 
 
Finally, I bid him to look into the lives of all men as if into a mirror and to 
take an example for himself from others. 
 
From this, Demea explains, one can learn what one should do (hoc facito), what one 
should flee (fugito), what is praiseworthy (laudi), and what is considered vice (hoc vitio 
datur). This method of catoptric inspection of others’ lives becomes, in turn, an 
authorizing force for exemplarity in Roman historiography and biography, wherein the 
text becomes the life, fusing together with it to provide a prosthetic mirror to the 
reader.106 Moreover, this speculum represents a version of what Rabun Taylor calls 
triangulative mirroring, according to which a viewer measures himself against a third 
party in respect to virtues and vices rather than contemplating his or her own faults in the 
reflexive mirror.107 We shall return to this passage in chapter 1, where I will trace a 
tradition I label the ‘Socratic didactic speculum’. But, it is worth noting at this point that 
the kind of viewing Demea demands here – inspicere – is a catoptric self-contemplation 
aimed toward the cultivation of virtue – that is, to a serious purpose. 
 In between this exemplary self-inspection and another well-known text-speculum – 
Seneca’s famous mirror for princes – lies a passage from Horace’s ‘other Ars Poetica,’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 On this passage in connection with Roman exemplarity, see Mayer 1991, 145. On the mirror as a 
didactic prosthesis, see Eco 1986. 
107 See Taylor 2008, 20-1 (to be discussed in ch. 1). 
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Epistles 1.2108; in it, Horace recounts how he has spent his otium re-reading Homer 
because “he tells us what is beautiful, what is foul, what is helpful and what is not” 
(Epist. 1.2.3: qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non…). In a treatment of 
exemplarity similar to Terence’s triangulative mirror of men’s lives, Homer is framed as 
a moral teacher with a certain utilitas. The Odyssey, in turn, is held up to be a teaching 
text in a tradition of allegorizing interpretation that can be traced back to a famous 
fragment from Alcidamas, where he describes the Odyssey as “a beautiful mirror of 
human life” (see n. 34 above: Ὀδύσσεια...καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον).109 When 
Horace comes to the figure of Odysseus, he explains (lines 17-20): 
 Rursus, quid virtus et quid sapientia possit, 
 utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen, 
 qui domitor Troiae multorum providus urbes 
 et mores hominum inspexit… 
 
Again, as to what power virtue and wisdom possess, Homer has set before us a 
useful model in Ulysses, the conqueror of Troy, who looked with prudence upon 
the cities and customs of many men… 
 
In the context of reading, therefore, Homer places before (proponere) the reader’s eyes a 
“useful exemplary figure” (utile exemplar), who “providently looked into” 
(providus…inspexit) cities and customs. In passing, we should note here that Horace may 
also be working in the same tradition of exemplarity that Cicero alludes to in the Pro 
Archia (Pro Arch. 14, to be discussed more fully in ch. 1), which is itself engaged with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 For the phrase, see the title of Hunter 2014b. 
109 Though I know of no one who has suggested a intertextual connection between Horace’s passage and 
Alcidamas’ fragment yet, Hunter 2014b, 33-5 connects these lines from Horace to a passage from 
Apuleius’ de deo Socratis, which refers to Homer – and more specifically, Odysseus the character – as a 
mirror of discernment (DDS 177-8). In chapter 1, I argue that Apuleius’ use of Homer as a didactic mirror 
in this passage certainly alludes to the tradition of Alcidamas’ Odyssey-mirror. Thus, whether or not Horace 
is actually alluding to Alcidamas, we can say that Apuleius put the passages together in his later moralizing 
interpretation of Odysseus as a didactic model. 
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Terence’s mirror of imitation and deterrence. There, Cicero expounds upon the beautiful 
imagines left behind by Greek and Roman authors, which he holds in front of his face 
(proponere) to guide him in his administration of the republic.110 In Horace’s encomium 
of Homer from the Epistles, too, Odysseus becomes an imago (here, exemplar) that 
interacts with the reader in the same dialogic, triangulative mirror-text that we will 
encounter many times. Essential to my point here is how “loaded” this term inspicere is 
as a translation of Homer’s ἴδεν (Od. 1.3), especially when we compare it to Horace’s 
other translation of the same word at Ars Poetica 142 (vidit).111 This makes good sense in 
Epistles 1.2, where Homer is framed as the fountainhead of philosophical learning and as 
a teacher greater than Chrysippus and Crantor: in order to make Odysseus into a 
philosophical journeyman, Horace must, in a sense, enhance the verb of ‘seeing.’ 
Homer’s utilitas as a textual mirror for life becomes, in turn, inextricably connected to 
the display of the philosophical exemplar he puts before our eyes.112 But in Apuleius’ 
Odyssey-esque Metamorphoses, in which Lucius (among other characters) is obsessed 
with seeing, the “scrupulous reader” (lector scrupulosus) outside of the text is asked by 
the Prologue-narrator to employ a more philosophical type of viewing than the characters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 quam multas nobis imagines non solum ad intuendum verum etiam ad imitandum fortissimorum 
virorum expressas scriptores et Graeci et Latini reliquerunt! quas ego mihi semper in administranda re 
publica proponens animum et mentem meam ipsa cogitatione hominum excellentium conformabam (“How 
many imagines of the strongest men carved for our benefit did the Greek and Latin writers leave behind- 
for us not only to gaze upon them but also to imitate them! Which, placing them before myself always as I 
administer the affairs of the Republic, I molded my soul and mind by the very cogitation of excellent 
men”). 
111 See Hunter 2014b, 34 n. 2 and Moles 1985, 35, both of whom bring up the philosophical implications of 
inspicere and providus. 
112 Hunter 2014b, in explicating the tradition of moralizing allegorization of Homer, connects this passage 
to Apuleius’ description of the exemplary character of Odysseus in the de deo Socratis. Just as here 
Odysseus “providently looks into” the cities and customs of men, in the Apuleius passage, Homer “teaches 
us with the character of Odysseus” (177-8) about how to keep prudentia and sapientia as companions 
through the journey. Indeed, this passage in the DDS appears just after Apuleius invokes the trope from 
Alcidamas that the “Odyssey is a beautiful mirror for life”. 
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within the text. While Horace’s Odysseus “looks into” (inspicere) cities and customs and 
by doing so, shows readers an exemplary model of philosophical investigation, the reader 
of the Metamorphoses sees Lucius employing a non-philosophical or pleasurable kind of 
viewing (adspicere) and is asked to do his or her own philosophical discernment.113 
 The final instance of inspicere that will be instructive for our interpretation of 
Apuleius’ Prologue comes from one of Seneca’s most well-known passages, the preface 
to his de Clementia, in which he claims to hold up a speculum into which Nero can gaze. 
The treatise opens: 
Scribere de clementia, Nero Caesar, institui, ut quodam modo speculi vice fungerer 
et te tibi ostenderem perventurum ad voluptatem maximam omnium. 
I decided to write about clemency, Nero Caesar, in order that I might function in 
some way like a mirror and reveal you to yourself, (showing) that you will come to 
the greatest pleasure of all (people/pleasures). 
 
Much has been written about this passage and the way in which it represents a brilliant 
approach for an inferior adopting a didactic position vis-à-vis an emperor114; and much 
could be said about the strangeness of this particular formulation, with the mirror-text 
substituted for the narrator’s voice. For the purposes of this introduction, it is not 
necessary to get into details, and I will thus postpone extensive discussion of it until 
chapter 1. But an important feature to note here is the line that follows this famous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 On the differences between these types of viewing – between inspicere and adspicere – see the 
introduction of ch. 4, where I offer a more detailed analysis. 
114 See, e.g., Braund 2009, 154 ad loc.: “The image of the mirror is a commonplace which goes back to at 
least Plato…But Seneca’s use of it in this context is ingenious. It allows him to avoid the inherent difficulty 
of giving advice to an emperor - a difficulty recognized by Plutarch in Ad Principem Ineruditum at Mor. 
779e and one which was always likely to be a problem for Seneca, as the teacher of Nero…- by appearing 
to praise Nero through simply acting as his mirror.” For an excellent general discussion of this passage, see 
also Ker 2009. 
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opening, where the narrator expounds upon the benefits of looking into this text-
speculum: 
iuvat inspicere et circumire bonam conscientiam… immittere oculos in hanc 
immensam multitudinem discordem… loqui secum 
   
…It is pleasing to look into and inspect a good conscience, to cast one’s eyes on 
the discordant multitude…and to dialogue with oneself… 
 
The text-speculum for Nero is framed simultaneously as a tool (1) to see deep within the 
conscience – though it is unclear whether it is his own conscientia or the people’s –, (2) 
to look upon the multitudo (i.e., to know people outside himself), and (3) to speak as if in 
dialogue with himself (loqui secum). That is, the text somehow gives Nero the kind of 
catoptric encounter we will see Plato advocate in the Alcibiades I – knowing oneself 
through dialectic with an other – but it does so through objectifying the self into the 
interlocutor and paradoxically revealing a comprehensive knowledge of both self and 
other. But it only works if Nero “looks into” it, with the inspicere-type of viewing once 
again representing a deeply philosophical (albeit pleasurable) procedure. 
 We shall return to the opening of the Met.’s Prologue in chapter 4 in order to flesh 
out more fully how the whole sentence alludes obliquely to the text-mirror tradition and 
sets up an embedded choice for reading the rest of the novel. With a more thorough 
philological study of all the verbs from the -spicere family that appear in Apuleius (i.e., 
despicere, aspicere, inspicere), I suggest that inspicere represents the most philosophical 
and Platonic type of viewing, that is, the kind of transcendent theoretic viewing that 
happens in sublime moments of ascent in the dialogues.115 One may compare inspicere, in 
particular, to the mode of superficial viewing we shall see Lucius engage in throughout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 On Platonic viewing in general, see the excellent monograph of Nightingale 2004. 
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the novel, “gazing upon” (adspicere) the superficial and surface level features of reality 
and conceiving erotic and narrative desire. That is Lucius’ psychological state at the 
opening of book two, where he indulges his curious desire to look at (aspicere) 
everything; and that is how Lucius-auctor encourages us readers to look at the mirroring 
water in Byrrhena’s atrium (pronus aspexeris) in order to see the narrative of a bathing 
goddess played out before our eyes. But at the outset of the novel, in a passage that seems 
to foreground its own charm and dulcedo, the narrator asks us to take a deeper look at 
λόγοι, which may be sown playfully like the seeds of knowledge in the Phaedrus. While 
these speeches have their own Siren-cicada charm, they nevertheless demand an acute 
and “wakeful” reader to pierce through the pleasurable words. By putting such a 
philosophically inflected word in a passage about divertissement, Apuleius gives us a 
choice between the “pleasurable” and “serious” modes of reading. 
 
Chapter Structure: 
	  
In chapter 1, I open with a reading of Apology 15-16, the section where Apuleius 
appeals to philosophical models to legitimize his mirror usage. Here I argue that 
Apuleius’ defense of the philosophical benefits of mirror-gazing represents a choice for 
the reader between two distinct intellectual traditions on the mirror: (1) a Platonic 
catoptric tradition, which likens the process of dialectic to seeing oneself in the mirroring 
soul of another and acquiring self-knowledge, and (2) a separate, pseudo-philosophical 
tradition, which encourages mirror-gazing as an incitement to virtuous behavior and 
which curiously (and most likely, spuriously) claims Socrates as its founder. The former, 
46	  
	  
Platonic tradition is primarily introspective insofar as it encourages the viewer/user to 
look beneath the surface features of a person (or of oneself) and to find the soul beneath; 
the latter, Socratic didactic speculum, which teaches both ugly and beautiful people to act 
virtuously in order to compensate for or live up to their external appearance, represents 
what I label the extraspective mirror – a tool for the cultivation of external virtue, which 
has material and social advantages. In presenting the two traditions as if they are 
interchangeable, Apuleius offers the reader/audience a choice between ways of 
cultivating and displaying the self, and portrays his opponent, Aemilianus, as someone 
who has failed to gaze into the mirror and thus failed to choose the philosophical life. 
  Chapter 2 turns to the much-discussed ekphrasis of Byrrhena’s atrium, which I 
analyze in relation to aesthetic ideas developed in Apuleius’ Apology. That is, Apuleius’ 
defense speech introduces well-known Platonic questions about the problems associated 
with representation and the affective influence it has over a viewer/listener. The 
mirroring water of Byrrhena’s atrium, in turn, brings these representational problems to 
life in narrative form, posing an inherently Platonic choice to readers as to how they will 
engage with this text. For this chapter, I will depend on a version of Lessing’s famous 
division between the ‘plastic arts’ and poetry in his Laokoon: the ‘plastic’ arts can only 
represent “bodies in space”, whereas poetry (and words in general) are able to depict 
“actions in time”. The laus speculi of Apologia 14 clearly positions the speculum in the 
liminal space between the boundaries of these two separate arts, being a visual tool that 
can both represent “bodies in space” and “actions in time”. Taking this framework, I turn 
to Byrrhena’s atrium, where I demonstrate that Lucius’ (and the reader’s) position over 
the mirroring water not only alludes to Ovid’s Narcissus and Actaeon scenes, but 
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simultaneously engages with important Platonic questions about mimesis and the 
narrative and erotic desire it inspires in the viewer/listener. Apuleius’ Actaeon, being 
both a combination of different Ovidian mirror-gazers and a thematic double of Lucius at 
the end, is simultaneously a Platonic joke on Lucius and a warning to the reader about 
indulging in the same fantasy. Though Lucius fails to make the right choice in response 
to his pleasurable gazing in the mirror, the reader is nonetheless encouraged to question 
his or her own attachment to the voyeuristic pleasure that this novel offers in its 
presentation of illicit or otherwise inaccessible sights. As the reader looks into the 
mirroring water together with Lucius, the text presents a choice, particularly to the 
retrospective reader, about how he or she wants to read this novel: as a co-voyeur with 
Lucius or as a critic and philosophical initiate. 
The third chapter explores a similar engagement with Plato, in which a Platonic 
scene of idealized, erotic mirroring is reinterpreted through a Roman poetic and Second 
Sophistic tradition of reading Plato. In Metamorphoses 2.9, at the opening of his tryst 
with Photis, Lucius looks at her from behind as she seductively dances, and he eulogizes 
her hair for its catoptric quality. This scene of erotic visualization of the beloved, I 
suggest, alludes (albeit ironically) to a very famous scene of transcendent mirroring from 
Plato’s Phaedrus. There, at the apex of the myth of the soul, the beloved looks into the 
eyes of the lover, and “does not realize that he is seeing himself as if in a mirror”. At this 
moment, the issues at the heart of the Phaedrus – self-knowledge, the hybrid nature of 
the soul, the psychagogic power of rhetoric – are resolved at least temporarily in a 
moment of inter-subjective reflection. Plato’s account of the sublime heights of erotic 
mirroring had a rich afterlife in antiquity, inspiring many alternative accounts of 
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mirroring erotic desire, and Ovid’s Narcissus and Seneca’s Hostius Quadra episodes 
represent only two of many moments in literary history that allude to Plato’s ideal. 
Apuleius’ hair-mirror takes the allusion to this well-known Platonic reference point one 
step further by turning the beloved around. That is to say, the interaction Lucius has with 
the transcendent mirror is mediated not through the eyes – the Platonic windows to the 
soul – but through the hair. In my view, though, the refracted allusion to Plato is not an 
empty hermeneutic game, where we watch a bad interpreter of Plato fumble around while 
we take pleasure in the spectacle. Rather, the complication of the Platonic model invites 
us to make a choice between models of love – the idealized Platonic Eros or the Roman 
ironized interpretation of it. That is, Lucius’ hermeneutic dilemma leaves us poised 
between utilitarian and aesthetic modes of appreciating beauty, and through the dilemma, 
we readers are given a chance to reassess our own erotic desires and to reconsider how 
we approach love. 
This engagement with Plato could also be seen as a different kind of choice 
narrative, especially when we consider a possible intertextual relationship with pseudo-
Lucian’s Amores. As I mentioned above, in that text, there is a choice between boy-
loving and girl-loving. The crux of the narrative happens when two viewers of opposite 
sexual preferences walk around Praxiteles’ statue of Knidian Aphrodite and respond 
differently to different parts of the goddess’ body: the boy-lover is excited by Aphrodites’ 
boyish backside, and the girl-lover takes his pleasure from her front. The hair-mirror in 
Met. 2.9 – which I label the Haarspiegel for the sake of convenience – is almost 
immediately succeeded by a rather obvious reference to the Knidian Aphrodite pose: in 
Met. 2.17, Photis strips off her clothes, lets her hair down, and “is transformed into the 
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guise of Venus who comes up from the waves of the sea, even covering over her smooth-
shaven pubes for a short time, intentionally shadowing it rather than hiding it out of 
modesty” (in speciem Veneris quae marinos fluctus subit pulchre reformata, paulisper 
etiam glabellum feminal rosea palmula potius obumbrans de industria quam tegens 
verecundia). But before the Haarspiegel, in sections 2.7-8, Lucius lustfully gazes upon 
Photis’ backside, and imagines himself to be the ideal Platonic, homoerotic viewer. Thus, 
just as in pseudo-Lucian’s Amores, the choice for Lucius is between two types of erotic 
love and two types of viewing. Viewing the Knidian Photis through Lucius’ eyes, the 
reader is invited to participate in and simultaneously question Lucius’ own delusional 
Platonic theorizing. 
In the fourth and final chapter, I will return to the opening of the Prologue and 
demonstrate how it establishes what I call an “embedded choice” particularly for the 
retrospective reader. One of the ways it does this is through a subtle allusion to the 
conclusion of Plato’s Symposium, where Alcibiades eulogizes Socrates in two “images”: 
Socrates is like (1) a Silenic statue, which, when one opens it up, reveals “statues of 
gods”, and (2) Marsyas the Satyr, who competed with Apollo in charming his listeners. I 
will suggest, moreover, that already in Plato’s eulogy of Socrates, the readers (and 
listeners at the symposium) are invited to an embedded choice between models of erotic 
desire, that is, between the sublime and transcendent ἔρως of Diotima, and the love of the 
“serio-comic” spectacle of Socrates. Thus, Apuleius’ allusion to this moment at the 
beginning (and for that matter, the end) of the Metamorphoses similarly invites readers to 
contemplate the options, and to feel a similar confusion over which interpretive road to 
take.
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CHAPTER 1: The Didactic Mirror of the Apologia 
 
In the whirlwind rhetorical conclusion of Apuleius’ defense speech (Apol. 103), 
Apuleius sets himself the task of summarizing and responding to each of the subsidiary 
charges in a series of laconic phrases. After having delivered a marathon defense speech 
that would rival any congressional filibuster, he reduces the charges to “shiny teeth” 
(spendidas dentes), “looking into mirrors” (specula inspicis), “making verses” (versus 
facis), “exploring fish” (pisces exploras), “consecrating wood” (lignum consecras), and 
“taking a wife” (uxorem ducis).116 To each of these subsidiary charges, he offers a two-
word answer; and to the charge that he looks into mirrors, Apuleius responds: debet 
philosophus. Though the accusation clearly hinges on the mirror’s association with 
effeminate behavior in men and is intended to portray the accused as a magic-performing 
dandy,117 Apuleius rhetorically manipulates the situation by explaining that mirror 
speculation constitutes a sine qua non of philosophical activity — one authorized by 
previous exemplars. But how can Apuleius conclude that a philosopher “should” look 
into a mirror? Or perhaps we should ask, why is mirror-gazing one of the necessary 
activities that defines the philosophical life? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 On the powerful rhetorical display of this two-word summarization of and response to the charges, see 
Hunink 1997, 248 ad loc. 103.2: “the defense reaches its climax with a series of triumphant 
exclamations…Apuleius clearly takes pride in his ability to need only two words for every charge or 
response. This piece of verbal skill, which reads like an oratorical exercise or an impressive improvisation, 
illustrates yet again his great proficiency as a speaker and a verbal artist. Furthermore, it is in accordance 
with the practical rule given by Cic. Orat. 226…” 
117 See the discussion that opens Apologia 13-16 in Hunink 1997, 58: “Apart from magic and luxury, there 
is also a strong link with erotic purposes: mirrors were a common attribute of Venus and their use was 
conventionally restricted to women for erotic or related purposes…Use by men was often condemned, 
since it implied effeminacy…” 
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 The Apologia constitutes the clearest starting point for my investigation into what 
I am calling “high-stakes choice” narratives not only because the genre of philosophical 
apologies was inaugurated by Plato’s Apology for Socrates — a text that attempts to 
make Athenian readers retroactively rethink a choice they had already made — but also 
because the requirements of the genre already establish a choice for the audience. That is 
to say, Apuleius puts the reader or listener in the position of the judge, transforming the 
external audience into another Claudius Maximus, the judge of the trial whom Apuleius 
flatteringly presents as a true philosopher. Readers/listeners are given a choice, in turn, 
between the prosecution’s version of the story and Apuleius’, and between two models of 
life, the philosophical and the non-philosophical.118 As we shall see, nowhere in this 
rhetorical masterpiece is this choice more apparent than in Apuleius’ encomium of the 
mirror, where he represents mirror usage as an eminently philosophical activity. Indeed, 
towards the end of the laus speculi, when the speaker transitions from a eulogy of the 
mirror to an invective against Aemilianus, the prosecutor, Apuleius even translates 
phrases and tropes from Plato’s Apology in an effort to align the listener’s high-stakes 
choice with a notorious choice where the audience had taken the wrong path. 
 In what follows, I argue that the second half of the laus speculi, which appeals to 
moral and natural philosophy as authorizing forces for legitimate mirror usage, conflates 
two alternative intellectual traditions of specular viewing: a Platonic tradition derived 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Of this “performative gesture”, Fletcher 2014, 177 says: “In both Apologia and Florida, Apuleius’ role 
as philosopher-speaker is confirmed by his separation from the activities of his prosecutors in the former 
and affiliation with his audience in the latter. By adopting this manner of defense in his speech, Apuleius 
states that he is ‘justifying philosophy before the ignorant and proving myself’ (purgandae apud imperitos 
philosophiae et probandi mei, Apol. 1.3). Besides, the flip side of this is that by expressing his own 
situation as a philosopher on trial, Apuleius can build the best possible defense of philosophy from his own 
situation”. 
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from texts such as Alcibiades I, Phaedrus, and Apology,119 and another catoptric tradition 
that utilizes the metamorphic associations of the speculum to frame the acquisition of 
virtue in terms of external adornment. One fascinating feature of this process of reception 
is the fact that this latter strand of philosophical catoptrics, though distinctly anti-Platonic 
in its conceptualization of virtue, claims Socrates as its ancestor.120 That is, there is a 
spurious story, popularized in the Imperial Era and the Second Sophistic, that Socrates 
advocated catoptric speculation to his disciples: a beautiful person should gaze into a 
mirror in order to cultivate virtuous behaviors that correspond to his or her external 
appearance, whereas an ugly person ought to recognize his or her own grotesque aspect 
in the mirror and learn to compensate for it with beautiful customs. If the former Platonic 
tradition represents an introspective procedure – one akin to the deeper “looking” 
(inspicere) discussed in the introduction – the Socratic didactic speculum is concerned 
rather with external appearances and behavioral transformation, for which reason I am 
coining a new umbrella term for it, the extraspective mirror. By combining the two 
ethical-philosophical traditions in his laus speculi, Apuleius offers two choices to his 
readers/listeners: (1) should one follow Apuleius, a well-educated philosopher-
rhetorician, in looking into a speculum, or should one avoid specular reflection, as 
Apuleius’ grotesque and mean accuser, Aemilianus, did?, and (2) if one chooses to follow 
Apuleius, then what kind of viewing should one utilize in mirror-gazing – introspective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See Zadorojnyi 2010 for a good treatment of the relationship between Plutarch’s teaching-mirror and 
Plato’s. See Bartsch 2006 on the influence of the Platonic self-knowledge tradition on later treatments of 
the mirror. Cf. also McCarty 1989, 168: “Exemplary mirroring as a whole is based on this Socratic notion 
that individuation is a process of self-discovery”. 
120 For those that cite Socrates as the progenitor to this tradition – either naming him explicitly or indirectly 
alluding to the γνῶθι σεαυτόν tradition, of which Plato’s Socrates was a notorious proponent – see Seneca 
Nat. Quaest. 1.17.4, Plutarch Mor. 141dff., Apuleius Apol. 15, Diogenes Laertius Vit. Phil. 2.33, and 
Phaedrus 3.8 (all to be discussed below, save Phaedrus). 
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viewing aimed at self-knowledge, which strips away external features such as physical 
beauty and social circumstance, or extraspective speculation, which advocates an ethical, 
behavioral metamorphosis for political or social benefits?  
 Fundamentally at stake in this choice, as is the case in many scenes of catoptrics 
in antiquity, is how one chooses to define the self.121 In the Alcibiades I – a text which 
acquired the status of an introductory textbook for a student first learning Plato in 
antiquity122 – Socrates defines the self radically as the soul and advocates the 
introspective approach to mirroring.123 As this dialogue represents an attempt at 
philosophical education through the mirror, moreover, Alcibiades’ recognition of his own 
soul in the mirroring eyes of another offers him an opportunity to choose a different life 
path from the pursuit of social and political success. In his appropriation of the teaching-
mirror in Apologia 15-16, Apuleius employs the same Platonic terms and concepts (e.g., 
self-knowledge and the Delphic maxim, transcendent encounters through mirroring 
phenomena, philosophical marvel and its pedagogical effect), but leaves open the 
possibility for drastically different definitions of the self, of philosophical growth and 
transcendence, and of the goal of education. Whereas progress in the Platonic philosophic 
journey is portrayed as a process of recognizing a fixed, immortal soul, which is merely 
temporarily stuck in the mutability of material reality, Apuleius’ alternative conception of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See again Bartsch 2006 for a full explication of the speculum’s relationship to conceptions of the self in 
antiquity. 
122 On the Alcibiades I in antiquity, see Denyer 2001, 14; Pradeau 1999; the introduction to Segonds’ text 
of Proclus’ commentary on the Alcibiades (Segonds 1985). For more references, see Bartsch 2006, 41ff. 
We know that Apuleius read the Alcibiades I and considered it authentic, as he quotes it in the Apologia 
(Apol. 25.11), on which, see pp. 79-80 below. 
123 See Alcibiades I 131c1-3, discussed below. This radical definition of the self-as-soul is part of the 
reason why commentators, such as Vlastos, have been so bothered with Platonic ideas of erotic love. See 
Vlastos 1981 on the radical nature of the Platonic model of erotics. On the Alcibiades I as one of Plato’s 
most “extreme” dialogues, see Scott 2000, 82. 
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philosophical self-reflection is a metamorphic one, in which one’s internal character 
transforms to match and/or compensate for one’s external characteristics.124 Learning is, 
moreover, about one’s inside as well as one’s outside; the metamorphosis of character, or 
the internal transformation one experiences through the teaching mirror, is thus borrowed 
as a metaphor from the external transformation a woman undergoes vis-à-vis the mirror 
for erotic adornment.125 But rather than doing one’s hair when one looks in the mirror, 
one “does” one’s soul, as it were. In other words, “adorning the inner man” with virtue is 
merely an alternative version of using cosmetics, which stands in stark contrast to 
Platonic catoptrics. 
 As suggested above, Apuleius is not the first to use the “teaching-mirror” of 
Socrates in this way, and shortly, we will scan through the tradition of the paideutic 
speculum/κάτοπτρον in order to see how the entire trope, developed roughly in the time 
of Apuleius, hinges on a kind of misreading of Plato or on a spurious biographical 
tradition. This teaching mirror can take many forms – the mirror-of-the-text, the 
author/narrator as mirror, the speculum of biography or of “lives” (vitae/βίοι), the mirror 
of pantomime and dance, the κάτοπτρον of history – and the slippage between these 
categories of the didactic mirror tends to render the trope itself rather ill-defined. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 One may consider as a partial proof of this the end of Apuleius’ biography of Plato in the de Platone (de 
Plat. 1.2). As Fletcher 2014 suggests but does not fully develop, there is a pivotal moment in the middle of 
Plato’s biography – namely, his encounter with Socrates – which Apuleius frames as a conversion to 
philosophy. The boy whose natural talent is displayed on his beautiful “external face” gives up the 
frivolous life of writing poetry and converts to the life of philosophical reflection. Thus, the education at 
the feet of Socrates leads to self-reflection, which, in turn, brings about internal transformation to match 
external beauty. 
125 See McCarty 1989, 168: “…a woman’s use of a mirror implied the creation and maintenance not merely 
of her status in the world but of the mundus muliebris itself, created in this life and the next by an act of 
adornment in which mirroring played an intimate role. The nature of this role becomes clearer when we 
note that although use of mirrors by men was usually condemned, the adornment of the inward man often 
adopted the metaphor if not the philosophical use of an actual mirror”. 
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instance, in a text of Plutarch that recounts a life, the narrator claims to offer a mirror to 
readers, with both the text and life conflated into the same teaching mirror trope and with 
both providing the reader a way of seeing him- or herself.126 However, this seems to blur 
the lines between reading a text and looking at a person127: the person, or his/her vita, 
becomes the text, which oddly a reader can look into in order to adorn his or her self. 
What is truly strange about this encounter, though, is the fact that the text-life-spectacle-
mirror (for lack of a single term) does not show the reader his or her self as it essentially 
is – that is, it does not, like the Platonic mirror from which it is derived, reveal an inner, 
eternal soul that is merely obscured by perception and external reality. Rather, when the 
text is invoked as a teaching mirror, it offers to readers a behavioral model or exemplum 
for them to follow.128 It reveals a putative self, a self that could exist if the reader or 
viewer takes the text-mirror into hand and responds appropriately.129 This externally-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See, e.g., the opening lines of Plutarch’s Life of Timoleon (discussed below). 
127 See, e.g., Duff 1999, 32-4 for a helpful analysis of this slippage in Plutarch. On the brilliant but muddled 
confusion between narrator, text, and mirror in Seneca’s opening to de Clementia – a passage which 
spawned the famous “mirror for princes” trope – see Ker 2009; Braund 2009. 
128 Taylor 2008, 20-1 is right to divide this cosmetic mirror into two separate forms, the reflexive and the 
triangulative (his italics). He explains that in the reflexive mirror, “…the subject would see himself, along 
with…his faults and virtues, and adjust his life accordingly,” whereas, in the triangulative, “…he might be 
instructed by the virtues and faults of others, reflected in some metaphorical mirror such as a literary or 
theatrical account of their deeds”. But, contrary to his point, the triangulation that occurs in Terence’s 
speculum of other men’s lives, for instance, is utterly different from Plato’s ‘triangulative’ mirroring 
between people and the divine. At a fundamental level, Terence’s mirror is about metamorphosis towards 
an exemplary ideal, whereas Plato’s triangulation relates to the recognition of an already existing self, 
hidden behind the layers of external reality. The cosmetic mirror, therefore, differs from the Platonic mirror 
in as much as the former is behavioral and the latter is self-reflective. Plato’s mirror may just as easily be 
categorized as reflexive in a different sense from Taylor’s, because it shows a viewer one’s self as one 
already is through triangulation. 
129 Zadorojnyi 2010, 172 : “In a culture preoccupied with exemplarity the mirror delivers not merely a 
likeness but rather a template of the self….Appositely, Plato is given credit for an analogous practice of 
moral mirroring”. Zadorojnyi then proceeds to cite four instances where Plutarch tells the (likely 
apocryphal) story that Plato would ask, ‘am I too like that?,’ whenever he saw someone misbehave (see de 
aud. 40d; de cap. ex inim. 88e; de tuen. san. 129d; de coh. ira 463e). Related to this didactic mirror trope, 
too, is another motif, which was popular in the Second Sophistic, of ‘serious’ and ‘pleasurable’ reading 
practices, as in Plutarch’s How to Recognize that One is Making Progress in Virtue (see p. 16-8 below for 
discussion). In a way, mirror-gazing and reading could be linked by this ‘serious’ vs. ‘pleasurable’ 
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oriented text-narrator-life-spectacle-mirror is what I refer to with my new umbrella term, 
the extraspective mirror.  
 
1. Literary History of the Didactic Mirror: 
 
 In order to situate Apuleius in the tradition of the teaching mirror trope, it will be 
helpful to see its derivation from earlier usages as well as its proliferation as an image in 
the Imperial period and the Second Sophistic. Already before Plato, the mirror is 
endowed with strange metaphoric powers and starts to signify accurate representation of 
reality or even a hyperbolic representation. In Pindar’s Nemean 7, for instance, the poet 
serves as a mirror for the athlete, offering a poetic telling of his deeds that actually 
outstrips the reality of the events and immortalizes the athlete.130 Wine is a mirror for a 
person in Aeschylus,131 and the flow of time reflects reality like a κάτοπτρον in 
Euripides.132 Even the text-mirror or the mirror of literature can be found before or 
possibly in the time of Plato: the pupil of the sophist Gorgias, Alcidamas, is said to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dichotomy that ultimately has its roots in literary critical categories of utile and dulce – a theme to which 
we will return in chapter 4. 
130 See Nem. 7.12-7: εἰ δὲ τύχῃ τις ἔρδων, µελίφρον᾽ αἰτίαν/ ῥοαῖσι Μοισᾶν ἐνέβαλε: ταὶ µεγάλαι γὰρ 
ἀλκαὶ/ σκότον πολὺν ὕµνων ἔχοντι δεόµεναι:/ ἔργοις δὲ καλοῖς ἔσοπτρον ἴσαµεν ἑνὶ σὺν τρόπῳ,/ εἰ 
Μναµοσύνας ἕκατι λιπαράµπυκος/ εὕρηται ἄποινα µόχθων κλυταῖς ἐπέων ἀοιδαῖς. On the aesthetic 
enhancement the mirror gives to reality in this passage, see Frontisi-Ducroux and Vernant 1997, 117-18; 
Halliwell 2002, 133 n. 42. Taylor 2008 is wrong to categorize this as the earliest example of triangulative 
viewing in the mirror (see p. 209 n. 13), in as much as the purpose of Pindar’s mirror is not exactly to hold 
up an exemplary model for viewers. Pindar’s version of mimetic realism is meant to immortalize the victor 
rather than to create clones of him. On the immortalizing function of the mirror in Nem. 7 and Epinician 
more generally as a way of coping with temporality, see Segal 1967; Grethlein 2010. 
131 Aesch. fr. 393 Radt: κάτοπτρον εἴδους χαλκός ἐστ’, οἶνος δὲ νοῦ… 
132 Eur. Hipp. 428-30: κακοὺς δὲ θνητῶν ἐξέφην᾽ ὅταν τύχῃ,/ προθεὶς κάτοπτρον ὥστε παρθένῳ νέᾳ,/ 
χρόνος: 
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called the “Odyssey a beautiful mirror of human life”,133 though we know little more 
about this citation than the fact that it was said.134 As Timothy Duff points out in regard 
to Plutarch’s appropriation of the mirror trope in programmatic statements, the metaphor 
of the speculum/κάτοπτρον encompasses “anything which reveals the true nature of a 
man”.135 But as one moves forward in time, one sees the mirror trope itself transformed 
into a moralizing literary device. Whereas these pre-Platonic instances of the trope seem 
to be concerned with representation and revelation of selfhood, as we see, e.g., in the 
notion that wine reveals the true person hidden beneath social niceties,136 in the later 
adaptation of the didactic mirror, we will encounter the notion that the goal of mirror 
speculation is to change the self hidden underneath, or even stranger, to learn how to hide 
better the vices that the mirror reveals.137 The speculum itself metamorphoses from 
revealer of hidden selfhood to a normative enforcer of an exemplary self, and this 
transformation primarily takes place, as we might expect, in the Imperial period and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 See Alcidamas apud Aristotle Rhet. 3.3: Ὀδύσσεια...καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, where, 
interestingly, Aristotle is speaking about successful and unsuccessful metaphors. This line of Alcidamas is 
classed, according to Aristotle, as an example of frigidity of metaphor. 
134 This claim likely predates Plato’s famous mirror of mimesis in Republic 10 (Halliwell 2002, 171-2). For 
the “ethical value” implied in this line, see Richardson 1981, 7. For the notion that this represents an 
impressive literary-critical judgment, see O’Sullivan 1992, 72. Solmsen 1968, 2 n. 139 goes so far as to 
suggest that Alcidamas’ claim spurred Plato to use the mirror metaphor in his critique of mimesis. Though 
the connection between this line and Plato’s mirror is interesting, I am inclined to agree with Stephen 
Halliwell that the excerpt is too brief to attribute any of these readings to it, especially considering its 
function as an example of failed metaphor in Aristotle (see Halliwell 2002, 133 n. 42).  
135 See Duff 1999, 32 n. 56. 
136 Cf. the later aphorism – in vino veritas – attributed to Socrates. 
137 This latter version of the mirror of self-knowledge – i.e., knowledge that enables one to obscure vices 
and nasty character traits – is one of the options we will find in Apuleius, when he cites what I am calling 
the ‘Socratic’ teaching mirror (Apol. 15); Diogenes Laertius, too, describes Socrates’ exhortation to mirror-
gazing for the cultivation of virtue in terms of hiding vice rather than cultivating virtue. See Diog. Laert. 
Lives 2.33, quoted below (n. 148).  
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Second Sophistic, the age that has been aptly referred to as a “panopticon of 
spectatorship”.138 
 One strand of the didactic mirror is attributed to Socrates himself – what I will 
hereafter call the ‘Socratic’ teaching or didactic mirror – who is said to have exhorted his 
followers to look into a mirror. According to this spurious anecdote, he allegedly 
encouraged both the beautiful and the ugly to mirror-gaze, the beautiful in order that they 
might recognize their beauty in it and desire not to ruin it with bad character,139 and the 
ugly in order that they may see their grotesqueness and long to compensate for it with 
beautiful virtue. While this anecdote seems to epitomize Shadi Bartsch’s definition of 
self-knowledge as “directed toward moderation and control of the social behavior of the 
individual”,140 one would have difficulty arguing, I imagine, that Plato’s Socrates 
understood self-knowledge in this way or that he would have endorsed such a socially 
conditioned function for mirror-gazing.141 The first extant allusion to this ‘Socratic’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See Elsner 2000, 105-6. 
139 Clearly, this does not work, and as evidenced by episodes like Narcissus and Hostius Quadra, the 
Romans could conceive of things going terribly wrong when beautiful youths looked into mirrors. 
140 See Bartsch 2006, 25 for the larger quotation: “Although the idea of ‘self-knowledge’ suggests, for us, a 
romantic introspection into the hidden depths of the soul, or a Freudian uncovering of the unconscious 
desires of the id, the ancient notion of sōphrosyne was directed toward moderation and control of the social 
behavior of the individual, toward the approbation of his peers rather than the flowering of an inner 
potential. This provides the crucial link between sōphrosyne as a set of practices and the notion of self-
knowledge in antiquity, and also explains why, for us, the employment of the mirror as a tool to those ends 
might seem empty or superficial, while for our Greco-Roman writers it provides a significant view onto the 
self”. I would not dispute Bartsch’s claim that this is a general cultural view of σωφροσύνη in antiquity, but 
I would argue that the “romantic introspection into the hidden depths of the soul” is certainly gestured to in 
Plato, as Bartsch herself comes close to acknowledging in her discussion of the Alcibiades I (see p. 42). In 
other words, Plato was not concerned primarily with certain social behaviors, but did very much suggest 
that self-knowledge was a process of reaching beyond to a metaphysical soul. 
141 Contra Schuller 1998, who suggests through analysis of Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium that social 
relations was precisely the kind of self-knowledge Plato endorsed. However, Alcibiades’ speech, I would 
argue, provides the wrong evidence for what Plato was after in inserting the mirror into the self-
knowledge/σωφροσύνη tradition. In chapter 4, I will argue that Apuleius recognizes precisely the interplay 
between the socially motivated self-knowledge in Alcibiades’ speech and the more transcendent knowledge 
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tradition – although, it should be noted, it does not specifically mention Socrates – comes 
from Seneca’s Naturales Quaestiones. In the middle of his digression on Hostius Quadra 
and his depraved use of distorting mirrors during sex, Seneca obliquely refers to this 
alleged anecdote about Socrates (Nat. Quaest. 1.17.4): 
Inuenta sunt specula, ut homo ipse se nosset…formosus, ut uitaret infamiam; 
deformis, ut sciret redimendum esse uirtutibus quicquid corpori deesset… 
  
Mirrors were created so that man might know himself…the handsome man, to 
avoid infamy, the ugly man, to know that whatever is lacking to his body must be 
compensated for by means of virtue. 
 
This passage is often assumed to be alluding to the famous mirror of self-knowledge in 
Alcibiades I142; there, as we will see shortly, Socrates argues that the self is the soul and 
that the best way for the soul to see itself – and thereby, to fulfill the Delphic maxim – is 
for it to look into the best part of another soul, which will, in turn, serve as a mirror. This 
bewildering scene treats the soul as divine and the intersubjective encounter primarily as 
a narcissistic means of seeing one’s self and having a transcendent encounter at the same 
time.143 But already in Seneca’s analysis of this scene, we see the socially-motivated 
mirror-speculation rear its ugly (or beautiful) head. It is not Platonic self-knowledge in 
any transcendent sense that Seneca is striving after here, but rather a social contract in 
which beauty is not besmeared by a bad reputation and ugliness is compensated for by 
means of inner goodness. Plutarch is the first we know of to explicitly cite Socrates as the 
fount of this tradition, claiming that Socrates bid those of the “mirror-gazing youths” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the metaphysical soul in the Phaedrus, and prefers the self-fashioning and socially entrenched model 
over the Platonic model in his creation of the character of Lucius. 
142 See Taylor 2008, 19. 
143 See Wohl 2013 for a good treatment of this passage and its relationship to the socially motivated erotic 
desire one finds in Xenophon’s Socratic dialogues. 
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(τῶν ἐσοπτριζοµένων νεανίσκων) who were ugly to “correct their form with virtue” 
(ἐπανορθοῦσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ…τὸ εἶδος) and exhorted the beautiful among them “not to 
dishonor their form with vice” (µὴ καταισχύνειν τῇ κακίᾳ τὸ εἶδος).144 This citation of the 
‘Socratic’ teaching mirror occurs ironically in a treatise where Plutarch advises wives – 
those who would use actual mirrors for cosmetic adornment – to look into the 
philosophical mirror as well and employ it to gauge their inner virtue. We even see 
Plutarch here lifting phrases wholesale from the Platonic self-knowledge tradition and 
appropriating them to a more extraspective end: the phrase εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, for 
instance, is actually borrowed directly from the scene in Plato’s Phaedrus where Socrates 
refuses to rationalize a myth because he does not yet know himself.145 That is to say, 
Plutarch takes a line from a passage where Plato introduces concerns about the structure 
of the metaphysical soul and self-knowledge – arguably, the most important concerns of 
that dialogue146 – and applies it somewhat haphazardly to mirror-gazing in the context of 
female behavior.147 Later in the Imperial period and the Second Sophistic, we hear of 
other versions of Socrates’ exhortation to youthful mirror-gazing, for instance, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See Plut. Conj. Praec. 25 (Mor. 141dff.). 
145 See Phaedr. 229d2ff.: ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως µὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦµαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ 
ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός, κατ᾽ ἄλλο µὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ᾽ αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη µετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν 
Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αὖθις τὸ τῆς Χιµαίρας, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων 
Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων ἀµηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων. 
146 See Griswold 1986; Ferrari 1987; Morgan 2012. 
147 We may compare another passage of Plutarch’s with this analogy between self-knowledge and cosmetic 
adornment. At Mor. 42bff., Plutarch compares an audience member’s reaction to a public, philosophical 
lecture to a man looking in the mirror after receiving a hair-cut at the barber shop. He suggests that just as a 
man coming from the barber (κουρεῖον) needs “to stand in front of a mirror” (δεῖ τῷ κατόπτρῳ 
παραστῆναι) and inspect (ἐπισκοποῦντα) his new haircut and the difference it makes for his head, so also, 
one coming away from a public lecture must “look into himself” (ἀφορᾶν χρὴ πρὸς ἑαυτόν) and “inspect 
his soul” (καταµανθάνοντα τὴν ψυχὴν). The metaphor of cosmetic transformation is identical, but here, the 
metamorphosis has already taken place and the viewer/listener is merely double-checking to see if it looks 
good enough. 
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Diogenes Laertius.148 It will be important to keep this ‘Socratic’ strand of the 
extraspective mirror in mind when we turn to Apuleius, who also cites a version of this 
didactic model, which transforms the Platonic self-knowledge tradition into the mirror of 
behavioral metamorphosis. 
 This ‘Socratic’ didactic speculum seems to rely on a concept of viewer response 
by which gazing upon grotesque appearances changes the behavior of the viewer. This 
type of response is embedded in the speculum tradition already in renditions of the myth 
of Athena and Marsyas, for instance, when Athena catches a glimpse of herself playing 
the αὐλός in a reflection from water and is disgusted by the appearance of her face. After 
being mocked by Marsyas, she decides never to play the αὐλός again, and Marsyas, in 
turn, becomes the new master of the instrument.149 But again, in the period of the late 1st 
to 2nd century, this grotesque transformation in front of the mirror becomes another 
moralizing trope, which authors of philosophical treatises begin to use in reference to 
emotions or states of being that distort the face. In this way, Seneca suggests in de Ira 
(2.36.2) that it has proven beneficial (profuit) for angry men “to look at a mirror” 
(aspexisse speculum): by becoming angry, he explains, a great metamorphosis of their 
selves (tanta mutatio sui) has overtaken them; but the mirror, revealing the grotesque face 
mangled by emotion, brings them back to themselves. Any deviation from the normative 
standard of appearance, therefore, is a mutatio, and the counter-active transformation – 
the re-transformation, as it were – is effected through mirror-speculation. Diogenes 
Laertius shares another no doubt spurious anecdote about Plato that suggests a similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Vit. Phil. 2.33: ἠξίου δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους συνεχὲς κατοπτρίζεσθαι, ἵν’ εἰ µὲν καλοὶ εἶεν, ἄξιοι γίγνοιντο·εἰ 
δ’ αἰσχροί, παιδείᾳ τὴν δυσείδειαν ἐπικαλύπτοιεν. 
149 See Taylor 2008, 26-31 for an analysis of this myth and its morally exemplary import. 
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normative function for the mirror (Vit. Phil. 3.39): Plato would advise drunk men to 
“mirror-gaze” (κατοπτρίζεσθαι), claiming that the activity would make them desire to 
“move away from such disfiguration” (ἀποστήσεσθαι γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀσχηµοσύνης). 
This moralizing function of the mirror provides the negative analogue to the ‘Socratic’ 
teaching mirror, offering what Alexei Zadorojnyi has labeled “ethical therapy by 
deterrence”.150 
 However, the use of the ‘Socratic’ didactic mirror and its negative counterpart 
was only one of the pedagogical mirrors that became widely popular in the Second 
Sophistic. As I suggested above, the proliferation of mirror metaphors, wherein any 
didactic tool could be analogized to a mirror both of self-knowledge and exemplary 
behavior, became quite diffuse and imprecise. If the ‘Socratic’ paideutic mirror is akin to 
Taylor’s reflexive function of the mirror (see n. 128 above), then the next version of the 
teaching mirror – the mirror of the text, which one could likely trace back to Alcidamas’ 
Odyssey-κάτοπτρον and which became an authorizing pretext for moralizing, didactic 
literature – represents a triangulative relationship between viewer and speculum. In this 
case, the viewer looks upon an ‘other’, embedded in a text, and compares him- or herself 
to this model in a manner that is, similarly to the ‘Socratic’ mirror, related to behavior. If 
we were to step back and ask how texts and mirrors are in fact similar, we might be 
tempted to shrug and say outright that they are not, and we would be supported in this 
assessment at least by Aristotle, who complains of the imprecision of the mirror 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Zadorojnyi 2010, 172. There are instances in the Imperial period, though, where the grotesque 
appearance of a distorted face in the mirror is not a deterrent but an encouragement to more heinous acts, as 
in Suetonius’ anecdote that Caligula practiced horrible faces before a mirror to make his appearance even 
more savage (Cal. 50.1). Even Seneca’s Hostius Quadra episode – though itself transformed into a 
moralizing passage about true self-knowledge – demonstrates the danger of mirror speculation, in as much 
as Quadra’s twisted use of mirrors inspires more deviant desires and pleasurable delusions. 
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“metaphor” even as he quotes the Alcidamas passage.151 However, as we are not 
attempting to assess the utility or success of the metaphor but rather to trace its lineage, 
we may more sympathetically note that the formal features – i.e., looking into a flat 
surface – as well as the dialogic or reciprocal encounter one has with both objects are 
analogous. As Shadi Bartsch says of the formation of selfhood vis-à-vis the speculum:  
…the mirror provides a tool for the splitting of the viewer into viewing subject 
and viewed object, judging ‘I’ and judged-to-be-lacking ‘me.’…since the figure 
who judges the mirror-image in disgust has taken on the role of a dispassionate 
audience, the use of the mirror does, suggestively, reflect upon the idea that a 
dislocation, or self-splitting, of the ego into judger and judged could have a part to 
play in formulations of the ethical self. Such a dislocation could take visual or 
dialogic form; several of the mirror-viewers are urged to keep up a conversation 
with themselves as they gaze at their likenesses…152 
 
To apply this self-splitting to the mirror-text trope, therefore, just as mirroring provides 
the objectified self as a partner in dialectic, the text-speculum actually stands in 
metaphorically for a person – a biographical life, an exemplary character, a narrator – 
with whom the reader is engaged in a kind of dialogue. By way of example, we may 
consider Cicero’s encomium of the exemplary value of literature in the Pro Archia, 
though it can only be obliquely connected to the mirror via mimesis. There, the words of 
the text become “imagines depicted for us to gaze upon and imitate”: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 In the passage of the Rhetoric where we find this quotation of Alcidamas (Rhet. 3.3), Aristotle is 
discussing stylistic flaws – particularly in usage of metaphors – which lead to frigidity (τὸ ψυχρὸν) of style, 
either on account of ridiculousness (γελοῖον) or inappropriate and excessive tragic sense (τραγικόν). 
152 See Bartsch 2006, 23-4. Cf. also McCarty 1989, 169, who points out that the exemplary mirror’s 
function seems to depend on two physical features of mirroring: “Two properties of the physical device are 
significant to the metaphor…: its responsiveness, mirroring the observer, change for change, in time; and 
objectification, capturing his changeable image in space and thus seeming to give it an almost independent 
being. Creating a personality would, then, be an interactive process: not simply adopting an external image 
as the self, but discovering the self by correspondence with an external world in which the observer finds 
himself mirrored. The result is an objectified soul, a personality provoked from without and ‘conjured up’ 
from within”. 
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quam multas nobis imagines non solum ad intuendum verum etiam ad imitandum 
fortissimorum virorum expressas scriptores et Graeci et Latini reliquerunt! quas 
ego mihi semper in administranda re publica proponens animum et mentem meam 
ipsa cogitatione hominum excellentium conformabam. 
  
How many imagines of the strongest men carved for our benefit did the Greek and 
Latin writers leave behind – for us not only to gaze upon them but also to imitate 
them! Which, placing them before myself always as I administered the affairs of 
the Republic, I molded my soul and mind by means of the very cogitation of 
excellent men. 
 
In a sweeping aesthetic metaphor, the words on the page are transformed into artistic 
depictions – the sculpted ancestor masks (imagines) – which one can hold in front 
(proponens) of one’s face and with which one can have a dialogue. But importantly, this 
dialogue with the ancestor mask, which helps to transform the reader (conformabam), is 
not a conversation with a person, but with the very thought of excellent men. That is, the 
impact of ancestor imagines has the same metamorphic effect on the viewer as specular 
imagines, namely to form his or her moral behavior. With the subtle shift from the words 
of the text to the face of the character and finally to the very thought of the author or 
exemplary character, Cicero completely elides the troublesome problems of 
misinterpretation that were so bothersome to Plato.153 When this conflation of the textual 
object and the person – historical, fictional, or narratorial – occurs in the context of the 
text-speculum trope proper, the “mirroring” that happens between reader and text blends 
this model of looking into an exemplary mask and conversing with men’s cogitatio 
together with the Platonic, intersubjective encounter between two people looking into one 
another’s “mirroring” eyes; but, again, the effect is rather different. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 We may once again compare this sentiment with the Schriftkritik of the Phaedrus, in which the image 
depicted in the words of the book is similar to a painting – note again the artistic metaphor for words on the 
page – which always misrepresents the cogitations of its progenitor. 
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 We already saw one of the earliest ancestors of the exemplary text-speculum in 
my analysis of deep “looking” (inspicere). Recall how the comically strict father figure 
advised his lascivious son in Terence’s Adelphoi 415-7: 
       denique  
  inspicere tamquam in speculum in vitas omnium  
  iubeo, atque ex aliis sumere exemplum sibi. 
Finally, I bid him to look into the lives of all men as if into a mirror and to 
take an example for himself from others. 
As I suggested in the introduction, this passage became a locus classicus for biographers 
looking for an authorizing model to legitimize the genre. Indeed, we may see Demea’s 
advice to the young Ctesipho as a backdrop for many of the quintessentially Roman 
concerns with exemplarity, as has been shown by Roland Mayer.154 Along these lines, 
perhaps the most famous passage on exemplarity – Livy’s programmatic aspiration to 
provide omnis…exempli documenta for the reader to “gaze upon” (intueri) in order to 
take models for “imitation” (imitari) or for “avoidance” (vitare) – seems to borrow 
concepts directly from the Terentian speculum.155  In fact, even in the earliest usages of 
the word speculum, some scholars have suggested it can mean something closer to 
“model” or “standard” like the word exemplum.156  We find the related prosthetic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Mayer 1991, 145, who interestingly also suggests Horace’s Sat. 1.4 as the other inaugural moment in the 
tradition of Roman exemplarity. In that poem, Horace’s father accompanied him on his way to school every 
day and pointed out negative and positive exempla for the young Horace to flee and imitate, respectively. 
Important for my point, this satire represents a programmatic claim for the calling of the satirist, who 
metaphorically provides the same didactic exemplary models in his text. Though not labeled a textual 
“mirror”, the conception of the text as a wise (sapiens) teacher is nonetheless participating in the same 
tradition. 
155 See Chaplin 2000. Moreover, as Andrew Feldherr has shown, Livy’s claim for presenting exempla is 
also framed in terms borrowed from the rhetorical tradition on enargeia, which is itself derived from 
Platonic and Aristotelian discussions of vividness in presentation (See Feldherr 1998, 1-12). 
156 See Callahan 1964, who is analyzing a curious line from Plautus’ Mostellaria (250-1). There, an older 
courtesan Scapha tells a younger one, whom she is helping to prepare for a lover, that she has no need of a 
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biographical mirror-text, in turn, most clearly illustrated in the programmatic prologue to 
Plutarch’s Timoleon-Aemilius pair of lives (Tim. 1.1): 
ἐµοὶ τῆς τῶν βίων ἅψασθαι µὲν γραφῆς συνέβη δι᾽ ἑτέρους, ἐπιµένειν δὲ καὶ 
φιλοχωρεῖν ἤδη καὶ δι᾽ ἐµαυτόν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώµενον ἁµῶς 
γέ πως κοσµεῖν καὶ ἀφοµοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον. 
 
It occurred to me to undertake the writing of my ‘Lives’ for the sake of others, but 
now, I am continuing the work and taking pleasure in it for my own sake also, 
attempting to adorn my life with history as if in front of a mirror, and to fashion it 
in conformity with the virtues of those men. 
 
Here Plutarch borrows unashamedly from the realm of female adornment – i.e., in 
combining the verb κοσµέω with a metaphor of adornment vis-à-vis a mirror (ὥσπερ ἐν 
ἐσόπτρῳ) – to describe the process of growth in virtue: one does one’s life up 
cosmetically, so to speak, by making him- or herself similar to an external, normative 
measurement. Thus, history, or rather the examples of famous men, provide a mirror in 
which one can adorn oneself and make his or her life similar (ἀφοµοιόω) to the virtues of 
those men.157 It is important for us to recognize the relationship between “life” (βίος) and 
“history” (ἱστορία), which, though not synonymous elsewhere in Plutarch,158 nevertheless 
presents a subtle ambiguity between person and text. As Timothy Duff notes:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mirror (quid opust speculo tibi), since she is speculo speculum maxumum. See especially p. 6, where, as 
evidence of the exemplary nature of Philematium’s superlative beauty, Callahan quotes a line from 
Cicero’s Rep. 2.42.69 about how the statesman should behave in such a way ut ad imitationem sui vocet 
alios, ut sese splendore animi et vitae suae sicut speculum praebeat civibus. We can see the language of 
exemplarity retained (e.g., imitatio), which leads Callahan to connect both of these passages to Terence’s 
mirror-of-lives. This semantic connection between speculum and exemplum would further connect the 
passage from Horace’s Epistles 1.2 (analyzed in the introduction) to the Terentian mirror, at least insofar as 
the speaker tells the reader to look at Odysseus as an exemplar. 
157 Cf. the imago virtutis of the Roman tradition, which occurs in many formulations (e.g., the death of 
Seneca at Tac. Ann. 16.34 (imaginem vitae suae); Seneca’s exhortation to Lucilius at Ep. 120.4-5 (imago 
virtutis); Seneca’s desire to be like Cato, who is said to be virtutum viva imago at Tranq. 16.1). Cf. Mayer 
1991. 
158 Cf. the famous programmatic claim in Plutarch’s Alex. 1.2: “It is not histories I am writing, but lives” 
(οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφοµεν, ἀλλὰ βίους). Although, there, too, the mimetic metaphor is invoked, whereby 
the narrator compares himself to a painter depicting the face and eyes of the subject (ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ 
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The mirror here is, on the one hand, the lives of virtuous men, in accordance with 
which Plutarch amends his own life. But, for his readers, the mirror is Plutarch’s 
own literary work. The ambiguities of the terms ‘history’ and ‘life’ reinforce this 
double meaning.159 
 
After offering this moralizing preface, Plutarch immediately invokes Democritus, who 
apparently claimed that we should pray for good phantoms, or εἴδωλα, to come visit us, 
implying that historical figures presented via textual biography are precisely those 
positive phantoms that can lead us to virtue. It should be noted that here, Plutarch is 
playing on the polyvalence of the word εἴδωλα, which is also the term for the mirror-
image in Democritean theories of vision.160 The examples of good men are not merely the 
actualization of “phantoms” that visit us and teach us virtue; but, just like the death-
masks or imagines in the Roman discussions of exemplarity, the εἴδωλα double as images 
in the mirror of history displayed for our contemplation and imitation.  
 The passage from Plutarch’s Quomodo Quis suos in Virtute Profectus Sentiat, 
which I discussed in the introduction, can also be situated in this text-speculum tradition. 
We may recall that there Plutarch framed the activity of reading as a high-stakes choice – 
one that he interestingly connects to Hesiod’s “two roads”: just as a bee flits from flower 
to flower in search of pollen, certain men find serious sentiments (τι σπουδῆς ἄξιον) in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ζῳγράφοι τὰς ὁµοιότητας ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἰδῶν) and capturing the “signs of his 
soul” (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σηµεῖα). Again, the text is conflated with the actual person, and the act of reading is 
likened to looking into the face (and soul) of the subject of the biography. 
159 See Duff 2005, 33. Then, he proceeds to explain how there is a double meaning in the semantic range of 
both terms, with ἱστορία referring to past events as well as the act of researching past events and with βίος 
meaning both the character and career of a man, and the written record associated with it. 
160 The εἴδωλον is a key term of Democritean and Epicurean optics, functioning as the image of the 
emanation of an object, which enters and penetrates the eyes of the beholder. See Burkert 1977, 103-6, who 
discusses how Democritus likely wrote a treatise called Περὶ τῶν εἰδώλων and traces how Democritus’ 
atomist theories of vision passed through Epicurus and Theophrastus into the work of Lucretius. Of 
particular interest is how Epicurus dispenses of Democritus’ theory of “air-imprints” (ἀπορροή), but 
generalizes the theory of εἴδωλα for his own version of optics: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο τὰ ἔξω τὴν 
ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τοῦ τε χρώµατος καὶ τῆς µορφῆς διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ µεταξὺ ἡµῶν τε κἀκείνων (Epist. 1.49; 
cf. Burkert 1977, 104 n. 40 for further discussion). 
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literature read for pleasure (ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα καὶ παιδιᾶς). The seriousness vs. pleasure 
dichotomy established in Plutarch’s theory of active reading sets the stage for the 
appropriate reader-response that he outlines a little further in the treatise: a serious 
reader’s reaction to moral exemplars should be “emulation” (ζῆλος) and the “desire to do 
what we marvel at” (τὸ ποιεῖν εἶναι προθύµους ἃ θαυµάζοµεν); one means of doing this 
is to look to moral exemplars like Socrates or Plato – “to hold them before our eyes” 
(τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀφθαλµῶν τοὺς ὄντας ἀγαθοὺς ἢ γενοµένους)161 – and to ask what they 
would do in a given situation. In that way, we adorn ourselves and change our forms as if 
before mirrors (οἷον πρὸς ἔσοπτρα κοσµοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς καὶ µεταρρυθµίζοντας). Again, 
we see the trivial activity of adornment (κοσµέω) before the mirror conflated with a 
theory of moral transformation (µεταρρυθµίζω).162 The affective response of marvel or 
wonder, which inspires the Plutarchan reader to look into the didactic mirror of exempla, 
will also play an important role in Apuleius’ version of mirror-gazing and its pedagogic 
effect. In fact, there is a direct correlation between the phenomena in Plutarch: desire for 
emulation is first conceived through awe, which, in turn, leads the reader to place 
biographical images before his or her eyes and try to adorn his or her soul accordingly. 
We will see later how this, too, is fundamental to the philosopher’s journey. But what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 No doubt, this line also alludes to the rhetorical tradition on ekphrasis, defined (though not given the 
appellation ‘ekphrasis’) in Aristotle, in which the object of description is “as if brought before the eyes of 
the viewer” (see, e.g., Aristotle’s Rhet. 1411a-b, with the multiple recurrences of the phrase πρὸ ὀµµάτων). 
Cf. Webb 2009. 
162 Interestingly, this word µεταρρυθµίζω appears in Plato’s bewildering description of optics and dreams in 
the Timaeus (46a1ff.): the fire within the eyes wells up while we sleep with our eyes closed and creates all 
kinds of φαντάσµατα. Plato then analogizes this phenomenon to image-making in mirrors (περὶ τὴν τῶν 
κατόπτρων εἰδωλοποιίαν), which occurs when the inner and outer fire meet and create a variegated 
deflection or transformation (πολλαχῇ µεταρρυθµισθέντος). Plutarch borrows this image, one could argue, 
from the transformation or deflection of εἴδωλα in the mirror, but applies it to an internal metamorphosis of 
character. 
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represents in Plato a journey toward the knowledge of a metaphysical soul achieved 
through a transcendent experience, becomes in Plutarch a tool for behavioral 
metamorphosis. One primps oneself up with the actions viewed in the extraspective 
mirror, not with the transcendent self-knowledge acquired through it. 
 Another, somewhat subtler conflation of text and narrator in the extraspective 
mirror is Seneca’s well-known address to Nero in de Clementia, which we also 
encountered in the introduction: 
Scribere de clementia, Nero Caesar, institui, ut quodam modo speculi vice 
fungerer et te tibi ostenderem perventurum ad voluptatem maximam omnium. 
 
I decided to write about clemency, Nero Caesar, in order that I might function in 
some way like a mirror and reveal you to yourself, (showing) that you will come 
to the greatest pleasure of all (people/pleasures). 
 
There is a strange slippage in the text-mirror formulation of this passage, which is worth 
dwelling on briefly. While it is clear that the mirror-as-philosophical-tool grants Seneca a 
safe position from which to take a didactic stance vis-à-vis his political superior,163 it is 
odd how he accomplishes this stance by conflating himself with a text and apparently 
promising both a dialogic interaction and a prophetic encounter. In a literal sense, the 
narrator, Seneca, is promising to be the mirror: “so that I might function as a mirror”. But 
the textual medium is highlighted as well – scribere…institui164; Seneca is not actually a 
Platonic interlocutor for Nero, but his text is his voice, or his face, and the request is that 
Nero look into his textual face, or in other words, that Nero treat him like an instrument 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 See, e.g., Braund 2009, 154 ad loc.: “The image of the mirror is a commonplace which goes back to at 
least Plato…But Seneca’s use of it in this context is ingenious. It allows him to avoid the inherent difficulty 
of giving advice to an emperor - a difficulty recognized by Plutarch in Ad Principem Ineruditum at Mor. 
779e and one which was always likely to be a problem for Seneca, as the teacher of Nero…- by appearing 
to praise Nero through simply acting as his mirror”. 
164 Ibid.: “It is also unclear whether the mirror consists of the text itself or of Seneca, as the first-person 
verb fungerer suggests.” 
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for the acquisition of self-knowledge in the Platonic sense (cf. the purpose of mirrors in 
the Nat. Quaest. passage: ut homo ipse se nosset). If we scrutinize the future participle 
(perventurum), it seems that the text-mirror is both a prophecy and a manual for how to 
fulfill the prophecy.165 Seneca-the-narrator will provide the exemplary models for Nero to 
emulate.166 This is more than Umberto Eco’s formulation that the text-mirror works by 
analogy to the mirror-as-prosthetic-device which enables the reader/viewer to see him- or 
herself and thereby glean self-knowledge.167 The text/narrator does ask the reader/viewer 
to identify with elements embedded in the text, thereby making him or her implicated in 
the reading experience as a viewer in a mirror would be implicated.168 But this is also a 
journey narrative (pervenire), and the narrator-speculum points (ostendere)169 the way 
toward pleasure (voluptas), a strange end point of mirror-speculation, considering the 
traditional models of self-knowledge and emulation.170 Moreover, if we look a couple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 The usage of a future participle here seems to express purpose (NLS 92). Cf. Braund 2009, 154 ad loc.: 
“The mirror image is clever especially because it can be interpreted descriptively – representing Nero’s 
present state – or prescriptively – representing an idealized state”. This descriptive vs. prescriptive 
distinction gets to the heart of the difference between Platonic and Second Sophistic uses of the trope. 
166 Such as, e.g., Augustus, who is explicitly rejected as a viable exemplar in the Praefatio, but then, is later 
invoked as an exemplum. Cf. Mayer 1991 on this moment in de Clementia. 
167 For Eco’s analysis of the ‘prosthetic’ function of the mirror, see Eco 1986. 
168 See Ker 2009, 264-5: “Given that the text is conceived of as a mirror, the reader-viewer is implicitly 
invited to relate to persons and objects mentioned in the text...in an effort of self-identification”. 
169 It is possible that Apuleius knew this famous moment from de Clementia. We may compare this entire 
formulation – “showing the way toward pleasure” - with the opening passage of book 2 of Apuleius’ de 
Platone: Moralis philosophiae caput est, Faustine fili, ut scias quibus ad beatam vitam perveniri rationibus 
possit. Verum ut beatitudinem bonorum fine ante alia contingere putes, ostendam quae de hoc Plato 
senserit. Similarly to Seneca’s praefatio, this book opening of a text on moral philosophy promises to show 
(ostendere) the reader a way to “travel to the good life” (perveniri). But, in this case, the dialogue is with 
Plato himself (Plato senserit). It is possible that Apuleius alludes specifically to this opening passage of de 
Clementia with the didactic display of the journey, but one would not want to put too much weight on the 
possible intertext. 
170 See Bartsch 2006, 184-5 for an interpretation of the twisted blend of mirror traditions and sexual 
implications in this passage: “What the mirror of the text promises to show Nero, if he succeeds in ethical 
rulership, is not self-knowledge - however pleasant it may be to inspect a good conscience - or a profitable 
estrangement from the self, but rather voluptas, a term that is distinctly sensual in its connotations. The 
only other occasions on which this word is employed in Latin texts in connection with a specular image are 
in Seneca’s treatment of the orgiastic Hostius in the Naturales Quaestiones and by the author of Justinian’s 
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lines further in the text, we see how this triangulative relationship between text-mirror, 
narrator, and reader actually inspires a dialogue with the self: after “looking deep” 
(inspicere) into his own conscience and then “casting his eyes” (inmittere oculos) upon 
the multitude – both activities paradoxically accomplished through looking into the text – 
Nero’s third and final (putative) action is to “speak with himself” (loqui secum). Again, I 
would suggest that Plato’s mirror of erotic dialectic lurks uncomfortably behind the 
interactive model of exemplary mirroring here: whereas in Plato, an actual dialogue with 
another person causes one to see one’s self as he or she essentially is, the text-speculum 
in the opening of Seneca’s treatise asks the reader to look into the text and then have a 
dialogue with himself, where the self is objectified into an ‘other’, with whom Nero 
interacts in order to see himself. The text holds up a partner in dialectic, which 
paradoxically becomes an objectified version of the self that can serve as the Platonic 
other. 
 We find an application of the trope similar to Seneca’s narrator-text-mirror in 
Lucian’s How to Write History, where the historian’s mind, Lucian argues, must be like a 
mirror in its mimetic clarity. 
µάλιστα δὲ κατόπτρῳ ἐοικυῖαν παρασχέσθω τὴν γνώµην ἀθόλῳ καὶ στιλπνῷ καὶ 
ἀκριβεῖ τὸ κέντρον, καὶ ὁποίας ἂν δέξηται τὰς µορφὰς τῶν ἔργων, τοιαῦτα καὶ 
δεικνύτω αὐτά, διάστροφον δὲ ἢ παράχρουν ἢ ἑτερόσχηµον µηδέν. 
 
Above all, let him bring a mind similar to a mirror, clear, gleaming-bright, 
precisely centered, displaying the shape of events just as he receives them, free 
from distortion, false coloring, and misrepresentation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Digest – when he dismisses the mirror as a tool for pleasure…in both these Senecan examples, the mirror 
of self-knowledge returns not a Platonic truth or an ethical exhortation, but a distorted view that brings 
pleasure and that confirms the viewer in, not dissuades him from his willfulness…in introducing this 
terminology, then, Seneca has mingled two mirror traditions: he has introduced the erotic pleasure of the 
mirror of vanity into the corrective usage of the mirror of self-improvement”. 
72	  
	  
 
In fact, this appeal to the mirror-like mind of the historian becomes somewhat 
paradoxical as well, as the narrator proceeds to explain how the historian is akin to a 
great sculptor, such as Phidias, Praxiteles, or Alcamenes: he does not create the raw 
material – the gold, the silver, or the ivory are given to him; rather, his job is “to give a 
fine arrangement of events and illuminate them as vividly as possible” (καλὸν διαθέσθαι 
τὰ πεπραγµένα καὶ εἰς δύναµιν ἐναργέστατα ἐπιδεῖξαι αὐτά) so that when a man has 
heard them, he thinks he “is actually seeing what is being described” (ὁρᾶν τὰ 
λεγόµενα).171 Once again, we should note the elusive slippage between narrator and text, 
whereby the reader simultaneously becomes a hearer (ἀκροώµενος) and a viewer of the 
narrator’s mimetic project. The text is elided and only “the events” are left to be gazed 
upon. The historian is thus imagined to be a creator of a kind of trompe l'oeil mirror, into 
which the reader can gaze and see the events themselves. 
 Even theatrical spectacles in the Second Sophistic were accorded the status of a 
“didactic mirror”, inaugurating a trope that seems to represent the ancestor to the 
Renaissance “mirror of drama”, wherein the stage is conceived of as providing for 
viewers “a glass, a mirrour of Truth, to see their Deformities in, as well as Beauty”.172 If 
we trace Alcidamas’ Odyssey-mirror along a path different from the text-speculum, we 
see that both Cicero and Livius Andronicus were said to have made claims for the 
catoptric verisimilitude of the genre of comedy. In a comment we find in Donatus’ 4th 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 We may see in this passage another instance where the terminology (e.g., ἐναργέστατα; ὁρᾶν τὰ 
λεγόµενα) is borrowed from the rhetorical tradition on ekphrasis – a tradition to which both Livy and 
Plutarch also allude in their programmatic statements about exemplary historiography. See n. 161 above. 
More will be said in chapter 2 about Apuleius’ use of the rhetorical tradition on ekphrasis. 
172 Anonymous 1972 [1699] 81, quoted in Lada-Richards 2005, 340. 
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century commentary on Terence, we learn that Cicero called comedy “an imitation of 
life, a mirror of custom, and an image of truth” (imitationem vitae, speculum 
consuetudinis, imaginem veritatis); and similarly, that Livius Andronicus considered 
comoedia to be a “mirror of daily life” (cotidianae vitae speculum).173 But, if we once 
again move into the Second Sophistic, where these tropes take on a life of their own, we 
find one of the most explicit instances of the spectacle-speculum in Lucian’s de 
Saltatione.174 There, the main narrator Lycinus eulogizes the pedagogic influence of a 
precise and well-ordered pantomime dance. At de Salt. 72, the spectacle (τὸ θέατρον) is 
said to give the audience a “better character” (ἀµείνων τὸ ἦθος) by educating the moral 
disposition of viewers (τὰ ἤθη τῶν ὁρώντων παιδαγωγοῦν). Lycinus goes on to explain at 
81 how the paideutic effect of the dance is complete when each of the spectators 
“recognizes his/her own characteristics [in the dance]” (γνωρίζῃ τὰ αὑτοῦ) or when he or 
she “sees him- or herself in the dancer as if in a mirror” (ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ τῷ ὀρχηστῇ 
βλέπῃ). It is at that time that beholders “cannot restrain themselves because of pleasure” 
(οὐδὲ κατέχειν ἑαυτοὺς…ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς δύνανται); they “see the εἰκόνες of [their] own 
souls” (τὰς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς ἕκαστος εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες) and through the spectacle, they 
fully accomplish the Delphic maxim (τὸ Δελφικὸν ἐκεῖνο τὸ Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν), “having 
learned what they should choose and what they should avoid, and having been taught 
what they previously didn’t know” (ἅ τε χρὴ αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ ἃ φεύγειν µεµαθηκότες καὶ ἃ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 For the first quotation, see Evanthii Excerpta de Comoedia V.1.19-20: comoediam esse Cicero ait 
imitationem vitae, speculum consuetudinis, imaginem veritatis. For the second, see V.5.14ff.: aitque (sc. 
Livius Andronicus) esse comoediam cotidianae vitae speculum, nec iniuria. nam ut intenti speculo veritatis 
liniamenta facile per imaginem colligimus, ita lectione comoediae imitationem vitae consuetudinisque non 
aegerrime animadvertimus. For discussion, see Wessner 1962 (also cited in Lada-Richards 2005, 344 n. 
17). 
174 See Lada-Richards 2005 for an excellent treatment of this passage. Cf. Petrides 2013 for helpful analysis 
of this text more broadly. 
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πρότερον ἠγνόουν διδαχθέντες). A satirical mix of Terence’s biographical mirror, which 
tells us what to pursue and what to flee,175 and a deeper Platonic investigation of the 
Delphic maxim and true self-knowledge, Lucian’s mirror of the pantomime dance may 
offer one of the clearest models for what we will shortly see in Apuleius. That is, the 
moralizing effect of the dance and the improvement of character brought about through 
exemplary emulation are blended with Platonic models of viewing, wherein the spectator 
of beauty cannot control himself (οὐδὲ κατέχειν… δύνανται)176 and acquires self-
knowledge, seeing him- or herself “as if in a mirror” (ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ; cf. the 
discussion of this Platonic phrase and its Nachleben in chapter 3). Indeed, at the end of 
the dialogue, Lycinus depicts the internal reaction his interlocutor will have, if he attends 
the spectacle as a viewer, as a metamorphosis and a conversion of the soul. Similarly to 
Circe’s potion, he says, a viewer “drinks down the drugs” of the spectacle; unlike 
Odysseus and his companions, though, the viewer does not grow the head of an ass or the 
heart of a pig (οὐκ ὄνου κεφαλὴν ἢ συὸς καρδίαν ἕξεις), but has a transformation of the 
soul through enchantment (θελχθήσῃ) and pleasure (ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς). Just as Homer 
describes the golden wand of Hermes, the narrator concludes, the dance “charms the 
eyes” (ὄµµατα θέλγει) of the viewer and “rouses [his mind] to wakefulness” (ὑπνώοντας 
ἐγείρει). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 It should be noted that we saw this pattern – exempla for pursuit and avoidance – in all of the passages 
on exemplarity, including those that made explicit reference to a speculum. From Terence and Livy to 
Seneca, Plutarch, and Lucian, the exemplary viewing of mirrors and mimesis seems to inspire the same 
external comparison between visible virtues of characters/lives and the reader’s social appearance. See 
Chaplin 2015 for more discussion of how Livian exempla function in precisely this manner.  
176 Cf. the obedient horse of the Phaedrus, which must “hold itself back from leaping on the beloved” 
(ἑαυτὸν κατέχει µὴ ἐπιπηδᾶν τῷ ἐρωµένῳ), while the disobedient horse refuses to respond to goads or 
whips (254a2): . Cf. also Alcibiades’ description of the effect of seeing the εἰκόνες of Socrates and 
listening to his words (215a4ff.): people become “dumbstruck and possessed (i.e. not in possession of 
themselves)” (ἐκπεπληγµένοι ἐσµὲν καὶ κατεχόµεθα).  
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  We know that Apuleius was, at least, aware of these various strands of the 
didactic mirror trope because he seems to quote Alcidamas’ Odyssey-κάτοπτρον at the 
end of his treatise de deo Socratis and, similarly to other writers of his milieu, to conflate 
a number of these traditions in that allusion. At DDS 158, at a point in the discussion 
where Apuleius searches for analogies for the figure of Socrates to more fully explicate 
his dual mastery of sapientia and divinatio, he resorts to a popular type of Homeric 
allegorical moralizing. He tells his addressee that one can discern exemplary models of 
behavior “in Homer as if in a large mirror” (DDS 158: an non apud Homerum, ut <in> 
quodam ingenti speculo, claritus cernis haec…officia). But just as in the Plutarchan 
mirror of lives or the exemplary speculum of personae,177 Homer-the-author is quickly 
replaced by his characters, who, in turn, become the behavioral models for imitation. As 
the first catoptric exemplum, Apuleius chooses Nestor, the Pylian orator, who “could 
warn [Achilles and Agamemnon] with exempla and charm them with speech” (exemplis 
moneat, oratione permulceat); the reason for such a choice is that Nestor was strong in 
prudentia and his words “flowed with sweetness” (dulcedine adfluere). Other Homeric 
exempla – Odysseus, Diomedes, and Calchas – follow after in quick succession; 
ultimately, they set up the conclusion of the treatise, at which point, Apuleius delivers a 
classic diatribe to his reader: the mirror of Homeric exempla and the way in which 
Socrates perfectly embodies all of the ideal character traits ought to “rouse the reader to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 We may adduce as evidence for the “mirror of characters” a passage from Cicero’s Pro Sexto Roscio 
Amerino, which Lada-Richard 2005, 345 also uses to trace the early history of the mirror of drama. At Pro 
Rosc. 47, Cicero discusses once again the mimetic verisimilitude of the personae of comedy: etenim haec 
conficta arbitror esse a poetis, ut effictos nostros mores in alienis personis expressamque imaginem 
nostrae vitae cotidianae videremus. 
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the study of wisdom” (ad studium sapientiae erigeris),178 engendering in him or her the 
desire to be praised “just as Accius praised Odysseus” (ut Accius Ulixen laudavit) and 
helping the reader to recognize the lessons about wisdom (sapientia) and prudence 
(prudentia) that “Homer teaches [us]” (Homerus docet) in the character of Odysseus.179 
We see in this complicated conflation of exemplary mirroring not merely a happenstance 
allusion to Alcidamas’ beautiful κάτοπτρον of the Odyssey, but indeed, a dense 
interweaving of text, character, and story into a triangulative and extraspective mirror of 
behavior. Not only are each of these characters paradoxically specula of Socrates, 
revealing elements of Socrates’ genius in their own admirable character traits, but 
together with Socrates they are held up as a mirror for the reader – both an exhortation 
towards and a model of doing philosophy. And just as in Lucian’s mirror of the dance, 
this concluding exemplary mirror of Homer has the effect of rousing the reader towards 
philosophy – towards a conversion to philosophy180 – through pleasurable words and 
stories. As the Pylian orator “charms” (permulcere)181 the quarreling Achilles and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Here, I follow Rohde’s conjecture, erigeris, for the corrupt text, as Harrison appears also to do in his 
translation (Harrison, et al. 2001). A good argument could be made on analogy to Lucian’s “mirror of the 
dance”, which “wakes up” (ἐγείρει) or “rouses” the mind to philosophical study “through pleasure” (ὑφ᾽ 
ἡδονῆς). The concept of waking up the sleeping mind ad studium sapientiae seems to be a propos for the 
traditional Cynic diatribe, but also has its Platonic antecedent in the famous discussion of the Phaedrus 
about the charming cicadas who put their unphilosophical listeners to sleep with a pleasurable song (see 
Phaedr. 258e6-259b2). 
179 On how this passage participates in the tradition of Homeric moralizing allegory, as exemplified, e.g., in 
Horace’s “other Ars Poetica” (Epist. 1.2), see Hunter 2014b. 
180 On the concept of the “conversion to philosophy”, which Apuleius models in some way or another in 
each of his works and which he exhorts his readers/listeners to through protreptic images, see again 
Fletcher 2014. 
181 It is useful to compare this word choice, permulcere, not only with the Prologue to the Met., as we will 
in chapter 4, but also with the biography of Plato, in which we hear of Socrates’ dream that the swan of 
Cupid flew out of his lap, “charming the ears of men and gods with its musical song” (canore musico 
auditus hominum deorumque mulcentem). This swan, of course, turns out to be Plato. This line represents 
one of the primary pieces of evidence for Richard Fletcher’s thesis that Apuleius’ version of Platonic 
philosophy is an aestheticized blend of ratio and oratio (Fletcher 2014). The exemplary reference to Nestor 
from the DDS adds one more piece of evidence to this position. 
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Agamemnon with his flowing and dulcis oratio, and warns them “with exempla”, so also 
the narrator of de deo Socratis shows us Homeric spectacles and attempts to charm our 
eyes (and souls) awake (cf. Lucian's ὄµµατα θέλγει above). 
  In our brief survey and exegesis of the didactic mirror trope, we have seen not 
only an increased frequency of usage of the metaphor in the Imperial period and the 
Second Sophistic but also a certain malleability of the speculum tradition and a 
willingness on the part of authors to blend previously separate models of mirror-
speculation. We saw in Seneca a masterful mixing of the Platonic mirror of self-
knowledge and dialectic with the erotic, female adornment function of the mirror in the 
concluding word voluptas; while in Plutarch, we encountered even words and phrases 
lifted directly from the Platonic γνῶθι σεαυτόν tradition and re-appropriated to the 
context of character adornment. Socrates himself became an authorizing voice for the 
didactic mirror into which beautiful and ugly viewers gaze in order to improve their 
internal virtue, and even Plato managed to take on an authoritative role in the 
extraspective mirror of deterrence. What all of these extraspective mirrors have in 
common, though, is an apparently un-Platonic model of selfhood, which conceives of the 
internal and external dichotomy entirely differently from the ideal found in Platonic 
dialogues: the self is the social self, embedded in and defined by social and political 
relationships. In every case, however, the didactic speculum inspires a metamorphosis, or 
a “conversion” of a sort. Along these lines, we may again see the Second Sophistic 
version of the didactic mirror as another instance of the high-stakes choice narrative. 
Lucian’s ironically didactic mirror of the dance could perhaps provide the most à propos 
analogy for what we will encounter in Apuleius. The way in which he takes Platonically 
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inflected concepts such as the εἰκόνες of the soul182 and divine possession from pleasure 
at a sight and combines them with an exemplary spectacle could be seen as a model for 
Apuleius’ parodic blending of traditions. When viewers stare into the “mirror of the 
dance”, they encounter ethical models for living – both positive and negative exempla – 
and are forced to feel a kind of dangerous stupefaction that could possess them to follow 
one of models, for better or for worse. 
 
2. The κάτοπτρον in Alcibiades I: 
	  
 Now that we have seen the appropriation and popularization of the exemplary 
mirror trope, it will be beneficial for us to analyze more closely the original Platonic 
model of selfhood and the illuminating mirror in order to see just how cleverly Apuleius 
jumps between two traditions as if performing a circus trick. When we transition to the 
Metamorphoses and consider the mirrors into which Lucius (and by extension, the 
reader) gaze, we will encounter the full spectrum of Plato’s complicated and ambivalent 
relationship to catoptric mimesis and Apuleius’ deep engagement with it. In what follows, 
however, we will open our discussion of Plato in the way one was expected to in 
antiquity, namely with Alcibiades I, where the “mirror of another’s soul” is the primary 
means for fulfilling the Delphic maxim, γνῶθι σεαυτόν. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Cf. Phaedrus 246a4ff., where Socrates develops a likeness, or an analogy for the soul: οἷον µέν ἐστι, 
πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ µακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος. Cf. also the 
εἰκόνες of Socrates in Symposium 215a5ff. 
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 While the question of the authenticity of this dialogue is still up in the air,183 the 
scholarly community is beginning to settle, it would seem, in favor of Platonic 
authorship.184 However, whether or not Plato wrote this dialogue is immaterial to my 
investigation, in a sense, because I am interested in how Apuleius and his contemporaries 
read this dialogue and considered it authentic rather than the modern communis opinio.185 
In this regard, it is important to note that the Alcibiades I was often the first Platonic text 
for a student of philosophy because it seemed to encompass in nuce Platonic questions 
that arise in the rest of the corpus.186 We know, too, that Apuleius himself read the 
dialogue because he quotes it in the Apologia.187 Though the Phaedrus and the 
Symposium were the most likely candidates for allusion and interpretation in the Second 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 The authenticity of Alcibiades I was never questioned in antiquity. In fact, Schleiermacher was the first 
to question the dialogue’s authenticity in the 19th century, explaining that the dialogue is “very 
insignificant and poor, and that to such a degree, that we cannot ascribe it to Plato” (Schleiermacher 1836, 
329). See Denyer 2001, 14-26 for a full exposition of the arguments for and against authenticity. Cf. 
Bartsch 2006. 
184 See Annas 1985; Goldin 1993; Pradeu 1999. See also Bartsch 2006, 41-2, whose reading of authenticity 
I am largely following here, particularly because she is also more interested in the dialogues reception than 
its relation to other dialogues. 
185 Denyer 2001, 14: “In ancient times, no one ever doubted that Plato wrote the Alcibiades. This is not 
because the ancients casually described as ‘Plato’s’ any work written in an approximately Platonic manner; 
on the contrary, several such works…were circulated under the description ‘bastards’ (νόθοι), to 
distinguish them from Plato’s lawful offspring…Nor was the absence of doubts about the authenticity of 
our Alcibiades due to any neglect of the dialogue. It was frequently read, and frequently cited under Plato’s 
name…Some thought indeed that the Alcibiades deserved to be the first dialogue read by someone starting 
to read Plato”. 
186 See Bartsch 2006, 41, who uses the phrase in nuce. For ancient testimonials, see Olympiodorus In 
Platonis Alcibiadem commentarii 10.18-11.6, who called this dialogue the ‘gateway’ (προπυλαίοις) to 
Platonic philosophy, and Proclus In Platonis Alcibiadem i 11.1-21, where Proclus explains how this 
dialogue represents a unitary and comprehensive view of all of Platonic philosophy and says that it is ‘the 
beginning of all philosophy, just as also self-knowledge is’ (ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ διάλογος ἁπάσης 
φιλοσοφίας, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ἡ ἑαυτῶν γνῶσις). Cf. Forde 1987, 222 (quoted in Bartsch 2006, 41): “The neo-
Platonist Iamblichus wrote that the Alcibiades I contains the whole philosophy of Plato, as in a seed. The 
Islamic sage and Platonic commentator Alfarabi concurs, saying in effect that in the Alcibiades I all the 
Platonic questions are raised as if for the first time.” 
187 In the Apologia, the quotation of Alcibiades I (Apol. 25.11) provides the definitional basis from which 
Apuleius begins to refute the main charge of using magic to seduce Pudentilla. The precise quotation only 
differs slightly from the transmitted text of Plato (see Hunink 1997, 89 ad loc.; cf. Helm’s apparatus in 
Helm 1963). 
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Sophistic,188 the Alcibiades I nevertheless provided a model of selfhood, erotic love, 
education, and fulfillment of the Delphic oracle that would be expounded upon in those 
later dialogues.189 Reframing the Platonic mirror in terms of adorning the self with virtue 
could thus be a play on this dialogue, which most clearly articulates what a self is. That 
ancient readers considered the question of selfhood to be the primary investigation of 
Alcibiades I is further proven by the subtitle that ancient commentators appended to it, 
“On the Nature of Man”.190 
 Before we analyze the mirror scene proper, we should consider briefly how Plato 
arrives at the mirror as a metaphor for seeing the soul. The dialogue opens with Socrates 
finally breaking a long held silence and professing his love for Alcibiades, whom he 
loved from afar up to the (dramatic) time that this dialogue takes place. Socrates was one 
of many ἐρασταί of Alcibiades, but he kept silent because his divine sign warned him to 
stay away. In the interim, though, Socrates observed Alcibiades, watching how he 
scorned many lovers in his youth because he was beautiful – like Narcissus, we may note 
– and put them to flight. With this playful opening, Plato subtly introduces a question, 
which, in turn, leads to the primary investigation of the dialogue: why does Socrates 
continue to pursue Alcibiades after his beauty has faded and all other lovers have left? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 See, e.g., Trapp 1990; Hunter 2012; Fletcher 2014. 
189 The dating of the Alcibiades I is also indeterminate. Denyer 2001 considers it to be a late dialogue on 
the grounds that Plato’s motivations for writing it may have been due to his own love affair with Dion of 
Syracuse and his own failed attempt to teach the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius. But I am inclined to side with 
Bartsch 2006, 42 that this represents an early work of Plato because it does not contain any of the analogies 
between the philosophic journey and θεωρία, on which the major middle and late dialogues are entirely 
based (see Nightingale 2004, among others). To suggest that Plato dispensed with this essential metaphor in 
a late dialogue, which was concerned with the same primary questions, seems to me more implausible than 
the notion that Plato had not yet developed this overarching metaphor for the philosophical journey when 
he wrote this text. Though, once again, the actual dating of the text does not so much matter for my 
interests, but rather, how ancient readers understood this dialogue in relation to the rest of the Platonic 
corpus. 
190 See Scott 2000, 82 for a discussion of the ancient commentator tradition. 
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The answer, we later find out, is that Socrates is an ἐραστής of Alcibiades’ soul, not of 
his body. In fact, all of Alcibiades’ other so-called ἐρασταί were never really lovers at all 
because all they wanted was Alcibiades’ body. Those so-called ‘lovers’ cease loving once 
the bloom of beauty disappears191; Socrates, on the other hand, is and always was the 
only ἐραστής of Alcibiades because he loves who Alcibiades truly is.192 While the line of 
argument to get to this point travels a rather circuitous route, the answer to this persistent 
question is the immediate consequence of the conclusion reached at 130c1-3, namely that 
a human being is nothing other than the soul.193 The model of selfhood in the Platonic 
paradigm is, therefore, abstracted from any external features that would traditionally 
define a person; it is the internal – what is beneath the exterior envelope of skin – that 
truly makes people who they are. As such, this set up for the later mirroring scene enables 
the development of an optical paradigm in which self-knowledge and true erotic love are 
more fully explicated.194 
 In light of this new Platonic model of selfhood, Socrates and Alcibiades attempt 
once again to solve the problem of fulfilling the Delphic oracle, and Socrates forges the 
way toward a new interpretation of the exhortation to know oneself by employing an 
analogy to the mirroring phenomenon that occurs between two eyes looking into one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Alcib. I 131c6ff.: εἰ ἄρα τις γέγονεν ἐραστὴς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου σώµατος, οὐκ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἄρα ἠράσθη 
ἀλλά τινος τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου…οὐκοῦν ὁ µὲν τοῦ σώµατός σου ἐρῶν, ἐπειδὴ λήγει ἀνθοῦν, ἀπιὼν οἴχεται; 
192 Alcib. I 131e8: τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον, ὅτι µόνος ἐραστὴς ἦν σός, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι τῶν σῶν: τὰ δὲ σὰ λήγει 
ὥρας, σὺ δ᾽ ἄρχῃ ἀνθεῖν. 
193 Alcib. I 130c1-3: ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ οὔτε σῶµα οὔτε τὸ συναµφότερόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, λείπεται οἶµαι ἢ µηδὲν 
αὔτ᾽ εἶναι, ἢ εἴπερ τί ἐστι, µηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον συµβαίνειν ἢ ψυχήν. 
194 See Wohl 2013, 46: “The observation that the soul is the self is thus offered as a key not only to self-
knowledge but also to true love: Socrates is Alcibiades’ only real erastēs…The paradigmatic eye is a 
lover’s eye and that into which it gazes is the eye of its beloved. In the context of the dialogue’s erotic 
scenario, then, the optical paradigm becomes paradigmatic for a mode of philosophical erōs”. 
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another. At 132d5, he asks what the Delphic oracle would mean if it addressed a human 
eye (I print below the entire interaction): 
Σωκράτης: σκόπει καὶ σύ. εἰ ἡµῶν τῷ ὄµµατι ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ συµβουλεῦον 
εἶπεν ‘ἰδὲ σαυτόν,’ πῶς ἂν ὑπελάβοµεν τί παραινεῖν; ἆρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπειν, 
εἰς ὃ βλέπων ὁ ὀφθαλµὸς ἔµελλεν αὑτὸν ἰδεῖν;   
Ἀλκιβιάδης: δῆλον.        
Σωκράτης: ἐννοῶµεν δὴ εἰς τί βλέποντες τῶν ὄντων ἐκεῖνό τε ὁρῷµεν ἅµα ἂν 
καὶ ἡµᾶς αὐτούς;    
Ἀλκιβιάδης: δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.   
Σωκράτης: ὀρθῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ὀφθαλµῷ ᾧ ὁρῶµεν ἔνεστί τι τῶν 
τοιούτων;     
Ἀλκιβιάδης: πάνυ γε.         
Σωκράτης: ἐννενόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐµβλέποντος εἰς τὸνὀφθαλµὸν τὸ πρόσωπον 
ἐµφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ὄψει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην 
καλοῦµεν, εἴδωλον ὄν τι τοῦ ἐµβλέποντος;    
Ἀλκιβιάδης: ἀληθῆ λέγεις.         
Σωκράτης: ὀφθαλµὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλµὸν θεώµενος, καὶ ἐµβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ 
βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ᾧ ὁρᾷ, οὕτως ἂν αὑτὸν ἴδοι.     
Ἀλκιβιάδης: φαίνεται.       
Σωκράτης: εἰ δέ γ᾽ εἰς ἄλλο τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βλέποι ἤ τι τῶν ὄντων, πλὴν εἰς 
ἐκεῖνο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅµοιον, οὐκ ὄψεται ἑαυτόν.     
Ἀλκιβιάδης: ἀληθῆ λέγεις.      
Σωκράτης: ὀφθαλµὸς ἄρ᾽ εἰ µέλλει ἰδεῖν αὑτόν, εἰς ὀφθαλµὸν αὐτῷ βλεπτέον, 
καὶ τοῦ ὄµµατος εἰς ἐκεῖνον  τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἡ ὀφθαλµοῦ ἀρετὴ 
ἐγγιγνοµένη: ἔστι δὲ τοῦτό που ὄψις;    
Ἀλκιβιάδης: οὕτως.       
Σωκράτης: ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ µέλλει γνώσεσθαι αὑτήν, εἰς 
ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλεπτέον, καὶ µάλιστ᾽ εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται ἡ 
ψυχῆς ἀρετή, σοφία, καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅµοιον ὄν; 
Ἀλκιβιάδης: ἔµοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.     
Σωκράτης: ἔχοµεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ 
εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστιν;  
Ἀλκιβιάδης: οὐκ ἔχοµεν.       
Σωκράτης: τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ᾽ ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καί τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ 
θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη µάλιστα. 
Ἀλκιβιάδης: φαίνεται.        
   
Socrates: Consider this. If [the Delphic oracle] spoke to our eye, as if to a man, 
advising, ‘See yourself’, how would we interpret its advice? Surely it means to 
look into that part of the eye into which, by looking, it would see itself, doesn’t it? 
Alcibiades: Clearly.         
Socrates: Do we understand what sorts of things we can look into to see both that 
thing and ourselves simultaneously?        
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Alcibiades: Obviously, you mean mirrors and such things as that, Socrates. 
Socrates: Exactly. And is there not also something similar to those things in the 
eye with which we see? 
Alcibiades: Indeed.         
Socrates: Have you taken notice of the fact that the face of the person looking 
into an eye appears in the pupil of the person directly opposite him, as if in a 
mirror? We call this part the korē because there is some image (eidōlon) of the 
person looking.   
Alcibiades: Quite right.        
Socrates: Then an eye, beholding another eye and looking into the very part of it 
that is best and by means of which it sees, would see itself.     
Alcibiades: It seems to be the case.        
Socrates: And if it should look into another one of the parts of a human being or 
anything else in reality except that to which this happens to be similar, it will not 
see itself.    
Alcibiades: To be sure.         
Socrates: And if an eye is to see itself, mustn’t it look into an eye, and 
specifically into that place of an eye in which the virtue of the eye happens to 
reside? And isn’t that the pupil, as it were?  
Alcibiades: Yes.          
Socrates: Well then, dear Alcibiades, isn’t this also true of the soul, that is, if it 
intends to know itself, it must look into a soul, and particularly into that part of it 
in which the virtue of the soul – wisdom – resides, and into any other part to 
which this happens to be similar?     
Alcibiades: It seems so, at least to me, Socrates.      
Socrates: Are we able to speak of any part of the soul more divine than that, 
which is the seat of knowing and thinking?       
Alcibiades: We cannot.         
Socrates: Then, this part of it is similar to the god, and someone looking into this 
and coming to know all that is divine – both the god and wisdom – would thus 
best know himself?   
Alcibiades: It seems so. 
 
At first glance, we can already see in nuce many themes that will recur in the Phaedrus 
mirroring scene – a scene to which we will return in chapter 3. Socrates presents here a 
strangely narcissistic model for intersubjective looking, which, together with Diotima’s 
speech in the Symposium, led Gregory Vlastos famously to criticize Plato’s entire erotic 
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theory as dismissive of whole and unique individuals in their own subjectivity.195 That is, 
Plato’s model of “erotic reciprocity” – a phrase David Halperin coined for the erotic 
encounter one finds in the Phaedrus – hides a strangely solipsistic or selfish motivation 
behind an idealized mode of viewing. Rather than seeing the other person, one sees the 
most divine part of his or her own soul through this paradoxical soul-catoptric 
encounter,196 and thereby, simultaneously theorizes the god and wisdom. Wohl critiques 
the problematic model this scene presents as follows: 
The philosopher-lover gazes into the eyes of his beloved and sees himself as a 
god. Self-knowledge becomes not only solipsistic but even onanistic. The other 
becomes irrelevant: his autonomy and alterity, his actual otherness, is elided both 
as a precondition of this mirroring – for we are told that the eye can only see itself 
in what is like itself… – and as the goal of this same mirroring, which is, after all, 
self-knowledge. The other disappears in the philosopher’s loving self-regard.197 
 
We will see a similar narcissism in the illumination scene of the Phaedrus, where the 
beloved looks into the eyes of the lover and “does not realize that he is seeing himself as 
if in a mirror”. In fact, as many have recently argued, Ovid’s Narcissus seems to be based 
in some way on the Platonic model from the Phaedrus.198 We could likewise add that, 
from the perspective of Apuleius, Alcibiades here prefigures a kind of Narcissus figure – 
a beautiful beloved who constantly rejects the advances of other lovers and eventually 
falls into a web of his own design; an ironic reading of this scene, such as we could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 See Vlastos 1981, 32: “Since persons in their concreteness are thinking, feeling, wishing, hoping, 
fearing beings, to think of love for them as love for objectifications of excellence is to fail to make the 
thought of them as subjects central to what is felt for them in love”. Cf. Nussbaum 1986, 156-99 for an 
alternative reading. For a trenchant critique of both Vlastos and Nussbaum, see Lawrence 2003. 
196 We may even go so far as to suggest that Apuleius recognized this solipsism involved in Platonic 
mirroring scenes and re-enacted it in the Haarspiegel, which elides the other person altogether by turning 
her into a mere object of viewing (to be analyzed in chapter 3). 
197 Wohl 2013, 47. However, for an alternative reading of Socrates’ erotic model as always embedded in 
conversation (and therefore, not solipsistic), see Nichols 2007. 
198 See Pellizer 1989; Egan 2004; Bartsch 2006. 
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expect from a “sophist” of the second century, might suggest that Socrates teaches 
Alcibiades with the mirror analogy how to become an island unto himself, one 
consequence of which is his later disastrous political career.199 To phrase it differently, 
one purpose of this passage is to educate Alcibiades in the acquisition of self-knowledge, 
which is held to be one of the quintessential goods in the Platonic framework,200 and 
thereby to teach Alcibiades virtue. But the didactic mirror in this scene does not promise 
to teach Alcibiades the kind of external virtue that one might consider socially good; it 
does not employ the mirror of exemplarity or deterrence to police Alcibiades’ actions or 
to educate him in socially acceptable behavior. The virtue it promises is the knowledge of 
the abstract, internal self, entirely divorced from social relations – much like the virtue 
Socrates possessed of not concerning himself with matters outside of himself. With the 
new model of selfhood in place, even looking into other people’s eyes – an activity 
whose eroticism Plato does not even acknowledge201 – or into other people’s souls for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Indeed, the Alcibiades I in its entirety could be feasibly read, together with the closing of the 
Symposium, as another attempt by Plato to absolve Socrates of any culpability in the failure to educate 
Alcibiades and in his subsequent terrible political career. The disastrous outcome of this charismatic 
figure’s involvement in Athenian affairs during the Peloponnesian war was remembered well into the 4th 
century, as is evidenced by the multiple accusations and apologies of Socrates for his association with him. 
Beyond the official charge against Socrates of ‘corrupting the youth’, which clearly referred to Alcibiades 
in particular, we know of others who maintained Socrates’ culpability in the matter even after his 
execution. For instance, we know of one Polycrates, who wrote an Accusation of Socrates, which, in turn, 
inspired Socrates’ followers to write formal apologies as well as informal accounts of Alcibiades’ life (e.g., 
Lysias’ Apology; the various eponymous Alcibiades dialogues written by Aeschines, Antisthenes, Euclides, 
and Phaedo, etc.). Cf. Denyer 2001, 1: “If anything could be used to substantiate the charge of corrupting 
the young men, it was Socrates’ association with the most spectacularly corrupted of them all, Alcibiades”. 
We may also note how Socrates “turns the tables on his accusers” (ibid. 226 ad loc. 132a1) just before our 
passage in question when he tells Alcibiades “not to be corrupted by the δηµός of the Athenians” (Alc. I 
132a1:  καὶ νῦν γε ἂν µὴ διαφθαρῇς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήµου), using the same language of corruption 
applied to him in the formal charge. See also Archie 2003, who reads the Alcibiades I as a complementary 
dialogue to Plato’s Apology that demonstrates Socrates’ defense in action through dialectic. 
200 Cf. Alc. I 131b4: εἰ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκειν…, where ἄρα denotes that the 
“possibility [of this condition] has just been realized” (Denyer 2001, 222 ad loc. 131b4). 
201 See Denyer 2001, 229 ad loc. 132c9-133c17: “Glaringly absent is explicit mention of how erotic are 
looks from, or into, someone’s eyes.” 
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that matter, does not lead to a real communion between souls or a truly intersubjective 
encounter; rather, it offers a strange, simultaneous communion with oneself and the 
divine.  
 Even in Plato’s time, this model of selfhood as a metaphysical soul abstracted 
from physical reality was rejected out of hand together with the pedagogical mirror, 
which offers a primarily solipsistic and narcissistic encounter with the self. Xenophon’s 
Socrates in his own Symposium, for instance, demonstrates how the mirror of the beloved 
Socrates inculcates viewers in Socratic virtues, such as ἐγκράτεια.202 In other words, the 
ἐρώµενος-mirror of transcendent self-knowledge we will find in the Phaedrus is 
appropriated to the realm of socially beneficial pedagogy. One might argue further that 
Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates in Plato’s Symposium puts forward a similar kind of 
pedagogical function for the Socratic image. But the point in turning to the 
intersubjective mirroring souls in Alcibiades I has been to prepare the ground for the 
argument that Apuleius’ conception of selfhood opens up options beyond Plato’s and that 
the purpose of the mirroring encounter is different. In the Platonic scene, the seeing 
eye/soul strips away the external reality in order to look beneath and acquire a deeper and 
more transcendent knowledge of the self.203 In Apuleius’ laus speculi of the ‘Socratic’ 
and philosophical didactic mirror, we will see him borrowing the Platonic terminology of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 On this passage and its relationship to Alcibiades I, see Wohl 2013; Cf. Goldhill 1998. 
203 In fact, even before the eye/soul mirror discussion, there is a some playful, euphemistic banter between 
Socrates and Alcibiades about taking their clothes off. See Alc. I 132a-b, where Socrates claims that, 
though Erechtheus is “fair-of-face” (εὐπρόσωπος), “it is necessary to see a man stripped” (ἀλλ᾽ ἀποδύντα 
χρὴ αὐτὸν θεάσασθαι) before one can assess his character. That is, in the set up to the mirror of the 
metaphysical self, the dialogue frames the process of seeing as a kind of stripping away of the external veils 
that obscure reality. In the case of Alcibiades, Socrates is trying to strip away his external self – the self 
beloved by the people and externally beautiful – and reach behind to the soul. To my point, what is at issue 
is how to reach beyond one’s ‘beautiful face’ (εὐπρόσωπος), where Plato uses a derivative word of 
πρόσωπον, the theatrical mask, which is translated into Latin as persona.  
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the acquisition of self-knowledge, but using it in the context of a different conception of 
selfhood and an alternative mode of didaxis. Whereas in Plato Socrates must undress the 
object of vision before seeing the internal self (and simultaneously, his own internal self), 
in Apuleius there is an alternative definition of the self, in which he sees mirror-gazing 
and philosophical speculation as tools for external transformation. 
 
3. The Didactic Speculum of Apologia 15-16: 
	  
 We saw in part one of this chapter how many authors of this time period tend to 
collect mirror tropes from different sources and combine them in interesting and often ill-
defined ways. We will see Apuleius doing something similar in blending two separate 
mirroring traditions in his laus speculi – namely, the mirror as a philosophical tool of 
introspection and what I have labeled the extraspective speculum – and offering to his 
readers a choice between them. That is, similarly to Plutarch and Seneca, he appropriates 
the ‘Socratic’ didactic mirror tradition but transforms it into a mixture of pleasurable 
optical illusions and grotesque spectacles that can be categorized in the “ethical 
deterrence” model of exemplarity. Moreover, just as we saw Plutarch borrowing phrases 
from the Platonic tradition and reusing them for un-Platonic ends (e.g., female 
adornment), Apuleius takes phrases and concepts from the Platonic realm of viewing in 
his representation of the encounter with the mirror, but introduces an alternative model of 
selfhood and a different pedagogical end point. Representing the activity of mirror-gazing 
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as a kind of Platonic θεωρία (e.g., with terms such as inspectio),204 Apuleius suggests that 
the speculum can offer a deeply philosophical and transcendent experience. But the 
sublime encounter in front of the mirror only appears to educate the viewer in virtue and 
self-knowledge. Upon further inspection, we will also find that the philosopher “ought” 
(philosophus debet) to look into the mirror because the mirror reveals interesting 
delusions, or spectacles that are worth seeing. 
 Let us begin by looking at the paideutic activity of mirror-gazing that Apuleius 
recommends to his accuser in the Apologia. After waxing poetic about the superiority of 
the mirror’s mimesis over that of the material arts in Apologia 14 (to be discussed in 
chapter 2), Apuleius opens Apologia 15 by citing the ‘Socratic’ tradition on the 
educational benefits of the mirror: 
an turpe arbitraris formam suam spectaculo assiduo explorare? an non Socrates 
philosophus ultro etiam suasisse fertur discipulis suis, crebro ut semet in speculo 
contemplarentur, ut qui eorum foret pulchritudine sibi complacitus impendio 
procuraret, ne dignitatem corporis malis moribus dedecoraret, qui uero minus se 
commendabilem forma putaret sedulo operam daret, ut uirtutis laude turpitudinem 
tegeret? adeo uir omnium sapientissimus speculo etiam ad disciplinam morum 
utebatur. 
 Do you judge that it is shameful to explore one’s own form in a continual 
spectacle? Is not Socrates the philosopher said to have actually exhorted his 
disciples that they contemplate themselves frequently in the mirror, in order that 
one who was pleasing to himself in beauty might take great care not to disfigure 
the dignity of his body with evil character, and in order that one who considered 
himself less commendable in form might continually labor to hide his ugliness 
with the praise of virtue? In this way, the wisest man of all used a mirror even for 
the discipline of character.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 See OLD s.v. 3. Cf. Hunink (1997) ad loc. 13.8 on the word play of inspectio and its more common 
association with “theoretical examination”. Cf. the discussion of inspicere in the introduction. 
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“Exploring” one’s own form is phrased ironically in the language of theatre and spectacle 
(spectaculum), but even in the word choices of the first line, we can see a problematic 
construction of internal versus external realities in the speculum. Explorare is a rather 
strange verb to use for viewing one’s form, as it is a term more usually applied to 
investigation of a place205; and in Apuleius it seems most often to refer to a kind of 
dialectic examination through question and answer or a philosophical investigation. In the 
former sense, Aemilianus ought to have “explored” Apuleius before taking him to court 
(Apol. 2: qui si quippiam veri in me explorasset); and similarly, Milo interrogates Lucius 
about his place of origin and family through a dialectic “examination” (Met. 1.26: iam et 
de patria nostra et eius primoribus ac denique de ipso praeside scrupulosissime 
explorans: cf. “the scrupulous reader” in Met. 9.30: Lector scrupulosus). Elsewhere in the 
Apologia, moreover, Apuleius speaks of “exploring books” about natural philosophy 
(Apol. 40: libros ἀνατοµῶν Aristoteli et explorare studio) – an activity that authorizes his 
strange investigations of fish. But perhaps most resonant for making sense of this scene, 
Lucius looks at the back of Photis’ head at the opening of their sexual tryst in 2.8 and 
wants to “explore her aspect” (explorassem habitudinem). In the visual sphere, this 
“investigation” may be engaging with intromissive or penetrative optical paradigms, as I 
will suggest in chapter 3, offering a means for the viewer to get inside or penetrate the 
external forma. In Met. 2.8-9, in particular, Lucius’ exploration of Photis’ habitudo 
strangely leads to a eulogy of her metamorphic, mirror-esque hair, which changes 
appearance over time and returns a “more pleasing image” (imaginem gratiorem) to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Consider, e.g., its origin as a military term, used for scoping out a landscape (OLD 1; TLL I: speciatim et 
technice in re militare). 
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whoever gazes into it. Moreover, it sets up the eventual terms of the sexual tryst, which 
allude quite openly to a choice between models of penetration.206  
 In addition to the philosophical type of viewing we find here, the adjective 
modifying spectaculo – assiduo – implies that the object of visualization is “constantly” 
changing. Coming on the heels of Apologia 14, where the mirror is eulogized precisely 
because it registers change over time (see chapter 2), the “continual” inspection Apuleius 
implicitly advocates here suggests a perpetual, external transformation. In other words, 
why would one need a “continual” inspection unless the object being viewed was in 
constant flux? To top it off, moreover, the thing that is in a process of metamorphosis, 
one’s forma, is compared to a spectacle (spectaculum). The word-play in this phrase – 
i.e., a speculum that reveals a perpetual spectaculum to the viewer – may be intended to 
conjure up notions of the educative function of theatre, the very kind of didaxis about 
which Plato is exceedingly anxious in Republic 10; and in this spectaculum-speculum, we 
may also be reminded also of the spectacle of Lucian’s κάτοπτρον of the pantomime 
dance, which offers both “self-knowledge” to the viewer and an “exemplary” model of 
how to behave.207 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Another passage that is of interest here is the opening biography of Plato in Apuleius’ de Platone (de 
Platone 1.2), in which Socrates “looks upon” (aspexit) the external form of Plato (habitudo) and divines 
“his internal character from his external face” (ingenium…intimum de exteriore conspicatus est facie). In 
chapter 4, I will return to this passage and discuss how it plays with superficial and deep modes of viewing. 
207 See Lada-Richards 2005, 349-50, who applies the broader category of the paideutic function of the 
mirror to pantomime: “…pantomime fulfills a function attributed elsewhere to theatre in its entirety, that is 
to say, it becomes an instructional, corrective mirror, eliciting from the spectating public the twofold 
response of refraining from wrongdoing all the while embracing righteousness and virtue”. Though Plato’s 
Socrates does not specifically refer to the mirror of theater, the educative function of the Athenian stage 
certainly represents one of the avenues through which poetry and the “mirror of poetry” became so 
influential. His rejection of the mimetic mirror in Republic 10 can thus be seen as a rejection of tragedy just 
as much as it is a refusal to admit Homer into the ideal Republic. 
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 If we review Lucian’s de Saltatione again for a brief moment, we may get more 
interpretive purchase on the spectaculum-speculum here. Earlier in that dialogue, there is 
a long discussion of the difference between the masks of tragedy and pantomime: the 
mask of tragedy reveals the virtue or vice of the character through the external facial 
expression fixed in its representational form; but the mask of pantomime, which is neutral 
in its pose, is more fluid in its semiosis, and tends to adapt as a mimetic device to the 
motions and words of the dancer. As A. K. Petrides has recently shown, a spectator can 
glean from the external appearance of the tragic mask the virtue or vice of the character 
who wears it, and this feature of tragedy depends largely on the physiognomic theories of 
discerning inner character from external characteristic; but Lucian’s “mirror of the 
dance”, which uses the more semiotically flexible mask of pantomime, is open to a 
broader range of interpretations precisely because it changes over time with the 
movement of the performer.208 And the connection between Apuleius’ mirror, by which 
one “explores his or her own form in a continual spectacle”, and Lucian’s mirror of the 
pantomime dance and mask becomes stronger when we consider the fact that this pun on 
the spectaculum-speculum, though initially merely playful, acquires a new meaning in the 
concluding invective of chapter 16: Aemilianus, as we soon learn, fails to look at his face 
in a mirror, which looks exactly like the stock character of Thyestes! 
 Returning to the passage at hand, though “exploring” one’s own form is phrased 
in the language of spectacle, Socrates is nevertheless invoked as the first exemplar in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 See Petrides 2013. The value of this motive-mimesis as evidence for the diachronic mirror, which we 
will see in the next chapter, should not be overlooked here. We may consider, for instance, the theorization 
of the ancient mask, discussed in Dupont 2001, 78: “Broadly speaking, in Greek tragedy as in Roman 
tragedy, text and actors serve to animate timeless masks, that is to say, to integrate them within the 
transient, linear, irreversible time of a performance; otherwise these masks would retain the fixity of a 
statue or a corpse.” Cf. also Wiles 2007, 237-260 on “sacred viewing” and the mask. 
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using mirrors for the philosophical endeavor of cultivating virtue. Just as in the instances 
I noted in my literary history, the ‘Socratic’ model is strangely anti-Platonic, inasmuch as 
the purpose or goal of philosophical contemplation (contemplarentur) in the mirror is 
either to preserve the dignitas of the viewer’s body or to hide (tegere)209 its shame 
(turpitudo). There is a direct correlation between Socrates’ wisdom (sapientissimus) and 
his use of the mirror as an object for the cultivation of virtue (ad disciplinam morum). 
But the kind of virtue that this inspires does not come from an experience of the Forms or 
a true vision of beauty; it does not even come from a true dialectic encounter with an 
‘other’. Rather, it represents an ironic twist on the Delphic tradition of self-knowledge, 
which imagines virtue as an internal transformation that mirrors an external reality. In the 
Apuleian model, the ‘self-knowledge’ one acquires from ‘Socratic’ mirror-gazing 
concerns knowledge of one’s physical appearance – much as we will see in Ovid’s ironic 
play on the γνῶθι σεαυτόν tradition in the Narcissus episode210 – which then causes the 
viewer to modify his/her internal “appearance”, or “to adorn the inner man”. Of course, 
as we saw above, Apuleius is not the first to cite Socrates as the fount of this tradition. 
However, we should note the strangeness of Apuleius’ particular blend of “theoretical 
speculation” (contemplor) and metamorphosis: this is no Platonic Socrates, who only 
uses the mirror of dialectic or the κάτοπτρον of erotic mania to acquire knowledge of an 
inner self – the soul – and to experience a theoretic encounter with the Forms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 As Hunink 1997, 62 ad loc. points out, there is no need to emend tegeret to tergeret as Watt 1994, 518 
conjectured. One should also note the recurrence of the verb at the end of Apol. 16, in a passage that I will 
argue is another refracted allusion to the Platonic self-knowledge tradition (see below). Moreover, if 
Diogenes Laertius’ later version of the same story is any indication, the concept shows up there as well, 
with Socrates using the verb ἐπικαλύπτειν. 
210 See Bartsch 2006, 86-7, who convincingly argues that Tiresias’ prophecy for Narcissus – “provided that 
he does not know himself” – represents an ironic twist on the self-knowledge tradition found in the 
Phaedrus. See chapters 2 and 3 for further discussion. 
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 Apuleius then proceeds to explain why a philosopher in particular “should” 
(debet) look into a mirror211: he ought to consider not only the phenomenon of similarity 
(similitudo) – that great mimetic quality Apuleius praises in Apologia 14 – but also the 
reason (ratio) behind the similarity. To conclude chapter 15, he offers an exposition on 
the science of optics, dropping famous names from moral and natural philosophy to 
legitimize his argument: 
num, ut ait Epicurus, profectae a nobis imagines uelut quaedam exuuiae iugi 
fluore a corporibus manantes, cum leue aliquid et solidum offenderunt, illisae 
reflectantur et retro expressae contrauersim respondeant an, ut alii philosophi 
disputant, radii nostri seu mediis oculis proliquati et lumini extrario mixti atque ita 
uniti, ut Plato arbitratur, seu tantum oculis profecti sine ullo foris amminiculo, ut 
Archytas putat, seu intentu aeris facti, ut Stoici rentur, cum alicui corpori 
inciderunt spisso et splendido et leui, paribus angulis quibus inciderant resultent 
ad faciem suam reduces atque ita, quod extra tangant ac uisant, id intra speculum 
imaginentur. 
[He ought to consider] whether it is the case that, as Epicurus says, images 
proceed from us, as if they are a kind of fleece streaming from our bodies in a 
constant flow; or whether, when they meet with something smooth and solid, they 
are reflected after striking it and they correspond, transferred back in the opposite 
direction; or if it is as other philosophers suggest, that rays coming from us are 
liquified in the middle of our eyes, mixed with external light and thus united, as 
Plato judges; or whether it is that rays, after departing from our eyes without any 
outside support, as Archytas thinks, or after being formed from the exertion of air, 
as the Stoics think, leap back when they (the rays) have fallen on any dense, 
bright, and smooth object with equal angles of incidence and reflection; and 
returning back into the viewer’s face, they thus make an image within the mirror 
of that which they touch and see on the outside. 
This tour through intellectual history, though only a partially true representation of the 
various optical theories on offer in Apuleius’ day, is ostensibly meant to prove why a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Apol. 15: quid, quod nec ob haec debet tantummodo philosophus speculum inuisere; nam saepe oportet 
non modo similitudinem suam, uerum etiam ipsius similitudinis rationem considerare. 
94	  
	  
philosopher “should” look into a mirror. On first glance, it seems to be because a 
philosopher likes to understand phenomena, such as how “mirroring” works. However, 
how does meditation on optics qualify as the sine qua non of philosophical activity? If 
the story about Socrates’ exhortation to students to look in the mirror seems a strange 
twist for a Platonicus philosophus on the γνῶθι σεαυτόν tradition, then in what sense is 
optical theory a necessary tool in the repertoire of a Platonist? Moreover, the conclusion 
Apuleius draws for this scene, employing a “self-confident rhetorical question”,212 is that 
a philosopher ought to “track down” (vestigare) all things and inquire into and look at all 
mirrors.213 This word – vestigare – becomes nearly synonymous with philosophical 
activity in the Apologia, especially as Apuleius comes to the end of the subsidiary 
charges; at that point he quotes the myth of the Pheadrus to show how the Platonists have 
“investigated (vestigare) loftier things in heaven and stood on the ridge of the world”.214 
Philosophical “investigation”, therefore, is linked not only to mirror-gazing, but also to 
undergoing a Platonic ascent of the sort that the soul experiences in the Phaedrus 
myth.215 That is to say, a Platonicus philosophus ought to look into a mirror because the 
mirror provides the means to have a transcendent encounter, to ascend the ladder and to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 See Hunink 1997, 64 ad loc. 16.1. 
213 See Apol. 16.1: uideturne uobis debere philosophia haec omnia uestigare et inquirere et cuncta specula, 
uel uda uel suda soli, uidere? 
214 See Apol. 64.12: ceterum Platonica familia nihil nouimus nisi festum et laetum et sollemne et superum et 
caeleste. quin altitudinis studio secta ista etiam caelo ipso sublimiora quaepiam uestigauit et in extimo 
mundi tergo stetit. scit me uera dicere Maximus, qui τὸν ὑπερουράνιον τόπον et οὐρανοῦ νῶτον legit in 
Phaedro diligenter. For the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος in the Phaedrus, which Apuleius quotes here, see Phaedr. 
247b-d. Cf. also Apol. 27.7 and 61.6 for more references to philosophical ‘investigation’. Of particular 
interest as well is Apol. 41.24 where Apuleius again quotes Plato as his antecedent in philosophical 
‘investigation,’ even in connection with his inspection of fish. 
215 This is akin to what Fletcher 2014 calls the “catascopic flight” of the soul, which one encounters in the 
pseudo-Apuleian de Mundo. At p. 217, he argues not only that the allusion to the Phaedran flight of the 
soul in Apologia 64 simultaneously alludes to opening of de Mundo, where the soul scours the earth and the 
cosmos through philosophical flight, but also that Apuleius connects this all to the “diligent reading” of the 
judge, Maximus. See below on the connection between reading and mirror-gazing. 
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traipse upon the ridge of the heavens, so to speak. But how does understanding optics 
actually accomplish this?  
 In order to answer this question, it will be useful for us to interrogate the names 
that appear in Apuleius’ list and to trace the possible backdrop for his optical theories. 
Some scholars have considered the above quotation to be a somewhat accurate depiction 
of optical theories, citing, e.g., Lucretius (DRN 4.26-468) as the source for 
Epicureanism,216 or suggesting Platonic (Tim. 45b-46a) or Pythagorean antecedents to 
this passage.217 However, much of the language used to describe each of the theories, 
though explained as separate and disparate schools of thought on vision, blends optical 
models in a way reminiscent of the Phaedrus, which itself borrows from multiple 
contradictory theories (e.g., intromission, extromission, etc.) in its tactile description of 
erotic reciprocity. That is, in a transcendent episode of mirroring at the climax of Plato’s 
sublime myth in the Phaedrus (Phaedr. 255c1ff.), the kinetics of erotic desire are mapped 
onto the optical theories available to Plato. Borrowing from Empedoclean flux theory to 
describe desire and erotic mania,218 Plato depicts beauty as a physical substance that 
flows (τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ῥεῦµα) from the body of the beloved; after filling the lover up 
with beauty, it bounces off of him “just as a wind or an echo leaping back from smooth 
and solid surfaces is carried back from where it came” (καὶ οἷον πνεῦµα ἤ τις ἠχὼ ἀπὸ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 See Hunink (1997) 64 ad loc. ‘Epicurus’: “in the Epicurean theory, all objects constantly emit eidola 
(simulacra), which are perceived by the senses…this Epicurean notion is well known from the poem of 
Lucretius…and Apuleius may well have been inspired by this poet rather than by Epicurus himself…the 
terminology used here seems to point in this direction too, especially the stately expression illisae - 
respondeant, which recalls Lucretius’ language”. However, Hunink is wrong to suggest this about illisae, 
as the term does not occur in Lucretius in the context of mirroring, but rather in the context of erotic love 
and the interaction that happens between two lovers (see DRN 4.1080).  
217 See, e.g., Bingenheimer 1993, 159 n. 94, in which he explains Apuleius’ theory about the invisibility of 
Daemons by reference to Apuleius’ discussion of optics in the Apologia.  
218 See Yunis 2011, 152-3 ad loc. 251b2. 
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λείων τε καὶ στερεῶν ἁλλοµένη πάλιν ὅθεν ὡρµήθη φέρεται); at this point, it flows back 
into the beautiful beloved “through the eyes” (πάλιν…διὰ τῶν ὀµµάτων ἰόν). It is at that 
moment that the beloved unwittingly acquires self-knowledge and feels a reciprocal kind 
of desire, which Socrates calls an εἴδωλον.  
 Returning to the discussion of optics from the Apologia, not only are imagines 
conceived of as physical and tactile entites (quaedam exuviae) paradoxically “flowing 
from our bodies in a constant stream” (iugi fluore a corporibus manantes) – in a manner 
similar to the Phaedran model of desire (cf. ῥεῦµα; ἀπορρόη) – but they are also said to 
be reflected (reflectantur) and translated in the opposite direction (retro expressae 
contrauersim respondeant) precisely when they hit (offenderunt) something “smooth and 
solid” (leue aliquid et solidum). In a similar fashion to the Platonic antecedent, the light 
involved in mirroring mixes images of water and wind – such as the echo – and how they 
interact with “smooth and solid” surfaces: compare leue...et solidum with λείων τε καὶ 
στερεῶν. We could even see in the excessive repetition of reciprocity (reflectantur 
…retro...contraversim respondeant) a translation of Plato’s πνεῦµα which travels back 
(πάλιν) just as the specular reciprocity of the flow of beauty returns (πάλιν) to the 
beautiful one. Even Plato’s image of beauty “bouncing back” (ἁλλοµένη πάλιν) like wind 
is retained here in the word resultent, while the phrase πάλιν διὰ τῶν ὀµµάτων ἰόν – a 
phrase that was of great importance in Second Sophistic Platonizing literature, as we will 
see in chapter 3 – may be translated by the line ad faciem suam reduces. 
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 This deep engagement with the Phaedrus, which has generally gone unnoticed in 
the scholarship on this passage,219 both implicitly suggests the connection between the 
mirror and self-knowledge and subtly sets up the concluding protreptic of the coming 
invective in chapter 16. If we, therefore, ask again why a philosopher should look into a 
mirror, the answer seems to be clear at this point. It is not merely the superficial and 
facile notion that the ‘Socrates’ of the didactic mirror-tradition is purported to have 
advocated, namely that the mirror exhorts beautiful and ugly people to virtue for some 
kind of inner transformation that corresponds to the outer; nor is it the apparent non-
sequitur that ‘philosophers’ care about physical and natural phenomena, such as optics. 
Philosophers ought to care about mirroring and theoretical speculation because it can lead 
to a Platonic kind of self-knowledge and investigation (vestigare) of the upper realm. 
That is, the erotic reciprocity of catoptrics is one of the choices on offer through mirror 
speculation. 
 On the other side, however, Apuleius provides the alternative choice by 
expanding his discussion of optics to account for all types of mirrors, even those which 
are apparently deceptive, such as convex or concave mirrors – the optical illusions that 
Socrates is anxious about in the Republic. In fact, in Apuleius’ explanation, a comparison 
of different types of mirrors enables the viewer to develop reasons as to why flat mirrors 
reflect “equal gazes and images” (pares optutus et imagines), or why in convex or 
concave mirrors, objects seem smaller or larger. Further mirror speculation enables a 
philosopher to distinguish when and why the left hand changes (permutentur) with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 McCreight 1991, 466 is the exception, who notes that the hapax legomenon, proliquati, could be 
Apuleius’ attempt to translate the Platonic word ἀπορρόη. 
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right or why an imago at one time hides (tum recondat) in the same mirror and at another 
time comes out (tum exerat). The play with categories of transformation juxtaposes 
internal and external realities, and even in the mirror, an imago can hide or come out. 
Thus, while optics have the potential to show a viewer one path to a philosophical 
enlightenment, an alternative model of looking into mirrors – such as one finds, e.g., in 
Seneca’s Hostius Quadra, whose self-knowledge is another distorted version of the 
Platonic γνῶθι σεαυτόν tradition220 – can offer to the viewer a series of pleasurable 
deceptions. But even this model of looking at illusions has its philosophical exemplars, 
such as Archimedes who was “most memorable” (memorandus) because he frequently 
and diligently “looked into” a mirror (inspexerat). In other words, the very features of 
mirroring that Plato is anxious about in the Republic – i.e., optical illusions due to 
refraction – are other elements of philosophical learning for Apuleius. For the 
philosopher who knows how to look and see – that is, for the one who “look[s] diligently 
and often into the mirror” (quod inspexerat speculum saepe ac diligenter) – even 
mutations or distorting features of reality can have a didactic function.221 
 In Apologia 16, Apuleius concludes the laus speculi with a piece of invective 
against his accuser. He turns to Aemilianus and says: 
quem tu librum, Aemiliane, si nosses ac non modo campo et glebis, uerum etiam 
abaco et puluisculo te dedisses, mihi istud crede, quanquam teterrimum os tuum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 See again Bartsch 2006. 
221 We may compare this idea to Lucretius’ exposition of optical illusions in book 4 of DRN. A particularly 
illustrative example occurs at 4.414-19, where the narrator explains an illusory phenomenon of staring into 
a puddle no more than a finger’s depth, but one in which “you seem to look down at clouds and see the sky 
and bodies hidden marvelously in a sky under the earth” (nubila despicere et caelum ut videare videre/ 
corpora mirande sub terras abdita caelo). Here, just as in Apuleius, the philosopher who has been initiated 
into Epicureanism – i.e., the reader who has learned from Lucretius – is able to dispel the confusion 
engendered by this deceptive natural phenomenon. 
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minimum a Thyesta tragico demutet, tamen  profecto discendi cupidine speculum 
inuiseres et aliquando relicto aratro mirarere tot in facie tua sulcos rugarum. 
 
And if you had come to know this book (i.e., Archimedes’ book on mirrors), 
Aemilianus, and if you had given yourself over not only to the field and clods, but 
also to the abacus and chalk, believe me about this, even though your utterly 
grotesque face differs minimally from the tragic Thyestes, you would nonetheless 
be looking into a mirror out of a desire for learning and sometimes, leaving the 
plow aside, you would be marveling at the very many furrows of wrinkles on your 
face.   
 
This dense passage, combining a number of philosophical traditions into an invective 
masterpiece, should be considered as a blending of three separate tropes. In the first 
trope, Apuleius highlights his own literary expertise by arguing that Aemilianus would 
have made different life choices if he had read certain books. As is fitting to the genre of 
an Apology, moreover, Apuleius’ suggestion that Aemelianus ought to have approached 
his high-stakes choice differently reminds the reader/audience that they, too, have a 
choice between Apuleius’ and Aemilianus’ models of living. The way in which Apuleius 
makes the leap from looking at various types of mirrors to Aemilianus’ ignorance of 
books appears somewhat disconnected at a superficial glance, but if we think back to the 
extraspective mirror-text, the gap seems to shrink. Because of a failure to read, 
Aemilianus has never truly contemplated life choices and has never compared his own 
choices with the exemplary, triangulative mirror of a character or narrator. Had he spent 
time reading, on the other hand, he would have chosen to mirror-gaze and he might have 
chosen to do so in the correct manner.  
 In the next movement, which brings the reader back to the spectaculum-speculum 
word play at the beginning of chapter 15, Apuleius claims that Aemilianus would have 
received a kind of self-knowledge through mirror speculation – at least insofar as he 
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would have realized how little his face (os) differs (demuto) from the tragic Thyestes in 
its appearance. If the former metamorphic capacity of the mirror and its ability to 
transform visual reality with optical effects is emphasized in the appeal to the ‘Socratic’ 
didactic speculum and the tour of optical theory, the transformation that happens here is a 
lack of change, or a lack of differentiation (demuto) between the real viewer and a 
representational type.222 The mirror image is once again framed as a theatrical display, 
which, in line with Lucian’s mirror of dance, could have didactic value according to 
ancient theories of mimesis223: for an audience member witnessing a performance of the 
Thyestes, the tragic figure could inspire self-reflection and teach a viewer “what to 
choose and what to flee” (cf. Lucian de Salt. 81: ἅ τε χρὴ αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ ἃ φεύγειν 
µεµαθηκότες). Essential to my point, moreover, the mask, or the imago of theater and 
pantomime, was always viewed as a kind of metamorphosis, not only of characters who 
transform over the course of the play,224 but also of the dancer whose pantomime mask 
changes in its affective influence on viewers depending on the movements and words of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Apuleius is apparently the only ancient author to use the verb demuto in this particular type of 
construction, in which a real thing “differs from” a mimesis or vice versa. The intransitive usage of the verb 
is borrowed from Plautus (see TLL.2; cf. Lee 2005, 154 on Flor. 16.30 ad. loc.); however, the four 
intransitive usages cited in Plautus all still refer to some kind of change or transformation, whether it be 
changing one’s mind (Ps. 555 & 566), changing a date of payment (Vid. 91), or transforming one’s 
character (Mil. Glor. 1130, where Palaestrio questions whether the ‘adulterous soldier has changed his 
ways’). The closest we get in Plautus to the ‘difference’ between a mimesis and an original is in a line 
where two characters have a dance off and the first one to ‘slip up’ (demuto) loses (Stich. 725). On the 
other similar usage in Apuleius, see Florida 16.30, where Apuleius promises that a written version of a 
speech ‘will differ very little’ (paululum demutabit) from the original. Cf. Lee 2005, 154 on Flor. 16.30 ad 
loc., who explains in particular some of the textual problems in this passage. 
223  See Lada-Richard 2005 for discussion of the didactic value of mimesis in Lucian; for didactic mimesis 
more generally, see Halliwell 2002. 
224 See, e.g., Wiles 1991, 129-49 for discussion of the metamorphic nature of Plautine masks. 
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the dancer or actor.225 That is, the mask is not only a theatrical device that an actor can 
don or take off to adopt recognizable personae, but can also represent a selfhood in flux 
and subject to change both for the actor who wears it and the viewer who sees it.226 
 There is an irony, however, in Apuleius’ hypothetical situation hidden in the fact 
that Aemilianus’ self-knowledge, acquired through seeing his own face in the mirror, 
provides a recognition that his face is like a mask from theater. No doubt, in the 
framework of the extraspective mirror, one could argue that there is a similarity between 
a mask and a mirror in as much as both represent an exemplar of some sort – either a 
paradigm presented for a viewer to follow or a negative exemplum for avoidance.227 As 
we will see shortly, though, Apuleius is also clearly blending in the terms of Platonic 
self-knowledge, in which mirror speculation allows a vision of an internal, metaphysical 
soul. However, Aemilianus would not see his true character or soul, and in fact, he would 
not even see his own face. Rather, he would only see how his face is a type known from 
myth and spectacle – a type which ironically represents excessive consumption and 
delusion. Thus, in this cleverly constructed invective, Aemilianus becomes the wrong 
kind of viewer, which, in turn, provides a moral lesson from mythology. It is not his 
grotesque face that is the problem; rather, it is the fact that, given the chance to see his 
grotesque face, Apuleius implies, he would not have followed the Socratic dictum to 
mirror-gaze for the purpose of compensating for turpitudo corporis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 See Petrides 2013 on the semiotic variability of the pantomime mask. 
226 See Wiles 2007, 263 on selfhood as a series of shifting personae in Roman culture. Cf. Cicero de 
Oratore 2.221-2 for a description of the process of adopting new personae (quoted in Wiles). Cf. also 
Wiles 1991 on the metamorphic mask of the stage. 
227 We may compare this once again with the passage quoted above from Cicero’s Pro Archia, which, as 
Bartsch 2006, 126 has shown, plays with the double meaning of imago as ancestor mask and as reflection 
in the mirror: “The term imago, like the mirror itself…provided a link between reflection and prescription, 
and came to be associated with a certain instructive potential.” 
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 The third trope this invective taps into is a philosophical tradition of marvel. 
What, one may ask, is Aemilianus’ internal response in this thought experiment? Even 
though his face does not differ from the grotesque, stock theatrical character, the 
spectacle viewed in the mirror would not provide self-knowledge – at least, not the kind 
of soul-knowledge we saw Plato’s Socrates advocating in Alcibiades I; nor would it 
effect a transformation toward virtue. Rather, reading Archimedes’ book would cause 
Aemilianus to gaze into a mirror “out of a desire for learning” (discendi cupidine) and to 
“marvel” (mirarere) at the spectacular sight. Apuleius deftly passes over the question of 
precisely what Aemilianus would desire to learn in the mirror by skipping directly to his 
internal reaction. Although the whirlwind tour through optical theory is an impressive 
display of Apuleius’ philosophical knowledge, Aemilianus’ mirror inspection does not 
seem to correspond to the ‘Socratic’ didactic tradition Apuleius cited in chapter 15. In 
other words, while Aemilianus falls into the category of the grotesquely ugly and would 
be expected to learn virtuous behavior through his encounter with such a spectacle, he 
would not be exhorted to virtue in Apuleius’ thought-experiment because, in reality, he 
turns out to be the stock character who offers “ethical therapy by deterrence” (see 
Zadorojnyi 2010, quoted on p. 62 above), and he cannot take the mask off. In a subtle 
blending of the Platonic self-knowledge and ‘Socratic’ didactic speculum traditions, 
Apuleius implies that the external is the internal, or in other words, Aemilianus’ self is 
his face. The external mask of Thyestes that his face resembles mirrors the internal man, 
thus characterizing him as a Thyestes type at the same time as dresses him up with the 
mask.228 As a consequence, marvel or stupefaction rather than a call to virtue comprises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Cf. Hunink 1997, 66 ad loc. says of the association: “the ugly mask of the horrified Thyestes is a 
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the affective response that Aemilianus would undergo. There is much to be said on the 
use of the verb miror here and its connection to philosophical “wonder” or “amazement”, 
and I will need to digress shortly into the philosophical tradition of marveling at sights 
and spectacles, which lead to philosophic enlightenment. But first, we must look at the 
closing words of the laus speculi, which represent the most fantastic twist on the Platonic 
self-knowledge tradition associated with the mirror. 
 Apuleius finishes the invective portion at the end of chapter 16 by railing against 
Aemilianus’ mores, which are even worse than his disgusting face. At Apol. 16, he says: 
At ego non mirer, si boni consulis me de isto distortissimo uultu tuo dicere, de 
moribus tuis multo truculentioribus reticere. 
 
But I would not marvel if you consider it a good thing that I speak about that most 
distorted face of yours, but remain silent about your character, which is much 
worse. 
 
On first glance, the implication seems to be that Aemilianus’ mores are so much worse 
because he has not looked in the mirror and attempted to compensate for his disgusting 
face with virtuous behavior. We may note that Apuleius, in speaking of Aemilianus’ 
physical appearance rather than his mores, is showing him precisely what an actual 
mirror would reveal: one could say that, in the conception of the speculum as a partner in 
dialectic (cf. Bartsch quoted on p. 62-3 above), the mirror only tells us about our vultus 
but “remains silent” (reticere) about our mores. If we think back to the ‘Socratic’ didactic 
tradition, the kind of self-knowledge that speculum offers is, of course, supposed to 
inspire the viewer to adorn him- or herself with beautiful virtue. That mirror speaks not 
only about external realities, but tells the viewer about his or her mores, or more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
theatrical element with clearly negative associations; it is firmly put on Aemilianus’ face. ..By contrast, in 
13.7 Apuleius had dissociated himself with various forms of theatrical equipment”. 
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prescriptively, what his or her mores ought to be. The paideutic speculum thus 
demonstrates via exemplarity what one should aim for and in that sense, provides the 
viewer with a kind of self-knowledge. Apuleius’ speculum, despite his protestations, does 
not promise to function in an exemplary way, or to offer the same type of self-knowledge 
and exhortation toward virtue. In fact, as Apuleius continues this invective, he subtly and 
comically invokes a perverted version of the Delphic maxim so frequently cited by 
Plato’s Socrates, much as Lucian’s Lycinus did. He explains that it is because of 
Aemilianus’ obscurity – his pursuit of farming and rustic activities, his lack of study and 
public persona – that he has not investigated himself and arrived at the kind of self-
knowledge one would acquire through mirror speculation. But precisely because 
Apuleius is famous for his public persona as an intellectual, which he acquired through 
philosophical activities such as looking into the mirror, he is open to criticism from 
Aemilianus:  
ita et tibi umbra ignobilitatis a probatore obstitit, et ego numquam studui male 
facta cuiusquam cognoscere,  sed semper potius duxi mea peccata tegere quam 
aliena indagare. 
 
In this way, while the shadow of obscurity has shielded your character from 
scrutiny, I have never been zealous to learn about the misdeeds of anyone else, but 
I have always worked to conceal my own faults rather than investigate the faults 
belonging to others. 
 
One may see here an adaptation and interpretation of the Platonic Socrates’ invocation of 
the Delphic maxim. Not only has Aemilianus failed to acquire self-knowledge in the 
mirror, but it also has been impossible for others to know his character because of the 
shadow of ignobility. Apuleius, on the other hand, prefers not to learn (cognoscere) the 
misdeeds of others, but rather to hide his own faults. The self-knowledge he acquires 
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through his studies and his contemplation vis-à-vis the mirror does not, however, inspire 
him to adorn the inner man with virtue. Rather, as in Apuleius’ version of the ‘Socratic’ 
speculum, where the ugly learn how to hide (tegere) their turpitudo with beautiful virtue, 
self-knowledge only enables Apuleius to better conceal his own ugly faults. It is worth 
noting the parody of Apulieus employing exactly the converse argument from Socrates in 
Plato’s Apology (Apol. 20c6-23c1). There, when famously seeking out (ζήτησις)229 the 
meaning of the Delphic oracle’s statement that he is the wisest man of all, Socrates 
concludes that those people least believed to be wise in the eyes of the general public are 
often the wisest whereas those who have a reputation for wisdom very often turn out to 
be fools. In contrast, Apuleius argues in his invective that public opinion about 
Aemilianus – or rather, the lack of public opinion, since no one knows who he is – neatly 
corresponds to his lack of wisdom. Moreover, if we think of the larger self-knowledge 
tradition in Platonic discourse, Apuleius’ claim to “hide his own faults rather than track 
down the faults of others” appears to be a very strange appropriation indeed. In the 
Phaedrus, for instance, Socrates curiously refuses to give a rationalization of mythology 
on the grounds that he has not yet fulfilled the Delphic maxim to know himself. At 
229e6, he says: 
οὐ δύναµαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράµµα γνῶναι ἐµαυτόν: γελοῖον δή µοι 
φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. 
 
I am not yet able to know myself in accordance with the Delphic maxim; it would 
indeed  seem laughable to inspect the matters of others while I am still ignorant of 
this fact. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 We may note that the verbal parallel between Plato’s Apology and Apuleius’ is resonant as well. 
indagare is glossed in the TLL as ἐκζητέω (see TLL.GLOSS). 
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In a similar fashion to Apuleius, there is a piece of knowledge that Socrates has failed to 
recognize (γιγνώσκειν, to which cognoscere is cognate), and as a consequence he prefers 
not to investigate (σκοπεῖν; cf. indagare) the matters of others (ἀλλότρια, for which 
aliena would be the Latin translation).230 The Delphic maxim and the injunction to “know 
oneself”, moreover, went hand in hand with the mirror tradition in Platonic dialogues231; 
thus, we saw above in Alcibiades I how Socrates explores the Delphic maxim with regard 
to one coming to know (γιγνώσκειν) one’s own soul; and we will return to this motif in 
chapter 3, when we analyze how Apuleius’ Haarspiegel plays off this tradition. Here, 
too, we may see Apuleius working within this Platonic self-knowledge-mirroring 
tradition, particularly in the way that he claims not to “track down the [vices] of others” 
and only to concern himself with his own faults. But Apuleius’ mock-Delphic dictum 
here in the Apologia once again manipulates the Platonic self-knowledge tradition into a 
readerly choice. Beyond the Platonic mirror, there are social benefits of philosophical 
education – in this case, the ability to conceal one’s faults from the eyes of others – which 
Apuleius highlights in order to criticize the failed life choices of his accuser. In that 
regard, the question is similar to the life-choice posed to Alcibiades, whose concern for 
external appearances and social advantage makes him incapable of learning from the 
mirroring soul of his lover.232  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 See TLL.GLOSS for alienus, which gives ἀλλότριος as the Greek word which alienus translates. 
231 Bartsch 2006, 41-56. 
232 See, e.g., Denyer 2001, 233 ad loc. 133a7: “…hence when an eye sees itself by seeing its reflection in a 
pupil, it is seeing itself by seeing how another eye sees it. This has two consequences. First, the analogy 
with an eye that sees itself will make self-knowledge particularly attractive to one with Alcibiades’ concern 
for the impression that he makes upon others (cf. 124a5-6n). Second, the analogy will mean that self-
knowledge is gained, not by any inward-looking self-absorption, but by casting the mind outward, to 
appreciate what others know about oneself”. 
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 We have seen so far how Apuleius manipulates the optical and the self-knowledge 
traditions of the mirror, borrowing terminology and concepts especially from the 
Phaedrus but twisting the thrust or the meaning of the original metaphors. If we return to 
the internal reaction that Apuleius claims Aemilianus would undergo at the mirror’s 
instigation, we find one final ambivalent borrowing from the philosophical tradition, one 
that will become of paramount importance for our reading of the Metamorphoses. 
Apuleius suggests, we may recall, that Aemilianus would have looked into the mirror 
(invisere) just as Archimedes looked (inspicere)233 and would have marveled (mirari) at 
his own grotesqueness, if only he had read Archimedes’ book. When we consider the 
Prologue of the Metamorphoses in chapter 4, we will see that these two actions – or 
rather, action (looking) and re-action (wonder) – are precisely what the narrator exhorts 
us to do in our engagement with that text. While these words are frequently used in Latin 
literature, they are also deeply embedded in the philosophical tradition, beginning with 
Plato and his own appropriation of the language of the Eleusinian mysteries and theoretic 
encounters in his programmatic, philosophical statements.  
As Andrea Nightingale has argued, an often-overlooked feature of the theoretic 
encounter in Plato’s application of the language of mystery cult is its connection to 
philosophical “wonder” or “amazement”.234 She points out that there are two types of 
“wonder” in Platonic theoretic experience: (1) the “wonder” or “amazement” inspired by 
looking upon the Forms, particularly the Form of beauty, and (2) “wonder” as a sense of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Apuleius seems to use the words inspicere and invisere interchangeably here, as is noted also in the TLL 
entry on inviso. See TLL B.3, where invisere is i. q. introspicere, but the two canonical citations come from 
the Apologia, where, the entry notes, he also uses inspicere for mirror-gazing. 
234 See Nightingale 2004, 253-268. In particular, see 253: “Wonder plays an essential role in the pursuit and 
practice of θεωρία, yet it is rarely analyzed in the scholarly literature.” 
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perplexity that inspires philosophical investigation and leads to a demystification of the 
object of wonder. In the vein of (1), there is a playful account of transcendent “wonder” 
in the section of the Symposium that immediately precedes Diotima’s description of the 
vision of the Form of beauty235; and similarly, Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates at the 
end of the Symposium is inspired by marvel at Socrates’ appearance and words. In the 
Republic, too, the philosopher “wonders” at the Forms and tries to imitate them, after 
“beholding” (ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωµένους) them.236 We will see in chapter 3, as well, that 
being “dumbstruck” (ἐκπλήττονται) and literally “outside of one’s self” (οὐκέτ᾽ ἐν αὑτῶν 
γίγνονται) comprises the affective reaction of the ἐραστής of the Phaedrus237; and the 
viewer’s encounter with beauty is inherited by the rhetorical and poetic tradition of 
ekphrasis, as evidenced most notably in Aeneas’ encounter with himself in the reliefs of 
Dido’s temple to Juno238 or in Narcissus’ ‘quasi-ekphrastic’ gazing into the mirror, in 
which he is ‘dumbstruck’ (Met. 3.418: adstupet).239 This response is not at all divergent 
from the one we will see Lucius having at the prospect of seeing sorceresses and 
goddesses undress; and we will find Psyche, too, ironically having a kind of out-of-body 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 See Symp. 205a-b; 207c-d; 208b-c. And after the philosopher sees the Form of beauty, Diotima calls it a 
“wonderous vision” (see 210e): ὃς γὰρ ἂν µέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ παιδαγωγηθῇ, θεώµενος ἐφεξῆς 
τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυµαστὸν τὴν φύσιν 
καλόν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔµπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν... 
236 Rep. 6.500c-d. 
237 Phaedr. 250a4. 
238 Aen. 1.494-6: Haec dum Dardanio Aeneae miranda uidentur/ dum stupet obtutuque haeret defixus in 
uno/ regina ad templum, forma pulcherrima Dido… Importantly, in this scene, “things worthy of wonder” 
(miranda) are seen and Aeneas’ response is stupefaction. 
239 Of interest is perhaps the intersection between aesthetic and erotic responses to beauty. See, e.g., Hardie 
2002, 185 on the stupefaction (stupor) inspired by beautiful art and beautiful women, and the slippage 
between the internal responses to the two separate sights: “The line between the two kinds of amazement, 
at a work of art and at a supremely beautiful human being, is one that is difficult to draw within the 
reactions of both Aeneas and Perseus to the objects that hold their gaze. But the attempt to discriminate is 
misguided, given the routine interference in ancient writing on art between aesthetic and erotic responses”. 
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experience because of marvel.240 Thus, it seems quite possible that Apuleius picks up on 
the philosophical and literary trope that connects viewing with marvel and employs it 
here in his invective against Aemilianus to humorous effect. Of course, Aemilianus 
would not marvel at his encounter with the Form of beauty, but more accurately, with the 
Form of grotesqueness. His ugliness comically has the same effect that the beauty of the 
ἐρώµενος has on the ideal, philosophical viewer – stupefaction. 
 However, the connection between “viewing” and “wonder” is only one piece of 
the comedy. The other piece comes in the phrase discendi cupidine, which Apuleius uses 
rather vaguely and which depends on the connection between “wonder” and philosophy – 
the second type of wonder Nightingale describes in Platonic experience. Not only do 
some dialogues open with a playful reference to wonder as a meta-literary beginning to 
the dialogue241 – “wonder” being the starting point of philosophy – but in the Theaetetus, 
Socrates specifically addresses the relationship between “wonder” and philosophy. At 
155c5, Theaetetus exclaims that he is lost in “wonder” at the argument, and Socrates 
replies: 
Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. µάλα 
γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυµάζειν: οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ 
αὕτη…  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Graverini 2010 convincingly argues that marvel in the Cupid and Psyche episode is inherited from this 
scene in the Phaedrus, where the lover looks upon beauty and is ‘no longer in himself,’ 
241 As representative, see, e.g., Alcibiades I 103a1ff.: ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἶµαί σε θαυµάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος 
ἐραστής σου γενόµενος τῶν ἄλλων πεπαυµένων µόνος οὐκ ἀπαλλάττοµαι, καὶ ὅτι οἱ µὲν ἄλλοι δι᾽ ὄχλου 
ἐγένοντό σοι διαλεγόµενοι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσεῖπον... It is worthwhile to note here the 
connection between ‘marveling,’ the lover, and dialectic, particularly in a dialogue concerned with the 
mirror of the lover/interlocutor as a means to self knowledge. 
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Then Theodorus seems to have guessed well about your nature my friend. For this 
experience, namely marveling, is characteristic of the philosopher: in fact, there is 
no other beginning of philosophy than this…242 
 
“Wonder” is strangely framed as a natural quality (περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου), and it 
comprises the beginning of philosophy. In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, too, “wonder” 
constitutes the beginning of ἀπορία, and these two affective experiences together provide 
the foundational components of philosophy. At Metaphysics 982b, he says: 
διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυµάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς µὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων θαυµάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ µικρὸν οὕτω 
προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν µειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περί τε τῶν τῆς σελήνης 
παθηµάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. ὁ 
δ᾽ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυµάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόµυθος φιλόσοφός πώς 
ἐστιν: ὁ γὰρ µῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυµασίων): ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν 
ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ οὐ 
χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν. 
 
It is on account of wondering that men began to philosophize both now and at 
first; wondering from the beginning at obviously strange things, and then 
progressing little by little and raising issues of greater importance, such as 
questions about the changes of the moon and of the sun, about the stars and about 
the generation of everything. Now the man who feels at a loss and experiences 
wonder thinks that he does not know (wherefore the lover of myth is in a sense a 
philosopher, for myth is composed out of wonders); thus if they philosophized for 
the sake of escaping ignorance, it is evident that they pursued knowledge for its 
own sake, and not for some utility. 
 
We may again note the importance of ἀπορία in the Platonic metaphor of the theoretic 
journey of the philosopher, which Aristotle here seems to borrow from Plato. Wonder 
and confusion at the natural world – or for that matter, at mythology – make up the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 For further references on the importance of philosophical “wonder” in the dialogues, see Denyer 2001, 
83 ad loc. Alcibiades I 103a1. Cf. Murray 1996, 183 ad loc. Rep. 398a4 for references to the unhealthy or 
deceptive kind of wonder in Platonic viewing experience, such as we see in the “wondrous sophist” in 
Republic 10 who holds up the mirror and creates the whole world. 
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necessary attitudes or states of mind that lead to true learning. In fact, there is a 
particularly resonant passage for our study of Apuleius’ invective in Aristotle’s Rhetoric; 
in a passage where Aristotle explains how pleasure is a movement of the soul and how it 
is created (1.11.21ff. (1370a21ff.)), he says: 
καὶ τὸ µανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυµάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ: ἐν µὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυµάζειν 
τὸ ἐπιθυµεῖν µαθεῖν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ θαυµαστὸν ἐπιθυµητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ µανθάνειν τὸ 
εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι…ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ  µανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυµάζειν, 
καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι, οἷον τό τε µιµούµενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ 
ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ µεµιµηµένον ᾖ, κἂν ᾖ µὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ 
τὸ µεµιµηµένον: οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισµὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο 
ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε µανθάνειν τι συµβαίνει. 
Both learning and wondering are pleasant for the most part: for in wondering, 
there is a desire to learn, with the result that the marvelous thing is desirable; and 
in learning, there is an establishing of that which happens according to 
nature…And since learning and wondering are pleasant, all things connected with 
them are necessarily also pleasant; such as in the imitation of something, as in 
painting, sculpture, poetry, and everything which is imitated well, even if the very 
thing being imitated is not pleasant. For it is not because of this that there is 
pleasure; but it is through reasoning that this is that such that we learn something. 
As Froma Zeitlin has shown, this Aristotelian connection between wonder, pleasure, 
learning, and imitation is already picked up in works of Apuleius’ contemporaries, for 
instance, in the prologue of Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe.243 But whereas in Longus the 
allusion to philosophical wonder is a programmatic statement about two levels of 
imitation – both a competitive mimesis of nature and an imitation of earlier, authoritative 
literary models – Apuleius’ conflation of these tropes takes place in an invective railing 
against an unphilosophical opponent who lacks wonder. If Aemilianus had even an iota 
of wonder, he would have conceived of a desire for learning in an Aristotelian sense, and 
he would have recognized the correspondence between his face and the Thyestes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 See Zeitlin 1990, 436-44. Cf. also Graverini 2010 on philosophical wonder in Longus and Antonius 
Diogenes. 
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representational-type. But Apuleius is not interested here in educating Aemilianus, or in 
inspiring the kind of awe that leads to knowledge. This is not a Platonic dialogue, but an 
invective, in which one party has not even reached the first stage of philosophy, but the 
other party, Apuleius, naturally possessed the wonder that led him to philosophical 
inquiry and has moved far beyond the state of perplexity and on to philosophical pursuits. 
Recall how Apuleius transitions to the final stage of invective: At ego non mirer.244 
Moreover, the wonder at external reality and the act of comparing a mimesis with an 
object are ultimately associated in Plato and Aristotle with a kind of transformation, or 
rather, a conversion to philosophy. In the case of Plato, “wonder” is the beginning of a 
journey narrative; in Aristotle, mystification leads to a “fleeing from ignorance” (τὸ 
φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν), much like the exemplary mirrors of drama and dance provide a 
ethical deterrence (cf. again de Salt.: ἃ φεύγειν). 
 In this somewhat absurd defense of owning a mirror, Apuleius continually 
oscillates between two poles, between speaking about and doing actual Platonic 
philosophy and merely using it as a rhetorical sleight of hand. He employs deeply 
philosophical (and Platonic) concepts and language in his advocation of mirror inspection 
– e.g. the acquisition of self-knowledge, philosophical wonder or awe, dialogic 
engagement with another person, investigation of the upper realms – but he reduces the 
high-minded ideas to shallow and quotidian concerns. Mirror inspection (inspectio) can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 It is tempting to make something of the dialogic transition at ego, which is also the same bewildering 
opening of the Metamorphoses, one that has plagued interpreters of the Prologue for a very long time. 
Importantly, the ambiguous narrator of that text is positing a dialogic relationship between himself and the 
reader, in which he has a mystical experience to offer to the reader/viewer provided that he/she “looks into” 
the text. See Morgan 2001 for a discussion of the dialogic nature of the opening of the Metamorphoses, to 
which we shall return in chapter 4. 
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lead to the bewildering vision of the upper realms through the dialogic interaction 
between the “flow” of bodies and the mirror that reflects them. But the distortions and 
optical illusions of mirrors are also just exciting and pleasurable to look at; perhaps it is 
more fun to look at convex or concave mirrors, to see permutations of reality and to 
speculate, as “philosophers ought to”, about the various causes. 
 As I suggested at the outset of this chapter, the ethical-philosophical chapters of 
the laus speculi are consistent not only with the constraints of the apology-genre – which 
is by necessity a high-stakes choice between an accuser and a defendant – but also with 
the popularization of choice narratives in philosophical and parodic texts of the Second 
Sophistic. In view of our scan through the literary history of the extraspective mirror, 
moreover, we can see that Apuleius fits quite nicely in this tradition, which proliferates in 
the second century, of re-appropriating Platonic ideas about the mirror and the self to a 
model of philosophy concerned with behaviors. The irony of Apuleius’ invective at the 
close of his encomium is that Aemilianus would fail to mirror-gaze in every tradition: 
though grotesque, he would not have compensated for his external appearance with 
virtue, as Seneca’s angry man did when faced with his own distorted face; though feeling 
marvel and a desire for learning, the object of his education would be not philosophical 
knowledge, but the furrows and ruts on his face – with his face ironically likened to the 
landscape of a farm he has worked. And perhaps most interestingly, Apuleius connects 
this life-style choice to diligent and frequent reading: had Aemilianus read a book, the 
kind of self-awareness acquired from catoptric speculation would have been the logical 
next step. That is, there is an intimate relationship implied here between reading, self-
knowledge, and catoptrics. 
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 In the chapters that follow, we will turn to the Metamorphoses – a text which self-
consciously poses as a book245 and which demands a “scrupulous reader” (9.30: lector 
scrupulosus) – and we will analyze the mirroring encounters of Lucius, a character at 
least as grotesque as Aemilianus in regard to his mores. In every mirroring encounter, I 
argue, Lucius is given a high-stakes choice; and he, being a poor reader of Plato, usually 
misconstrues the situation and chooses pleasure, no matter what the cost. Essential for the 
reader, though, is the fact that this grotesque character becomes the book (2.12: libros me 
futurum) in a similar conflation of character, text, and thought. As we look into the same 
mirrors he does – albeit through reading his words – the question Apuleius poses for us is 
how we will choose to respond. The narrator promises us marvel – the experience 
Aemilianus could have undergone through mirror-gazing. We are given the choice as to 
how far we will pursue it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 See, e.g., Stephen Harrison’s suggestion that the Prologue speaker is the book (Harrison 1990), though I 
will argue against this line of reasoning in chapter 4.	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CHAPTER 2: The Seductions of Ekphrasis: Platonic Psychagogia 
through Deception: 
 
We saw in the previous chapter how Apuleius engages with the ethical-
philosophical tradition of the mirror in its various manifestations in the concluding 
chapters of the laus speculi. I argued there that the blending of multiple traditions in the 
context of a courtroom drama presents a number of embedded choices for the reader: one 
has a choice first as to which speaker one should believe, then as to what model of life 
one ought to follow, and finally as to which mode of viewing one should employ. In this 
chapter, I will work backwards through the laus speculi to its opening argument in 
chapter 14, in which Apuleius presents a theory of aesthetics that similarly mixes two 
traditions – a Platonic critique of mimesis and a literary and art critical response to it. As 
we will see, Apuleius claims that what makes the mirror a particularly magical device is 
its capacity to register motion over time246: it is the most “faithful” type of representation 
because it changes in response to a metamorphosis in the viewer. However, there is latent 
in this encomium of specular mimesis a Platonic concern about the potentially dangerous 
and morally harmful effects of visualizing and imagining the insubstantial images that 
representation produces. The fidelity, it turns out, is that of a courtesan, and the problem 
with giving in to mimesis – consorting with it like a prostitute, as Plato puts it – is dealing 
with the negative consequences which ensue: obsession such as one would experience in 
an erotic tryst and the bastard offspring that issue forth from such an encounter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Representing diachronic change was clearly a growing concern of authors and artists at this time, as 
Sharrock 1996 has demonstrated. 
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 After analyzing how Apuleius develops his own brand of specular aesthetics in 
Apologia 14, we will turn to the famous ekphrasis of Byrrhena’s atrium, which also raises 
Platonic questions about representation. How this ekphrasis functions within the novel – 
whether it is a plot device, a prophetic warning, or merely a rhetorical display piece – has 
long vexed Apuleius scholars.247 One of the most interesting and largely understudied 
features of the passage is the way in which Lucius-auctor focalizes the attention of the 
reader, slowly zooming in on the reflections in the water rippling at the goddess’ feet.248 
We are then presented with a verbal description of a visual mimesis mediated through a 
specular representation – three removes from the original artistic mimesis. But apart from 
the implied engagement with Plato in Apuleius’ play with mimetic media, the narrator 
shows us in the mirroring water a series of transformations: the statue of Diana is 
transformed in its iconography from a “Striding Diana” to a “Bathing Diana” 249; Actaeon, 
too, appears to be in the process of a metamorphosis; and perhaps most imaginatively, the 
whole Actaeon tradition, which Apuleius had inherited from Callimachus and Ovid,250 is 
reimagined to be a tale about voyeurism, thus creating a correspondence between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 For copious bibliography on this passage, see GCA 2001. In particular, Heath 1992, Slater 1998, 
Paschalis 2002, and Freudenburg 2007 give the most sensitive readings of the scene. The function and 
affective influence of ekphrasis writ large has been of increasing concern to scholars in the last 25 years, 
and the bibliography, both modern and ancient, is too copious to treat within the bounds of this dissertation. 
Noteworthy contributions are as follows: on modern studies of ekphrasis: Heffernan 1993, Mitchell 1986, 
Mitchell 1994, Krieger 1992, and Wagner 1996; on ancient studies:  Fowler 1990, Elsner 2002, Bartsch and 
Elsner 2007, Webb 1999, Webb 2009, Putnam 1998, Squire 2009, Squire 2014. 
248 It should be noted, however, that there is some disagreement about precisely how this scene is focalized 
through the narrator. John Heath, who has given the seminal treatment of the ekphrasis, says that Lucius 
describes the statues in Byrrhena’s atrium “as objects meet his eye” (Heath 1992, 123). Paschalis 2002, 138 
says of this suggestion: “This is not accurate. Spatial deictics make the statue of Diana the very center of 
the arrangement and the very focus of attention.” In this, I agree with Paschalis, though I think there is a 
shift in focalization in the second half of the ekphrasis. 
249 See Schlam 1984. 
250 On the Actaeon tradition in the literary sources, see the very thorough treatment of Heath 1992. 
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statue of Actaeon inside the ensemble and the viewing spectator outside of it.251 In what 
follows, I argue that the mirroring water enacts these metamorphoses, adding temporality 
to an otherwise fixed statuary ensemble. Moreover, while diachrony is what gives 
mimesis its “fidelity” in the Apologia, the erotic danger of consorting with that “faithful” 
speculum lurks behind this visual encounter as well, with Diana transforming into a 
bathing goddess before our eyes. As Lucius’ relationship to Actaeon is mirrored by the 
reader’s relationship to Lucius at the conclusion of the novel – that is, as an external 
viewer gazing on a fixed statue in an ensemble – I propose that the way in which the 
mirror inspires Lucius’ imagination to run wild with desire (and his mouth to run wild 
with description) is programmatic for Apuleius. Gazing into a mirror, much like staring 
into a novel, compels the viewer/reader to be incorporated into the spectacle and to 
become a part of the scene. Through an ekphrasis of a temporal narrative played out in a 
mirror, Apuleius thus “seduces the reader to succumb to visualization”, to borrow a 
phrase from Tim Whitmarsh.252 
 Before we turn to Apologia 14, it will be useful to develop a theoretical 
framework for analyzing Apuleius’ aesthetic theory and to situate him in the broader 
Second Sophistic discourse. In the next section, I argue that Apuleius along with other 
writers of the second century foreshadow Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s influential theory 
of ekphrasis. In his Laökoon, he posits that the distinction between the verbal and visual 
arts is one found in nature – a difference between temporal and spatial representation. I 
will show that the issue of representing time in mimesis becomes a popular topos in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 On Actaeon’s “curious gaze” and the way in which it creates correspondences between Actaeon, Lucius, 
and reader, see p. 163ff. below. 
252 Whitmarsh 2002, 122.	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second century, one that sophistic rhetors receive as a challenge, to which they respond 
through ekphraseis. In the Second Sophistic discussions that follow, we will see many of 
the same terms that recur in Apuleius’ praise of the mirror’s magic: the verbal arts have 
the advantage of time in representation (i.e., diachrony); writers must make a choice as to 
which medium will best incorporate the viewer; and perhaps most importantly, there is an 
erotic danger involved in viewing and responding in kind. All of these issues recur in the 
laus speculi, where the mirror occupies a paradoxical position somewhere in between the 
verbal and visual arts. Moreover, Apuleius uses the speculum, I suggest, as a metonymy 
for the expressive potential of words: while the speculum may seem naturally to fall on 
the visual side of the binary, its ability to register time in mimesis makes it resemble more 
closely verbal representation. But there is a moral danger, nonetheless, in looking (or 
listening), because the viewer (or hearer) can easily be incorporated into the scene and 
eventually become part of the story. Nowhere will this be clearer than in Apuleius’ 
ekphrasis of Byrrhena’s atrium, where the mirroring water seduces Lucius (and us) into a 
risky act of visualization. 
 
Lessing and Second Sophistic Aesthetics: 
 
 Any treatment of ekphrasis ought to begin with the seminal work of Lessing, 
whose Laökoon: oder über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie offered one of the 
earliest modern expositions of Homer’s ‘Shield of Achilles’ and Horace’s famous ut 
pictura poesis. In this essay, Lessing proposed that the ‘plastic’ arts could only exist in 
what he called a “convenient relation” (bequemes Verhältnis) with “bodies in space”, 
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whereas poetry and the verbal arts could only depict “actions in time”. For this reason, 
poetry represents a more sublime medium of mimesis, at least insofar as it has narrative 
potential. As Tom Mitchell describes it: 
Reading occurs in time; the signs which are read are uttered or inscribed in a 
temporal sequence; and the events represented or narrated occur in time. There is 
thus a kind of homology…between medium, message, and the mental process of 
decoding.253 
 
According to this theoretical model, the semiotic value of poetic expression and its 
faithful representation lies in the fact that words register the passing of time: the statue of 
Laocoon can either be clothed, and thus have the sign ‘robe’, or it can be naked and 
represent a ‘body’,254 but poetry can manage to conjure in the imagination of the listener 
both signs interchangeably and in temporal succession. Moreover, painting, in its attempt 
to avoid the mortification of fixity only has recourse to what Lessing calls a “pregnant 
moment” (fruchtbarer Moment) – that is, a still life depiction that suggests temporality. 
But poetry provides a more transcendent mimetic medium because of its ability to retain 
what David Wellbery labels “the end of autonomous imaginative activity”.255 
 When we turn to the opening of Apuleius’ laus speculi, I suggest we will see how 
Lessing’s representational dichotomy between “bodies in space” and “actions in time” 
illuminates well the paradoxes of Apuleius’ discussion of specular mimesis. Apuleius 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Mitchell 1986, 98-9. 
254 As proof that ancient thinkers did understand statues to be either clothed or naked, with no possible 
suggestion of the alternative state, we may compare the anecdote in Pliny’s natural history where he 
describes the sculpting of the origin of the Knidian Aphrodite. At Nat. Hist. 36.20-1, Pliny discusses how 
Praxiteles originally made two statues of Aphrodite, one naked and one draped with a robe; the Coans 
bought the clothed statue because they judged it to be honorable and chaste, and the Cnidians purchased the 
naked version, which, in turn, became one of the most famous statues of antiquity. See Haynes 2013, 77 for 
discussion. 
255 See Wellbery 1984, 133 for the line. For another excellent treatment of Lessing and ekphrasis, 
particularly in relation to Classical literature, see Becker 1995, 9-22. 
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takes the ability to register diachronic change, or to represent metamorphosis, to be the 
sine qua non of faithful mimesis.256 His claim about the mirror’s mimetic fidelity, I argue, 
can be seen as a disguised preference for verbal mimesis and the imaginative potential of 
the word. Moreover, if we consider Apuleius’ strange representational preference in the 
context of the Second Sophistic, we can see that he is, in fact, part of a movement that 
anticipates Lessing’s strict division of the arts according to nature.257 That is, many 
philosophers and second sophists in Apuleius’ milieu wrote similar meditations on 
intermediality which draw the boundaries between art and literature along precisely the 
same lines as Lessing, and which touch upon the same representational terms explored in 
Apuleius’ laus speculi. 
 Plutarch, in an opening discussion of his de gloria Atheniensium, invokes a pithy 
remark he attributes to Simonides to discuss the agonistic relationship between the verbal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Many recent treatments of the Apologia have tried to make sense of Apuleius’ representational 
preferences. Too 1996, whose treatment is perhaps the most extended analysis of the passage, suggests that 
Apuleius’ praise of specular mimesis over other representational media has to do with having control over 
the afterlife of one’s artistic representation. It is likely, she explains, that Apuleius rejected a statue that the 
Carthaginians dedicated to him on the grounds that it would fix his image in an immobile state. As 
evidence, she cites the model of Alexander for Apuleius, who, according to Apuleius in Florida 7, rejected 
all fixed representational media. Though, it should be noted that Alexander actually only rejects bad artists, 
and not the media themselves. Hunink 1997 takes issue with Too’s interpretation, arguing that she over-
reads the mobility piece of the laus speculi. However, he seems to be fairly outnumbered in his view that 
mobility is not so important to Apuleius: see, e.g., Lateiner 2001, Slater 1998, Slater 2003, Paschalis 2002, 
and Freudenburg 2007, all of whom find something curious about Apuleius’ regard for motion in mimesis. 
Paschalis 2002, in particular, comes closest to the argument I will present here insofar as he claims to use 
Lessing’s dichotomy as a guiding principle. But his argument ends up amounting to merely a restatement of 
Winkler’s aporetic interpretation. 
257 Contra Squire 2009, who argues that Lessing’s strict division between the verbal and visual arts is 
“thoroughly modern in conception” (94) and “wholly alien to ancient thought and practice” (96; my italics). 
While Squire’s fundamental objective is to lay bare the theological (and primarily Lutheran) assumptions 
behind Lessing’s dichotomy – an objective he largely succeeds in accomplishing – it is clear from his 
treatment of Plato at least that the seeds of Lessing’s thought had already been planted long before Luther. 
The following line is illustrative: “The Platonic injunction of the image…might be thought to foreshadow 
the fundamentals of not only Luther’s position, but also, in some sense, Lessing’s own” (117). As we are 
exploring the influence of Platonic thought on second century aesthetics, it is fitting to suppose that some 
of Plato’s repudiation of visual and verbal mimesis seeped into these later rhetorical-philosophical 
treatments. 
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and visual arts, and to explain how Thucydides mastered “image-making” (εἰδωλοποιεῖν) 
in his history-writing through his skilled use of ἐνάργεια. At Moralia 346f5-347a4, he 
says: 
πλὴν ὁ Σιµωνίδης τὴν µὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ 
ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν. ἃς γάρ οἱ ζωγράφοι πράξεις ὡς γιγνοµένας 
δεικνύουσι, ταύτας οἱ λόγοι γεγενηµένας διηγοῦνται καὶ συγγράφουσιν. εἰ δ᾽ οἱ µὲν 
χρώµασι καὶ σχήµασιν, οἱ δ᾽ ὀνόµασι καὶ λέξεσι ταὐτὰ δηλοῦσιν, ὕλῃ καὶ τρόποις 
µιµήσεως διαφέρουσι… 
 
Simonides, however, calls painting silent poetry, and poetry painting that speaks. 
For the actions that painters portray at the moment they take place (ὡς γιγνοµένας), 
words describe and represent after they have already happened (γεγενηµένας). But 
if the former display the same subjects with colors and forms, and the latter with 
words and phrases, they differ with respect to the material and modes of their 
mimesis. 
  
The fact that this passage appears as the epigraph of Laökoon already hints at the 
influence of this period on Lessing’s theoretical division. Here, Plutarch mixes 
Aristotelian mimetic theory with Platonic categories of diegesis and mimesis. But, as D. 
Thomas Benediktson has pointed out, the second sentence explains (γάρ) the 
problematics of intermediality as an issue of a representation’s relationship to time. 
Comparing the present participle (γινόµεναι) used to depict painting’s time relationship to 
the perfect participle (γεγενηµέναι) of poetic narrative, Benediktson explains: 
Plutarch seems to be making the distinction that paintings or statues are frozen in 
a permanent present, while the actions of literature are narrated through to the end 
and hence completed.258 
 
Whether or not Plutarch fully understands the implications of his temporal 
distinction for the age-old question about the relationship between the poetic and the 
‘plastic’ arts, our next example most certainly recognizes how he is drawing a clear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Benediktson 1987, 103. 
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dichotomy between fixed representation and metamorphic mimesis. Dio Chrysostom, a 
contemporary of Plutarch, devotes the second half of his Twelfth Oration to a defense of 
Pheidias’ statue of Zeus by conjuring up the ghost of the famous sculptor, who, in turn, 
discusses the advantages that poets enjoy in the game of imitation. Whereas the sculptor, 
Pheidias explains, is confined to a “single pose for each image” (ἓν σχῆµα ἑκάστης 
εἰκόνος) – and a “motionless and fixed one” (ἀκίνητον καὶ µένον) – poets have the 
advantage “in respect to both difficulty and time” (τὸ τῆς χαλεπότητος 259 καὶ τὸ τοῦ 
χρόνου). For, he explains:  
 
τοῖς δὲ ποιηταῖς πολλάς τινας µορφὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰ εἴδη περιλαβεῖν τῇ ποιήσει 
ῥᾴδιον, κινήσεις τε καὶ ἡσυχίας προστιθέντας αὐτοῖς, ὅπως ἂν ἑκάστοτε πρέπειν 
ἡγῶνται, καὶ ἔργα καὶ λόγους… 
 
…it is easier for poets to encompass in their poetry all manner of shapes and 
manifold forms, adding motions and stops to them, however they deem it fit each 
time, as well as deeds and speeches… 
 
Beyond poetry’s ability to register movement (κίνησις) over time as compared to the 
fixed limits of statuary, the key to Dio Chrysostom’s aesthetics lies in the ease with 
which a representational mode can “comprehend” (περιλαβεῖν) variegated “shapes and 
forms” (µορφὰς καὶ…εἴδη) – an aesthetic principle that prompted Alison Sharrock to 
open her excellent piece ‘Representing Metamorphosis’ with this anecdote from 
Chrysostom.260 There is more than a hint of irony, as Sharrock points out, in the fact that 
Pheidias gives an exposition of the representational advantages of poetry by means of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 χαλεπότητος is a conjecture to replace ἀπάτης. As far as I can tell, both seem to make reasonable sense 
here, but the conjecture works by analogy to Plato’s Critias 107e, where Critias discusses how difficult it is 
to represent reality satisfactorily, particularly in the portraiture of divine and human bodies. I am retaining 
the conjecture because χαλεπότης seems to be a recurring category in Second Sophistic discussions of 
mimesis, as we shall see shortly. 
260 See Sharrock 1996, 103-4, and esp. 300 n. 2, where she reads µορφὰς as oblique reference to 
metamorphosis. 
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sophistic description in words.261 We are thus invited by Pheidias’ verbal lament over the 
limits of his own discipline to choose between him and Homer, or rather, to choose which 
of the two modes of representation we want to look at and how we want to look at it. The 
fundamental issue at stake in the choice is diachrony. 
 If we are given an implicit choice between viewing “bodies in space” and “actions 
in time” in Dio Chrysostom’s Twelfth Oration, we find an explicit exhortation to a choice 
over modes of representation in the work of a near successor to Apuleius, Philostratus the 
Elder. As Jás Elsner notes in passing, an interesting feature of many Philostratean 
ekphraseis – and one particularly relevant to our reading of Lucius’ ekphrasis of 
Byrrhena’s atrium – is the fact that Philostratus frequently describes in vivid detail 
paintings of scenes that we do not have extant in the literary or visual repertoire, such as 
death scenes that are elided in messenger speeches262 or paintings that do not seem to 
have been well-defined artistic topoi.263 One such ekphrasis, Imagines 2.10, will be 
illustrative for us to consider in our attempt to situate Apuleius’ laus speculi, particularly 
since Philostratus also embeds in it a choice between modes of representation and types 
of viewing. This set-piece description, which narrates a painting of Clytemnestra’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Squire 2009, 101 n. 31 dismisses Dio’s treatment here as a relevant antecedent to Lessing in part on the 
grounds that “Dio ends by suggesting that Pheidias’ anthropomorphic image in fact outstrips the poetic 
description in the Iliad”. However, I think it would be more appropriate to say that Dio’s Pheidias – the one 
who speaks in Dio’s words and not the real sculptor – seems to outstrip the description in the Iliad. 
Sharrock 1996 notes how ironic it is that Pheidias competes with Homer through words rather than 
sculpture. Cf. Benediktson 1987 and 2000, 177-85 for a discussion of the similarity between the distinction 
Dio’s Pheidias makes and Lessing’s dichotomy. 
262 See Elsner 2007a, 312: “Philostratean ecphrasis…genuflects (especially) to Euripidean ecphrasis (in so 
far as Euripides’ messenger speeches bring to mind descriptively events, including objects, not seen 
directly on stage), while simultaneously surpassing Euripides’ failure to enact the deaths of Pentheus, 
Hippolytus, or the children of Heracles by offering a painting that fills the absence”. 
263 Ibid.: “…it is interesting that the tragic climaxes seized upon by Philostratus are relatively rare in 
Graeco-Roman art in general and particularly so in the period in which Philostratus was writing (so far as 
we can tell from the surviving material)”. 
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murder of Cassandra and Agamemnon, relays a rather gory scene of striking pathos. 
Though the ekphrasis begins in medias res and illuminates a brutal scene of slaughter, the 
narrator abruptly interrupts the scene for a very strange interpretive comment. With the 
axe still warm from the slaughter, Philostratus interjects: 
καὶ εἰ µὲν ὡς δρᾶµα ἐξετάζοµεν, ὦ παῖ, ταῦτα, τετραγῴδηται µεγάλα ἐν σµικρῷ, 
εἰ δ’ ὡς γραφήν, πλείω ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄψει. 
 
If we examine this scene as a drama, my boy, a great tragedy has been enacted in 
a brief space of time, but if [we consider it] as a painting, you will see more in it. 
 
As the ekphrasis continues – with a classic mode of ekphrastic incorporation, σκόπει γάρ 
– Philostratus describes a series of “actions in time”, adding a diachronic narrative to an 
already fixed scene through his own exegesis. What this word πλείω means in context has 
long been a source of confusion, and naturally invites the question, ‘more than what?’.264 
At the very least, it must mean that one will see more than one would if one read 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, since this scene is narrated in Aeschylus through a messenger 
speech. Philostratus is not actually suggesting, however, that a painting (γραφή) would 
reveal more, because, as he continues the ekphrasis (a different kind of γραφή),265 the 
temporal narrative that he supplies is evidently the substance of the πλείω. That is, as the 
sophistic describer begins to expound upon the scene, his interpretation slowly transforms 
into narrative, until the very end of the ekphrasis, at which point, the narrator focalizes 
the scene on the final interaction between Cassandra and Clytemnestra. The central focus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Beall 1993, 352 takes the πλείω to mean “its moral and philosophical significance”. Elsner 2007a, 331 
interprets it as representative of Philostratus’ “studied ambiguity” insofar as it highlights the agonistic 
relationship with drama, tragedy, and verbal-visual interactions writ large. 
265 For the dual meaning of γραφή, which becomes its own kind of trope in the Second Sophistic, we may 
recall, e.g., the prologue to Longus’ Daphnis & Chloe. All of the Second Sophistic texts that play with the 
semantic ambiguity of this word, however, may be alluding to the end of the Phaedrus, where Socrates 
discusses the strange quality of fixity that “writing” (γραφή) and “painting” (ζωγραφία) share. 
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becomes the pitiable sight of Cassandra, as Clytemnestra stands over her, “darting a crazy 
glance” (µανικὸν βλέπουσα) with her “hair flowing violently” (σεσοβηµένη τὰς χαίτας) 
and her “arm raised savagely” (τραχεῖα τὴν ὠλένην); it is at that moment that Cassandra, 
who has attempted to fall over Agamemnon, “turns her eyes” (ἀναστρέφει τοὺς 
ὀφθαλµοὺς ) towards the falling axe and “utters so pathetic a cry” (βοᾷ δὲ οὕτω τι 
οἰκτρόν) that Agamemnon feels pity for her with his last remnant of life. The description 
is transformed from a mere exegesis of the painting to a narrative of “actions in time” – a 
feature which is emphasized with the change of verbal tense, from the perfect (e.g., 
ἐφέστηκε) to the present indicative (ἀναστρέφει). That the painting (γραφή) makes a 
sound for the reader to hear creates a kind of synaesthetic experience of reading – a  
phenomenon Andrew Laird has labeled “disobedient ekphrasis”.266 This synaesthesia 
further highlights Philostratus’ agonistic relationship with his models, especially if we 
consider that stage drama involves actual sounds. Just as in Chrysostom’s prosopopoeia 
of Pheidias, where the reader is given a choice between looking at visual art or listening 
to verbal art, Philostratus’ strange exegetical interjection simultaneously recalls its 
models while giving us a choice as to how we might see them – as a drama or a γραφή. 
The final ekphrasis worth considering before we return to Apuleius’ laus speculi 
occurs in De domo written by Lucian, a sophistic writer contemporary with Apuleius.267 
In this piece, we encounter a comic dialogue between two learned interlocutors about the 
appropriate response to visual beauty – specifically, the visual experience of a finely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 See Laird 1993. 
267 Although this fascinating text opens interesting avenues for scholars of the Second Sophistic practice of 
ekphrasis, it has rarely been studied in detail. Goldhill 2001a, Newby 2002, and Dobrov 2002 are the 
exceptions. 
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decorated hall. The first interlocutor suggests that only an uncultured man (ἰδιώτης) 
would stand dumbstruck in marvel (θαυµάσας), leaving the sight “noiseless and without a 
speech” (κωφὸν…καὶ ἄλογον); the educated man (πεπαιδευµένος), on the other hand, 
would not be content to remain a “silent beholder of beauty” (ἄφωνος θεατὴς τοῦ 
κάλλους) but would attempt, by the very nature of the experience, “to repay the sight 
with a speech” (λόγῳ ἀµείψασθαι τὴν θέαν). This first speaker in the competition adds a 
number of erotic undertones to his description of responding to visual beauty: the 
educated man must behave as Alexander the Great did upon seeing the river Cydnus, 
namely, to conceive of an erotic desire (ἐπεθύµησεν) to become one with it by bathing in 
it; the visual beauty of the ceiling and its simplicity of form, moreover, are likened to a 
modest yet beautiful woman (γυναικὶ σώφρονι καὶ καλῇ), who, unlike courtesans 
(ἑταῖραι), prefers to show her beauty naked (γυµνή). We may add to these overtly erotic 
valences a number of echoes of Plato’s Phaedrus, with the speaker likening himself to 
Socrates flowing forth in speech beside the famous plane tree.268 Zahra Newby has even 
suggested that the hall is as an Echo figure, which, in turn, transforms the first speaker 
into a Narcissus,269 at least for a reader familiar with Ovid’s account of Narcissus and 
Echo. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Beyond the overt invocation of Socrates beside the plane tree (4), this text even deals in the Phaedran 
erotics of visual experience in subtle ways. See, e.g., the language of flow in the opening line of de Domo 
4: σχεδὸν γὰρ εἰσρεῖ τι διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλµῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καλόν, εἶτα πρὸς αὑτὸ κοσµῆσαν ἐκπέµπει τοὺς 
λόγους. The beauty of the hall is said to flow in “through the eyes” (διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλµῶν) – a phrase that is 
of great importance to the Phaedran model of erotic reciprocity, as we will see in the next chapter – and 
then to inspire a specular response in words. Though, cf. Goldhill 2001a, 162, who connects this to Stoic 
materialist theories of optics. 
269 Newby 2002, 127: “While the word Echo is not used here, though the verb συνεπηχῶν…does appear a 
little earlier, the reference to a maiden is a clear allusion to the story of Echo, most famous as the lover of 
Narcissus. If the hall is thus equated with Echo, the speaker takes the role of Narcissus, for whom, 
according to Ovid, she wasted away with love. This Narcissus, however, is a rhetor, who actively enjoys 
being the object of such aural attention”.  
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While the dialogue opens in medias res without a clear marker that it is even a 
dialogue, a second speaker is announced in the very middle, and the whole piece is 
transformed into opposing arguments in a court case, with the audience unwittingly cast 
into the role of jury.270 This ἕτερος λόγος, though he argues that silent marvel is a 
perfectly legitimate response to beauty, nevertheless decides to vie with the images 
through a rhetorical ekphrasis. That is, ostensibly, he disagrees with the original λόγος: 
calling Herodotus to the stand as a witness, he explains that the “ears happen to be less 
trustworthy than the eyes” (ὦτα γὰρ τυγχάνει ἀνθρώποισι ἐόντα ἀπιστότερα 
ὀφθαλµῶν).271 Herodotus’ aphorism also explains why the Sirens, who “charm” 
(ἐκήλουν) passersby, are less powerful than the Gorgons, whose beauty transforms 
beholders into “stone from wonder” (λίθινοι ἐγίγνοντο ὑπὸ θαύµατος). But even though 
this speaker seems dead set against vying with images, in the end he chooses to attempt a 
word painting – again, a γραφή – for the attendant viewers because they will “take 
pleasure to hear about the things that cause them marvel to see” (ἡσθήσεσθε…ἀκούοντες 
ἃ καὶ ὁρῶντες θαυµάζετε): and just before beginning his ekphrasis, this speaker claims 
that “word painting is but a naked thing” (ψιλὴ γάρ τις ἡ γραφὴ τῶν λόγων), since it is 
impossible to render “such beautiful images” (τοσαύτας εἰκόνας) “without colors, forms, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Newby 2002, 130: “…halfway through the piece we suddenly find that there is, in fact, another speaker 
ready to put the alternative case for us and to argue the dangers of speaking in such a beautiful room…So 
ἕτερος λόγος…comes to the stand, framing the dialogue as a court case, in which his audience, and by 
implication the reader, is the jury”. 
271 The line comes from Herodotus’ Gyges and Candaules narrative in 1.8.2, where the king tries to 
convince his servant to look at his wife naked, since words about her beauty would not suffice. The full 
quotation from Lucian continues as follows (de Domo 20):…τὰ µὲν γὰρ ἔπεα πτερόεντά ἐστι καὶ οἴχεται 
ἅµα τῷ προελθεῖν ἀποπτάµενα, ἡ δὲ τῶν ὁρωµένων τέρψις ἀεὶ παρεστῶσα καὶ παραµένουσα πάντως τὸν 
θεατὴν ὑπάγεται. Dobrov 2002, 176 n. 11 notes here a “sort of inversion of the ancient prejudice in favor of 
the ‘living’ spoken word as opposed to debilitating representation”, and cites as a comparandum passage of 
the Phaedrus (Phaedr. 274e-75b) with which Apuleius is also engaging, as I will show later. 
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or space” (ἄνευ χρωµάτων καὶ σχηµάτων καὶ τόπου).272 After giving this strange 
exegetical interlude, the speaker breaks into a museum-tour style ekphrasis – i.e., “on 
your right, you’ll see” (ἐν δεξιᾷ) – filled with narrative description akin to Philostratus’. 
Compiling thematic elements from all of these Second Sophistic treatments, I 
suggest that we can situate the particular oddities we will see in Apuleius’ treatment of 
mimesis within an aesthetic movement that anticipates Lessing’s influential analysis of 
the boundaries of the verbal and the visual. Plutarch traces the difference between 
mimetic media to a distinction in temporality and material; and similarly, Dio 
Chrysostom connects poetry’s particular mimetic power to its ability to represent 
metamorphosis – encompassing variegated forms and shapes (µορφὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰ 
εἴδη) – and links the advantages of the poetic art to time (τὸ τοῦ χρόνου). Philostratus, 
making the embedded choice between modes of representation explicit, describes a scene 
passed over in the literary and the visual repertoire, and then exhorts his reader to see 
“more” by looking at is “as a painting/ekphrasis” (ὡς γραφήν) rather than “as a drama” 
(ὡς δρᾶµα).  
When we come to Lucian, then, we find the final piece that is also latent in 
Apuleius’ laus speculi, as we will see shortly, namely, the presentation of desire for 
narrative in erotic terms. Just as Alexander desired “to become part of the beauty” (µέρος 
τοῦ κάλλους αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι) of the river Cydnus, no matter how much harm it might do 
him, a cultured spectator of beauty, upon experiencing stupefaction at beauty and 
conceiving of a similar erotic desire for narrative, must describe the pictures in an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 See Goldhill 2001a, 165 on the value of χρώµατα (Lat. colores) and σχήµατα as rhetorical terms, and 
therefore, as an embedded joke on the power of verbal production. Color, in particular, will become 
important when we turn to Apuleius. 
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ekphrasis. Or to phrase it differently, though verbal response is dangerous – and indeed, 
in a Platonic framework, all mimesis can be dangerous in erotic terms – Lucian’s de 
Domo demands for the reader to make choices: both a courtroom choice between two 
contradictory λόγοι and a deeper philosophical choice about what the appropriate 
response to seeing visual beauty is. Is it dumbstruck wonder and silent awe, as the myth 
of Plato’s Phaedrus might have us believe, or is it philosophical and/or rhetorical 
reflection, as the Phaedran Socrates suggests in the Siren-cicada choice? Moreover, with 
the subtle allusion to Narcissus and Echo in the reverberating nymph-like room, we are 
invited to see the relationship between viewer and room not only as a specular interaction 
between lover and beloved, but specifically as one that has potentially transcendent 
and/or deadly delusional effects on anyone who enters. 
To conclude this survey through the Second Sophistic discussions of 
intermediality, we should take a moment to meditate on the exegetical comment with 
which Lucian’s ἕτερος λόγος opens his ekphraseis, since it seems to allude to a Platonic 
embedded choice. Recall how he introduces the difficult task of ekphrasis: “word-
painting is a naked thing” (ψιλὴ γάρ τις ἡ γραφὴ τῶν λόγων). In applying the adjective 
ψιλός to a type of speaking (λόγοι), we may also be invited to remember one of the 
εἰκόνες of Socrates at the end of the Symposium, namely, how he is similar to the satyr 
Marsyas in his ability to charm listeners: whereas Marsyas requires an αὐλός to 
accomplish his beguiling effect on listeners, Socrates uses only ψιλοὶ λόγοι to bewitch 
whoever listens to him.273 This passage, too, represents an embedded choice between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 To my knowledge, no one has noticed this clear allusion to the end of the Symposium, which is made 
perhaps even more evident by the dialogic situation of speech competition before an audience. Strangely, 
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modes of viewing and listening, as I will argue more fully in chapter 4; and here, 
Alcibiades, the encomiast of Socrates’ beauty, also uses the language of stripping away 
the external barriers, which obscure the real, naked Socrates within – a Socrates who 
ironically happens to be another type of representation, an ἄγαλµα. Thus, Lucian not only 
combines diachrony and erotic desire with a choice narrative about the appropriate 
responses to viewing, but he even subtly portrays the very act of ekphrasis as the same 
activity that Socrates inaugurated with his synaesthetic bewitchment of anyone that came 
into contact with him. As we will see in the next section, Apuleius prefaces his mirror 
usage with a strong claim about the speculum’s mimetic power – a claim that involves 
erotic desire for narrative, the ability to register change over time, and a preference for 
the courtesan-fidelity of catoptric mimesis. While Apuleius is situated in the Second 
Sophistic and participates in this aesthetic movement, however, his particular expression 
of the competitive relationship between mimetic media is uniquely Platonic. Therefore, in 
what follows, we will analyze how Apuleius inherits this concern for diachrony in 
representation from his contemporaries but skews it to offer a Platonic moral lesson to the 
reader. 
 
The Courtesan-mirror of Apologia 14: Erotic and Narrative Desire: 
	  
Now that we have seen the Second Sophistic contextual underpinnings to 
Apuleius’ representational claims in Apologia 14, it is fitting to turn to Apuleius’ laus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
even a reader as sensitive as Goldhill, who deals with this line (Goldhill 2001a, 165), seems to have missed 
it. 
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speculi proper in order to establish the particular terms of catoptric mimesis that I will 
argue are at play in ekphrastic passages of the Metamorphoses. We will see here a 
concern for the same particular features of mimesis that other Second Sophistic writers 
highlighted in their reflections on intermediality – diachrony, metamorphosis, erotic and 
narrative desire, and choice – but Apuleius’ take on it has an especially Platonic bent. 
While the speculum at first appears to occupy a middle ground between “bodies in space” 
and “actions in time”, I will suggest that the mirror functions as a metonymy for the 
imaginative potential of the verbal arts. Whereas chapters 15 and 16 of the Apologia offer 
an extended meditation on the ethico-philosophical benefits of mirror-gazing, as we saw 
in chapter 1 of this dissertation, chapter 14 opens the laus speculi with a rather striking 
take on the age-old literary question about mimesis, one that bears vestiges of Plato’s 
discussion in Republic 10 but also diverges from it significantly on one key point, the 
speculum.274 
nisi forte quod artificio elaboratum laudabile habetur, hoc natura oblatum 
culpabile iudicandum est, cum sit in ea uel magis miranda et facilitas et 
similitudo. quippe in omnibus manu faciundis imaginibus opera diutina sumitur, 
neque tamen similitudo aeque ut in speculis comparet; deest enim et luto uigor et 
saxo color et picturae rigor et motus omnibus, qui praecipua fide similitudinem 
repraesentat, cum in eo uisitur imago mire relata, ut similis, ita mobilis et ad 
omnem nutum hominis sui morigera; eadem semper contemplantibus aequaeua 
est ab ineunte pueritia ad obeuntem senectam, tot aetatis uices induit, tam uarias 
habitudines corporis participat, tot uultus eiusdem laetantis uel dolentis imitatur. 
enimuero quod luto fictum uel aere infusum uel lapide incussum uel cera inustum 
uel pigmento illitum uel alio quopiam humano artificio adsimulatum est, non 
multa intercapedine temporis dissimile redditur et ritu cadaueris unum uultum et 
immobilem possidet. tantum praestat imaginis artibus ad similitudinem 
referundam leuitas illa speculi fabra et splendor opifex. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Too 1996, 135 oversimplifies its relationship to Platonic concerns about mimesis: “Apuleius firmly 
reiterates the Platonic line on the inferiority of imitation”. 
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Unless perhaps that which is fashioned through artifice with skill (i.e., sculpture) 
is considered praiseworthy, but this one offered by nature (i.e., a reflection in a 
mirror) is blameworthy, even though in it the facility and similarity of 
representation are perhaps more marvelous. Clearly, in the crafting of all images 
by hand, long labor is spent, and still, they never attain to a similarity that 
compares to that found in mirrors. For clay is lacking in vigor, rock in color, and 
painting in firmness, and all of them are lacking in motion, which conveys 
similarity with particular fidelity. Since in it (i.e., a mirror), an image is seen, 
marvelously rendered, both similar and mobile, and subservient to every nod of its 
man. For those looking into it, it always remains at their same age from the 
entrance of boyhood to old age as it departs. It adopts so many changes of age, 
participates in so many varying appearances of the body, and imitates so many 
expressions of the same man, both when he takes pleasure and when he endures 
pain. For anything molded from clay or cast in bronze or carved in stone or 
expressed in wax or spread with color or imitated by any other human skill, is 
rendered dissimilar in no great space of time; in the manner of a corpse, it 
possesses one motionless face. So much does that skillful smoothness and artistic 
shine of a mirror surpass the representational arts in regard to returning similarity. 
 
While every type of artistic representation has its particular mimetic flaws – i.e., clay is 
lacking vigor, rock color, and painting rigor – the operative term lacking in all 
representational “fidelity” is motion (motus).275 That is to say, “movement” is what 
supplies the praecipua fides to a visual representation.276 Upon closer inspection, though, 
it is not really motion so much as diachronic change that the ‘plastic’ arts fail to 
represent. Indeed, specular mimesis at any given time depicts the viewer (contemplans) as 
the appropriate age (aequaeva) even though he or she has gotten older (ab ineunte 
pueritia ad obeuntem senectam); moreover, the imago of the speculum imitates not only 
changes (vices) in age, but also variations of physical and emotional states: “so many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 The locus classicus for representational fidelity in Latin literature is Horace’s Ars Poet. 133-4: nec 
verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus interpres, nec desilies imitator in artum. These lines seem to be 
concerned not merely with strict “faithful” translation but with a kind of exegesis of familiar tales – which 
Horace refers to as publica materies. The notion of mimetic “return” (reddere) is precisely what is at issue 
in the Apuleius passage (cf. redditur). On how this line from Horace is interpreted in later cricism, see 
Copeland 1991. Below, I will suggest that the “mobile” fidelity of the mirror has to potential to tell a story, 
and therefore, a new interpretation and exegesis of a tale familiar from mythology. 
276 Apuleius’ praise of specular motion is elaborated on to varying degrees in Too 1996, Slater 1998, and 
Paschalis 2002. 
133	  
	  
faces of the same man both when he delights and when he grieves” (eiusdem laetantis uel 
dolentis). In other words, the ‘plastic’ arts fail to represent metamorphosis, a key 
association of the mirror, as we saw in the previous chapter.277 We may be reminded of 
Dio Chrysostom’s prosopopoeia of Pheidias, wherein the famous sculptor claims that 
poets can encompass variegated shapes and forms: the mirror, for all its Platonic 
baggage, seems to exist in a middle space between the temporal and spatial boundaries 
Lessing draws for the verbal and visual arts, at least insofar as it manages to reveal bodies 
in space performing series of actions.278 
 Although Apuleius attributes the mimetic fidelity of speculum to its “similarity” 
and “mobility”, the catoptric imago possesses a rather strange kind of fides: it is said to 
be “subservient to every nod of its man” (ad omnem nutum sui hominis morigera). 
Morigera is a marked term here, one that is primarily used to describe courtesans and 
prostitutes in Roman comedy.279 No doubt, that is how Apuleius understood this term, as 
he employs it in this way to describe the debased sexual behavior of Aemilianus at 
Apologia 74, playing the submissive, pathic role in a youthful erotic tryst280; in Met. 2.5, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 It bears remembering that the “metamorphic” mirror is one of the primary categories Taylor 2008 
delineates. Cf. again Sharrock 1996 for a great discussion of how Romans thought about representing 
metamorphosis both visually and verbally. 
278 Michael Paschalis, who offers his own analysis of Byrrhena’s atrium in the terms of Lessing, notes on 
this passage: “Had Lessing been interested in mirror reflections, he would undoubtedly have said that 
mirrors are capable of rendering both ‘bodies in space’ and ‘actions in time’” (Paschalis 2002, 137-8). 
279 See TLL.b: speciatim in re veneria. Adams 1982, 164 deals with this term in same entry as officium (on 
which, see my reading of Met. 2.4 below). There, he suggests that its earliest meaning in Plautus concerned 
“the ideal married relationship of wife to husband” (quoting Williams 1958), but soon after, came to be 
associate with the behavior of prostitutes and courtesans. 
280 See Apol. 74, where Apuleius lambasts Aemilianus for debased behavior (as a receiving partner) in his 
youth: olim in pueritia, priusquam isto caluitio deformaretur, emasculatoribus suis ad omnia infanda 
morigerus, mox in iuuentute saltandis fabulis exossis plane et eneruis, sed, ut audio, indocta et rudi 
mollitia (“once, in his boyhood, before he was deformed by that baldness, [Aemilianus] was submissive to 
his pederasts in all manner of unspeakable behaviors, and then, in his youth, by performing evidently 
boneless and nerveless dances in pantomimes, but ones, as I have heard, with an unlearned and crude 
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moreover, we encounter men whom Pamphile transforms into animals because they are 
minus morigeri – “less submissive” in an erotic sense; and lastly, at 2.16, Lucius begs 
Photis to show him how “submissive” she is (ut mihi morem plenius gesseris)281 by 
letting her hair down – a scene that will be of great interest again when we consider the 
Haarspiegel in chapter 3. In both Met. 2.5 and 2.16, we should further note, 
“submissiveness” is intimately tied to metamorphosis: the minus morigeri are 
transformed as a punishment for their refusal of erotic submission, whereas Photis, by 
letting her hair down “submissively”, enacts her metamorphosis into the Knidian 
Aphrodite.282 In our current passage, the fides of catoptric mimesis is thus likened to a 
woman (or a pathic man) who will do anything the viewer/client wants no matter how 
much time has passed in the relationship. Or, to phrase it differently, the mirror’s mimetic 
virtue of registering diachrony seems strangely at odds with a model of fidelity that 
requires no temporal development: the literary archetype of faithfulness, Homer’s 
Penelope, demonstrates her devotion to her husband through tests and trials over time283; 
but the fides of a courtesan, though quite literally morigera to every nod of its man, is not 
really fides at all, at least not the kind of fides that exemplary models of feminine 
behavior demonstrate.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
softness.”). In addition to associations of morigerus with pederasty and submissive sexual behavior, we 
may be reminded here of Lucius’ refusal to disbelieve a fabula on the grounds that he witnessed a young 
boy perform a “boneless and sinew-less dance” (enervam et exossam saltationem). 
281 See Adams 1982, 164 for the development of the idiom morem gero and its later associations with 
passive sexual behavior. 
282 See Met. 2.17, which clearly recalls the iconography of the Knidian Aphrodite: Neci mora, cum omnibus 
illis cibariis vasculis raptim remotis, laciniis cunctis suis renudata, crinibus quam dissolutis ad hilarem 
lasciviam in speciem Veneris quae marinos fluctus subit pulchre reformata, paulisper etiam glabellum 
femina rosea palmula potius obumbrans de industria quam tegens verecundia… I will return to this 
passage again in the next chapter, where I will discuss how it relates to the viewing choice elaborated upon 
in pseudo-Lucian’s Amores. 
283 I should note that this comparison is complicated by the fact that Penelope, while faithful to her husband 
(at least in the Odyssey), is not a faithful narrator or story-teller, but a duplicitous one.	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The strangeness of Apuleius’ metaphor for mimetic realism should become even 
clearer with a little more philological digging into the word fides: while I initially 
assumed it would be an age-old representational metaphor, the word is, in fact, nowhere 
else used in connection with the ‘plastic’ arts. Indeed, the only type of mimetic fidelity 
within the semantic range of fides concerns narrative or historiographical fidelity.284 To 
put it in Lessing’s terms, fides is a term in representational semantics only associated 
with the verisimilitude of narrative – “actions in time” – but Apuleius expands the 
semantic range of the word to explain what “bodies in space” lack. Other modes of 
mimesis are not faithful because fidelity as a representational concept only relates to 
“actions in time”. Considering Apuleius’ erotic characterization of specular mimesis, 
moreover, it should also be noted that fides is a recurring term in lyric and elegiac poetry 
to describe the infidelity of a lover: consider, for instance, Horace’s Odes 1.5, in which 
the poet laments the “changed faith” (fides mutata) of a beloved,285 and Odes 1.33, in 
which Horace encourages a certain Albius not to waste his time writing “miserable 
elegies” (miserabiles elegos) about a betrayal of fidelity (laesa fides).286 What is at issue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 See TLL. caput prius.II.B.1 (de dictis vel rebus fictis), where one can find a great number of citations 
about the fides of a historical or written account. Of particular interest are a line from Seneca’s Natural 
Questions, in which he questions the fides of Homer (Nat. Quaest. 6.26: si Homero fides est) on issues of 
geography, and Horace’s Ars Poetica 52, in which he recommends to poets the creation of neologisms in 
order to add fides to their work (et nova fictaque nuper habebunt verba fidem). In Horace especially, the 
process of poetic construction (or mimesis) is framed in terms of constructing visual art: neologisms are 
helpful “in weaving together words” (46: in verbis…serendis). Narrative fidelity constitutes a classic trope 
of historiography that can be traced all the way back to Pericles’ funeral oration in Thucydides’ 
Peloponnesian War: “it is difficult for a speaker to be believed” (χεῖρον εἰπόντι πιστευθῆναι) because the 
words seem to “exaggerate” (πλεονάζεσθαι) the deeds. This locus classicus on narrative πίστις then elicits a 
number of allusions to Pericles’ claim in Roman historiography, wherein verbal descriptions of “actions in 
time” seem to outstrip the realism of the events. 
285 Odes 1.5.5-8: …heu quotiens fidem/ mutatosque deos flebit et aspera/ nigris aequora ventis/ emirabitur 
insolens. 
286 See TLL.caput prius.II.A.2.c.α, labeled inter amores under the heading in re amatoria. In some cases, 
this type of fides concerns mutual or reciprocal fidelity between the poet and his beloved, as, e.g., in Prop. 
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in the world of erotics, therefore, is the stability or mutability of fides. It is no 
coincidence, then, that a near quotation of Apuleius’ phrase praecipua fides recurs in an 
adultery tale in Metamorphoses 9, when a husband named Barbarus worries about how to 
protect the chastity of his wife, who is ironically named after another ideal Homeric wife, 
Arete: in the hope of preserving her pudicitia, Barbarus entrusts his wife to a servant “of 
particular fidelity” (Met. 9.17: praecipua fidelitas), who, in turn, hires her out to a young 
suitor for a good time. Though this fidelitas refers to the servant rather than the wife in 
this passage, I think the point still stands that mimetic fides is framed in terms of serving 
a master and relates to obedience and subordination. Even in the case of an ‘Arete’ in 
Apuleius, fides is for sale, just as it is in Roman elegy,287 and resembles a meretricious 
rather than marital erotic love, especially in its ability to change and adapt over time. 
Beyond merely participating in a Second Sophistic aesthetic movement, the 
passage in question also alludes to a much richer philosophical background. In light of 
his self-proclaimed Platonic affiliations, it seems fitting first to compare Apuleius’ 
preference for catoptric mimesis to Plato’s well-known expulsion of poetry from the ideal 
state in Republic 10, which he opens by means of an analogy that has, as Ernst Gombrich 
phrased it, “haunted the philosophy of art ever since.”288 There, Socrates uses the 
κάτοπτρον as a stand-in for all forms of mimesis – but in particular, painting and poetry – 
which, in turn, leads to the famous claim that all representation is “twice removed” from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1.4.16, 1.12.8, 2.20.4, 2.20.18, 2.20.34, etc. However, it can also refer to the infidelity of the elegiac 
beloved, as in Horace Odes 1.33.1-4. It should also be noted that fides can refer to marital fidelity (TLL. 
caput prius.II.A.2.c. β) of the sort displayed by the archetypal Penelope (cf. esp. Ovid Trist. 5.14.26: 
Penelopea fides). But, in many of the instances cited in the TLL, marital fides is ironically invoked, as, e.g., 
in Seneca’s Agamemnon, where Clytemnestra laments the loss of casta fides (Ag. 111). 
287 Indeed, fides and its cognates recur all over the adultery tales of book 9, which recount the faithlessness 
of women known for their chastity (as, e.g., in the tale of the fuller’s wife, starting at 9.23). 
288 Gombrich 1977, 79. 
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reality (10.599a1: τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος) – i.e., from the original form of an 
object.289 While Socrates (facetiously) suggests that the κάτοπτρον can “create” 
(10.596e1: ποιεῖν) whatever objects one faces it toward– including objects not directly 
accessible to human vision, such as, e.g., the gods, things in the underworld, the sun, and 
everything in the sky, etc.290 – the interlocutor predictably protests that this is not a real 
act of creation: the mirror only depicts φαινόµενα rather than ὄντα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. 
The deception of specular viewing is then extended to a broader criticism of the mimetic 
arts, with a particular focus on painting (ζωγραφία) and, by one further step in the 
analogy, poetry.  
The implied problem of perspective in Plato’s criticism of catoptric mimesis – i.e., 
(1) who is looking into the mirror?, and (2) at what angles? – is made explicit in the 
analysis of painting: a couch, Socrates explains, “whether you look at it from the side, or 
down from above, or from whatever angle” (10.598a7ff.: ἐάντε ἐκ πλαγίου αὐτὴν θεᾷ 
ἐάντε καταντικρὺ ἢ ὁπῃοῦν), is not essentially different, but merely “appears different” 
(φαίνεται δὲ ἀλλοία). Since a painting thus transforms a three-dimensional object into a 
two-dimensional visualization of that object, however, it must by necessity focalize an 
object from one particular angle, thereby obscuring the essential nature of that object.291 
That Plato conveniently disregards three-dimensional visual media in his attack is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Halliwell 1988, 116 ad loc. 597e3 elaborates: “The idea of an ontological hierarchy (a series of levels of 
reality) is now firmly brought into play.” 
290 Halliwell 1988, 112 ad loc. 596e3 notes the absurdity of this claim: “…it is not clear how a mirror could 
produce images of the gods…the argument runs tendentiously ahead of itself; this is even true of the uses 
of the verb poiein (make/produce) in this context.” Murray 1996, 194 ad loc. 596c4-9 implies that the 
phrase τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου could allude to Polygnotus’ painting of Hades at Delphi. 
291 However, cf. the distinction Halliwell 1988, 117 ad loc. 598a9 draws “between (a) ‘appears as if it were 
different’, and (b) ‘shows a different aspect of its appearance’”. Halliwell suggests that Plato is not being 
precise here by conflating this important distinction “so as to tarnish even further the credentials of 
mimesis”.  
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only a substantial and well-known flaw in his argument,292 but is also a feature of his 
criticism that will play an interesting role in our assessment of Lucius’ ekphrasis of 
Byrrhena’s atrium, as Lucius focalizes three-dimensional mimetic media through the 
two-dimensional medium of the mirroring water. 
As book 10’s argument proceeds to poetry, Socrates likens the listener’s/viewer’s 
engagement with mimesis to that of consorting with a ἑταίρα. At 10.603a10-b2, he 
explains: 
τοῦτο τοίνυν διοµολογήσασθαι βουλόµενος ἔλεγον ὅτι ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ 
µιµητικὴ πόρρω µὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ὂν τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, πόρρω δ᾽ αὖ 
φρονήσεως ὄντι τῷ ἐν ἡµῖν προσοµιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταίρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐπ᾽ οὐδενὶ 
ὑγιεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἀληθεῖ. 
 
It was with the aim of getting agreement on just this point that I said that painting, 
and mimetic art as a whole, produces work which is far from the truth; and far 
from wisdom too is the element within us with which it consorts like a mistress 
and beloved, for no sound or true purpose. 
 
Just as a meretricious love could result in unwanted, bastard children, Plato characterizes 
mimesis in book 10 “as a courtesan engaging in a liaison which produces defective 
offspring”.293 In extending this erotic metaphor to the verbal arts, in turn, Socrates 
explains that mimetic poetry “imitates men in action...who think that they have fared well 
or badly, and who, in all these actions, either grieve or rejoice” (10.603c4: πράττοντας… 
ἀνθρώπους µιµεῖται ἡ µιµητικὴ… ἢ εὖ οἰοµένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ 
πᾶσιν ἢ λυπουµένους ἢ χαίροντας). And finally, this attack on mimesis comes to a head 
with one of the most famous passages of Platonic writing, namely, the exposition of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 See, e.g., Murray 1996, 200 ad loc. 598b6-8: “The generalization from painting to mimetic art as a 
whole…is slipped in unobtrusively; but the argument just used in relation to painting cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to a three-dimensional medium like sculpture, let alone poetry.” 
293 See Halliwell 1988, 135 ad loc. 603b1. See also p. 156 ad loc. 607e4: “Poetry is implicitly the kind of 
seductive hetaera, courtesan…with whom young men may fall disastrously in love, but from whom older 
and mature men, despite some lingering affection, will keep their distance”. 
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famous “ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy”, which is once again framed in 
erotic terms (10.607e3ff.): 
εἰ δέ γε µή, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὥσπερ οἱ ποτέ του ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἡγήσωνται µὴ 
ὠφέλιµον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, βίᾳ µέν, ὅµως δὲ ἀπέχονται, καὶ ἡµεῖς οὕτως…ἕως δ᾽ 
ἂν µὴ οἵα τ᾽ ᾖ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροασόµεθ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐπᾴδοντες ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον 
τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέγοµεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν, εὐλαβούµενοι πάλιν ἐµπεσεῖν εἰς 
τὸν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα. 
 
But if the poet [cannot give an apology], my dear companion, then we must 
behave just as those who have once fallen in love with someone but realize that 
the love is not beneficial and hold themselves back, even by force…so long as she 
[poetry] cannot make a defense for herself, we will listen to her while chanting 
(ἐπᾴδειν) this λόγος of ours over ourselves and reciting this soothing incantation 
(ἐπῳδή), taking care not to fall back into the childish love of the many. 
 
The danger of engaging with mimetic poetry, in the Platonic framework, is thus likened 
to contracting an unhealthy erotic attachment. The kind of desire that issues forth from 
mimesis is a childish obsession, which can consume the viewer with deception. 
Moreover, the defective offspring from this kind of association is precisely what Plato 
worries about at the conclusion of the Phaedrus, too, in a passage where he likens written 
speeches to painting in their monolithic semiosis – a passage, one could argue, that 
represents a clear intratext in the Platonic corpus to Republic 10.294 In a scene that has a 
great influence on Apuleius among other writers in the Second Sophistic,295 Socrates 
questions the value of written speeches by employing the analogy of painting (Phaedrus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 One might point to a number of shared lexical and conceptual concerns between these two passages, 
although, to my knowledge, scholars have done little more than acknowledge particular word choices. Both 
scenes refer to mimesis with a key term of Democritean optics associated with the mirror, εἴδωλον (cf. Rep. 
10.598b and Phaedr. 274dff.); both use the metaphor of offspring and lineage for the production of 
mimesis; and both compare painting with some form of verbal art. See Halliwell 1988, 116 ad loc. 597e3, 
where he refers to the Phaedrus’ invocation of the metaphor of offspring. Halliwell 2002, however, makes 
no mention of a possible connection. 
295 Many scholars have suggested, for instance, that the conclusion of the Phaedrus is an important intertext 
for the Prologue of the Metamorphoses, particularly with its play on oral and written communication. See 
Trapp 2001 for the most sustained argument. See also Thibau 1965; Dowden 2006. Kirichenko 2008 
expands on Trapp’s argument. 
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274dff.). ζωγραφία possesses the strange quality of producing “offspring” (τὰ ἐκείνης 
ἔκγονα) that seem “as if they are alive” (ὡς ζῶντα), but ultimately cannot respond to 
questions or criticism. The analogy is then extended to written speeches (λόγοι), which 
also stand in solemn silence when faced with any criticisms of a hypothetical interlocutor. 
Speeches, therefore, trick their hearers into believing that they can think (δόξαις µὲν ἂν 
ὥς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν), but when one interrogates them, they “signify only one 
and the same thing always” (ἕν τι σηµαίνει µόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί).  
If we return to Apuleius’ laus speculi in Apologia 14, I suggest that we have 
found not only the philosophical origins from which Apuleius developed his paradoxical 
erotic model for specular mimesis – though, we should note he does not follow Plato to 
his final assessment of it; we have also discovered a line that may be the very phrase 
Apuleius translates at the conclusion of chapter 14. After enumerating the many benefits 
of the metamorphic mimesis the speculum offers, Apuleius polishes off the first piece of 
his laus speculi with one final condemnation of the ‘plastic arts’: 
non multa intercapedine temporis dissimile redditur et ritu cadaueris unum uultum 
et immobilem possidet. 
 
In a small interval of time, [the mimetic representation] is rendered dissimilar, and 
in the manner of a corpse, possesses one motionless face. 
 
We find out here why the mirror’s courtesan-fidelity is more desirable than the ‘plastic 
arts’: other modes of mimesis fix the object of depiction ritu cadaveris – “in the manner 
of a corpse”. What is at stake in mimesis is nothing less than mortification. Just as written 
speeches “signify one and the same thing always” (ἕν τι σηµαίνει µόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί) 
according to the Phaedrus, all plastic media “possess one unchanging face” (unum 
uultum et immobilem) in Apuleus’ framework, which becomes dissimilar from the object 
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of the representation “in no time” (non multa intercapedine temporis). Both discussions 
of mimesis are, at the most basic level, concerned with the ability to register a change 
over time – in the case of Plato, the failure of mimesis to change in accordance with the 
needs of an interlocutor who wants to learn (i.e., to change internally), and in Apuleius’ 
case, the incapacity of a fixed representation to accurately portray its real object after 
external changes have inevitably occurred. Moreover, both scenes are figured in terms of 
life and death – in Plato, bastard children who only seem alive (but are actually dead, or 
at least not “ensouled”),296 and in Apuleius, a virtual death through artistic fixity.297 While 
no one to my knowledge has suggested it, it is quite possible that Plato is playing here 
with the etymological connection between σηµαίνει and a σῆµα – the burial stone298: 
written down words, such as one sees on a σῆµα, may seem to speak but cannot truly 
answer a passerby. In any case, what we find in Apuleius is a mixture of terms that Plato 
has already explored in relation to mimesis: ability to respond to change in the 
viewer/listener, erotic desire for illegitimate love, and mortified representation. 
 While Apuleius seems to borrow the characterization of the speculum as a 
courtesan from Plato’s critique, strangely framing the erotic association in positive terms, 
it is also possible to see how Apuleius arrives at Platonic ideas by traveling over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 See Phaedr. 276a4: Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔµψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραµµένος εἴδωλον ἄν τι 
λέγοιτο δικαίως. 
297 Too 1996, 135 reads ritu cadaveris as a reference to a kind of artistic death that occurs with fixing a 
representation in a static form: “…imitation is…a dangerous, even deadly, way of coming to terms with the 
world. Painting and sculpture produce immobile images, which Apuleius compares to a rigid death mask, 
cf. ritu cadaveris unum vultum et immobilem. The author suggests now that art is a device for murdering 
people, as it induces into its subjects, not the rigor of the three dimensional object which a painting is said 
to lack, but rigor mortis. Art annihilates the vitality of its subjects and transforms them into corpses”. 
298 It would not be far fetched to question whether this phraseology in Latin could be a gloss on the Greek 
ἕν τι σηµαίνει µόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί, especially considering the connection between the verb σηµαίνω and 
burial stones (σῆµα) which actually speak on behalf of a corpse. One need only perform a TLG search on 
σηµαίνω and σῆµα in the Anthologia Graeca to see the importance of these terms in the epigrammatic 
tradition. 
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“bridge” of Latin literature, as I suggested in the introduction – in this case, through 
Ovid. If we return to the wording of the laus speculi and consider it in light of the 
collocation of erotic nodding (nutus), motion (motus), and emotional changes (laetans; 
dolens), it is difficult not to detect here a subtle allusion to Ovid’s Narcissus, who 
recognizes himself in the mirror through the reflexive correspondence of precisely these 
features (Met. 3.457-60): 
cum risi, adrides; lacrimas quoque saepe notavi  
me lacrimante tuas; nutu quoque signa remittis  
et, quantum motu formosi suspicor oris,  
verba refers aures non pervenientia nostras! 
 
Whenever I smile, you smile in response; and I have often noticed tears on your 
cheeks when I am crying. To my nod, you respond with signs of recognition; and 
as I suspect from the movement of your beautiful lips, you answer my words as 
well, but with words that do not reach my ears. 
 
Here, too, the mirror’s signifier is a responsive nod to its man (nutus; cf. ad omnem 
nutum hominis sui) and a mimesis of an erotic motion (motus); and here, the recognition 
of the self in the mirror is brought about through corresponding emotional reactions – 
namely, laughing and crying (cum risi…lacrimante), similar to Apuleius’ delighting and 
grieving (cf. laetantis vel dolentis) – with both scenes relating stories of men “faring well 
or badly” (ἢ εὖ…ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι) and as a consequence, “grieving or rejoicing” (ἢ 
λυπουµένους ἢ χαίροντας), exactly as Socrates defined poetic mimesis in Republic 10. Of 
course, these diachronic changes registered in the speculum, which first bring about 
Narcissus’ recognition of himself in fulfillment of Tiresias’ prophecy (Met. 2.248: si se 
non noverit), serve as the catalyst for his final metamorphosis into the flower. Therefore, 
the speculum not only registers change over time, but even enacts it. As Shadi Bartsch 
has recently suggested, Tiresias’ prophecy itself may be considered an ironic play on the 
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philosophical strand of the γνῶθι σεαυτόν tradition, which Ovid inherits directly from 
Plato’s Phaedrus.299 Narcissus gazing upon his lover in the mirroring water echoes the 
intersubjective encounter between lover and beloved in the Phaedrus, where the eyes are 
mirrors of the soul, proffering self-knowledge as well as transcendent experience. 
However, what we should especially take note of in these lines of the Narcissus episode 
is how catoptric mimesis, with its ability to register the nod (nutus) and motion (motus) of 
its man, leads to an erotic longing for verba to reach the ears (3.462: verba…aures 
…pervenientia nostras). Even if the ears are less trustworthy than the eyes – a phrase 
Herodotus’ Candaules famously coined and Lucian’s ἕτερος λόγος quoted – the reflection 
of erotic motions is not enough for Narcissus: he needs the verba to assure him of erotic 
reciprocity. Thus, while the philosophical underpinnings of Apuleius’ representational 
preference can be traced back to Plato, they are nonetheless mediated through Ovid’s 
own engagement with Plato, as it were.300 We see in Ovid a longing for a verbal exchange 
of the sort that the Phaedran Socrates laments is missing from fixed forms of mimesis 
writ large; and we see Apuleius, in turn, allude to a tradition of playing with Plato 
through subtle word choices that signal a Narcissan kind of delusion. 
 If we return once again to the peculiar elements that Apuleius claims are lacking 
from other mimetic media – vigor, color, and rigor – there are a number of paradoxes in 
their uses as art-critical terms of representational success, which also point to Apuleius’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 See Bartsch 2006, 84 says of this “[story] of reflection gone awry”: “it seems clear that…[Ovid] had the 
Phaedrus in mind…in treating the triad of mirrors, eros, and self-knowledge, [he] clearly had cause to 
reflect on a text whose popularity and influence are well documented for the centuries before and after”.  
300 For the view that Ovid’s Narcissus and Pygmalion episodes represent anti-Platonic statements on 
aesthetics, particularly in response to Republic 10, see Rosati 1983. However, understood in light of a more 
nuanced approach to Plato’s view of mimesis (such as, e.g., in Halliwell 2002), we might rather say that 
these Ovidian episodes function as narrative re-workings of Platonic concerns with the problems of 
mimesis. 
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preference for verbal over visual mimesis. Consider, for instance, vigor – the missing 
element that deprives clay of its mimetic naturalism – in the literary tradition. We may 
note that it is rarely applied to inanimate or artistic objects in Latin literature, and thus, 
has a rather strange resonance here. Indeed, only in Pliny the Elder’s Natural Histories is 
vigor used of stones, particularly precious stones; and in context, the word describes the 
way in which certain stones interact with light and change color under the sun.301 In fact, 
vigor, much like fides, is a term applied not to ‘plastic’ representation, but to physical and 
mental processes – as, e.g., in vigor animi.302 Under this semantic heading, vigor can be a 
descriptive word for “lively” rhetoric: in the preface to Seneca the Elder’s Controversiae 
10, the narrator speaks of “the color of ancient oratory, and the vigor of new” (color 
orationis antiquae, vigor novae); and Seneca the Younger, in discussing the writings of 
Fabianus, uses exactly the same construction as Apuleius to express what rhetorical 
quality is lacking in them – deest illis oratorius vigor (Ep. 100.8; cf. deest enim…luto 
vigor).  In Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, on the other hand, vigor and its cognates are 
employed to describe the “vigorousness” of sexual appetite aroused by wine and 
seduction in the tryst between Lucius and Photis. At 2.11, Lucius says:  
Vinum istud hodie sorbamus omne, quod nobis restinguat pudoris ignaviam et 
alacrem vigorem libidinis incutiat. 
 
We should drink up all this wine today so that it may extinguish the cowardice of 
our modesty and stir up the speedy vigor of our lust. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 At Nat. Hist. 9.109, Pliny discusses how marvelously pearls change color and “grow ruddy in the sun 
and lose their brightness just like the human body” (sole rufescere candoremque perdere ut corpus 
humanum). But even the deep-sea pearls, which do not see the sun, become yellow over time, and lose the 
vigor that they once had in their youth (nec nisi in iuventa constat ille qui quaeritur vigor). Alternatively, in 
book 37, where Pliny discusses precious gems, he describes a certain kind of stone called a sandastros, 
which “tinges objects placed next to it with a certain vigor” (37.101: quidam vigor adposita tinguens). 
302 See the examples in OLD 1a. Cf. Apuleius’ DDS 3.26, where he uses the phrase vigor animi precisely to 
describe the mental energy required of wise men to comprehend divine things. 
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And as the sexual tension rises between Lucius and Photis, he claims to have “vigorously 
stretched his bow” (Met. 2.16: arcum meum et ipse vigorate tetendi) to a very taut point. 
Beyond vigorous sexual activity, though, vigor is one of the pleasing elements of the 
lively dance that Minerva’s cortege performs in Lucius’ ekphrasis of the Judgment of 
Paris in Met. 10: the war song that members of her troop sang “stir[s] up the vigor of their 
swift dance” (saltationis agilis vigorem suscitabat). Therefore, while the semantic range 
of the verb insofar as it relates to mimesis concerns a certain kind of verbal activity 
(oratorius vigor),303 Apuleius uses it in relation to movement, and in particular, erotic 
movement (alacrem vigorem libidinis). 
 Color, which is missing from statuary, presents another interesting term – in this 
case, an art critical term that has both elegiac and diachronic associations attached to it. 
Though statuary (saxum) lacks color in Apuleius, there is actually a tradition of 
discussing the variegated colores of painting: according to Pliny the Elder, Apelles had a 
special varnish for his paintings that offered an especially life-like verisimilitude304; and 
the well-known color work of Apelles gets taken up as an elegiac trope,305 in, e.g., 
Propertius, who describes beautiful female mythological exempla as follows in 1.2.21-2: 
 sed facies aderat nullis obnoxia gemmis, 
 qualis Apelleis est color in tabulis. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 An instance of this kind of verbal vigor also occurs in one of the adultery tales of the Met.: in the 
Barbarus-Arete episode, after the cuckolded husband discovers a young man’s slippers under his bed, he 
drags his servant – the one known for his “particular fidelity” (praecipua fidelitas) – into the public square, 
and the young adulterer attacks him for stealing his slippers; Barbarus, “elated by the deception of the 
vigorous youth” (Met. 9.21: fallacia vigorati iuvenis…immo sublatus), lapsed (delapsus) into credulity. 
This usage would likely fall under the category of mental ingenuity (vigor animi). 
304 See Pliny Nat. Hist. 35.97. That Apuleius knew of this tradition is clear from his claim about Alexander 
in Florida 7 (see n. 306 below). 
305 See Sharrock 1991. 
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 But their appearance was not dependent on any gems, 
 (and they had) a such color as is in the paintings of Apelles. 
 
It is this trope that enables Apuleius elsewhere to use color as a metonymy for painting, 
as he does in the Florida when describing Alexander’s refusal to allow any visual 
representation of himself.306 Even the elegiac undertones of a maiden’s colorful flush 
make their way into lofty epic, which, as Alison Sharrock suggests, explains Vergil’s 
description of Lavinia: 
    Indum sanguineo veluti violaverit ostro 
    siquis ebur, aut mixta rubent ubi lilia multa 
alba rosa: talis virgo dabat ore colores. 
As when someone has dyed Indian ivory with the purple of blood, 
or when white lilies grow red, mixed with many a rose, 
such were the colors the maiden revealed on her face. 
 
The color blend on the maiden’s face, which Sharrock tentatively suggests is an intertext 
for Ovid’s Pygmalion episode (to be discussed shortly), depicts Lavinia in art-critical 
terms – as “another ‘painted lady’…an object to be fought over, and…an art-object the 
sight of which inflames Turnus.”307 Thus, color, in addition to its value as an art-critical 
term, has a certain erotic and particularly elegiac valence. 
 But this is not its only value in connection with a discussion of mimesis. Color – 
like the Greek term χρῶµα (see n. 272 above) – is also an important rhetorical term, one 
that could be applied both to stylistic and flowery rhetorical constructions as well as 
verbal decorations for narrative history. Thus, Quintilian speaks of “extemporaneous 
color” (Inst. Orat. 10.6.5: extemporalis color) of speech striking a rhetorician “in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 See Fl. 7: sed edixit uniuerso orbi suo, ne quis effigiem regis temere adsimularet aere, colore, 
caelamine, quin saepe scripsit, solus eam Polycletus aere duceret, solus Apelles coloribus deliniaret, solus 
Pyrgoteles caelamine excuderet. 
307 Sharrock 1991, 44 (her italics). 
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midst of speaking” (inter dicendum), and Catulus in Cicero’s de Oratore questions 
Lucius Coelius Antipater’s influence on narrative history on the grounds that he “did not 
distinguish history neither with his variety of colors nor with his arrangement of words” 
(de Orat. 2.54: sed iste ipse Caelius neque distinxit historiam varietate colorum neque 
verborum conlocatione). Perhaps most relevant, the color of speech is a metaphor 
borrowed from painting and applied both to oratorical and poetic speech in Crassus’ 
explication of the rules of embellishment: oratio is “adorned…as if with a certain color 
and life-blood of its own” (de Orat. 3.96: ornatur…quasi colore quodam et suco suo), 
and the immediate pleasure we receive from it is greater because of the floridity of color 
– a fact which explains why novae picturae please us more than antiquae tabulae308; 
however, without variation (sine varietate) or a cessation of words (sine intermission), a 
piece of writing, whether poetry or prose (de Orat. 3.100: vel poesis vel oratio), will not 
please the listener for long, “even if it is painted with the brightest colors” (quamvis 
claris sit coloribus picta).  
If color, by virtue of its semantic value as an art critical term, can also be applied 
to the verbal arts, then I suggest that the mirror’s ability to register this mimetic virtue (as 
is implied in Apol. 14) again reveals how specular representation serves as a veiled 
preference for the imaginative and erotic power of the word – just as we saw with fides 
above. Indeed, color is precisely the element that furnishes diachrony to Photis’ catoptric 
hair (Met. 2.9): in Lucius’ encomium of Photis’ capillus, which we shall analyze more 
fully in chapter 3, he strangely likens it to a speculum because it changes color over time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 See de Orat. 3.98: Quanto colorum pulcritudine et varietate floridiora sunt in picturis novis pleraque 
quam in veteribus! 
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Part of the pleasure of looking at hair throughout the Metamorphoses (and precisely what 
is missing from Apuleius’ hair in the Apologia) is its waving and undulant motion,309 
which produces the optical illusions of color change and inspires erotic desire for 
narrative in the viewer. Considering the peculiarities of the two terms vigor and color in 
relation to mimetic verisimilitude, then, it is noteworthy that they are precisely the 
elements that Narcissus loses when he begins to waste away in front of the mirroring 
water. At Met. 3.491-3, the narrator explains: 
 Et neque iam color est mixto candore rubori, 
 nec vigor et vires et quae modo visa placebant, 
  
 His ruddy blush no longer had its color with whiteness mixed in, 
 Nor did he have his vigor and strength and all that was once pleasing to look at… 
 
Color and vigor – the elements that the mirroring water once revealed (modo visa) to 
Narcissus – become by their very absence signs that a transformation is in the process of 
taking place. That Apuleius takes them to be necessary features of successfully 
naturalistic mimesis – and the very elements lacking in different types of sculpture – 
reenacts once again Ovid’s engagement with questions about representation that go all 
the way back to Plato. 
While vigor and color can be applied equally to visual and verbal mimesis, the 
element that Apuleius claims is missing from painting, rigor, would certainly be an odd 
virtue to espouse for the verbal arts. In fact, it turns out that it is not really a 
representational virtue at all. Rigor and its cognates appear in art historical treatments not 
of painting, but of statuary. In this realm of criticism, rigor describes not naturalistic or 
realistic three-dimensional art, but the early stages of sculpture, when the productions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 On this phenomenon in Apuleius, see Schmeling and Montiglio 2006. 
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artists had yet to achieve life-like verisimilitude. In Cicero’s Brutus, for instance, the 
character Cicero discusses the statues of Canachus, which, he says, “are too rigid to 
imitate reality” (Brut. 70: Canachi signa rigidiora esse quam ut imitentur veritatem); as 
artistic method evolves, signa become softer (molliora), and thus, are better able to 
represent veritas. In a similar comparative treatment of the arts, Quintilian traces the 
evolution of statuary from the “hard” (dura) pieces of Callon and Hegesias to the “less 
rigid” (minus rigida) work of Calamis and the “still softer” (molliora adhuc) statues of 
Myron. It is very strange indeed not only that Apuleius applies rigor to painting, but also 
that he imagines it to be an operative feature in producing naturalistic verisimilitude, 
considering that it functions in precisely the opposite fashion in art critical discussions. 
One final episode that may be at play here – in part because it is the textual mirror 
to Ovid’s Narcissus, and in part because it is a quintessential scene in Latin literature for 
erotic and narrative imagination – is Ovid’s Pygmalion.310 As has already been suggested 
in the copious scholarship on this episode, Pygmalion-as-sculptor can be seen as an 
avatar for Ovid-as-poet, with Pygmalion representing the “creative artist par 
excellence”.311 What is of particular interest to my investigation of Apuleius’ courtesan-
mirror is the way in which Ovid’s Pygmalion episode invites the reader to participate in 
Pygmalion’s erotic desire for his fantasy to become a reality.312 As such, it represents a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 See Rosati 1983 among others on the mirroring relationship between Narcissus and Pygmalion in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses. 
311 See Anderson 1963, 25 for the phrase. See also Elsner 1991, 159: “[Ovid’s version] turns Pygmalion 
into the supreme myth of the artist. He is the artist who makes his image so like life that in the end art 
becomes life. He is the artist – the one and only artist – to preserve his work in its pristine integrity of 
meaning, since he never lets go of it, never lets it into anyone else’s sight”.  
312 Jaś Elsner was the first to read this scene through the desiring eyes of the reader: “…the invitation to the 
viewer in realistic art to become his own artist has been transformed by Ovid’s text into an invitation to the 
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locus classicus for calling into question Platonic concerns over the deceptive and delusive 
effects of mimesis on viewers, listeners, and readers.313 It is illustrative first to point out 
the opening exegetical comment Orpheus makes to the reader at 10.250-1: 
virginis est verae facies, quam vivere credas 
 et, si non obstet reverentia, velle moveri 
 
She had the face of a true maiden, one which/who you would believe was alive, 
and, if modesty did not object, would want to be moved/to move itself. 
 
In this pseudo-ekphrasis, Orpheus-the-narrator incorporates the reader into the viewing 
experience with a 2nd-person singular generalizing subjunctive – a feature of ekphrasis 
we will see prominently on display in Lucius’ description of Byrrhena’s atrium. And the 
delusion Pygmalion experiences over the ontology of this statue is felt in the playful 
repetition of the root ver- of the adjective verus314 as well as in the confused syntax of the 
line: is virgo or facies the antecedent of quam? Moreover, in this incorporation of the 
reader, the narrator also suggests with the ambiguity of the medio-passive meaning of 
moveri that this reader/viewer would desire for the statue to move in some way. Does the 
girl/appearance want “to move herself” or does she want “to be moved”? Both meanings 
have the same sexual undertones as Apuleius’ courtesan-speculum.315 In addition to 
motion, the sign that Venus has granted Pygmalion’s wish for his ivory statue to become 
real comes in the form of softening rigor. That is, after Venus offers her divine nod 
(amici numinis omen) to Pygmalion – with the nod once again being a response that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reader to write his own version – his own fantasy – of the transgressive passion so brilliantly captured in 
the Pygmalion episode” (Elsner 1991, 164). 
313 See again Rosati 1983, according to whom this scene appears to offer a challenge to Republic 10. 
314 ver-: verae…vivere…reverentia…moveri. See Ahl 1985, 248 for the recognition of the wordplay; cf. 
Elsner 1991, 160 for further discussion. 
315 Adams 1982, 195 points out how moveo “(in the medio-passive) and some of its derivatives were 
applicable to sexual motions”. Cf. Feldherr 2010, 264. 
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registers his erotic desire – the ivory maiden is said to “grow soft” (mollescit) and to “set 
aside her rigor at the touch of [Pygmalion’s] fingers” (positoque rigore/ subsedit digitis). 
Then, the ivory maiden reciprocates Pygmalion’s love by changing color, “blushing” 
(erubuit) as he showers kisses on her, and she undergoes a Phaedran kind of visual 
experience – i.e., by “lifting up her…eyes to the eyes/stars” (293: ad lumina lumen 
attollens) and “seeing the eyes of her lover at the same time as she sees the sky” (pariter 
cum caelo vidit amantem).316 It is no coincidence that, upon realizing that his erotic 
fantasy has been granted, Pygmalion does nothing other than “conceive of words” 
(concipit…/verba) to the goddess, a fact emphasized by enjambment.317  
Thus, in a quintessential moment in Latin literature concerning the appropriate 
aesthetic and erotic responses to art – one that could be seen either as a confirmation of or 
a challenge to Platonic concerns about mimesis – we encounter yet another competition 
between the visual and the verbal over representing the real and fulfilling the erotic 
imagination. Once again, the elements at play are motion, color change, reciprocation (or 
what we might call mirroring), a softening of rigor, and a verbal response. If we are to 
accept Andrew Feldherr’s reading of this scene, moreover, the text leaves us in an 
aporetic state, questioning whether the statue actually came to life or whether she just 
“seemed to” (visa); and by extension, it leaves us asking whether Pygmalion really had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 I do not know if anyone has suggested another kind of allusion to the Phaedrus in this scene, parallel to 
the Narcissus episode, but it seems to be yet another play on the eye-to-eye interaction of lover and beloved 
in Phaedrus 255c1ff. In that scene, there is both a sublimation and a reciprocation of erotic desire, and the 
intersubjective encounter between the mirroring eyes proffers a transcendent kind of knowledge. 
317 See Feldherr 2010, 265 n. 43: “Still problematic is the question of whether any real subjectivity can 
emerge from the ivory maiden other than the projection of the viewer/maker’s fantasy. In this connection, it 
is interesting to note Ovid’s treatment of the third traditional element in the animation of statues, speech. 
The ivory maiden remains mute throughout; as Pygmalion’s creation, she never gets the chance to speak, 
but at the very moment of the change, Pygmalion himself suddenly begins to speak, an act ‘pregnantly’ 
described as ‘conceiving words’ (concipit/verba, 290-1 – emphasized by enjambment)”. 
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his wish fulfilled or whether he merely descended further into a state of delusion. Thus, 
Feldherr concludes: 
How then, to summarize, does the story comment on the act of viewing visual 
representations, and how does it link that experience to the reception of the text? 
It articulates for its reader a set of alternatives for responding to the ivory maiden, 
assent to illusion and an awareness of artifice, making both available to its reader 
without unequivocally either exulting in the powers of illusion…or providing a 
cold shower in the form of a reminder of the limits of art.318 
 
Put simply, the Ovidian narrator, in this pseudo-ekphrastic text, incorporates us into his 
text through the traditional rhetorical-poetic techniques, and then gives us a choice as to 
the appropriate response to aesthetic illusion, putting the onus of deciding on the reader. 
I have suggested in this section that Apuleius’ courtesan mirror provides, in fact, 
an ideal metaphor for the temporality of narrative and its ability to inspire “autonomous 
imaginative activity” in the viewer. After all, if we return again to Apuleius’ paradoxical 
notion of fides, in sexual terms, a prostitute could represent erotic imagination, 
considering she does whatever the lover wants, literally responding to his every nod. That 
is, in the sexual encounter with a prostitute – much like in Pygmalion’s rather disturbing 
tactile manipulation of his beloved – the customer uses the woman or pathic man as an 
object of his imagination, a vehicle of wish-fulfillment. In the next section, we will turn 
to Lucius’ ekphrasis of a statuary group in Byrrhena’s atrium. There, I argue that the 
same terms of erotic imagination are played out in bringing a scene of heightened 
naturalistic realism to life through verbal description. And I propose that we as readers 
are left in the same kind of conundrum, deciding whether to allow ourselves to participate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 Feldherr 2010, 269. 
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in Lucius’ pleasure and delusion or whether to step back and reconsider our own 
attachment to this text. 
 
Metamorphoses 2.4: Turning “Bodies in Space” into “Actions in Time”: 
	  
If we turn now to the ekphrasis of Byrrhena’s atrium in Met. 2.4, I suggest that we 
see a similar connection between motion over time, catoptric mimesis, and erotic fantasy. 
The mirroring water into which we are exhorted to gaze seems to add the finishing 
touches to an already “pregnant moment”, furnishing a temporal narrative to an otherwise 
fixed scene. As Lucius enters Byrrhena’s house, already excited for illicit sights, he offers 
a cinematic description of her atrium: 
 Ecce lapis Parius in Dianam factus tenet libratam totius loci medietatem, 
signum perfecte luculentum, ueste reflatum, procursu uegetum, introeuntibus 
obuium et maiestate numinis uenerabile; canes utrimquesecus deae latera 
muniunt, qui canes et ipsi lapis erant; his oculi minantur, aures rigent, nares hiant, 
ora saeuiunt, et sicunde de proximo latratus ingruerit, eum putabis de faucibus 
lapidis exire, et in quo summum specimen operae fabrilis egregius ille signifex 
prodidit, sublatis canibus in pectus arduis pedes imi resistunt, currunt priores.  
 Pone tergum deae saxum insurgit in speluncae modum muscis et herbis et 
foliis et uirgulis et sicubi pampinis et arbusculis alibi de lapide florentibus. 
Splendet intus umbra signi de nitore lapidis. Sub extrema saxi margine poma et 
uuae faberrime politae dependent, quas ars aemula naturae ueritati similes 
explicuit. Putes ad cibum inde quaedam, cum mustulentus autumnus maturum 
colorem adflauerit, posse decerpi, et si fontem, qui deae uestigio discurrens in 
lenem uibratur undam, pronus aspexeris, credes illos ut rure pendentes racemos 
inter cetera ueritatis nec agitationis officio carere. Inter medias frondes lapidis 
Actaeon simulacrum curioso optutu in deam proiectus iam in ceruum ferinus et in 
saxo simul et in fonte loturam Dianam opperiens uisitur. 
 
 And behold, Parian stone fashioned into a Diana occupied in balance the 
middle of the whole area, a very brilliant statue, with its garment blowing in the 
wind, vividly running forward, coming to meet those who entered and venerable 
with the majesty of a divinity. Dogs guarded the flanks of the goddess on either 
side, and the dogs themselves were also made of stone. Their eyes were 
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threatening, their ears stiff, their nostrils flared, and their mouths were raging, and 
if any barking burst in from nearby, you would think that it came from the stone’s 
jaws – and the aspect in which that excellent sculptor exhibited the greatest proof 
of his craftsmanship – with the dogs lifted high so as to show their breast, their 
hind feet stood firm, but their front feet were running. 
 Behind the back of the goddess, the rock rose in the manner of a cave, with 
moss, grass, leafage, twigs, and here vines and there little trees all blossomed out 
of the stone. Inside, the statue’s shadow glistened from the sheen of the stone. 
Under the very edge of the rock, apples and skillfully polished grapes hung down, 
which art vying with nature displayed resembling reality. You might think that 
certain things from there could be plucked for food, when the wine-bringing 
autumn breathes the ripe color on them, and if you bend over and look down into 
the fountain that runs along by the goddess’ feet rippling into a gentle wave, you 
will believe that those clusters, hanging there as if in the country, do not lack the 
function of motion, among other aspects of verisimilitude. In the middle of the 
stone’s foliage, a statue of Actaeon is seen, leaning over with a curious gaze 
towards the goddess, already becoming wild, turning into a stag and awaiting 
Diana about to bathe in the rock and in the fountain. 
 
At the outset of a treatment of this passage, it seems fitting to point out that there remains 
no corresponding statuary ensemble of this size and/or detail in the extant visual 
repertoire. As Niall Slater has convincingly shown, this scene weaves together a pastiche 
of motifs from Pompeian wall paintings and statuary groups of Diana-Actaeon, none of 
which precisely correspond to the dimensions or scale of this atrium.319 The closest 
analogue in the material remains is the famous Lanuvium Actaeon, which displays a life-
sized statue of an untransformed Actaeon, holding a deerskin and being attacked by 
dogs.320 However, we know of other statuary scenes of a nearly comparable scale and 
level of detail, such as the Punishment of Dirce from the Baths of Caracalla – now 
housed in the archeological museum in Naples; there, the viewer can even decipher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 See, e.g., Slater 1998, 27: “While no set of surviving artifacts precisely represents this sculptural group, 
a number of pieces of Roman art can help us see what might have been in the author’s mind. At the same 
time, we must keep in mind that Apuleius is not merely a reporter here, but may be playing some very 
interesting games with the nature of artistic representation and particularly point of view”. 
320 The next closest, which represent similar stand-alone pieces, are partial statues of Diana the Huntress 
and Actaeon being attacked (see Slater 1998, 30-1). 
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bunches of grapes and foliage carved into the base, just as Apuleius describes in this 
ekphrasis. Taking this into consideration, we may suggest that Apuleius constructs 
through ekphrasis a grand scale statuary scene of an episode that did not appear in the 
visual repertoire, but expands the boundaries of imaginative potential and by doing so, 
twists the plausible. Just as Philostratus would later show us a scene from tragedy that is 
not shown in tragedy, and then exhort the reader to look at it “as a painting/ekphrasis” 
(ὡς γραφήν), Apuleius demonstrates just how capable he is at conjuring up images in the 
imagination through word-painting. Moreover, the fact that we see two distinct visual 
traditions in this statuary episode – with Diana transforming from the “Striding Diana” to 
the “Bathing Diana” through the medium of the mirroring water321 – only further 
demonstrates the speculum’s magic potential for imaginative narrative retellings. From 
the Platonic perspective, it adds a particularly ironic twist that Apuleius has taken a grand 
scale scene, which we have extant in painting (i.e., two-dimensional media), cast it into 
an expansive statuary ensemble akin to the Punishment of Dirce (i.e., three-dimensional 
media), and then focalized it through a catoptric medium in motion, thus playing with 
dimensionality.322 It represents a peculiar challenge to the Platonic criticism of mimesis in 
Republic 10 that shows just how pleasurable all these deceptive media can be, especially 
when narrated in words. 
 The first half of this description depicts a scene of particularly impressive artistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Schlam 1984 was the first to demonstrate the conflations of traditions, though he does not trace the 
metamorphosis of tradition to the speculum. 
322 A similar point (albeit without reference to Plato) is made in Slater 1998, 46: “Our exploration of the 
visual arts in Apuleius has shown how deftly he can manipulate the inheritance of the art historical tradition 
for his own literary purposes. He plays with iconographic elements to animate them, transferring elements 
from two-dimensional to three-dimensional representation or putting two different Venus statues in 
motion…” That these iconographic elements and the interplay with dimensionality can be reduced to 
fundamentally Platonic concerns about mimesis has yet to be noticed. 
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realism in the expected mode of a poetic ekphrasis. It opens with a traditional technique 
of focalization to direct the reader’s attention, ecce – a phenomenon similar to what 
Norman Bryson has labeled the “Philostratean ‘Look!’”.323 And the narrator further 
incorporates the reader into the description with a series of 2nd person singular verbs324: if 
any barking comes forth, “you will think” (putabis – note the future indicative) 
paradoxically that it comes “from the jaws of the stone” (de faucibus lapidis). Here, it is 
the eyes – the more trustworthy of the senses, according to Herodotus and the Second 
Sophistic tradition of quotation – that trick the ears into hearing sounds coming from 
inanimate material.325 Even this illusion of apparent sound and motion – the barking, the 
seeming motivity of the statue with its refluent robe – highlights the problems of 
intermediality: the narrator reminds us time and again that we are looking at lapis, even 
as he describes how it seems to step out of its still life. However, Lucius-auctor is sure to 
remind us also that this is “art emulating nature” (ars aemula naturae), that art 
“arranged” (explicare) the natural setting so as to show things that seem veritati similes. 
 The juxtaposition between art and nature – a feature of mimesis highlighted in the 
opening of the laus speculi of Apologia 14 – is not only a classic trope of Ovidian 
ekphrastic scenes, but is an even more commonly invoked topos of Early Imperial and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 Bryson 1994, 266 (et passim): “Frequently met with, in the Imagines, is a textual moment at which the 
description at last feels its own language to dissolve into the light of the scene it opens upon. This is the 
Philostratean ‘Look!’…After his exclaimed ‘For look!’, the description at last reaches the moment of life-
off”. 
324 On the proliferation of second person verbs in ekphrasis, see Bartsch 2007, 83. A practitioner of 
rhetorical ekphrasis could employ a number of methods to incorporate a reader into the act of ‘viewing’ the 
imagined scene in order to accomplish what Aelius Theon suggests is the goal of ekphrasis: Ἔκφρασις ἐστὶ 
λόγος περιηγηµατικὸς ἐναργῶς ὑπ’ ὄψιν ἄγων τὸ δηλούµενον (Progymnasmata 118.6-20). Cf. Webb 1999; 
Webb 2009. Importantly for us, phrases like ‘one would have said’ or ‘you would think’ are “a standard 
ekphrastic marker, hypothesising a viewer taken in by the illusion” (Whitmarsh 2002, 114). On 
incorporation of the viewer in Hellenistic art and poetry, see Zanker 2004. 
325 Hearing sounds from scenes of ‘plastic’ art in ekphrasis is a phenomenon that Andrew Laird has 
helpfully labeled “disobedient ekphrasis” (Laird 1993).  
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Second Sophistic literature. As has long been noted in Apuleius scholarship, the grove 
where Actaeon’s error takes place in Ovid’s Metamorphoses is so beautiful that the 
narrator, in describing it, declares: “nature simulated art with her talent” (simulaverat 
artem ingenio natura suo) – the precise opposite of Apuleius’ marble grove.326 And one 
of the most famous art-critical passages from antiquity is the anecdote from Pliny’s 
Natural Histories about the competition between Zeuxis and Parrhasius over artistic skill 
in producing mimetic realism (Nat. Hist. 35.64-6)327: Zeuxis, so the story goes, produced 
a painting of grapes so realistic (uvas pictas tanto successu) that he tricked some birds to 
fly down and eat them; Parrhasius, in turn, made a curtain of such life-like verisimilitude 
(veritate repraesentata) that he even deceived (fefelliset) Zeuxis, who asked him to draw 
the curtain back; Zeuxis, acknowledging his error, then conceded the palm to Parrhasius 
for accomplishing the feat of deceiving not only birds, but an artifex. It is likely no 
coincidence, then, that the pinnacle of artistic deception in Apuleius’ ekphrasis – at least, 
before we view the scene through the mirror – is a bunch of highly realistic grapes: uuae 
faberrime politae. The first half of Lucius’ ekphrasis represents an artistic feat of Zeuxis’ 
caliber, or so the polished grapes seem to signal. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 See, e.g., van der Paardt 2004, 29: “When Apuleius has Lucius describe the antrum of Diana he adds 
something to the usual items in this respect, viz. delicious fruit, poma et uvae…,quas ars aemula nature 
veritati similes explicuit. That is the very opposite of what we read in Ovid’s version. The explanation for 
this contrast-imitation is obvious: Ovid evoked a piece of nature so beautiful that it resembled art, Apuleius 
evoked a work of art so beautiful that it resembled nature. There can be no doubt that Apuleius 
intentionally varied here, in the description of the antrum, a symbol of (making) poetry, his Ovidian 
example”. 
327 Norman Bryson, who opens his seminal book on the Gaze with this passage, notes: “The enduring 
relevance of Pliny’s anecdote is remarkable: indeed, unless art history finds the strength to modify itself as 
a discipline, the anecdote will continue to sum up the essence of working assumptions still largely 
unquestioned. The Plinian tradition is a long one” (Bryson 1983, 1). 
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 That this motif of naturalistic deception was soon connected to the tricks that 
mirrors play on viewers is evidenced by the fact that Philostratus’ Narcissus- ekphrasis in 
the Imagines plays a game with the reader that echoes Pliny’s anecdote328: the painting 
(γραφὴ) of Narcissus, because it “honors the truth” (τιµῶσα…τὴν ἀλήθειαν), so 
realistically depicts flowers on which a bee has lighted that it is unclear whether a real 
bee has been “deceived by the painting” (ἐξαπατηθεῖσα ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς), or whether we, 
the viewers, are deceived into thinking that a painted bee is real (ἡµᾶς ἐξηπατῆσθαι χρὴ 
εἶναι αὐτήν). In offering an exegesis of this phenomenon, the sophist-narrator makes 
explicit the one-to-one correspondence between the deceptions of artistic realism and the 
delusion Narcissus undergoes vis-à-vis the speculum by leaving off his address to the 
reader and turning to the painted Narcissus: “As for you, Narcissus, it is no painting that 
has deceived you” (σὲ µέντοι, µειράκιον, οὐ γραφή τις ἐξηπάτησεν). Of this method of 
incorporating the reader, Jaś Elsner notes: 
If we are deceived by a painted bee, then our desire as beholders is – like that of 
Narcissus – sufficient to make the reflection seem real…as it is, the sophist does 
not know whether or not the bee is real. He (and we, his addressees) are caught in a 
version of the spell-bound fascination that grips Narcissus gazing into the pool. The 
dynamics of desire between Narcissus the painted viewer and the pool have 
transcended the painting’s frame and rest firmly in us as we attempt to relate with 
the painting.329 
 
 As I suggested above, it is the first half of Apuleius’ ekphrasis that plays similar 
games with the agonistic relationship between art and nature. Through the recurring 
reference to lapis, the speaker reminds us time and again that we are gazing upon a 
marble scene of particular mimetic realism. It is not Diana, but lapis Parius in Dianam 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 On the resemblance of this scene to Pliny’s Zeuxis and Parrhasius competition, see Elsner 1996a, 253. 
For a fuller reading of the anecdote, see Elsner 1991, 61-2. 
329 Elsner 1996a, 253. 
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factus that graces the middle of the atrium.330 The words used of this statuary scene, 
moreover, vividly evoke movement and motion, while many of them still possess the 
semantic range to describe fixed rock.331 The marble clothing is blowing in the wind and 
the statue is “lively” (vegetus) in its step. The fixed statue of Diana even comes to greet 
(introeuntibus obuium) those who enter the atrium.332 However, at the point when we 
start to believe the scene has come to life, with the dogs guarding the goddess, we are 
reminded again that we are looking at a “stone” display (qui canes et ipsi lapis erant). 
Many of the verbs used of Diana’s dogs have both a primary meaning that can be used of 
caves, rocks, and other fixed, natural phenomena, but also have a secondary meaning that 
is associated with action or movement (e.g. muniunt, minantur, rigent).333 We may note, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 We may contrast this, e.g., with the opening of Callistratus’ Narcissus-ekphrasis, which highlights how 
the person is made from rock (Νάρκισσος ἐκ λίθου πεποιηµένος) rather than how the marble is made into a 
person. What is the essential substance of an artistic rendering? In Apuleius, it would seem to be the 
material rather than the object of the depiction. Freudenburg 2007, 242 reads Apuleius’ line as an example 
of the way in which our vision of the ekphrasis is refracted through Lucius’ “thunderstruck way of 
experiencing them, fired by curiosity, gullibility and desire. We see these artifacts not as they are, but 
through Lucius’ way of seeing the world, as a magical never-land where stones turn into things (Ecce lapis 
Parius in Dianam factus). To take this sight in is to momentarily feel his enchantment”. In the end, this 
notion is in part what I would like to expand on, namely that Lucius’ sight of the atrium somehow corrupts 
us into feeling the same affective response that Lucius has. 
331 While Paschalis 2002 is one of the more sensitive readings of this scene, I think he is incorrect in 
determining “the mechanisms through which the sculptural representation of Diana and Actaeon is 
perceived as a narrative sequence” (see p. 35). I do not actually disagree that it is a narrative sequence, but 
in my view, the scene acquires its final finish when it is mediated through the mirror, the agent of 
displaying diachronic change. The earlier part of the description thus emphasizes its fixity while only 
playing with categories of temporality.  
332 The same artistic realism recurs in the ekphrasis of Cupid’s palace, which many scholars have 
connected thematically with this ekphrasis (see, for instance, James 1987, 127-8; cf. Nethercut 1968). One 
of the many connections between the two scenes is a variation on this particular phrase introeuntibus 
obuium; in Cupid’s palace, the wall reliefs of wild beasts and herds come to meet the gaze of those entering 
the palace (haediis et id genus pecudibus occurrentibus ob os introeuntium).  
333 Paschalis (2002) 136 is wrong to suggest that “the person who describes uses verbs which suggest a 
static rather than dynamic representation…” precisely because of the polyvalent semantic range of the 
verbs. Munio is of course etymologically derived from moenia (TLL ETYM.), but can (rarely) be used of 
animantibus (TLL I.A.1.a.β.13); cf. the ekphrasis of the theatrical scene of young boys guarding Minerva 
(Met. 10.31). Minor can be used in the literal sense (‘to jut forth, project’) of static objects, such as rocks or 
cliffs (see Verg. Aen. 1.162: geminique minantur in caelum scopuli; cf. Sil. 4.2), but is more often 
employed to depict threatening actions or movements (OLD 1.a and c).  Rigeo primarily signifies stiffness 
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in particular, that this statuary ensemble does not lack rigor, since the dogs’ ears “grow 
stiff” (regent) – though, we may recall from above that rigor was not a desirable quality 
for sculptural verisimilitude. The speaker reiterates the power of this mimesis by 
describing the “the aspect in which that excellent sculptor exhibited the greatest proof of 
his craftsmanship” (summum specimen operae fabrilis egregius ille signifex), namely the 
dual optical effect of simultaneous fixity and movement in the realism of the dogs’ 
posture.  We may compare this line with the elaborate and bombastic conclusion of the 
laus speculi, in which Apuleius explains how much “that skillful smoothness and artistic 
shine of a mirror surpass the representational arts in regard to returning similarity” 
(tantum praestat imaginis artibus ad similitudinem referundam levitas illa speculi fabra 
et splendor opifex).334 According to Apuleius’ comparison of modes of mimesis in 
Apologia 14, this statuary scene should be subpar to the other, more mobile and brilliant 
mirroring, but this particular ekphrasis seems to contend quite fiercely with nature. 
Nonetheless, Apuleius emphasizes this scene’s status as artistic deception by creating his 
own neologism, signifex: this is not the work of the specular opifex, nor even of an artifex 
like Zeuxis; it is made by a “statue-maker”.335 Even after all of the interplay between 
reality and illusion in this first half of the ekphrasis, we are reminded with the phrase ars 
aemula naturae and the verb explicare that this is still merely highly naturalistic art and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
or rigity (OLD 1.a) and is often descriptive for lapis (OLD 1.b), but can be used, as it is here, for a fixed 
stare (OLD 1.c). 
334 That these two passages are in conversation should be clear from the playful syllabic parallels, 
signifex/opifex,  fabra/fabrilis, specimen/speculi, operae/opifex. It is as if Apuleius, in a challenge to the 
reader, compels us to look back and compare. Can this statuary scene move without a mirror? It is almost a 
perfect mimesis, but one element (which will appear at the end of the ekphrasis) is missing for the scene to 
come to life. 
335 As far as I can tell, signifex is an Apuleian coinage, appearing only in Met. 2.4 and de deo Socratis 21. 
The only other attestation of this word is in Porphory’s commentary on Horace’s Epistulae, which he uses 
to describe the famous sculptor Lysippus (Comm. In Hor. Epist. 2.1.239). 
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these are still only “bodies in space”.  
 However, as the focalization changes – as the speaker approaches closer to the 
figure of Diana, and then refocuses the reader’s attention on the mirroring water beneath 
her feet – the whole ekphrasis is transformed into a different scene from iconography, the 
“Bathing Diana.”336 The narrator says in yet another readerly incorporation – this time, in 
the subjunctive (putes) – “you would think certain pieces from there could be picked for 
food, when the wine-bringing autumn breathes a mature color into them” (cum 
mustulentus autumnus maturum colorem afflaverit). If we think back to the laus speculi, 
color was precisely the element lacking from saxum – and indeed, from statuary in 
general.337 It is lacking from this marble ensemble, too, at least until the reader is 
encouraged to imagine a color change in conjunction with a change in season (i.e., a 
change over time). Continuing to focalize the reader’s visual experience, Lucius-auctor 
claims, “if you bend over and look down into the fountain” (si pronus aspexeris), then 
“you will believe” (credes) that the scene “does not lack the function of motion” 
(agitationis officio). The officium of movement is a very odd way of phrasing the illusory 
narrative that the mirror offers: the water literally “does the work” of supplying narrative. 
In light of Apuleius’ courtesan-mirror of Apologia 14, moreover, it should be noted that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 See again Schlam 1984. 
337 Apuleius strangely seems to use lapis and saxum interchangeably for the material of this statuary scene. 
The whole ensemble, one would imagine, is made of the same material. While no Diana/Actaeon statuary 
scene of this size or magnitude exists in the extant visual repertoire (see discussion above), the Punishment 
of Dirce from the Baths of Caracalla is perhaps the closest comparandum, and that is made of a uniform 
material. Similarly, the first half of the ekphrasis is described as lapis; at the opening of the second 
paragraph, we hear of a “rock” (saxum) cave. The foliage of this cave is once again lapis – inter medias 
fronds lapidis – but the simulacrum of Actaeon is once again made of saxum. 
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officium has an erotic valence synonymous to morigerus, as J. N. Adams suggests.338 The 
speculum is once again demonstrating its courtesan-fidelity in receiving the gaze of the 
viewer and reflecting it back with a kind of added motivity that enacts a metamorphosis 
of the scene before the viewer’s eyes.  
 As Lucius-actor walks closer to the statue and bends over the water, the reader’s 
focus is shifted from the full scene to reflections of it in the water (pronus aspexeris: “if 
you look…”).339 This fons is moving (vibratur), thereby adding the magical and 
metamorphic effect. It is at this moment that Actaeon appears as a simulacrum – a word 
that Wowerius deleted as an unnecessary gloss on Actaeon.340 In my view, however, 
simulacrum is there to add an ironic emphasis on the dual medium through which 
Actaeon is seen, simulacrum being a word for both a statue and a reflection in a mirror.341 
Actaeon is represented as a statue, to be sure; but the further Lucius leans pronus over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 In fact, the word officium seems to have developed into a double entendre for the passive partner in a 
homoerotic encounter. The sexual joke seems to have taken on a life of its own after the declaimer Haterius 
suggested that it was the officium of a freedman to be a lover to his patron: impudicitia in ingenuo crimen 
est, in servo necessitas, in liberto officium (Sen. Contr. 4 Praef. 10). Of this double entendre, see Adams 
1982, 163: “Because of the existing sexual use of officium, Haterius’ remark was deliberately misconstrued, 
as if he were equating lexically impudicitia (i.e. pathic behavior) and officium. His unintentional double 
entendre gave rise in the rhetorical schools to a spate of puns, in which officium at one level meant ‘duty,’ 
but on another ‘homosexual patientia’”. 
339 Cf. Winkler 1985, 168-9: “As the viewer’s eye descends from column top to ground level, the contrast 
of rest/motion is picked up by that of rock/water”. 
340 See the app. crit. of Zimmerman 2012, ad loc. 
341 Apuleius uses this word almost uniformly to mean “statue”, though simulacrum is the primary word for 
a specular reflection, as it is a translation of the Greek eidōlon in, e.g., Lucretius’ DRN. See Bailey 1947, 
1183 ad. loc. 30 for Lucretius’ use of mirroring terms; cf. Hardie 1988 for discussion of the significance of 
this Lucretian word in Ovid’s Narcissus episode. Simulacrum appears 26 times in the Apuleian corpus, 22 
of which refer to a physical statue or a stand in for a divinity. Twice, the word refers to a ghostly vision 
(Met. 1.6; 8.12). Here is one of only two places where Apuleius plays with the dichotomy between statues 
and mirrors, in this case, by placing a statue (simulacrum) of Actaeon above a pool of water. The only other 
ambiguous case is at Apol. 42.21, in which the simulacrum appears as a vision of Mercury in aqua (i.e. 
from a mirroring medium); in this instance, however, the simulacrum is clearly not a reflection but an 
epiphany of a god like the simulacrum of Isis in Met. 11.3. 
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fons, the more likely it is that he (and we) see a simulacrum (“mirror-image”) of him.342  
 Moreover, as scholars have noted, Actaeon “is seen” (visitur) in the process of 
getting punished for a crime that he has not yet committed. Unlike in Ovid’s version, 
Apuleius’ Actaeon has not yet seen the naked goddess. Rather than an innocent wanderer 
(error) that happens upon a goddess bathing, this Actaeon is a voyeur, lying in wait 
(opperiens) to cast his “curious gaze” (curiosus optutus) upon the goddess,343 who, in 
turn, is “about to bathe” (lotura). That is, the whole Actaeon tradition has been 
transformed in the imaginative retelling through description.344 If we look at the wording, 
Actaeon’s punishment is in the process of taking place, as is marked by the temporal 
deictic iam and the durative phrase in cervum.345 In contrast to the “Striding Diana” at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Riefstahl 1938 was the first to note the one-to-one correspondence between Actaeon and Lucius. But 
Winkler cleverly connected this phenomenon to the reader looking together with Lucius: “That the second 
person is normal in such descriptions does not prevent its being used with playful attention to its 
significance. Since my estimate of Apuleius’s controlled gamesmanship is high and since I believe him to 
be maneuvering the reader into a dilemma to choose among interpretations, I think that pronus aspexeris 
should be fully visualized. If you did (his italics) lean forward to look into the water you would see not only 
a second Actaeon but yourself” (Winkler 1985, 170). Heath 1992 also shows further correspondences. 
343 See Heath 1992 104 for discussion of Actaeon’s curiosus optutus. Cf. Slater 1998. 
344 On this, see the comparative treatment of the myth of Heath 1992. 
345 In my view, Paschalis 2002, 136ff. et. al. puts overly much emphasis on the completed aspect of the 
metamorphosis of the simulacrum Actaeon implied by this phrase: “…the person who describes turns the 
dynamic process of metamorphosis into an accomplished fact and hence into a static situation. Iam in 
cervum ferinus means that Actaeon ‘has already taken the shape of a beast.’ In other words, iam here marks 
not a beginning but a completed action, which is in addition rendered not with a participle but with an 
adjective…The choice of a synchronic (descriptive) over a diachronic (narrative) version is intended to 
render the visual text as faithfully as possible…artistic creation…and transformation…are perceived as 
accomplished facts and as having become ‘bodies in space’.” Cf. GCA 2001 ad. loc. and Callebat 1968, 
229ff., whom Paschalis cites. Cf. also Sharrock 1996 who scans through the evidence of half 
metamorphosed Actaeon’s in the iconographic tradition. If we follow Paschalis’ suggestion that the 
metamorphosis has already been accomplished – for which, I think he leans too heavily on the completed 
aspect of the adjective ferinus (cf. OLD 3a: ‘having the form or nature of a wild beast’) – then it seems to 
deprive in cervum of a necessary temporal progression. Are we to assume not only that the punishment 
begins before the crime (as most commentators note), but also that it has been fully accomplished? This 
certainly does not match with the visual evidence, where there exists only one scene with the 
metamorphosis not in progress, but fully completed (see Sharrock 1996). Paschalis’ reading also puts strain 
on the future participle lotura because the sequence occurs in a narrative progression (i.e., Actaeon is 
transforming as he awaits the future sight) rather than a static and completed punishment before the crime. 
Contra Paschalis, Hanson 1989 translates the phrase “in the very act of changing into a stag” (p. 55). 
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beginning of the ekphrasis, where the material has been fashioned into the figure of the 
goddess – “stone made into a Diana” (lapis in Dianam factus) – Actaeon, simultaneously 
a person and a simulacrum, is undergoing his metamorphosis into a new figure (in 
cervum), which is dually represented both as a statue and in the mirroring water.346 
 Not only is Actaeon represented in the process of metamorphosis, but also, from the 
iconographic perspective, Diana is transformed in the reflections of the speculum.347 Just 
as the statue of Laocoon in Lessing’s framework can only signify ‘robe’ or ‘body’, but 
not both simultaneously, the “Striding Diana”, robed in a seemingly flowing garment, 
cannot signify the “Bathing Diana”, except when viewed through the mirror – or, when 
spoken of in words. The motive speculum – here, actually moving from the imaginary 
autumnal breeze (afflaverit…vibratur) – enacts the metamorphosis, and encourages 
Lucius (and the reader) to imagine the goddess “about to bathe” (lotura). While Lucius 
focalizes the “Bathing Diana” – standing over the water at an angle, presumably, where 
he would see not only Actaeon and Diana, but also himself in the water – the reader is 
seduced through ekphrastic description to “succumb to visualization”348 – or, to phrase it 
in terms of Lessing, to autonomously imagine the goddess undressing. Curiously, 
Actaeon himself leans over the goddess (in deam proiectus)349 in order to sate his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 Schlam 1984, 105 takes et in saxo simul et in fonte with Actaeon and suggests a playful pun here: “The 
pun of in fonte loturam cannot be caught in English, since the ablative phrase, joined with in saxo, must be 
taken with visitur and refer to the reflection of Actaeon in the water.” 
347 See esp. Schlam 1984. Cf. Slater 1998 on other possible iconographic intertexts. GCA 2001 ad loc. cites 
the iconography of Actaeon wearing a deerskin as a potential visual representation with which this 
ekphrasis engages. 
348 The phrase comes from Whitmarsh 2002, 122, as noted above. 
349 There is a textual problem at this point in the ekphrasis that offers the tantalizing possibility that Lucius 
is Actaeon. The manuscript reads in deā tūsū proiectus, where the tum is corrected eadem manu with sum. 
Syntactically of course, sum cannot be a correct emendation, for which reason there have been a myriad of 
conjectures (susum, versum, suam deorsum, prorsum, etc.) contingent on comparisons with scene paintings 
of Actaeon and Diana. But, Winkler has suggested that even in its textual corruption, the Metamorphoses 
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curiosus optutus at the very moment when Lucius (and by extension, the reader) leans 
over the mirroring water to see the goddess transformed.  
 Pronus – “leaning over” – has an added ironic valence, not only because Lucius 
himself will soon be bent over and looking down – i.e., as an ass destined to stare at the 
ground – but also because the word is erotic in tone350 and appears in many major sex and 
death scenes parallel to Lucius’ visualization of this atrium. For instance, when Psyche 
finally sees Cupid in book 5 and casts her glance upon his hair – which, I will argue in 
chapter 3, mirrors the Haarspiegel of Photis and Isis – she leans over him, gazing with 
insatiable desire (5.23: prona in eum efflictim inhians).351 Moreover, in the kitchen 
seduction (2.7-10) only a few chapters after the ekphrasis in 2.4, Lucius leans over Photis 
– pronus in eam – trying to snatch open-mouthed kisses (patentis oris) from her, just as 
Psyche does with Cupid; Photis responds, in turn, with “unrestrained desire” (prona 
cupidine).352 But perhaps the most resonant scene – since it reveals a character standing 
pronus and staring down into mirroring water – is the death of Socrates in book 1. There, 
Apuleius’ fan fiction Socrates, who has escaped to Thessaly to live a licentious life, 
stands in a locus amoenus reminiscent of the Phaedrus beside a gentle river (lenis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
illuminates the synonymy between Lucius and Actaeon: the text at first appears to say, “I was hanging over 
the goddess as a simulacrum of Actaeon” (Winkler 1985, 170 n. 67). 
350 See Adams 1982, 192.  
351 Braund 1999, 184 connects this phrase to Lucretius’ tableau of Mars and Venus in DRN, insofar as both 
depict a lover laying down with a beloved hanging over him: “Mars reclines horizontally (e.g. reposta, 
resupini) and gazes up, open-mouthed and greedy (avidos), at Venus. Psyche here mirrors him by leaning 
over (prona) Venus’ son Cupid and gazing down on him passionately (efflictim)”. I would suggest, 
however, that the primary textual mirrors are intratexts within the Metamorphoses (on which, see below). 
352 See GCA 2004, 287-8 ad loc. for a fuller analysis of the correspondences between Psyche’s vision of 
Cupid and Lucius’/Photis’ kitchen foreplay. 
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fluvius)353 – one that Aristomenes calls a fons and one that “rivals silver or glass in color” 
(argento vel vitro aemulus in colorem); having “greedily consumed” (avide devoraverat) 
an excessively large piece of cheese, he leans over the river – for which, Apuleius uses 
the hapax legomenon, appronat – to consume water greedily (avidus); at this point, he 
dies from having been stabbed in the throat earlier.  
 Wytse Keulen has noted the many correspondences between the description of 
Socrates’ death scene and Lucius’ ekphrasis of Byrrhena’s atrium: the “lightly” (lenis) 
flowing water,354 the suggestion of rivalry (aemulus) of media,355 and the strange usage of 
the verb opperior with an accusative object (oppertus paululum planiorem ripae 
marginem).356 Add to that the fact that both Lucius/Actaeon/reader and Socrates stand 
pronus over the water, and we can tell that Apuleius meant for us to make this 
connection.357 Moreover, the “silvery-fountain” motif (argenteus) is reminiscent of the 
untouched locus amoenus of Narcissus, whose fons is “…inlimis, nitidis argenteus 
undis”.358 Indeed, though no one has pointed it out yet, both Socrates and Narcissus go to 
the fountain to sate a thirst (Met. 1.19: sitire impatienter; cf. Met. 3.415: dumque sitim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 As Keulen points out, the presence of a plane tree (platanus) here “continues the homage to the Platonic 
locus amoenus, with the plane tree that had already been mentioned…and the clear river” (GCA 2007, 348 
ad loc. 1.19.7). 
354 GCA 2007, 350 ad loc. lenis fluvius. 
355 GCA 2007, 351 ad loc. argento…in colorem: “The rivalry of natural water with silver or glass…is a 
reversal of the ecphrasis of the sculptures in Byrrhena’s atrium, which embody the topos of ars aemula 
naturae…Here, then, we have an example of the topos of Natura Artifex.” 
356 GCA 2007, 353 ad loc. oppertus. 
357 I must thank an audience member, Evelyn Adkins, at the “Sexuality in Ancient Art” panel at the 2016 
Society for Classical Studies meeting, as she suggested this scene as a possible intertext.  
358 See Bömer on Ovid’s Met. 3.407 for the Ovidian description. Cf. May 2013, 186 for the Apuleian 
appropriation of this motif. 
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sedare cupit, sitis altera crevit),359 just as Lucius himself begins the novel “thirsty for 
novelty” (sititor alioquin novitatis). 
 There is a rich interpretive joke, to be sure, in the fact that Apuleius’ Socrates 
returns to the locus amoenus of the Phaedrus and has a deadly, Narcissan encounter with 
a mirroring fons.360 If Ovid’s Narcissus is a reworking of themes from the Phaedrus, as 
Shadi Bartsch has recently shown,361 and if Apuleius recognized it as such, then putting 
an over-sexed, gluttonous Socrates back in a Phaedran grove only to have him undergo a 
Narcissan catoptric encounter represents precisely the kind of deep (albeit serio-comic) 
engagement with Plato that I have been highlighting in this dissertation. But as we reflect 
further on this scene – one that is at first a joke, but becomes quite serious after we 
connect it to all its corresponding scenes of leaning and viewing – what does it mean for 
Lucius (and us) that he stands pronus over the water (and we over our texts) to catch a 
sight of the naked goddess, if we have already heard (or read) about Socrates leaning over 
a different fons and dying? John Heath, whose masterful reading of this scene 
demonstrates its value as a mise-en-abyme for the whole novel, suggests that the figure of 
Actaeon, book-ended by Socrates and Thelyphron, provides not only a warning to 
Lucius, who is “constantly threatened with an Actaeonic rending by dogs, wild beasts, 
and humans”,362 but also a signal to the reader about “the necessity of re-interpretation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 It should be noted that Merkel deleted this line from Ovid’s Metamorphoses as an interpolation; but if it 
is, it is likely an ancient interpolation, perhaps in the manuscript already by the time of Apuleius. See, e.g., 
the discussion of Tarrant 1987. 
360 Even Socrates’ corpse is buried beside the river, lefts to decompose into foliage, just like Narcissus’ 
body, which is transformed into a flower beside the river. 
361 Bartsch 2006, 84-103. 
362 Heath 1992, 110. 
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general”.363 That the ensemble in the atrium proffers an immediate warning to Lucius 
about dangers he will endure is, no doubt, one of the powerful hermeneutic purposes of 
this passage within the novel; the way in which Lucius-actor misses the point, as it were, 
and rushes off to see a witch disrobe and perform magic is precisely the kind of game that 
Apuleius plays with the reader, as Winkler, Heath’s teacher, famously demonstrated in 
his Auctor et Actor.  
 But the reason that Socrates frantically runs over to the fons in the locus amoenus, 
disrupting the leisurely setting for which the original scene is so well-known with a 
violent end,364 is to clear his throat because he – like Lucius at the opening of the novel – 
has consumed far too much cheese.365 In fact, in all of these cases of erotic leaning, it is 
an excessive desire for consumption – consumption of food, of sex, and/or of sights – that 
drives characters to lean over. The inevitable result is either death or stupefied 
statuization. If we link all of these correspondences – Socrates and Lucius as consumers 
in book 1, the death-bringing mirror-gazing of Socrates and Actaeon, the 
Narcissan/Phaedran grove in which these episodes take place, etc. – back to the marble 
grove of Met. 2.4, and furthermore, if we consider this grove in light of Ovid’s Actaeon 
episode, I suggest that we will find a unifying set of phenomena related to the kind of 
mirror-gazing we see in Met. 2.4: obstruction of the throat and/or a loss of voice, 
immobilization, and even death.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 Heath 1992, 118. 
364 See May 2013, 183 ad loc. Met. 18.8 for a discussion of loci amoeni as places where terrible things 
happen in Latin literature. She cites as one comparandum the locus amoenus where Ovid’s Narcissus and 
Echo episode happens.  
365 See May 2013, 185 ad loc. Met. 19.6 for the correspondences between Apuleius’ Socrates here and 
Lucius at the opening of the novel.  
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As I suggested above, Ovid’s Narcissus withers away in despair, in part, because 
there is a failure of words: the delights of seeing are supposed to give way to a verbal 
exchange, verba being an important sign of erotic reciprocity. So also, Ovid’s Actaeon 
episode ends in a loss of voice and a failure of language to accomplish what the speaker 
wants. As John Heath notes of Ovid’s Actaeon, there is a paradox in the punishment of 
the voyeur: Diana punishes Actaeon not by blinding him – the expected form of 
punishment – but by depriving him of his voice, the primary means of narrative.366 At 
3.192-3, upon discovering a voyeur, gazing upon her naked body, Diana says to Actaeon: 
  nunc tibi me posito visam velamine narres,     
  sit poeteris narrare, licet!... 
 
Now you are free to tell that you have seen me all unrobed – if you will be 
able to describe it! 
 
What Diana fears is precisely ekphrasis and Actaeon’s ability to narrate (narres) in detail 
how he has seen the goddess undressed and enjoyed the big reveal.367 As a consequence 
of Diana’s curse, moreover, Actaeon loses his capacity to vocalize when he encounters 
himself in the mirror at 3.200-3 and recognizes his new state as a stag: 
       Ut vero vultus et cornua vidit in unda,368 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 See Heath 1992, 67: “Actaeon has seen Diana naked in the pool…so it is awkward, if not completely 
incongruous, for the goddess to focus on his promised loss of speech. Why is his voice to be the key to his 
extended punishment and not his sight? Why should Diana take such an inapposite rhetorical approach to 
the accidental spectator?” 
367 The verb narro, though not explicitly used in discussions of ekphrasis, does seem to have many citations 
for ‘narrative description’ (OLD 2a). 
368 It should be noted that Tarrant 2004, following Hensius and a late manuscript ς, deletes this line from 
his text. By his own admission, however, Tarrant is attempting to revive a 17th century view about 
interpolation in Latin poetry - a ‘skeptical’ view held by ‘heroic critics’ such as Hensius and Bentley - and 
as a consequence is quick to bracket lines in his text (see Tarrant 2000 where he explains some of his 
choices for his Oxford text of Ovid). Contra Hensius, Merkel 1894 is one of many critics who accept this 
line as authentic. Moreover, even if Tarrant is correct that Ovid didn’t compose this line, he nonetheless 
maintains that it was of ancient origin, a result of the manner in which ancient readers interacted with their 
texts through imitation, a process which he labels ‘collaborative interpolation’ (see Tarrant 1987 for more 
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           “me miserum!” dicturus erat: vox nulla secuta est.    
 Ingemuit: vox illa fuit, lacrimaeque per ora     
 non sua fluxerunt; mens tantum pristina mansit. 
 
But when he saw the face and the horns in the water,   
“oh I am wretched” he was about to say: but no voice came out.  
He groaned: that was his voice, and tears flowed down cheeks that weren’t 
his own; Only his mind remained unchanged. 
 
There is a deep connection here between the visual experience in the mirror and the loss 
of verbalization, between the ocular and the oral. We may recall here that Lucius also 
laments the loss of his voice after his metamorphosis on a number of occasions.369 One 
passage of particular interest is Met. 7.2 where Lucius-asinus attempts to defend himself 
against charges brought against him, but only manages to “bellow” (boavi) the word non 
over and over.370 We find a similar loss of capacity for speech at the conclusion of the 
novel when Lucius is unable to narrate the mysteries into which he has been initiated,371 
and thereby rendered a speechless and voiceless Actaeonic figure. Indeed, the words of 
Ovid’s Actaeon fail him at precisely the moment he needs them, that is, when he tries to 
identify himself to his dogs (3.229): 
  “Actaeon ego sum, dominum cognoscite vestrum!”372   
  Verba animo desunt. 
 
  “I am Actaeon, recognize your master!”     
  but the words were lacking a mind. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on this distinction). For my purposes, then, this line very well could have slipped into the Ovidian tradition 
by the time Apuleius read the Metamorphoses. 
369 See Met. 3.29; 7.26; 8.29; 9.26. 
370 Met. 7.3: volui dicere ‘Non feci.’ Et verbum quidem praecedens semel ac saepius immodice clamitavi, 
sequens vero nullo pacto disserere potui, sed in prima remansi voce, et identidem boavi ‘Non, non,’ 
quamquam nimia rotunditate pendulas vibrassem labias. 
371 See the famous passage, Met. 11.23: Quaeras forsitan satis anxie, studiose lector, quid deinde dictum, 
quid factum: dicerem si dicere liceret, cognosceres si liceret audire: sed parem noxam contraherent aures 
et linguae illae temerariae curiositatis. 
372 Again, Tarrant 2004 deletes this line from his text, following Hensius, but with (apparently) no 
manuscript evidence. 
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Actaeon-the-stag demands from his dogs recognition (cognoscite) of his identity by 
claiming a one-to-one correspondence between himself and their master ‘Actaeon’. 
However, his words fail him in what might be a true failure of mimesis: verba desunt may 
have even been a phrase for failed oratory, or rhetoric that does not succeed in stirring the 
emotions of viewers.373 Actaeon’s inability to defend himself with language could be 
viewed as a narrative playing out of Platonic concerns with mimesis: all representation – 
language (λόγοι), artistic media (ζωγραφία), and the mirror (κάτοπτρον) – falls short in 
the Platonic perspective because it is unable to convey its true meaning to viewers/ 
listeners and it cannot respond to those who interact with it.  
So, returning once again to Met. 2.4, what can we say about the loss of voice and 
statuization of this Actaeon, who must by his very nature as a ‘plastic’ representation 
become the material of other people’s narratives? Or to phrase it differently, does the 
simulacrum actually have a curiosus optutus, or is this an interpretive feature that Lucius 
adds to the scene with his words? Since the artistic representation is mediated through the 
mirroring water in Lucius’ visual experience, and in turn, through Lucius’ ekphrasis of 
the mirrored simulacrum of a simulacrum in our visual experience – twice removed from 
the original – is it possible that Apuleius is playing some deeply Platonic games with us 
in displaying such metamorphoses of iconography, tradition, and interpretation? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 See e.g. Quint. Inst. Orat. 10.7.16.1: quare capiendae sunt illae, de quibus dixi, rerum imagines, quas 
vocari φαντασίας indicavimus, omniaque, de quibus dicturi erimus, personae, quaestiones, spes, metus 
habenda in oculis, in adfectus recipienda. pectus est enim, quod disertos facit, et vis mentis. ideoque 
imperitis quoque, si modo sint aliquo adfectu concitati, verba non desunt. Cf. Cic. De Orat. 2.110.6 for a 
discussion of failed oratory from “lacking words”. 
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 Apuleius’ ekphrasis concludes when Lucius’ inner fantasy world is interrupted by 
Byrrhena’s exegesis of the scene374: 
Dum haec identidem rimabundus exinde delector, ‘Tua sunt’ ait Byrrhaena ‘Cuncta 
quae vides ’ 
  
While I stood there, inspecting the scene closely and taking great pleasure from it, 
Byrrhena said, ‘it’s yours, everything you see.’ 
 
As Lucius becomes lost in a kind of fantasy version of the statuary scene,375 like a 
character in a movie whose stare goes blank as the film cuts to his/her fantasy, Byrrhena 
snaps him out of it with a seemingly hospitable gesture that turns out to be a foreboding 
warning.376 Byrrhena’s single line is probably one of the most discussed lines in Apuleian 
scholarship, particularly because it recurs after the ekphrasis of Cupid’s palace when the 
disembodied voices say the same words to Psyche (5.2).377 I would like to meditate 
briefly on some of the potential meanings of the ominous admonition. Many 
commentators have pointed out the irony of these lines, as Lucius is soon to undergo his 
own metamorphosis only to be perpetually threatened by an Actaeonic kind of rending.378 
A different way to read this exegesis is to see the erotic adventure Lucius imagines in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 On Byrrhena as the traditional ἐξηγητής of an ekphrasis in the scene, see Paschalis 2002, 139, though we 
should note that he oscillates between Byrrhena as exegete and Lucius-auctor as interpreter. On the 
ἐξηγητής more generally in novelistic ekphraseis, see Bartsch 1989. 
375 It should be noted that embedded in the word delecto are ideas of deception (ἀπατάω) and seductive 
charm (ἥδοµαι), the very features of mimesis that Plato warns us about. See TLL GLOSS on delecto. 
376 Winkler 1985, 168, who calls this line, “a lovely ambiguity, read as hospitable by the first-reader, as 
ominous by the second-reader”. Cf. James 1987, 128: “Byrrhaena’s words to Lucius appear to be nothing 
more than a politeness of the ‘make yourself at home’ manner. Closer analysis reveals a possible 
premonition, that Actaeon’s fate, brought about by an illicit curiosity, prefigures Lucius’ unfortunate 
transformation”. 
377 See, for instance, James 1987, 127-8;  
378 See GCA 2001, 115-6 ad loc. For all of the Actaeonic threats to Lucius, see Heath 1992, 102-121. At 
110-2, in particular, Heath notes how Lucius-the-ass is almost ripped apart by dogs, or other forms of 
mutilation, often throughout the novel: 4.3, by hounds, 6.26, by wolves and birds, 6.31-2, by his captors, 
7.16, by horses, 7.22, by the shepherds and the wicked boy, 8.16-7, by wolves, and at other places where 
Lucius fears an Actaeonic fate. Other characters in frame tales also undergo Actaeonic rending, such as the 
Trojan bear, Thrasyleon (4.20). 
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mirror as the reference point of tua: Byrrhena says, ‘this voyeuristic experience could be 
yours, as long as you let it take you.’ But the feature most interesting to me – and one that 
has not been fully explored in relation to Byrrhena’s words – is the fact that Lucius 
himself becomes the object of other people’s gazes, standing as a simulacrum next to Isis 
in book 11.379 If vision is a form of consumption,380 and narratives are also framed as 
comestibles – as they are at the end of book 1, where Lucius has “feasted on stories 
alone” (cenatus solis fabulis) – then this ominous warning to Lucius could also be a 
warning to us about gazing upon the simulacrum of a man iam in asinum and taking a 
kind of pleasure out of it. The imagination is a dangerous thing, as Plato knew well; and 
perhaps the courtesan-fidelity of this mode of mimesis can seduce us into looking along 
with Lucius. As we turn to the end of the novel, where Lucius is continually immobilized 
and eventually muted, we may do well to remember Byrrhena’s foreboding exegesis of 
her own statuary ensemble. And just as Lucius was given a choice (or perhaps a veiled 
warning) about the appropriate response to viewing and imagining the illicit sight of the 
naked goddess in the atrium, I suggest that we are invited by the spectacle of Lucius in 
book 11 to consider for ourselves the appropriate response to reading this novel and 
enjoying the erotic sights, mediated and enhanced through ekphrastic description. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 A similar point has been made in Slater 1998 and Heath 1992. However, both of them read Lucius’ 
statuization as a kind of cynical moment, one that reveals the underlying satire of book 11. I do not disagree 
that Lucius looks a bit foolish in the end – though appearing foolish to outsiders would not really be a 
major concern of religious initiates – or Platonists for that matter; but I think there is a didactic warning to 
the reader – as I will discuss – which is, in fact, quite serious. 
380 Cf. Helen Morales’ notion of the “consumptive gaze” in the Second Sophistic (Morales 2004, 32-4).	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Isis on the Pedestal, Reader at the Crossroads: 
	  
We may recall from our discussion of Lucian’s de Domo the analogy we are given 
by the first λόγος as to what the two possible responses are to the erotic desire inspired by 
beauty. Just as Alexander, upon feeling ἐπιθυµία at the sight of the river Cydnus, longed 
to “become part of the beauty” (µέρος τοῦ κάλλους αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι) no matter what the 
consequences, viewers everywhere should not just stand dumbstruck in awe and silence, 
but ought to become one with the sight by “reciprocating with a speech” (λόγῳ 
ἀµείψασθαι τὴν θέαν). Entering the hall is framed as a kind of erotic tryst – like 
Alexander entering the river – and narrating the scenes it displays represents a way to 
become one with it. At the end of Met. 2.4, Lucius, upon inspecting (rimabundus) and 
taking pleasure (delector)381 at the sight of Byrrhena’s atrium, responds with a desire to 
become part of the scene without experiencing the consequences that Actaeon does. He 
races back to Milo’s house only to get himself entangled in an erotic tryst with Photis – 
who inspires in him a similar kind of dumb stupefaction. And he, too, wants to become a 
participant in the atrium scene by witnessing a superhuman woman getting undressed and 
by undergoing his own metamorphosis into a different kind of animal, namely, a winged 
bird. We will return to this scene and the way it progresses through book 2 in the next 
chapter. There, I will argue that Lucius attempts to undergo a kind of idealized Platonic 
encounter through gazing into the mirror of another person’s eyes and experiencing a 
flight of the soul; however, he ends up more closely resembling a corrupted viewer, such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 Freudenberg 2007, 243-5 notes a significant word play in the terms rimabundus and delector here. 
Rimabundus, an Apuleian coinage as far as scholars can tell, seems to be a play on mirabundus, which is, in 
fact, Lucius’ actual affective reaction to this statuary scene – a reaction that is appropriate for aesthetic 
responses to art. Delector, on the other hand, has embedded in it the term lector, and therefore, may remind 
the reader of the opening command to pay attention: inten-de-lector (Met. 1.1). 
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as we find in pseudo-Lucian’s Amores, where two viewers debate which side of the 
Knidian Aphrodite offers more erotic pleasure. 
What is important to conclude this chapter, however, is to note how Lucius does, 
in fact, become part of Byrrhena’s atrium: in books 2-10, by experiencing an Actaeonic 
kind of metamorphosis, i.e., by changing into a quadruped and being threatened with 
constant σπαραγµός; but also in a very different way in book 11, i.e., by becoming a 
simulacrum in a mirroring relationship with a goddess for all time. At the end of book 11, 
after being initiated into the cult of the goddess, Lucius comes full circle and appears as a 
simulacrum for the people to theorize. Many recent scholars have considered 
Metamorphoses 11.26.1 to be a “first end” to the novel, a kind of anti-closural device.382 
In the chapters leading up to this first ending, Lucius offers us a characterization of 
himself during his initiation into the mysteries of Isis. His very first reaction to the end of 
the goddess’ procession is phrased in terms that recall Lucius’ prolonged tryst with Photis 
(Met. 11.17): 
Nec tamen me sinebat animus ungue latius indidem digredi, sed intentus in deae 
specimen pristinos casus meos recordabar. 
 
Yet, my spirit did not allow me to move from that spot further than a nail’s 
breadth (ungue latius), but intent on the statue of the goddess, I recalled my 
former misfortunes. 
 
This strange idiom, ungue latius, which the Groningen commentaries note is 
proverbial,383 only appears in this form in Apuleius; moreover, one of the other two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 See Finkelpearl 2004 for the most recent discussion of the anti-closure of the Metamorphoses. Cf. 
Winkler 1985, 215-23 who discussed a piling up of epilogues – what he calls ‘epiepilogues’ – that serve to 
pose hermeneutic problems for the reader. 
383 See GCA 2000 329, ad loc. 10.24. The commentator cites Otto 1890, 356 as evidence for the proverbial 
nature of this idiom; and while similar versions of the idiom appear, e.g., in Plautus, they are not only rare 
but do not appear in this particular form until Apuleius. 
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instances of this phrase is used to describe Lucius’ state as a sexually submissive slave to 
Photis. As he requests to leave the sexual service of Milo’s maidservant, Lucius explains 
(Met. 2.18): 
Ergo igitur Fotis erat adeunda deque nutu eius consilium velut auspicium 
petendum: quae quanquam invita quod a se ungue latius digrederer, tamen 
comiter amatoriae militiae brevem commeatum indulsit. 
 
Therefore, Photis had to be approached, and advice had to be sought from her nod 
(nutu) as if it were auspices. And she, though she was unwilling to let me depart 
from her further than a nail’s breadth (ungue latius), nevertheless kindly granted 
me a brief furlough from our amatory combat. 
 
The repetition of the idiom encourages us to consider these passages in tandem and to 
ponder Lucius’ relationship to the goddess in light of his earlier erotic masters.384 John 
Heath, furthermore, has suggested that Lucius’ immediate response to the train of Isis 
foreshadows his immobilization (and later, statuization) in the religious cult of Isis. But, I 
would go further to suggest a stronger connection between the mirror/statue dichotomy 
that I have already discussed at length in this chapter. After all, we may notice that it is 
Photis’ erotic and dominant nod (nutus) to which Lucius responds in book 2. And the nail 
– unguis – was a well-known metaphor for the precision with which a sculptor crafts a 
statue: one judges the aesthetic success of a sculptural representation from the attention to 
detail seen in the fingernail.385 In both cases, Lucius has become an immobilized statue, 
the only difference being the mistress whose nod he (subserviently) mirrors. Here in book 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 See GCA 2015, 322 ad loc. 11.17.5 (though the commentators do little to suggest a strong connection 
beyond the verbal parallel). On the Photis-Venus-Isis correspondence more broadly, see Krabbe 2003, 580-
7. 
385 OLD 1b. In particular, see Horace’s Sat. 1.5.32, where he describes Fonteius Capito as a man “made to 
the nail” (homo ad unguem factus). That this metaphor is borrowed from statuary is clear from Ars Poet. 
294, where Horace uses the same metaphor for the making of poetry. See D’Angour 1999 for the argument 
that the phrase ad unguem refers not to the “nail-test” sculptors would use to see how finely they had 
crafted something, but rather, to the level of detail a sculpture had. 
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11, however, it is his own spirit (animus) that does the bidding; and in recalling his earlier 
misfortunes (pristinos casus meos recordabar), the narrator invites the reader to 
participate in this recollection and reevaluation of books 1-10, as the Groningen group 
notes.386 
 As Lucius’ ekphrasis of himself continues, he begins to resemble more closely 
one of the statues in Byrrhena’s atrium in 2.4. At the behest of the priest, Lucius stands as 
a spectacle before the simulacrum of the goddess (Met. 11.24): 
Namque in ipso aedis sacrae meditullio ante deae simulacrum constitutum 
tribunal ligneum iussus superstiti byssina quidem, sed floride depicta veste 
conspicuus…Quaqua tamen viseres, colore vario circumnotatis insignibar 
animalibus… 
 
For bidden by the priest, I stepped up on a wooden platform set in the very middle 
of the sanctuary in front of the statue of the goddess, and I attracted attention by 
reason of my tunic, which was made of flax, but colorfully decorated...Wherever 
you looked, I was marked with animals embroidered in variegated colors on my 
garment. 
 
Signaling a clear echo of Byrrhena’s atrium, the simulacrum of the goddess that Lucius 
approaches is stationed in the “very middle of the sacred temple” (in ipso aedis sacrae 
meditullio ante deae simulacrum), similarly to the lapis-Diana, which was “occupying in 
balance the middle of the whole place” (Met. 2.4: tenet libratam totius loci medietatem). 
It is clear from this description, however, that Isis is not the focal point: rather, the object 
of our gaze turns out to be Lucius, conspicuous for the manner in which his flowery 
clothing offers a pleasurable display for those looking. Just as Actaeon was “seen” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 GCA 2015 323, ad loc. 11.17.5: “the emphatic position of the verb recordabar at the end of the sentence 
(and of the chapter) draws attention to the importance of rethinking these former tribulations as an 
interpretive background to Lucius’ present situation, both for Lucius and for the reader. Whereas Lucius 
rethinks his former life while contemplating the goddess, to whom he owes his new life, the reader is 
implicitly invited to rethink his stance as a reader, after reading the first ten books of the novel, and to 
evaluate – with hindsight, as it were – what kind of novel s/he has read so far, or will have read, in case 
s/he will read, remember, and rethink”. 
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(visitur), with Lucius mediating the ensemble through the moving water (and through his 
words), so also, the narrating ego in book 11 directs our attention to himself – once again, 
in a 2nd person singular generalizing subjunctive, a traditional mode of ekphrastic 
incorporation: “wherever you looked” (viseres; note that it is the same verb used for 
Actaeon and for the imago of the mirror in Apol. 14).387 That is to say, he uses similar 
tactics of readerly incorporation in his ekphrasis of Byrrhena’s atrium, but here, Lucius is 
giving an ekphrasis of himself, a sight for which he could not possibly fully account 
(except through the aid of a speculum). Furthermore, the complex visual experience he 
depicts is one of colorful variegation (vario colore) and ornamentation. He continues 
describing his transformation into a statue in 11.24: 
Sic ad instar Solis exornato me et in uicem simulacri constituto, repente uelis 
reductis, in aspectum populus errabat.  
 
Adorned like the sun in this way and set up in the manner of a simulacrum, with the 
curtains suddenly drawn, the people wandered about looking for a glimpse. 
 
Lucius’ role as a statue in this final scene has drawn polarized responses from scholars – 
responses that largely map onto the hermeneutic divide between comedic/parodic/satiric 
and serious/religious/philosophical readings of the Met. For instance, Niall Slater, who 
has investigated the Gaze and the role of spectacle in the novel (Slater 1998 and Slater 
2003, respectively), finds this final objectification of Lucius under the gaze of Isis “less 
appealing than appalling”.388 On the other hand, the Groningen group on the Isis book – 
though recognizing the connections between this scene, Psyche’s role as a statue in book 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 Cf. the discussion of the 2nd person singular in GCA 2015, 412 ad loc., where they also draw a 
comparison between this mode of reader incorporation and the ekphrasis of Byrrhena’s atrium in 2.4. 
388 Slater 1998, 40: “…I nonetheless find the pattern that transforms Lucius from a curious if over-eager 
explorer of his world into a virtually inanimate thing at the end less appealing than appalling”. 
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4 (4.32: ut simulacrum fabre politum mirantur omnes), and the statuary ensemble in 
Byrrhena’s atrium – nevertheless acknowledge elements of philosophical and religious 
initiation here (e.g., the initiate “looking down” on the uninitiated). Thus, they conclude 
of Lucius’ self-description: 
Lucius’ gazing at Isis’ statue can be viewed as a religious version of his marveling 
at the Diana statue in the Actaeon group…389 
 
To be honest, I am not particularly interested in trying to push for one or the other 
interpretation of this scene. I see the decision about whether to view Lucius cynically or 
seriously here as a major part of the embedded choice that Apuleius asks readers to make. 
What I am more concerned with is the way in which this scene, as the culmination of 
Lucius’ self-ekphrasis, incorporates readers into the populus that tries to catch a glimpse 
of the spectacle, collapsing the distance between internal and external audiences, and by 
doing so, subtly warning us to “read” with caution. As a simulacrum standing next to a 
simulacrum of a goddess, Lucius indeed recalls the half-metamorphosed simulacrum 
Actaeon in Met. 2.4: he has already been transformed into a quadruped and perpetually 
threatened with sparagmos; and here, he stands as a simulacrum of a man in the process 
of a religious metamorphosis in response to the nod of his goddess (Met. 11.21: deae 
nutu).390 We may add to this the fact that Lucius’ final words of the novel, an address to 
the goddess, are a promise to guard her image for eternity (11.25): 
diuinos tuos uultus numenque sanctissimum intra pectoris mei secreta conditum 
perpetuo custodiens imaginabor. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 GCA 2015, 407. 
390 The nod of the goddess is, in fact, quite prominent in the Isis book, as it opens Lucius’ revelation in 
11.1, and closes his praise of the divinity in 11.25. 
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I shall store your divine countenance and sacred godhead in the secret places of 
my heart, forever guarding it and imaging it. 
 
It is significant that the final word that the reborn, retransformed, and converted Lucius 
speaks in the novel is a promise to posit an imago of the goddess in his heart. The word 
imaginor, which I have tendentiously translated “imaging”, only occurs 3 other times in 
the Apuleian corpus,391 and the most suggestive instance for our purposes refers to 
Socrates’ ghastly appearance just before his death in book 1: at 1.19, Aristomenes 
describes how Socrates becomes so distorted in his color that he “recalls an image of 
those nocturnal Furies” (nocturnas…Furias illas imaginanti). In other words, Lucius 
stands as a simulacrum in a statuary ensemble next to a simulacrum of a goddess, while 
himself being in the process of transforming and existing in a kind of mirroring 
relationship with Isis – one which corresponds in the text, as it were, to Socrates’ death. 
That his metamorphosis into the simulacrum Actaeon of Byrrhena’s atrium has come full 
circle should be clear at this point. This transformation, in turn, opens him up to become 
the subject of other people’s narrative interpretations, much as he himself turned the 
“bodies in space” of Byrrhena’s atrium into “actions in time” through ekphrastic 
description.  
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this statuary ensemble – and one that has 
gone completely unnoticed in the scholarship to my knowledge – is the fact that the 
bystanders who view the simulacrum of Lucius and who represent the internal audience 
that mirrors us readers as external audience, are said to “wander about” (errare) the 
statue, “looking for a glimpse” (in aspectum). We may recall that one of the innovative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 See Apol. 15; Met. 1.19; Met. 8.12. It should not go unnoticed that Met. 8.12 concerns dreaming 
(imaginor) of an erotic encounter. 
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features of Apuleius’ Actaeon is the addition of the “curious glance” (curiosus optutus) 
with which the simulacrum looks at the “Striding Diana” as she transforms into the 
“Bathing Diana”. As has been thoroughly dealt with in the scholarship, this innovation is 
tantamount to reinterpreting Ovid’s exculpation of Actaeon from blame and transforming 
Actaeon into an intentional voyeur, like Lucius himself.392 In Ovid, though, the unnamed 
narrator takes pains to emphasize that it was error, and not crimen, that led Actaeon to 
his demise. Indeed, in an important exegetical interruption, the Ovidian speaker exclaims: 
“for what blame did error have?” (quod enim scelus error habebat?).393 Error, moreover, 
is said to incite and deceive the eyes of Narcissus (oculos idem, qui decipit, incitat error), 
as he gazes dumbstruck upon his own statuized form. Thus, we may be invited by this 
choice of the word, errare – a word that is conspicuously absent from Apuleius’ Actaeon 
episode but emphasized in the two related Ovidian episodes of mirror-gazing – to ponder 
the people’s visual experience of this statuary ensemble, and more importantly, to 
consider our relationship to it as the external viewing audience. Perhaps Apuleius’ 
Actaeon was not a victim of error because Lucius stumbled into Byrrhena’s atrium with a 
heightened sense of curiosity for magic and for visual delights and projected his own 
desires onto that scene. But we may have unwittingly stumbled upon Apuleius’ text by a 
kind of error, just as the people who view the statuary ensemble of a simulacrum Lucius 
imaging Isis wander around for a glance at the statue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 See, e.g., GCA 2001, 112 ad loc. curiosum optutum for discussion as well as bibliography on this feature 
of Apuleius’ version. 
393 We may also recall here Ovid’s famous claim to have been exiled on two charges, carmen et error 
(Trist. 2.207). He leaves his error unspecified, but claims that carmina cannot corrupt moral readers. For an 
interesting reading of Tristia 2 in terms of audience reception and reader response, see Gibson 1999.	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It is unclear from the text exactly how the people respond to this spectacular sight 
of a man garbed in a colorful robe, embroidered with otherworldly, hybrid creatures (e.g., 
Indian dragons and Hyperborean griffins). We know from 11.13, though, that the people 
“marvel” (populi mirantur) at the sight of Isis’ cortege – a response that is different from 
the religious devotees who express reverence (religiosi venerantur).394 But for us seeing 
this spectacular sight, we might wonder whether we, too, have been incorporated into a 
kind of Actaeonic atrium scene or whether there is another way to read this. Considering 
that we have been given access to the spectacle of a simulacrum – one that could be said 
to be made up of “statues of gods” (simulacrum deorum), if we accept the Groningen 
commentators’ suggestion that Lucius is reminiscent of Osiris in this spectacle395 – then 
we may think back not to Ovid’s Pygmalion or Narcissus, but to the end of Plato’s 
Symposium, where Socrates himself is described as having ἀγάλµατα θεῶν within his 
Satyr-esque external shell. I will explore this suggestion in much greater detail in chapter 
4 of this dissertation, where I argue that the Prologue of the Metamorphoses has language 
reminiscent of Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates. But it is worth noting here that an 
alternative reading to the cynical reading of book 11, which envisions this statuary 
ensemble as merely an Actaeon-Diana atrium retooled in Egyptian garb,396 is to consider 
this imago Lucius hides within his heart as a possible allusion to those ἀγάλµατα θεῶν 
that Socrates has inside of him. To be sure, there is still a kind of immobilization or a loss 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 Cf. GCA 2015, 265 ad loc. on the antithesis of these two responses by the un-initiated and the initiated. 
395 GCA 2015, 405-6. 
396 Slater 1998, 46-7 takes this position the most starkly: “My own experience of reading and re-reading 
Apuleius, however, has not left me balanced between two interpretations of the novel (either as an 
entertaining adventure with no deeper meaning or as a narrative of progress toward salvation) but more and 
more convinced of the irony of the ending and its final objectification of Lucius under the gaze of Isis. If 
we as readers wish to avoid her petrifying gaze, we would do well to observe the dynamics of that gaze as 
reflected in the viewpoint in the water”. 
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of narrative motion in Lucius’ statuization; and his role as a mirror of the goddess, 
erotically subservient with a courtesan fidelity, may seem to many readers a frightening 
conclusion to a tale of excessive curiosity. But Plato’s Socrates, too, reveals an 
immobilized and statuized speaker of “naked speeches” at the end of the Symposium; 
Socrates, too, is famously bald, half-human-half-ass, and on display for viewers to 
wander in and gaze upon.397 To conclude, I would only like to point out the frightening 
danger involved in looking at the enchanting visual-aural spectacle of Socrates. 
Alcibiades is simultaneously mystified by and afraid of Socrates’ bewitching words, to 
such an extent, in fact, that he likens Socrates to a Siren and runs away for fear of 
becoming a statue beside him (Symp. 216a): 
βίᾳ οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων ἐπισχόµενος τὰ ὦτα οἴχοµαι φεύγων, ἵνα µὴ 
αὐτοῦ καθήµενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγηράσω. 
 
Therefore, shutting up my ears by force, as if from the Sirens, I run away in flight, 
in order that I may not grow old, sitting here beside him. 
 
The synaesthetic spectacle of Socrates, which inspires the same affective response of 
stupefaction that later becomes associated with aesthetic and erotic responses to beauty, 
has the power to force (ἀναγκάζει) Alcibiades to make a choice, namely, whether to 
pursue a successful career in politics or whether to leave that behind and strive in pursuit 
of self-knowledge beside Socrates. It is quite possible that the spectacle of Byrrhena’s 
atrium has seduced us to participate in Lucius’ voyeurism and compelled us to imagine 
the goddess undressing; and perhaps we have done so with the belief that we stand 
pronus over our texts, at a safe distance of three removes from the original. If so, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012 has suggested that Lucius’ appearance as a bald-headed priest at the end of book 
11 is also reminiscent of this version of Socrates. 
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Apuleius will have pulled off the trick of deluding us into a Pygmalion-esque fantasy, 
inciting in us erotic desire for the narrative the mirror offers. However, what is more 
frightening to me is the possibility that I may become stuck sitting next to this pseudo-
Socrates, compelled to rethink my life choices. In fact, I would posit that the only thing 
more frightening than the cynical reading of this text is the serious one. Apuleius offers a 
choice to his readers – either, to look at Lucius and laugh, as Lucius does with the 
winged-ass in Isis’ cortege, or to remember Socrates and his bewitching words. What the 
reader chooses to do at the crossroads is his or her decision. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Mirror of Ἔρως: Platonic Epiphany in the 
Haarspiegel of the Metamorphoses: 
	  
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Platonic concerns about the dangerous 
seductions of mimesis are at the heart of Lucius’ visual encounters throughout the 
Metamorphoses. The act of looking into the mirror and enjoying the spectacle it displays 
is dangerous because it may incorporate the viewer into the scene. And Lucius’ role as a 
simulacrum – much like the simulacrum Actaeon we meet in book 2 – can be read as a 
warning to readers about the dangers of gazing into this text and looking at the 
simulacrum of a man iam in asinum ferinus. In this chapter, we will turn away from the 
aesthetic concerns of the Republic and Apuleius’ reception of them, and towards a 
different set of mirroring encounters in the Metamorphoses that reenact the sublime 
catoptric encounter between a lover and beloved in the Phaedrus. That is, after inspecting 
Byrrhena’s atrium and conceiving an erotic desire for the narrative to play out, Lucius 
has a specular encounter with a beloved, the maidservant Photis, in which he likens her 
hair to a mirror in its capacity to offer a transcendent encounter to the viewer.  
Importantly, this Encomium of Hair (Met. 2.9), which can be read as part of the 
budding tradition of hair-encomia in the Imperial Era and the Second Sophistic,398 is 
echoed in Lucius’ religious, epiphanic encounter with Isis (11.3). In the Cupid and 
Psyche inset story (hereafter C&P), moreover, there is a third epiphany scene, which does 
not contain a speculum per se, but which provides a definite structural and thematic 
comparandum for the first two. The narrator of the tale describes the visual experience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 Cf. Dio Chrysostom’s Encomium of Hair found in the Encomium of Baldness by the 4th century C.E. 
bishop, Synesius of Cyrene. Also, see Eumolpus’ capillorum elegidarion in Petr. Sat. 109 and Suet. Dom. 
18, in which Suetonius claims that Domitian wrote a de cura capillorum. 
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Psyche has when she first see Cupid with an encomium of hair parallel to Lucius’ in book 
2 and in anticipation of the description of Isis’ hair in book 11. These three passages 
create thematic correspondences between the viewers and the objects viewed (i.e., Lucius 
and Psyche both gaze upon hair and receive a revelation, Photis and Isis are both objects 
of Lucius’ visual experience, etc.), but the underlying meaning of the relationships has 
yet to be fully discovered. In what follows, I argue that Apuleius’ strange combination of 
these two fundamentally disparate objects – hair and the mirror – into a single object –
what I will label the Haarspiegel for the sake of convenience – enables him to engage in 
a parodic investigation of Platonic love in Lucius’ erotic (and religious) encounters. That 
is, on the one hand, I will show that the Haarspiegel alludes primarily to the Platonic 
tradition of erotic reciprocity, which is authorized by the catoptric encounter between the 
lover’s and beloved’s eyes in the Phaedrus. The eyes are windows to the soul, and the 
mirroring encounter between ἐραστής and ἐρώµενος has for the viewer/lover a 
pedagogical benefit similar to the didactic mirror of dialogue we saw in Alcibiades I 
(chapter 1).399 However, Apuleius’ allusive technique is rarely so simple as to signal only 
one text. Just as we saw in chapters 1 and 2, the Roman literary and the Second Sophistic 
traditions of interpreting and appropriating Plato complicate the original Platonic model. 
Apuleius’ particular innovation in constructing a dense structure of allusion, we will see, 
is to displace the locus of the self from the eyes onto the hair, thereby fetishizing the 
beloved. Moreover, there is a nexus of tropes – e.g. mirroring, epiphany, wings, erotic 
desire, and self-knowledge – that Apuleius adopts from the Platonic scene; but he 
complicates the fundamentally Platonic matrix of metaphors by mixing in other competing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 We may recall from chapter 1 that Socrates and Alcibiades were figured as an ἐραστής/ἐρώµενος pair.  
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models of erotic love, such as the domina/servus model of Latin elegy or the kinky 
perverted sex-addiction of an epigram from Martial. To phrase it differently, Apuleius co-
opts this heightened Platonic moment of mirroring between the eyes – a dialogic and 
intersubjective interaction – and reworks it into a ridiculous parody of revelation through 
appetitive pursuits. What we find in the generic richness of the passage is not merely a 
playful display piece of sophistic oratory or a literary showman sprinkling his otherwise 
low-brow novel with a dash of Platonism in order to appeal to more educated readers400; 
rather, in my view, it is a kind of interpretation of Plato – a scene where we see Lucius 
attempting to achieve the Platonic ideal of erotic reciprocity but parodically misconstruing 
the encounter and ultimately failing. 
Before we get into specific scenes from Apuleius, though, perhaps it will be useful 
to clarify what I mean by my potentially controversial idea of “intentional” misreading. In 
what follows, I take as my premise that Lucius represents a bad reader of Plato and that his 
failure of interpretation demonstrates what happens when a person gets his hands on a 
Platonic dialogue and attempts to re-enact its scenes literally. In the case of Lucius, this 
means blending the Platonic model with other famous and seemingly related scenes and 
tropes from literature; and after performing a more detailed analysis of the particular scenes 
in question, we will analyze exactly how Lucius mixes other traditions and scenes together 
in this densely allusive Haarspiegel. If we do the work to disentangle – for lack of a better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 See Harrison 2000 and van Mal-Maeder 1997, who are the two most outspoken proponents of this view. 
Recall also Swain 2001, 269, as a representative (albeit humorous and wry) passage for the communis 
opinio: “Apuleius was a showman and a playboy, clever but shallow. He deserved to be condemned for 
seducing a rich widow, but had the temerity to ground his innocence in the intellectual community between 
himself and the judge (the Apology). His egotism made him publish four books of highlights from his 
display speeches (the Florida). Intellectual vanity made him write a hack account of Socrates and his 
Deity. Finally his talents found a legitimate outlet in a comic novel about a man’s life as an ass (the 
Metamorphoses)”. 
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word – the tropes and allusions that Apuleius mixes together, though, we can see a 
hermeneutic function for complicating the Platonic model of epiphany: namely, it poses an 
embedded choice to the reader between pleasurable and philosophical models of love. In 
order to grasp more fully the matrix of terms embedded in the Haarspiegel and the 
symbolic valences of the terms, it will be necessary first to take another detour into the 
Apologia and consider Apuleius’ anti-encomium of his own hair. There, we will see how 
Apuleius not only associates beautiful hair with the Platonic recollection of the upper 
realm of Forms, but also how Apuleius’ own presentation of his grotesque external 
appearance (i.e., his disheveled hair) and his beautiful statues within plays on the trope of 
the Marsyan Socrates and thus anticipates the parodic version of this in Lucius’ baldness. 
In this scene, we will also see how Apuleius, gazing at the hair carved into a statuette of 
his god, re-enacts his Platonic model of epiphany. 
 
1: Hair in the Apologia: 
 
Apuleius’ preoccupation with hair has already been discussed to some extent in 
the scholarly literature.401 Hair style is, of course, the first subsidiary charge to which 
Apuleius responds in the Apologia and has therefore caused some readers to see Lucius’ 
obsession with hair as merely autobiographical and comic play on the charges in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 See Englert and Long 1973. 
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Apologia.402 Indeed, the motif of the capillus provides one of the most ridiculous puns in 
the Apologia, when Apuleius makes light of the capital charge by referring to it as a 
crinium crimen.403 However, a closer analysis will reveal Apuleius’ subtle engagement 
with the Socratic tradition of external grotesqueness accompanied by beautiful statues of 
gods within. We may recall from chapter 1 the description of Aemilianus, who has a 
disgusting face and yet fails to learn virtue through mirror-gazing. Apuleius, too, is not 
beautiful – at least, according to his rebuttal; but unlike Aemilianus, he has beautiful 
virtue beneath his ugly exterior, as symbolized by the beautiful statue of a god he carries 
with him. 
Apologia 4 opens with Apuleius’ initial rebuttal of the charge of being formonsus. 
Apuleius first quotes and paraphrases Paris’ response to Hector’s criticism of his 
dandyism: one should not reject the gifts given by the gods.404 If Apuleius is in fact 
formonsus, he argues, nature made him that way and he should not be expected to change 
it. In his extended treatment of the accusation, however, Apuleius addresses the 
behavioral connection between dandified hair and magical practices by appealing to a 
different tradition of beautiful hair, namely philosophy, in which the practitioners are not 
effeminate but adorn their hair nonetheless. And finally, he concludes his rebuttal by 
denying the validity of the accusation and by citing his etiolated body and his disgusting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 See Englert and Long 1973, 237. Cf. Hicter 1944, 100-1, who speculates that Lucius’ beauty in the 
Metamorphoses (Met. 2.2) is a sarcastic joke on the accusation of formonsus that is laid against Apuleius in 
the Apologia. 
403 Hunink 1997, 26 notes: “the sound effect [of the phrase crinium crimen] makes the charge seem even 
more ridiculous…the serious crimen capitis for which Apuleius is presently standing trial, is reduced to a 
mere trifle.” On the seriousness of the charge laid against Apuleius and the legitimate connections between 
long hair and magic, see Bradley 1997, 217-8. 
404 Il. 3.65-6: οὔ τοι ἀπόβλητ' ἐστὶ θεῶν ἐρικυδέα δῶρα,/ ὅσσα κεν αὐτοὶ δῶσιν, ἑκὼν δ' οὐκ ἄν τις 
ἕλοιτο… 
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hair as the primary proofs that the charge is unfounded. At the end of Apologia 4, he 
explains: 
sed haec defensio, ut dixi, aliquam multum a me remota est, cui praeter formae 
mediocritatem continuatio etiam litterati laboris omnem gratiam corpore deterget, 
habitudinem tenuat, sucum exsorbet, colorem obliterat, uigorem debilitat. capillus 
ipse, quem isti aperto mendacio ad lenocinium decoris promissum dixere, uides 
quam sit amoenus ac delicatus, horrore implexus atque impeditus, stuppeo 
tomento adsimilis et inaequaliter hirtus et globosus et congestus, prorsum 
inenodabilis diutina incuria non modo comendi, sed saltem expediendi et 
discriminandi: satis ut puto crinium crimen, quod illi quasi capitale intenderunt, 
refutatur. 
But such a defense is, as I said, some distance removed from me, since, aside 
from the mediocrity of my beauty, my constant pursuit of literary study wipes 
away every charm from my body, reduces me to a lean frame, sucks dry my life-
blood, blots out my color, and weakens my strength. As to my hair, which they 
with a boldfaced lie claim I have let grow as an allurement of my beauty, you can 
see [for yourself] how ‘charming’ and how ‘delicate’ it is. As you see, it is 
horribly tangled, knotted and unkempt like flaxen cushion-stuffings, shaggy and 
unequal in length, so tangled and mangled by my prolonged careless neglect not 
only of arranging [it], but even of untangling and combing [it]. Viola! And so I 
think the charge of hair — a charge that they hurled as me as if it were a capital 
crime — is refuted. 
 
At the very outset, this passage displays the kind of self-knowledge – i.e., knowledge of 
one’s own external appearance – that one could only acquire through contemplation in a 
mirror, which may explain why the charges are handled in tandem. It is philosophical 
labor – a life-choice that Apuleius shares with Plato of de Platone et eius Dogmate405 – 
that has removed the charm (gratia) from his body, emaciated his habitudo, sucked out 
his life juice (sucus), and removed his color and vigor. That is, Apuleius depicts his body 
as emaciated – much like Narcissus, we may recall, who loses his color and vigor as he 
wastes away before the mirror (Met. 3.491-2), or Echo, who loses the “spirit of her whole 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 See de Platone 1.2, where Plato is said to have acquired Socratic philosophy through labor and to have 
added dignity to it through elegantia. Cf. Fletcher 2014, 57ff. for discussion. 
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body” (Met. 3.397: sucus omnis corporis) when her figure disintegrates – as a direct 
consequence of philosophical pursuits. Apuleius’ devotion to philosophy, beyond causing 
him to neglect his body, is most clearly demonstrated in his capillus ipse, which is 
matted, knotty, and uncombed. This self-description shares some important lexical and 
conceptual affinities with Florida 3, in which Apuleius describes a singing contest 
between Apollo and Marsyas and the subsequent flaying of Marsyas as a punishment for 
his hubris. Many scholars have noted the similarity, for instance, between Marsyas’ 
accusations against Apollo and the charges Apuleius’ relatives laid against him in the 
Apologia, suggesting that Apuleius aligns himself with the cultured Apollo and subtly 
refashions his accusers as Marsyas figures.406 However, recent scholarship has 
recognized that Apuleius, in fact, straddles the line between the cultured Apollo and the 
buffoonish Marsyas in his own self-presentation,407 citing as a primary piece of evidence 
Apuleius’ depiction of his own “Marsyas-like hair”.408 Thus, through a comparative 
reading across the Apuleian corpus, we can already see that Apuleius’ treatment of his 
hair alludes obliquely to the character of Marsyas, who is stripped of his hideous external 
appearance – his corium – and reveals his naked insides at the end of the competition. 
Within the Apologia as well, there is a corresponding passage for this one, a kind 
of textual mirror that is meant to reflect Apuleius’ own statues hidden within. The last of 
the subsidiary charges for magical practices to which Apuleius responds concerns the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 See, e.g., the readings of Harrison 2000, 98, Hunink 2001, 69-79, and Lee 2005, 72-3. 
407 See Finkelpearl 2009 and Fletcher 2014, 228-234 for readings “against the grain” of previous 
scholarship. 
408 See Finkelpearl 2009, 17: “…some element of self-satire seems evident; Apuleius himself talks a lot 
about hair. This passage has a strong resemblance to descriptions of hair in the Metamorphoses…and 
Lucius’ praise of Isis’ hair begins with the same three words, iam primum crines…Granted, Marsyas finds 
fault with the kind of hair that Lucius loves, but we will see below that Apuleius also claims to have 
Marsyas-like hair”. 
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ownership of a small skeletal, deformed statuette (sigillum). The prosecution ostensibly 
claimed that Apuleius worshipped this sigillum, referring to it as his βασιλεύς,409 and the 
charge held weight, as Hunink points out, on the grounds that it was a statuette of 
Mercury, the patron god of magic.410 But Apuleius refutes the charge, first by referring to 
a legitimate use of the statuette in religious worship and claiming a Platonic precedent for 
his actions, and then by praising the beauty of the sigillum and insinuating that it could 
have no magical connection. In a classic ring-composition for the subsidiary charges, this 
scene formally recapitulates the earlier rebuttal of Apologia 4 where Apuleius refutes the 
charge of being beautiful (formonsus). At this point, however, Apuleius reverses the 
situation: in Apologia 4, the prosecution accuses Apuleius of being beautiful and he 
responds by pointing to his emaciated body and his disgusting hair as proofs of the 
prosecution’s mendacity; here in Apologia 63, however, the prosecution depicts his 
statuette as deformed (eviscerata), etiolated (macilenta), and cadaverous (diri cadaveris), 
and Apuleius, in turn, brings forth a beautiful work of art, noteworthy for its remarkable 
hair. At Apol. 63, he produces the actual statuette (or so he claims)411 on the spot, hands it 
to the judge presiding over the case, and says: 
en uide, quam facies eius decora et suci palaestrici plena sit, quam hilaris dei 
uultus, ut decenter utrimque lanugo malis deserpat, ut in capite crispatus capillus 
sub imo pillei umbraculo appareat, quam lepide super tempora pares pinnulae 
emineant, quam autem festiue circa humeros uestis substricta sit. 
Behold! Look at how beautiful and full of wrestling sheen its aspect is, how 
charming is the face of the god, how pleasantly the youthful wool creeps down 
both cheeks, how the hair on his head appears to curl under the edge of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 Apol. 61: Unum etiam crimen ab illis, cum Pudentillae litteras legerent, de cuiusdam sigilli fabricatione 
prolatum est, quod me aiunt ad magica maleficia occulta fabrica ligno exquisitissimo comparasse et, cum 
sit sceleti forma turpe et horribile, tamen impendio colere et Graeco uocabulo βασιλέα nuncupare. 
410 See Hunink 1997, 162-174. 
411 See Abt 1908, 223 for the suggestion that Apuleius could have brought in a different statue. 
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shadow of his cap, how charmingly his perfect little wings stick out from his 
temples, how handsomely his cloak is draped about his shoulders.   
  
Two textual proofs demonstrate the structural correspondence between this passage and 
Apologia 4: (1) the recurrence of the word sucus412 in describing the aspect of a person 
and (2) the reuse of the construction videre…quam…sit, a formula Apuleius used earlier 
to condemn the appearance of his hair (uides quam sit amoenus ac delicatus) and recycles 
in this passage in order to eulogize the charming sight of the statuette. The sigillum of the 
god thus mirrors the original picture of Apuleius the audience was given in section 4: 
Apuleius’ etiolated body, which had lost its color and life-blood (sucus) is only the 
external representation of his personhood; but he has a beautiful and bewitching statue of 
a god within. His disgusting hair is, in turn, counteracted by the beauty of the god’s hair 
because the sigillum actually represents Apuleius’ inner beauty, acquired through 
religious piety and pursuit of philosophical truth.413 We saw in the previous chapter how 
the depiction of Lucius as a bald-headed simulacrum at the end of the Metamorphoses 
may allude (ironically) to Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates at the conclusion of the 
Symposium,414 and we will flesh this point out more fully in the next chapter. Through 
this correspondence in the Apologia, Apuleius similarly taps into the important Socratic 
resonance with the parallelism of external ugliness and internal beauty. Just as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 sucus is a rarely used term in Apuleius, only occurring one other time in the Apuleian corpus besides 
these two parallel passages in the Apologia. The citation is in Florida 15, in the ekphrasis of the statue of 
Bathyllus. This ekphrasis again begins with a description of hair and then moves down to the neck (cervix), 
which is suci plena. 
413 The end of Apol. 63 ends with a claim used to bolster Apuleius’ piety and to imply that Aemilianus is 
lacking religious piety: Hunc qui sceletum audet dicere, profecto ille simulacra deorum nulla videt aut 
omnia neglegit. 
414 See Graverini 2012 and Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012, who both make similar points. 
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Apologia as a whole fashions Apuleius out to be a second Socrates, so his external 
grotesqueness, which hides within a regal sigillum dei, further echoes Alcibiades’ famous 
depiction of Socrates, who resembles the satyr Marsyas on the outside, but possesses 
ἀγάλµατα θεῶν underneath.415 
This description of the statuette of Mercury also nicely introduces us to the nexus 
of Platonic tropes from the Phaedrus that we will encounter in the Haarspiegel of the 
Metamorphoses and its corresponding scenes. That is, after Apuleius describes the 
sigillum’s shiny aspect, downy beard, and beautiful wings, he explicitly links this sight to 
the sublime flight of the soul in the Phaedrus. The sight of the statuette provokes in 
Apuleius an imprecation against his accuser, Aemilianus, and a praise of the pursuits of 
the Platonica familia. Unlike Aemilianus, Maximus, the judge presiding over the case, 
knows about the higher Platonic pursuits, Apuleius argues, because he has “diligently 
read” (legit…diligenter) about the ὑπερουράνιος	  τόπος in the Phaedrus (247b-d). That is 
to say, after displaying the statue to the court, Apuleius presumes that the immediate 
reference point the judge would have in mind is the escape of the soul into the upper 
realm. This strange mixing of terms and attributing them to a myth from the Phaedrus 
demonstrates for us the conceptual apparatus that we will deploy for the remainder of the 
chapter – namely, the underlying influence of the Phaedrus for the conflation of hair, 
wings, and shiny things/mirrors as symbols for Platonic epiphany. However, this 
apparatus introduces a Platonic question about aesthetic and utilitarian modes of relating 
to the statuette. How should one relate to a statue or to the sight of beauty? In Platonic 
erotics, the beloved is transformed into a statue: as we will see, in the Phaedrus, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 See Symp. 215a-216c. Cf. Florida 3, for Apuleius’ treatment of the Marsyas myth.  
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viewer worships him as an ἄγαλµα, and in the Symposium, Alcibiades transforms his 
beloved Socrates into ἀγάλµατα θεῶν. By looking upon these spectacles, erotic 
experience is also transformed into a religious/philosophical experience. It is for this 
reason that Apuleius, in depicting his disheveled hair as a philosophical life choice, strips 
his own external corium, as it were, and reveals a sigillum dei within. The accusation of 
the dangerous seduction of a widow is turned into an aesthetic experience of beauty that 
leads to a sublime encounter with the god and offers the “diligent reader” a moment of 
“investigating the upper realm” (sublimiora quaepiam vestigavit). 
 
 2: Platonic Misinterpretation in the Narrative Frame for the Haarspiegel: 
 
The famous mirroring scene in the Phaedrus occurs in the sublime Palinode 
situated in the middle of the dialogue, in which Socrates recants his earlier speech against 
῎Ερως by defending erotic desire and mania with a philosophical myth. This speech 
together with Diotima’s transcendent account of ῎Ερως in the Symposium nearly acquired 
the status of educational textbooks on Platonic love in the Second Sophistic,416 and as 
such, are functionally interchangeable as targets of allusion at this time. The fact that the 
Platonic dichotomy of “Heavenly Aphrodite” (οὐράνια Ἀφροδίτη) and “Vulgar Aphrodite” 
(Πάνδηµος Ἀφροδίτη) provides an important schema for Lucius’ journey and conversion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 See Trapp 1990; and most recently, see Fletcher 2014, 265: “…Platonising fiction was popular in the 
Second Sophistic and it took a variety of forms, ranging from the intertextual to the allegorical.The former 
can be seen in how fictional narratives used allusions to Plato’s dialogues, especially the erotic dialogues 
(Symposium and Phaedrus) as part of their setting and narratives as a means of adding literary prestige to a 
traditionally ‘low’ genre”. 
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has already been recognized in the scholarship on Apuleius.417 The binary is a recurrent 
theme throughout C&P and is explicitly highlighted in Lucius’ vision of Isis, where he 
refers to her as “Heavenly Venus” (Met. 11.2: caelestis Venus). While this dichotomy is 
actually derived from Pausanias’ speech in the Symposium, one could easily consider the 
Phaedrus to be a meditation on the same primary juxtaposition between shallow, earthly 
love and divine ῎Ερως, and this is precisely the reading Apuleius endorsed.418 Before we 
analyze the sublime moment of intersubjective mirroring in the Phaedrus and its 
Nachleben, therefore, it will be useful to consider more generally how Apuleius engages 
with Platonic ideas in books 2 and 3 of the Met. and complicates them with alternative 
models of erotic love. This will be particularly important for our consideration of the 
Haarspiegel, as it is bookended with scenes of Lucius misreading and misinterpreting Plato 
by subtly blending in other erotic scenes from literature. 
The myth of the Phaedrus concerns the flight of souls that comes about through 
philosophical enlightenment. The soul that is perfect has wings and flies about in the air 
(τελέα µὲν οὖν οὖσα καὶ ἐπτερωµένη µετεωροπορεῖ), but most souls have lost their wings 
(ἡ δὲ πτερορρυήσασα). The truly inspired lover of the Phaedrus is described in the 
language of disease: his inspiration is infectious. The sight of earthly beauty in the boy 
provides for the ἐραστής some kind of mystical experience of the Forms, but it also infects 
the ἐρώµενος with a similar internal experience. While mirroring in the Phaedrus offers a 
mystical contemplation to the ἐραστής and ἐρώµενος, the Haarspiegel in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 See Kenney 1990a, 17-22. 
418 See de Wilde 2008, 171ff., who suggests that Apuleius’ reading of the lock of Berenice represents a 
composite reading of these two dialogues and a fusion of the Οὐράνια Ἀφροδίτη/Πάνδηµος Ἀφροδίτη 
dichotomy from the Symposium with the journey of the soul from the Phaedrus. 
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Metamorphoses comically parodies this feature of the Platonic scene. In the Phaedrus, for 
instance, the immaterial soul grows wings and begins to sprout feathers as a consequence 
of seeing the beautiful beloved and worshipping him “like a statue or a god” (θύοι ἂν ὡς 
ἀγάλµατι καὶ θεῷ τοῖς παιδικοῖς). We saw above how Apuleius connects this Platonic kind 
of Icarianism to his philosophical enlightenment through aesthetic appreciation of his 
sigillum: such a statue of a god should remind Maximus of the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος.  
However, when we encounter the magic- and sex-obsessed Lucius in 
Metamorphoses 3, longing to transform into a bird, it is difficult not to remember this 
winged soul of the inspired lover in the Phaedrus. Indeed, in our investigation of book 2, 
we will see Lucius treating his beloved, Photis, like a famous statue of a goddess – the 
Knidian Aphrodite – and in book 3, we will find him attempting to acquire wings from this 
erotic attachment. In fact, in his pursuit of a Platonic Icarian experience, Lucius enslaves 
himself to Photis, ordering that she bind him to her forever (Met. 3.22: perpetuo pignera) 
by making him winged (perfice ut meae Veneri Cupido pinnatus assistam tibi). If Lucius 
represents the ἐραστής and Photis the ἐρώµενος in the mirroring scene in 2.9, as I will 
demonstrate below, then Lucius, rather than growing wings from the power of specular 
reciprocity, actually becomes more attached to the things of the earth. That is, instead of 
sprouting feathers, in the manner of the philosophically enlightened soul of the Phaedrus, 
Lucius grows hooves. The soul, which in Platonic terms is given wings through erotic 
reciprocity, is in Lucius’ case further debased and given the lot of an animal. It is no 
coincidence, then, that Socrates describes the fate of particularly gluttonous 
(γαστριµαργία), insolent (ὕβρις), and drunken men (φιλοποσία) in the Phaedo as follows: 
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their souls fall into the bodies of asses (εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη).419 Lucius, in attempting to 
reach a kind of Icarian freedom, ends up becoming a more servile creature420 – one that 
corresponds to his notorious serviles voluptates.421  
If we look closer at the erotic seduction (2.7) and the fulfillment of the tryst (2.16-
17) that bookend the Haarspiegel, respectively, there is a similar parodic reference to the 
feathered soul image. In a bewildering passage of the Phaedrus, in which Plato employs 
very corporeal and phallic language to describe the metaphysical experience of the 
enlightened soul, the feather of the soul is said to grow erect.422 That is, the incorporeal 
soul (paradoxically) grows an immaterial erection from the sight of beauty, but somehow 
transcends the concerns of the body, longing for a metaphysical connection of sorts. In 
book 2, Lucius undergoes a faux-Platonic enlightenment similar to the incorporeal erection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 See Phaed. 81e. This is, in fact, a frequently cited reference for the Platonic reading of Lucius’ 
metamorphosis. See Schlam 1970; DeFilippo 1990; and most recently, Tilg 2014. 
420 See Fitzgerald 2000, 87-114 for a discussion of Lucius’ asinine metamorphosis in terms of slavery. In 
particular, see 100, where he discusses how the ass is the most slavish of animals in literary terms: “Like 
the slave, the ass is the animal that is beaten. When the metamorphosed Lucius becomes an ass he 
exchanges his skin for a hide (corium). The Latin word not only denotes a type of body, it also connotes a 
particular relation of one body to the will or uses of another”. 
421 See Met. 11.15. Cf. Graverini 2012, 51-132 for a really useful discussion of Lucius’ “servile pleasures” 
and the problems that they have caused interpreters of the Met. 
422 See Phaedr. 251a7ff.: ἰδόντα δ᾽ αὐτὸν οἷον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης µεταβολή τε καὶ ἱδρὼς καὶ θερµότης ἀήθης 
λαµβάνει: δεξάµενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν ὀµµάτων ἐθερµάνθη ᾗ ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις 
ἄρδεται, θερµανθέντος δὲ ἐτάκη τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκφυσιν, ἃ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος συµµεµυκότα εἶργε µὴ 
βλαστάνειν, ἐπιρρυείσης δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ᾤδησέ τε καὶ ὥρµησε φύεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ῥίζης ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καυλὸς 
ὑπὸ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος: πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή (“when he [the lover] sees him [the beautiful 
beloved], a change comes over him as if from shivering, and sweat and a strange fever take hold of him; for 
receiving through his eyes the flow of beauty with which the nature of the feather is nourished, he grows 
warm, and when he is warmed the places [on the soul] where the feathers sprout melt, [places] which long 
ago closed up from hardness and prevented sprouting, but with the nourishment flowing in, the quill of the 
feather became swollen and began to grow from the root under the whole form of the soul; for long ago it 
was entirely winged”). Translation adapted from Yunis 2011, 153 ad loc. The phallic language is 
particularly evident from the botanical metaphor in the word καυλὸς, the stem of a plant, which appears as 
early as the Hippocratic Corpus as a medical term for the phallus. See the entry for this term in Adams 
1982, 26-7. 
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from gazing upon Photis, but in fact, ends up having a real erection. In response to viewing 
Photis’ undulating bottom (spinam mobilem), Lucius says (Met. 2.7): 
Isto aspectu defixus obstupui et mirabundus steti; steterunt et membra quae 
iacebant ante. 
 
I was transfixed (defixus) by the sight, utterly stunned (obstipui). I stood in 
amazement, as did those parts of mine which were lying limp before. 
This is not the only time we see Lucius “transfixed” (defixus); it happens to him both when 
he sees Pamphile transforming into a bird and again when the goddess Isis transforms him 
back into a man (11.14).  This recurrent language does not merely create an intra-textual 
relationship and correspondence between these three characters (although it does do that). 
It also introduces a choice about the appropriate response to beauty, such as we saw in 
Lucian’s de Domo in the previous chapter: can a viewer safely look upon beauty and long 
to become part of the sight or is it too dangerous?  
 The lover in the Phaedrus, upon seeing the sight of beauty on earth, is similarly 
dumbstruck with amazement at the sight and loses control of himself.423 The verb that is 
used there to express stupefaction – ἐκπλήσσειν – develops in later literature into a trope 
for a viewer’s reaction to a realist work of art – ἔκπληξις; this is, in turn, translated into 
Latin as stupere, which characterizes the affective experience of viewing beauty and art, 
such as, e.g., Narcissus experiences upon seeing himself in the mirror.424 And Lucius uses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 See Phaedr. 250a6: αὗται δέ, ὅταν τι τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁµοίωµα ἴδωσιν, ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέτ᾽ ἐν αὑτῶν 
γίγνονται, ὃ δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσι διὰ τὸ µὴ ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεσθαι (“The souls, whenever they see 
something similar to the things there [i.e., the beauty they saw in the heavenly realms], they are struck out 
of their minds (ἐκπλήσσειν) and they are no longer in themselves, and they do not know what they are 
experiencing on account of insufficient perception”). Cf. Graverini 2010, who discusses the reaction of 
stupefaction and the out-of-body experience in the Cupid & Pysche episode as an allusion to this 
experience of the soul in the Phaedrus. 
424 See Hardie 2002, 180, where he suggests that ἔκπληξις is the Greek for the Latin stupor. See also p. 146, 
where Hardie compares Narcissus’ stupefaction in response to his own beauty (Met. 3.418-19, a passage we 
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this verb (in the inchoative form obstipesco) to describe his own affective response of 
marvel at the sight of Photis’ seductive movements. In other words, Lucius, in trying to 
follow the Platonic model of viewing beauty, believes that he is undergoing an internal 
experience of enlightenment and employs the same language for his encounter; however, 
his reaction is not in his soul and is not a process of recollection, as it is for the lover in the 
Phaedrus, but rather, a very corporeal reaction. His body displays a man ruled by his 
appetites. 
 Icarianism or metaphysical flight is not only restricted to a few key passages of the 
Metamorphoses, as scholarship on the novel has only recently recognized.425 In fact, it is a 
thematic signifier that permeates the entire novel, with Lucius continually 
misunderstanding and misconstruing the Platonic eschatological image. Winged-ness is at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
will consider shortly) to the famous passage in the Aeneid, in which Aeneas encounters a relief of himself. 
We may also compare this line in Met. 2.7 to Aen. 1.495 (stupet obtutuque haeret defixus in uno; “he is 
dumbstruck and transfixed, he doesn’t move his face”). Lucius’ scenes of stupefaction share a number of 
verbal resonances with this scene. But the point is not only that this is a trope that Apuleius participates in; 
rather, it is also a trope that can be traced back to the Phaedrus as one of the primary sources because the 
lover is responding with amazement to the likeness between the beloved and the Form of beauty. 
425 See James 1998 who analyzes the theme of Icarianism in the C&P inset narrative and how it relates to 
Lucius’ desire to acquire wings in the main story. By employing theoretical approaches from psychology 
and phenomenology of religion, such as Eliade’s work on Shamanism and the universal cultural diffusion 
of the motif of magical flight, James argues that Apuleius is playing with the idea of magical flight and its 
connection to Levis Amor; but she focuses on places in the text where winged creatures like Cupid are 
paradoxically weighed down whereas embodied, earthbound creatures like Lucius and Psyche are trying to 
acquire lightness.  Disembodiment, however, is necessary for the ecstatic kind of flight to happen for 
mortals and, in the Eliadean framework, the magical flight associated with Shamanism is a journey of the 
soul. While this is a very useful analysis for its creative account of less frequently discussed passages of the 
Metamorphoses, I would argue that we have recourse to a much simpler account for the obsession with 
wings in the Metamorphoses; a conflation of Platonic eschatological tropes from the Phaedrus, the Phaedo, 
and the Republic could account for the nexus of metaphors in the Metamorphoses about wings, 
disembodiment, the journey of the soul, and love. For instance, in the eschatological myth of the Phaedo – 
a dialogue that we know Apuleius translated into Latin (see Harrison 2000, 23) – Socrates famously likens 
human beings to fish: if a person could become winged (πτηνὸς γενόµενος ἀνάπτοιτο) and escape up to the 
upper realm, he would have a true vision of reality, just like a fish jumping above the surface of the sea for 
a brief moment (Phaed. 109e-110a1). Here, Plato borrows from the language of initiation, or religious 
theoria (θεωροῦσα), in order to describe an experience of the true heaven (ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς) or the upper 
realm (cf. Nightingale 2004). It will be useful to keep this in mind as we encounter Apuleius’ own 
conflation of initiatory language and philosophical enlightenment. 
201	  
	  
the root of Lucius’ “Typhonic choice”, in which he, like the Socrates of the Phaedrus, 
questions what kind of composite animal he is.426 But, whereas Socrates wonders whether 
he is a complicated beast similar to the Hesiodic Typhon and eventually arrives at the 
allegorical image of the winged-horse-charioteer-soul, Lucius continually questions 
whether or not he will become a winged-Pegasus while he is still an ass.427 That is to say, 
Lucius adopts an image from the Phaedrus that refers to a psychic state – in a similar 
manner to his misconstrual of the metaphysical soul’s erection – and comically misapplies 
it to his ass-body, suggesting that he may still achieve flight in his asinine adventures. 
 The misinterpretation of Platonic ideas is, however, more than merely a parodic 
procedure in the Metamorphoses. In my view, Lucius does indeed represent an incompetent 
exegete of the Platonic texts. But this bad hermeneutics is heightened by Apuleius 
complicating Platonic models with alternative erotic models (e.g., from Latin elegy). A 
classic case of this occurs in the consummation of Lucius’ desire for Photis in book 3, 
immediately after his encounter with the Haarspiegel. When Lucius grows tired (Met. 3.20: 
mihi iam fatigo) from the duration and intensity of his erotic tryst with Photis, he says that 
Photis “offer[s] a boyish bonus out of her generosity” (de propria liberalitate Photis 
puerile obtulit corollarium). As we will see later, “weariness” overcomes Psyche as well 
when she tries to achieve a Platonic flight by holding onto Cupid’s leg (5.22: fessa); and 
many interpreters have recognized this moment in C&P as an explicit allusion to the soul in 
the Phaedrus, which falls to the earth after growing “heavy” or “weary” with forgetfulness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 For Lucius’ “Typhonic choice”, see Met. 1.4; see also Jeffrey Winkle’s analysis of this scene as it relates 
to the Phaedrus (Winkle 2011). On the Nachleben of Socrates’ refusal to rationalize a myth (Phaedr. 
229c6-230a7), particularly in the Second Sophistic, see Hunter 1997. 
427 See Met. 6.30 and Met. 8.16. In book 11, too, Lucius sees an ass with wings glued onto its back in the 
train of Isis. He names it Pegasus and calls the sight laughable (see Met. 11.8). 
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and evil (Phaedr. 248c:  λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα βαρυνθῇ).428 In the passage in 
question, though, Lucius, the ἐραστής figure, attempts to frame this as a truly Platonic 
encounter, where Photis takes on the position and gender of the Platonic ἐρώµενος. 
However, in the Phaedrus, it is the corrupted ἐραστής who attempts to mount the beloved 
in the manner of a quadruped (250e: τετράποδος νόµον βαίνειν) and is “not ashamed to 
pursue pleasure contrary to nature” (οὐδ᾽ αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὴν διώκων). Lucius 
thus becomes corrupted to the point of pretending Photis is a boy in order to derive more 
pleasure from the encounter; as a consequence of the affair, he is actually transformed into 
a quadruped.  
 This misreading of Plato also shows us a paradigmatic example of how Apuleius 
complicates an originally Platonic model with other competing models of erotic love. For 
instance, one of Martial’s epigrams (9.67) recounts an exhausting tryst with a particularly 
kinky or wanton (lascivia; cf. Photis’ “lasciviousness” on p. 20 below) girl. During this all 
night erotic encounter, the narrator grows tired (fessus; cf. fatigo in 3.20 and fessa in 5.22) 
from a thousand sexual positions and finally requests “that boyish” position (illud puerile; 
cf. puerile…corollarium), which the girl gives him without hesitation. Though Lucius 
frames his encounter as a Platonic ideal, a learned reader can decipher a failure to choose 
the correct erotic model in Lucius’ characteristic misconstrual of the original Platonic 
scene.  
 Perhaps most interestingly, it is also possible to see in Photis’ gender-bending a 
potential intertextual relationship with pseudo-Lucian’s discussion of Praxiteles’ famous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 On this well-recognized allusion in C&P, see GCA 2004, 294. Again, see also James 1998, 37ff. for 
discussion of how Psyche’s attempt at Icarianism relates to Lucius’ own endeavors to acquire wings. 
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Knidian Aphrodite in the Amores, though it is difficult to say whether this text would have 
been accessible to Apuleius.429 In that scene, the girl-loving Charicles and the boy-loving 
Callicratidas visit the famous statue of the goddess, and a discussion of the sort popular in 
Second Sophistic Platonizing treatises430 ensues about how one should look at the goddess, 
that is, whether one should love boys or girls and whether one would take more pleasure at 
an erotic sight by looking from the front or from the back. The Knidian Aphrodite stands in 
a structure constructed to offer full-frontal and backside viewing431; adopting the classic 
pose, she is said to “cover her private parts inconspicuously with one of her hands” (Am. 
13: τῇ ἑτέρᾳ χειρὶ τὴν αἰδῶ λεληθότως ἐπικρύπτειν). Charicles, upon seeing the front of the 
statue, cries out a formulaic exclamation – “happiest of the gods is Ares” (εὐτυχέστατος 
…θεῶν ὁ…Ἄρης); he then leaps upon the marble and begins to kiss the goddess with 
“importunate lips” (λιπαρέσι τοῖς χείλεσιν…κατεφίλει); Callicratidas, on the other hand, 
seems unimpressed until he sees her from behind and views “the boyish parts of the 
goddess” (Am. 14: ἐπεὶ τὰ παιδικὰ µέρη τῆς θεοῦ κατώπτευσεν). At that point, he cries out 
in his own fawning exclamation – “Heracles! What a rhythmically ordered back!” 
(Ἡράκλεις, ὅση µὲν τῶν µεταφρένων εὐρυθµία); he likens her backside to Ganymede and 
makes a euphemistic metaphor about drinking the “sweeter” liquid poured from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 See Amores 13-17. On issues of dating and authorship of the Amores, which scholars variously place 
from the 2nd to the 4th century, see Haynes 2013, 71. Buffière 1980 argues for a second century 
publication. Elsner 2007b makes an argument for the possibility that it is authentically Lucianic. If my 
reading of Apuleius can be pushed further, it would add to the argument in favor of an early dating (and 
possibly authenticity). Elsner 1991, 155-8 also has some helpful discussion of the scene more generally. 
430 See the debates over the benefits of heterosexual versus pederastic love in Plutarch’s Amatorius, 
Achilles Tatius L&C 2.33-8, and this scene from the pseudo-Lucianic Amores. See the analysis of Hubbard 
2009 and the dissertation of Michael Klabunde (Klabunde 2001). 
431 See the recent treatment of Melissa Haynes on the importance of the architecture for the viewing 
experience (Haynes 2013). 
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Ganymede’s cup; and finally, he becomes “almost petrified from the excessive marvel” 
(ὑπὸ τοῦ σφόδρα θάµβους ὀλίγου δεῖν ἐπεπήγει).  
 If we return to the scene in the Met., we may note that Lucius appears to view 
Photis from different angles at different times, fetishizing particular parts in the same way 
as these viewers who discuss the most pleasurable side of the statue to behold. If we look 
again at Met. 2.7, when Lucius first sees Photis, she is “shaking her nimble spine” (spinam 
mobilem quatiens placide decenter undabat; cf. τῶν µεταφρένων εὐρυθµία); gazing upon 
her backside, Lucius becomes stupefied (see above: defixus obstupui et mirabundus), gets 
an erection, and cries out in a formulaic exclamation: 
‘Quam pulchre quamque festive ’ inquam ‘Fotis mea, ollulam istam cum natibus 
intorques! Quam mellitum pulmentum apparas! Felix et certius beatus cui 
permiseris illuc digitum intingere!’ 
 
“How beautifully and charmingly”, I said, “my Photis, you twist that little pot with 
your buttocks!  How sweet a stew you are preparing! Happy and more certainly 
blessed is he to whom you give permission to dip his finger in there!” 
Experiencing exactly the same reaction that Callicratidas has, Lucius looks at Photis’ 
backside – what he later refers to as her “boyish bonus” (puerile…corollarium; cf. ἐπεὶ τὰ 
παιδικὰ µέρη) –, makes an exclamation about the movement of her buttocks, and alludes to 
their tryst in a consumption metaphor.432 It is at that point that Lucius ironically undergoes 
a Platonic kind of stupefaction and gazes into the Haarspiegel at the top of Photis’ head. 
 A little later in book 2, however, Lucius is transformed from the boy-lover to the 
girl-lover, as he explicitly likens Photis to the Knidian Aphrodite at the fulfillment of his 
tryst. That is, at Met. 2.17, Photis lets her hair down and metamorphoses into the goddess: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 On the food metaphors in this scene, see Schmeling and Montiglio 2006. 
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Nec mora, cum omnibus illis cibariis vasculis raptim remotis, laciniis cunctis suis 
renudata, crinibusque dissolutis ad hilarem lasciviam in speciem Veneris quae 
marinos fluctus subit pulchre reformata, paulisper etiam glabellum feminal rosea 
palmula potius obumbrans de industria quam tegens verecundia. 
 
Without delay, with all the dishes and food suddenly snatched away, stripping 
herself of all her clothes, and letting her hair down for charming wantonness, she 
beautifully transformed herself into the guise of Venus who rose from the waves 
of the sea and she just barely hid her smooth-shaven pubes with her rosy palm, 
intentionally shadowing it rather than hiding it out of modesty. 
 
Again, the Platonic model is blended with another tradition from art criticism, which 
reveals Lucius to be frenzied in his pursuit of a very physical pleasure. Moreover, after 
fetishizing Photis’ hair in 2.9, Lucius’ immediate reaction is identical to Charicles’, namely 
to leap upon the object of his desire (2.10: pronus in eam) and plant a kiss on his favorite 
body part (mellitissimum illud savium impressi).433 
 The fact that Lucius eulogizes Photis’ body from different angles in a mock-
Platonic enlightenment gets to the very heart of Lucius’ role as a bad reader of Plato — 
contrary to Maximus’ “diligent reading”, we may note. What in Plato is meant to 
demonstrate the sublime effect of beauty on a lover and its ability to provide a transcendent 
encounter with the divine becomes in these Second Sophistic treatises a meditation on 
fetishizing various parts of the beloved’s body. Whereas the lover in Plato worships his 
beloved “like a statue” (ὡς ἀγάλµατι) – with Plato playing upon the associations of cult 
worship and the ἄγαλµα’s power to make an absent god present434 – Apuleius’ faux-
Platonic lover transforms his beloved into a very specific statue, which has a history of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 Psyche’s parallel reaction to the sight of Cupid, where she “leans over him” (prona in eum) and plants 
kisses on him, explicitly describes the kisses as “passioned and impetuous” (patulis ac petulantibus saviis). 
If Apuleius was familiar with the passage from pseudo-Lucian, this phrase could be a translation of 
Charicles’ λιπαρέσι τοῖς χείλεσιν.  
434 See Nightingale 2004, 157-68; cf. Squire 2009, 117-20. 
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being fetishized for its particular parts. As we shall see in the next section, the most 
important piece of evidence for my claim that Apuleius presents Lucius as a bad reader of 
Plato lies in the fetishization of body parts that displace the locus of the beloved’s identity. 
When we look at the mirroring encounter in the Phaedrus, we will see that the erotic 
reciprocity, which leads to a sublime encounter with divinity and an acquisition of self-
knowledge, happens through the mirroring eyes. Indeed, as we already hinted at in chapter 
1 with the reading of Alcibiades I, the eyes are the windows to the soul in Platonic erotics, 
and readers in the Second Sophistic most certainly understood this feature of ῎Ερως.435 
That Lucius turns the beloved around – looking not into her mirroring eyes, but rather into 
her hair – accomplishes the same misinterpretation of Plato that Charicles’ and 
Callicratidas’ erotic responses to body parts does. After we consider the original Platonic 
text and its afterlife in antiquity (particularly in the Second Sophistic), we will turn to the 
Haarspiegel, where Apuleius reveals Lucius to be a fetishist masquerading as an ideal 
Platonic ἐραστής. 
 
3: The Platonic Mirror of ῎Ερως and its Nachleben in antiquity: 
	  
Now that we have seen some of the broader implications of the Phaedrus myth on 
the scenes surrounding the Haarspiegel, it is fitting to take a look at the particular mirroring 
scene that I propose is the primary intertext for Metamorphoses 2.9 and briefly consider its 
reception in later literature. At Phaedrus 255c1ff., Socrates describes the erotic encounter: 
ἡ τοῦ ῥεύµατος ἐκείνου πηγή, ὃν ἵµερον Ζεὺς Γανυµήδους ἐρῶν ὠνόµασε, πολλὴ 
φεροµένη πρὸς τὸν ἐραστήν, ἡ µὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδυ, ἡ δ' ἀποµεστουµένου ἔξω 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 On the eyes/face as mirrors of the metaphysical soul, see Morales 2004, 138-9. 
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ἀπορρεῖ· καὶ οἷον πνεῦµα ἤ τις ἠχὼ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ στερεῶν ἁλλοµένη πάλιν 
ὅθεν ὡρµήθη φέρεται, οὕτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ῥεῦµα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν 
ὀµµάτων ἰόν, ᾗ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι ἀφικόµενον καὶ ἀναπτερῶσαν, τὰς 
διόδους τῶν πτερῶν ἄρδει τε καὶ ὥρµησε πτεροφυεῖν τε καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωµένου αὖ 
ψυχὴν ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν. ἐρᾷ µὲν οὖν, ὅτου δὲ ἀπορεῖ· καὶ οὔθ' ὅτι πέπονθεν 
οἶδεν οὐδ' ἔχει φράσαι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀπ' ἄλλου ὀφθαλµίας ἀπολελαυκὼς πρόφασιν 
εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν. καὶ 
ὅταν µὲν ἐκεῖνος παρῇ, λήγει κατὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ τῆς ὀδύνης, ὅταν δὲ ἀπῇ, κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ αὖ ποθεῖ καὶ ποθεῖται, εἴδωλον ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων· καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ 
οἴεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι. 
 
The fountain (πηγή) of that stream which Zeus, when he was in love with 
Ganymede, named “desire” (ἵµερον) flows (ἀπορρεῖ) in abundance, being carried 
into the lover, and some [of it], when he is filled (ἀποµεστουµένου), overflows 
outside; and just as the wind or some echo bounces back from smooth, hard 
surfaces and is carried back whence it came, thus the stream of beauty travels back 
into the beautiful one through the eyes (διὰ τῶν ὀµµάτων ἰόν), through which 
[path] it enters into to the soul, where it stirs it up, waters the passages of the 
feathers and makes it grow wings, filling the soul of the beloved with love. So he 
is in love, but he is confused (ἀπορεῖ) about the object of his love; he neither 
understands what he is experiencing nor can he explain it; like one who has 
contracted an eye-disease from another, he is unable to give a reason for it; he does 
not realize that he is seeing himself in his lover as if in a mirror (ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν 
κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν). And whenever the lover is with 
him, he is free from his pain as is his lover; but whenever the lover is absent, he 
feels a similar desire to his lover’s desire for him, and he has love’s image 
(εἴδωλον), reciprocal love (ἀντέρωτα), within him; but he calls it, and believes it to 
be, not love, but friendship… 
 
This passage opens with a reference back to one of Plato’s curious etymologies given at 
251c6 – namely, desire (ἵµερος).436 Socrates, borrowing from Empedocles’ effluent theory 
of perception, implies that desire in its truest form nicely reflects its etymological 
combination of ἱέναι, µέρη, and ῥοή, which suggests that desire is a “flow” of particles that 
enters the eyes.437 According to this theory of optics, vision is conceived of as a form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 Cf. 251c5: ὅταν µὲν οὖν βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς κάλλος, ἐκεῖθεν µέρη ἐπιόντα καὶ ῥέοντ᾽—ἃ δὴ 
διὰ ταῦτα ἵµερος καλεῖται—δεχοµένη τὸν ἵµερον ἄρδηταί τε καὶ θερµαίνηται, λωφᾷ τε τῆς ὀδύνης (“when 
it [the soul] looks upon the beauty of the boy and receives the particles which flow into it from there - for 
which reason they are called ‘desire’ - it is watered and warmed, and it ceases from its pain…”).  
437 See Yunis 2011, 153. See Empedocles DK 31 A86.7, 87, B89, 109a. 
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penetration,438 which leads Frontisi-Ducroux to speculate that the swelling psyche looking 
upon the beautiful boy is, in fact, the phallus.439 That is the reason why Davidson, in 
elucidating the nuances of ἵµερος, describes it as follows: “Himeros has the effect of 
turning a passive object of desire into an innocent agent, and a subject of desire into an 
assault victim, attacked, penetrated through his eyes”.440 As this passage continues, we find 
more language of Empedoclean flow theory of perception: the fount or stream (πηγή) flows 
(ἀπορρεῖ) into the lover until it fills him up (ἀποµεστουµένου). 
 In addition to Empedoclean flow theory, though, Plato also borrows from atomist 
theories of vision in describing how the image (εἴδωλον) of the beloved appears in the eyes 
of the lover.441 That is, when someone looks into another’s eyes, s/he can see a miniature 
reflection of himself or herself in the cornea of the person into whose eyes s/he is gazing.442 
From this physical phenomenon, the atomists’ theory of vision derived the notion of actual 
“air-imprints” (εἴδωλα) traveling through the air and entering the eye. Socrates implies, 
therefore, that the lover’s eyes are not just like a mirror (ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ), but they 
actually are mirrors because they return physical εἴδωλα to the beloved. 
 This elaborate discussion of the passage from the Phaedrus is primarily intended to 
demonstrate how important the eyes are for the ideal Platonic, erotic mirroring. The flow of 
beauty (ἡ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροή) with its connotation of penetration later inspires a trope in 
Second Sophistic discussions of the erotics of vision, which we see displayed, e.g., in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 On penetrative models of optics and its relationship to sexuality, see Bartsch 2006. 
439 See Frontisi-Decroux 1996, 95. On the interconnection between eye, phallus, and penetration, see 
Bartsch 2006, 115-182. 
440 See Davidson 2007, 13. 
441 See again chapter 1, 16 n. 44. 
442 Cf. the discussion of the mirroring phenomenon between the eyes in Alcibiades I, in which the εἴδωλον 
is also called a κόρη (Alc. I 133a2, discussed in chapter 1). 
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Achilles Tatius’ imitation of the erotic mirroring of the Phaedrus.443 In Clitophon and 
Leucippe 1.9.4-5, Clinias explains to Clitophon why he is lucky to see Leucippe every day: 
οὐκ οἶδας οἷόν ἐστιν ἐρωµένη βλεποµένη· µείζονα τῶν ἔργων ἔχει τὴν ἡδονήν. 
ὀφθαλµοὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντανακλώµενοι ἀποµάττουσιν ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ τῶν 
σωµάτων τὰ εἴδωλα· ἡ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροή, δι' αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν 
καταρρέουσα, ἔχει τινὰ µίξιν ἐν ἀποστάσει· καὶ ὀλίγον ἐστὶ τῆς τῶν σωµάτων 
µίξεως· καινὴ γάρ ἐστι σωµάτων συµπλοκή. 
 
You do not understand the value of the sight of the beloved: it yields more 
pleasure than the act itself. You see, when two pairs of eyes reflect in each other, 
they forge images of each other’s bodies, as in a mirror. The effluxion of beauty 
floods down through the eyes to the soul, and effects a kind of union without 
contact. It is a bodily union in miniature, a new kind of bodily fusion.444 
 
Whether or not this is primarily a reference to Plato’s Phaedrus – a feature that Helen 
Morales445 among others calls into question – is not of concern for us. The number of 
important correspondences is certainly enough to conclude with the communis opinio that 
Plato is one of the most palpable intertexts with which this passage is engaging.446 
Particularly attractive for us, though, is Goldhill’s suggestion that “the discourse moves 
through its science, with a nod to ethical philosophy, toward a more familiar ‘ars 
amatoria’”.447 In the Haarspiegel, we shall see a similar kind of literary blending of 
Platonism and familiar models from elegy. What is particularly important to note is a 
peculiar lexical item Achilles Tatius quotes in his appropriation of the Phaedrus intertext: 
ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ τῶν σωµάτων τὰ εἴδωλα. This phrase, “as in a mirror”, is translated into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 Cf. also Plut. Table Talk 5.7.681a-c for another example of a Second Sophistic description of the 
penetrative flow of beauty. 
444 See Morales 2004, 131 for translation. With this Phaedrus-inspired passage of C&L, cf. 5.13.4 (also 
analyzed by Morales): ἡ δὲ τῆς θέας ἡδονὴ διὰ τῶν ὀµµάτων εἰσρέουσα τοῖς στέρνοις ἐγκάθηται· ἕλκουσα 
δὲ τοῦ ἐρωµένου τὸ εἴδωλον ἀεί, ἐναποµάττεται τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς κατόπτρῳ καὶ ἀναπλάττει τὴν µορφήν· ἡ δὲ 
τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροὴ δι' ἀφανῶν ἀκτίνων ἐπὶ τὴν ἐρωτικὴν ἑλκοµένη καρδίαν ἐναποσφραγίζει κάτω τὴν 
σκιάν. Note the confluence of terms borrowed directly from the Phaedrus mirroring passage. 
445 See Morales 2004, 130-5. 
446 Cf. also Goldhill 2001, who seems to split the difference between Platonism and Stoicism. 
447 Goldhill 2001, 379. 
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Latin in the Haarspiegel scene in Met. 2.9, where Lucius describes the color (color) and 
sheen (nitor) of hair coming to meet the eyes “in the manner of a mirror” (ad instar 
speculi). The penetrating vision in Achilles Tatius’ description, moreover, strangely offers 
more pleasure to the beholder than actual penetration: µείζονα τῶν ἔργων ἔχει τὴν ἡδονήν. 
This sounds remarkably similar to the pleasure (2.8: perfrui) Lucius claims to receive 
through “exploring Photis’ appearance” at the opening of his encomium.448 
It is also clear that Apuleius was aware of the intromissive model of vision and its 
penetrative capacity, as we can see, e.g., from the ‘Phaedra’ stepmother episode in 
Metamorphoses 10.3. In another strange blending of the ἐραστής/ἐρώµενος Platonic model 
with a famous scene from literature, a stepmother tries to seduce her son-in-law, setting off 
a chain of events. The stepmother describes the emotional effect the son-in-law has on her 
in the following way (Met. 10.3):  
Causa omnis et origo praesentis doloris et etiam medela ipsa et salus unica mihi 
tute ipse es. Isti enim tui oculi per meos oculos ad intima delapsi praecordia meis 
medullis acerrimum commouent incendium. 
 
You yourself are the entire cause and origin of my present pain, and also the very 
remedy and my only hope for deliverance. Those eyes of yours, having slipped 
through my eyes and deep into my innermost heart, are stirring up the most 
passionate fire in my marrow.  
 
Note how this twisted version of erotic desire follows the Platonic pattern: the desire travels 
through the eyes (per meos oculos) into the deepest soul and sets it on fire (incendium). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 It should be noted here (and will be discussed further later) that perfruor has a particularly erotic valence 
in this scene, making it appear like Lucius derives more enjoyment from the gaze than the act. See GCA 
2001, 161 ad. loc.: “que faut-il entendre par là? Une fois rentré chez lui, Lucius rêve-t-il des belles 
chevelues rencontrées dans la rue et qui lui inspirent de tels éloges? Ou ramène-t-il ces belles cheveleus à la 
maison pour en jouir plus pleinement? Dans les Met., perfrui est le plus souvent employé avec nuance 
érotique…” 
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 Returning to the passage from the Phaedrus, there is another lexical item of 
particular interest, in part because Apuleius chooses to incorporate it in only one of the 
scenes of epiphany we will analyze and in part because it reverberates through different 
mirroring scenes in Greek and Latin literature before it reaches Apuleius. The verb 
λανθάνω appears in a paradoxical sense in the Phaedrus mirroring scene: the beloved 
“[does] not realize that he sees himself in the eyes of the lover as if in a mirror” (ὥσπερ δὲ 
ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν). The process of unknowingly acquiring 
self-knowledge is compared to the bewildering effects of natural phenomena, such as a 
person catching a disease without realizing it at the time of contamination. The analogy 
may seem imprecise, but since the eyes were understood to have a tactile quality and to 
penetrate another person through the eyes (διὰ τῶν ὀµµάτων), the language of 
contamination appears to be an appropriate way of speaking of the transfer of desire. 
This lexical item, λανθάνω, becomes of particular importance for us as we trace this 
mirroring scene through Latin literature. This is one of the reasons, for instance, that many 
have seen the Phaedrus myth as intimately connected to the Narcissus myth of later 
treatments.449 Ezio Pellizer dubiously suggests that Plato had some insight into the deep 
mythic structure embedded in the Narcissus myth, citing as evidence the fact that Plato 
incorporates all of the narrative themes present in different manifestations of the Narcissus 
story.450 To be sure, the recurrence of the echo and the reflected countering-ἔρως image 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 See Bartsch 2006, 84 for the most reasonable assertion of the connection between the two myths. 
450 See Pellizer 1989, 117-18: “Plato is, without doubt, principally interested in defining the other by means 
of studying the effects love produces on the self, whereas [the accounts of Narcissus] attempt rather to 
demonstrate the disastrous effects of refusing reciprocity, which produces a closure of the narcissistic circle 
of the self. One realizes, however, that in this impressive passage of Plato’s, the reappearance of the figure 
of ἀντέρως, of amorous reciprocity, of the self who merges with the other and then returns to the self, of 
this finding-once-more with this bounce-back the image of the echo and the mirror, serves as a summary, as 
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(ἀντέρως) together with the general themes of self-knowledge and erotics would appear 
suspiciously coincidental if these traditions were not linked.451 
Ovid's version of Narcissus – a figure we saw Apuleius prominently draw upon in 
chapter 2 of this dissertation – also provides an instance in which we encounter the triad of 
mirrors, ἔρως, and self-knowledge. The version in Ovid opens with the Theban prophet 
Tiresias telling Narcissus’ mother the conditions under which he will grow to a ripe old 
age: “provided that he does not come to know himself” (Met. 3.348: si se non noverit). This 
seems like an inversion of the famous Delphic dictum γνῶθι σαυτὸν, which Bartsch argues 
may “represent an Ovidian play on the longstanding injunction to ‘know thyself’ that ran 
parallel to the mirror tradition in antiquity”.452 It is generally agreed upon that the unifying 
philosophical thread of the Phaedrus is an investigation of the Delphic dictum.453 Ovid, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
an inventory of the elements that constitute the system of meaning on which is based the theme of 
Narcissus in all its variations and narrative manifestations…The deep structures on which this has been 
articulated however, were already present in the mind of the philosopher who not infrequently amused 
himself by telling certain ‘myths’ that were no longer myths, but rather intentionally symbolic systems, 
elaborated in the space of very rich and organized thought, just as they had been present in the imaginaire 
that generated these stories in an unspecified and unspecifiable epoch, certainly before the time of Plato 
himself”. 
451 See Egan 2004, 149-50: “The Ovidian collocation of self-knowledge, self-love, repudiation of the love 
of others, auditory or echoic reciprocity, and specular reciprocity matches a constellation in the Phaedrus. 
To those shared elements we must also add the liquidity that links the eyes of the lover with those of his 
beloved in both works…Individually, any of these correspondences might be dismissed as unrelated 
instances of literary commonplaces, but the two matching collectivities of themes and motifs in the 
Narcissus texts and the Phaedrus can not easily be written off as coincidental”. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that in Pausanias’ account of Narcissus, the very same vocabulary of unrealized self-recognition 
appears. At 9.31.7, he says: ἐνταῦθά ἐστι Ναρκίσσου πηγή, καὶ τὸν Νάρκισσον ἰδεῖν ἐς τοῦτο τὸ ὕδωρ 
φασίν, οὐ συνέντα δὲ ὅτι ἑώρα σκιὰν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λαθεῖν τε αὐτὸν ἐρασθέντα αὑτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος 
ἐπὶ τῇ πηγῇ οἱ συµβῆναι τὴν τελευτήν. Note in particular the recurrence of λανθάνω, a word that will be 
significant for our treatment of Ovid’s Narcissus. 
452 See Bartsch 2006, 85. See also Taylor 2008, 59. 
453 See Griswold 1986 for the seminal treatment of the issue. For the discrepancy between self-knowledge 
and other forms of contingent knowledge explored in the Phaedrus, see the illuminating treatment by 
Ferrari (Ferrari 1987, and in particular, pp. 9-12). See Phaedr. 229c7-230a9 for the famous passage where 
Socrates cites the Delphic oracle as the reason why he refuses to rationalize a myth. 
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therefore, playfully adopts the philosophical thread of the mirror in the Phaedrus, but adds 
a kind of ironic twist: Narcissus’ goal is the lack of self-knowledge.  
The verbal resonances seem apposite as well. In 3.463, Narcissus finally recognizes 
himself: iste ego sum! Sensi, nec me mea fallit imago. The phraseology of this line is 
actually borrowed from Vergil’s bucolic imitation/blending of Theocritus’ Idylls 6 and 11, 
in which the Cyclops sees his reflection in the sea and concludes that he is not terribly 
hideous looking.454 At Ecl. 2.25-7, Corydon says: 
    nuper me in litore uidi, 
 cum placidum uentis staret mare. non ego Daphnin 
 iudice te metuam, si numquam fallit imago. 
 
I recently saw myself on the shore, when the sea stood placid from the winds. 
And I would not fear Daphnis, with you as judge, if the image never lies. 
 
 Now, we can see how Ovid borrows the phrase nec me mea fallit imago from Vergil’s 
Corydon. But, whereas Vergil’s phraseology may be merely a playful adaptation of an 
important moment in the proto-bucolic text,455 Ovid’s appropriation of the line in the 
Phaedrus, where the “beloved does not realize he is seeing himself as if in a mirror”, 
functions quite differently. Vergil’s text introduces a playful joke about the deceptiveness 
of reflections and embeds the philosophical position in a conditional (si numquam…); 
Ovid’s version, on the other hand, emphatically states that the imago is not deceptive, or 
rather, does not possess the property of the verb λανθάνω/fallo.456 Egan notes how many 
of the later Narcissus narratives share this particular lexical item, λανθάνω; Narcissus in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 See Theocr. Id. 6.35-8. Interestingly, this mirroring provides a kind of self-knowledge, but not in the 
Platonic or the Ovidian senses. 
455 On the Phaedrus as a proto-bucolic text, see Haß 1998. 
456 TLL (cf. II.B.1.a.add. part.) shows that fallo can be equivalent to λανθάνω as early as Horace and Livy. 
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other versions of the myth “does not realize” that he is seeing himself.457 But λανθάνω is 
translated ironically in Ovid’s version of Narcissus: we encounter a lover/beloved who, 
rather than unwittingly acquiring self-knowledge, does come to know himself – the same 
experience of self-knowledge that Plato’s ἐρώµενος undergoes – but in this case it does 
not escape his notice and that very fact is his downfall! 
This triad of scenes comprises the antecedents, I maintain, that inspire Apuleius’ 
Haarspiegel, which adopts the Platonic model itself and proceeds to complicate it with 
other philosophical and literary alternatives. This becomes particularly clear with Ovid's 
appropriation of Plato's ἔρως/ἀντέρως tradition because immediately after Narcissus is 
fossilized as a statue from encountering his reflection, he admires his twin eyes and the 
divine likeness of his own hair (3.420-1): 
  spectat humi positus geminum, sua lumina, sidus 
  et dignos Baccho, dignos et Apolline crines. 
 
Lying on the ground, he stares at the twin stars, his eyes, 
and the hair worthy of Bacchus and worthy of Apollo. 
 
One of the disconcerting features we will encounter in the Haarspiegel is the way in 
which Apuleius displaces the locus of identity from the eyes to the hair by suggesting that 
hair is the mirror of a person. In these two lines from Ovid, we may see one of the 
sources of Apuleius’ playful twist on the Platonic specular reciprocity. Narcissus, after 
consciously coming to know himself, admires his eyes and his hair as the two primary 
symbols of his striking beauty, suggesting that his hair in particular reminds him of 
divinity. While hair is not the mirror here, or even the means of the self-revelation, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 See Egan 2004, 151. The two citations he offers are Pausanias 9.31.7 and a catoptric simile employed by 
the Byzantine rhetorician Nikephoros Basilikates (Progymnasmata 16.11-14). 
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nevertheless a symbol of some kind of divine encounter. Part of the joke in Ovid, 
however, is that Narcissus’ specular encounter, which he likens to a revelatory experience 
of the gods, is a self-conscious delusion. But Narcissus, at least, is seeing an actual 
reflection of himself. When we meet Lucius, he confuses the hair with the mirror and he 
delights in a more extreme delusion. Apuleius adapts a tradition from Plato, which has 
already been refracted through these mirroring scenes in Latin literature, but comically 
twists it, skipping over the eyes and gazing directly at the hair. 
 
4. Close Reading of the Haarspiegel of Metamorphoses 2.9: 
	  
When we first encounter the Haarspiegel, it occurs in an extended Encomium of 
Hair that should be read in the contemporary tradition of Second Sophistic rhetorical 
practices. Lucius, in his flirtation with Photis, refuses to leave before he “explores” her 
entire aspect (Nec tamen ego prius inde discessi quam diligenter omnem eius explorassem 
habitudinem - Met. 2.8). It is tempting to see already at the outset of the encomium a 
euphemism in the use of the word explorare (discussed in chapter 1), which can be used 
either of seeing or touching458: Apuleius may be playing upon the erotic and penetrative 
power of the gaze in Lucius’ vision of Photis. The only description he shares with his 
readers, however, is that of his sole care (unica cura): hair. Lucius then elaborates on his 
general practice when he encounters a particularly nice head of hair: “to look at it first 
publicly and then later to enjoy it at home” (puplice prius intueri et domi postea perfrui). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 See TLL II.B.2.B.b videndi and TLL II.B.2.B.c tangendi. A usage of particular interest occurs in Aug. 
De civ. Dei 1.18, in which Augustine discusses how one can be contaminated by another’s lust; at one 
point, he explains how a virgin is contaminated or corrupted through the exploring (explorare) of a 
midwife. 
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As suggested above, the verb perfruor possesses a particularly erotic connotation, used 
elsewhere in the novel of sexual delight.459 Indeed, we should keep this word in mind when 
we later see Lucius enjoying the sight of Isis in book 11. 
 After offering this odd justification for his ensuing eulogy, Lucius introduces a 
curious thought experiment: take the most beautiful woman in the world, even Venus 
herself together with all of her attendants and adornments, strip her of her hair, and she 
could not attract anyone, not even Vulcan.460 Lucius then concludes his encomium in 
Metamorphoses 2.9 with the Haarspiegel, a sparkling example of epideictic rhetoric: 
Quid cum capillis color gratus et nitor splendidus inlucet et contra solis aciem 
uegetus fulgurat uel placidus renitet aut in contrariam gratiam uariat aspectum et 
nunc aurum coruscans in lenem mellis deprimitur umbram, nunc coruina nigredine 
caerulus columbarum colli flosculos aemulatur, uel cum guttis Arabicis obunctus 
et pectinis arguti dente tenui discriminatus et pone uersum coactus amatoris oculis 
occurrens ad instar speculi reddit imaginem gratiorem? 
 
What is it like when hair has a pleasing color and its brilliant luster shines and it 
flashes lively against the rays of sun or softly reflects or changes its appearance for 
an opposite charm; now gleaming gold it is compressed into the smooth shadow of 
honey, now dark blue with raven-black it imitates the little flowers on pigeons’ 
necks; or when it is anointed with Arabian myrrh and parted with a sharp comb’s 
fine tooth and gathered at the back, it comes to meet the lover’s eyes and just like a 
mirror returns a more pleasing image (amatoris oculis occurrens ad instar speculi 
reddit imaginem gratiorem)? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 See, e.g., 9.28. cf. Cic. de fin. 1.57, where perfruor is used of enjoying Epicurean voluptates. See also 
Adams 1982, 198, who has a discussion of the sexual valences of the verb fruor. Cf. GCA 2001, 161 ad loc. 
(see n. 448 above). 
460 Met. 2.8: At vero (quod nefas dicere, ne quid sit ullum huius rei tam dirum exemplum) si cuiuslibet 
eximiae pulcherrimaeque feminae caput capillo spoliaveris et faciem nativa specie nudaveris, licet illa 
caelo deiecta, mari edita, fluctibus educata—licet, inquam, Venus! ipsa fuerit, licet omni Gratiarum choro 
stipata et toto Cupidinum populo comitata et balteo suo cincta, cinnama fragrans et balsama rorans, calva 
processerit, I placere non poterit nec Vulcano suo. 
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The fact that this passage participates in the Encomium of Hair tradition popular in the 
Second Sophistic should be clear with only a cursory glance at the stylistic features.461 
Some have read this scene strictly as a display of epideictic rhetoric, parallel to other 
ekphraseis in the novel and in the same vein as the laus speculi in the Apologia.462 More 
recently, others have explicated this display piece with more sensitivity to the generic 
interplay that is woven into it.463  
Ellen Finkelpearl, for example, has usefully read this scene in light of allusions to 
the Vergilian Circe and to the elegiac beloved.464 In her reading, the phrase pectinis arguti 
dente tenui discriminatus – an explicit verbal allusion to a passage in book 7 of the Aeneid 
in which the Trojans encounter Circe singing and weaving465 – is meant to engage with the 
Augustan poets’ ever-present obsession with slight poetry as signaled by the key word of 
Callimachean poetics (tenuis). Finkelpearl further illuminates various interplays with 
elegiac women and the adornment (excessive or lacking) of their hair: Propertius hates the 
cosmetics that Cynthia employs to allure others with cheap tricks and prefers that she stay 
natural466; similarly Ovid tells Corinna to stop adorning her hair because her natural hair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 The passage opens with a flashy combination of parallelism and homoeoteleuton (color gratus et nitor 
splendidus), it is strewn throughout with figura etymologica (nitor-renitet) and variatio, and even at the level 
of syllables, the parallelism often reaches a perfect balance (e.g. vegetus fulgurat vel placidus renitet - 3 
syllable adj., 3 syllable verb, 3 syllable adj., 3 syllable verb). See GCA 2001, 172 for discussion on this 
particular rhetorical display. 
462 See Sandy 1994, 1568-69; cf. Englert and Long 1973. 
463 See Schmeling and Montiglio 2006. 
464 See Finkelpearl 1998, 62-7. 
465 Aen. 7.11-14 ubi Solis filia lucos/ adsiduo resonat cantu tectisque superbis/urit odoratam nocturna in 
lumina cedrum,/ arguto tenuis percurrens pectine telas. Note also that Apuleius has used the somewhat rare 
words pecten and argutus found in this passage of Vergil. Moreover, the connection with Photis and Circe 
has been pointed out by numerous people. See Finkelpearl 1998, 63; cf. Montiglio 2005, 58-61 who reads 
Lucius’ description of Photis’ hair as an expansion on the Homeric epithet, καλλιπλόκαµος, applied to 
Circe. 
466 Prop. 1.2.1-4: Quid iuvat ornato procedere, vita, capillo/ et tenuis Coa veste movere sinus,/ aut quid 
Orontea crinis perfundere murra,/ teque peregrinis vendere muneribus. 
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should bring her praise.467 While these allusions provide stylistic statements in 
Finkelpearl’s analysis,468 paradoxically promising an unadorned stylistic flourish 
(inordinatus ornatus), there is much more to be said for the generic richness of the passage 
as well as the cultural and philosophical import. If my reading of the Platonic allusion is 
correct, what does it mean that Apuleius combines elegiac tropes and allusions to Circe 
with an earlier Platonic ἔρως/ἀντέρως tradition? That is, how does the elegiac, 
lover/dominatrix heterosexual encounter complicate the primary intertext, the idealized, 
homoerotic mirroring between ἐραστής and ἐρώµενος? Moreover, how much was the 
original Platonic model already contaminated by the Ovidian Narcissus? Lucius once again 
functions as a kind of ἐραστής figure and Photis an ἐρώµενος, but the erotic encounter is 
a comically twisted version of an idealized Platonic relationship viewed through the lens 
of Ovid’s ironic appropriation of Plato’s specular reciprocity. Lucius, while fashioning 
himself to be an ideal Platonic viewer, is eventually revealed to be a self-deluded, 
narcissistic slave to Photis through the dense matrix of intertexts. 
Keeping these issues in mind, let us look back at the eulogy in Metamorphoses 2.9 
and analyze the language more closely. As we are led through the encomium, the 
Haarspiegel is anticipated by an elaborate ekphrasis of hair. If we recall the contrast drawn 
in Apologia 14 between mimetic representation and the natural image of the mirror, we can 
see a number of verbal resonances between that passage and our passage in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Amores 1.14 opens: dicebam “medicare tuos desiste capillos.” Ovid concludes the poem (1.14.56) with 
the promise that Corinna will find praise for her natural hair – postmodo nativa conspiciere coma. The 
word nativus is of particular importance in Finkelpearl’s analysis as it only occurs here (Met. 2.8) and in 
one other place in the Apuleian corpus, further strengthening the intertextual connection. 
468 See Finkelpearl 1998, 66: “I believe that Apuleius is here aware of the implications for the Augustan 
poetic program inherent in the passages he uses, and that he understands that Vergil is saying something 
about weaving slight poetry and that Ovid and Propertius are using their women to express, however 
contradictorily, a belief in some sort of plain style. Apuleius, however, is not entirely of their school.” 
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Metamorphoses. First of all, color is one of the qualities that is lacking in artistic 
representation, and therefore, a facet in which mirroring surpasses regular mimesis. An 
important feature of the Haarspiegel formulation lies in the phrase uariat aspectum. Just 
as we saw with the diachronic mirror in chapter 2, hair changes over time and under 
varying intensities of light – a fact that is emphasized by the rather intricate tri-colon of 
temporal phrases (nunc...nunc...cum...), in which hair mimics different natural 
phenomena at different times.469 
When we finally encounter the Haarspiegel analogy, it is introduced with the 
curious phrase amatoris oculis occurrens ad instar speculi reddit imaginem gratiorem. 
This line, I maintain, provides the crux of the entire encomium and, in characteristic 
Apuleian style, weaves together multiple generic traditions and philosophical tropes. While 
we have noticed a deep engagement with elegy as one of the primary genres that Apuleius 
comically incorporates, I suggest that the phrase amatoris oculis occurrens ad instar 
speculi is actually a translation of that very famous moment in the Phaedrus, when the 
“beloved does not realize that he sees himself in the eyes of the lover as if in a mirror” 
(Phaedr. 255d: ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν). In particular, 
we saw above how the phrase ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ was picked up by other Second 
Sophistic writers, such as Achilles Tatius, in passages on the erotics of vision; Plutarch in 
his Amatorius also adapts this phrase when discussing the way in which the οἱ πολλοί 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 One may compare the temporal markers and their relationship to color change with Philostratus’ 
overwrought description of the birth of Athena in Imagines 2.27. See, e.g., 2.27.3: τὴν δὲ ὕλην τῆς 
πανοπλίας οὐκ ἂν συµβάλοι τις, ὅσα γὰρ τῆς ἴριδος χρώµατα παραλλαττούσης ἐς ἄλλοτε ἄλλο φῶς, 
τοσαῦτα καὶ τῶν ὅπλων (“As for the material of her panoply, no one could guess it; for as many as are the 
colors of the rainbow, which changes its light now to one hue and now to another, so many are the colors of 
her armor”, translation Platt 2011, 5). For discussion of epiphany in ekphrasis, see Platt 2011, 1-7. But, 
here, we may liken the temporal phraseology of ἐς ἄλλοτε ἄλλο φῶς to the nunc…nunc…cum of Apuleius’ 
ekphrasis. 
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pursue a false reflection of love.470 Apuleius renders this particular phrase into Latin with 
the gloss ad instar speculi to allude manifestly to the primary intertext of the Phaedrus. 
The next part of the phrase for us to consider is the line amatoris oculis occurrens. 
It has been noted that the word amator has an elegiac resonance that ironically foreshadows 
the initiation to Isis, at which time Lucius will be freed from his more appetitive desires, his 
serviles voluptates.471 I maintain, however, that the phrase blends two lines from the scene 
in the Phaedrus. Recall how the flow of beauty “goes through the eyes” (διὰ τῶν ὀµµάτων 
ἰόν) and ultimately warms the soul of the ἐρώµενος, inspiring in him a counter-ἔρως-image 
of ἔρως (εἴδωλον ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα). I propose that oculis occurrens provides a Latin gloss 
on the phrase διὰ τῶν ὀµµάτων – a phrase we also encountered in the Achilles Tatius 
passage; simultaneously, the phrase incorporates the ἀντ-prefix of ἀντέρως with the ob- 
embedded in occurro, a prefix that Apuleius will playfully employ again in the very last 
sentence of the novel. While oculis occurrens is not an uncommon construction,472 it seems 
uncanny that a woman’s hair possesses the visual (and penetrative) power to enter the eyes 
of the lover – amator (a Latin gloss on ἐραστής)473 – and return an imago (a translation of 
the Greek εἴδωλον). Indeed, this collocation of particularly Phaedran words and motifs 
would likely have recalled in the mind of the educated ancient reader this famous Platonic 
mirroring scene. 
Even down to the precise phraseology, therefore, Lucius fashions himself to be an 
ideal Platonic ἐραστής, imagining that the bright sheen from Photis’ hair penetrates his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470 Plut. Amat. 765f7f.: ἀλλ’ οἱ πολλοὶ µὲν ἐν παισὶ καὶ γυναιξὶν ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ 
φανταζόµενον διώκοντες καὶ ψηλαφῶντες οὐδὲν ἡδονῆς µεµιγµένης λύπῃ δύνανται λαβεῖν βεβαιότερον· 
471 See GCA 2001, 176 ad loc.: “ce mot, qui évoque la poésie élégiaque sous-jacente à cette éloge, surprend 
dans la bouche d'un initié d'Isis, censé avoir renoncé aux plaisirs de la chair”. 
472 See TLL II.A.3.B.1.a. See also Tac. Ann. 16.13; Sen. Nat. Quaest. 14.4. 
473 See TLL GLOSS. 
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eyes like the flow of beauty and warms his soul. But he characteristically misunderstands 
the transcendent effect of the interchange of desire and he comically does not even realize 
that he is supposed to acquire self-knowledge from this encounter. Even Ovid’s Narcissus 
was aware of the elusive nature of the imago. Ovid preserves the lexical item fallo but 
twists it to fulfill Tiresias’ prophecy: Narcissus acquires self-knowledge wittingly. Lucius 
abandons the “unwitting” nature of the revelation – the lexical item λανθάνω – in this 
scene, and suggests rather that the Haarspiegel “returns a more pleasing image” (reddit 
imaginem gratiorem).  
This invites the question: more pleasing than what? In fact, this “more pleasing” 
image sounds strikingly close to the “greater pleasure” (µείζονα…τὴν ἡδονήν) a lover 
experiences from merely looking at the beloved in Achilles Tatius’ model of erotics (see 
pp. 208-9 above). But the lover in Achilles Tatius takes his pleasure from looking into the 
beloved’s eyes and experiencing an erotic exchange of desire διὰ τῶν ὀµµάτων akin to the 
Phaedran model. Lucius, on the other hand, takes his pleasure (perfrui) from the back of 
his beloved’s head. This represents a fantastic twist on the Platonic self-knowledge 
tradition, in as much as Lucius’ encounter with Photis’ hair somehow does manage to 
deceive him and transform him into a fetishist. Presumably, since Lucius is looking into the 
mirror of Photis’ hair, he ought to see himself; but the self that he encounters is a more 
pleasing version of himself. Whereas Plato’s ἐρώµενος has an unwitting revelation about 
the self and Ovid’s Narcissus endures a pure, unmediated self recognition, Lucius, in a 
fully aware state (or so Apuleius has us believe), recognizes that the vision he experiences 
is better than the real thing and he delights in the delusion. This depiction of Lucius as a 
mock-ἐραστής hiding a fetishist’s delusion under philosophical pretense becomes even 
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more condemning when we see Lucius feeding his appetites immediately after his 
transcendent vision. Lucius’ fetish for hair, which betrays a misunderstanding of Plato 
insofar as it displaces the locus of identity from the eyes to the back of Photis’ head, thus 
represents multiple levels of delusion. If we realize that Lucius fancies himself to be an 
ideal Platonic ἐραστής but appears in his tryst with Photis to be a corrupted ἐραστής, or 
even worse, an insatiable sex-addict from one of Martial’s epigrams, we cannot help but 
come back to this picture when we see Psyche behave in precisely the same way at the 
sight of Cupid’s hair. When we come to the end of the novel, moreover, and find Lucius 
looking into the mirror in Isis’ headdress, we are once again given a readerly choice. We 
can interpret Lucius as an Ovidian Narcissus figure, descending further into a willing 
delusion; or we can say that Apuleius has turned the beloved around and faced her in the 
right direction, as it were. Lucius still focuses on the goddess’ hair, as he gives us an even 
richer encomium of it. But, rather than fetishizing the goddess from behind – appearing 
similar to the viewers in pseudo-Lucian’s Amores discussing whether to gaze from the front 
or back – Lucius does stand face-to-face with the goddess. 
 
5: Metamorphoses 5.22-4: The Recognition Scene: 
	  
Although the formal recurrence of the Haarspiegel formula is postponed until we 
encounter Isis in book 11, the epiphany scene in the C&P inset narrative in which Psyche 
first gazes upon Cupid forms an intra-textual bridge between the passages in book 2 and 
book 11 and reminds us that the Platonic ἐραστής/ἐρώµενος model of erotic reciprocity is 
still one of the persistent questions for our interpretation of the text. At the most basic 
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level, this is a recognition scene in which the beholder experiences an encounter with the 
divine embodiment of ἔρως and attempts to experience a kind of Platonic flight of the 
soul. Many scholars have noticed that Psyche seeks a Platonic journey of the soul, for 
instance, when she grabs hold of Cupid’s leg.474 When the god awakes and flits up 
(avolavit) into the sky, Psyche attempts to stay with him and thereby experience Icarian 
flight into the upper region akin to the journey of the soul in the Phaedrus. Psyche, 
however, much like the winged soul of the Phaedrus, which becomes weighed down with 
concerns and cares of this world, grows weary and falls back to the earth (tandem fessa 
delabitur solo).475 This allegorical version of Platonic flight may remind us also of 
Lucius’ physical weariness in his prolonged tryst with Photis, which represents Lucius’ 
own attempt at Platonic flight.  
While this is most certainly a reference to the Phaedrus, the significance of the 
entire µῦθος of the Phaedrus has been under-appreciated in the scholarship. If we can re-
evaluate the recognition scene by understanding it as another misconstrued ἐραστής 
encounter with beauty, then we can begin to realize how C&P as a whole reveals another 
kind of reversal of the Platonic mythic journey of the soul. That is, Psyche begins her 
mortal life by being worshipped as a divinity. However, rather than experiencing the 
ἀνάβασις of the enlightened soul – such as the soul who escapes in the Republic’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 See Walsh 1970, 206-7; Kenney 1990b, 184-5; GCA 2004, 294-7 for a summary of scholarship on this 
scene. Specifically, at 294: “The description of Psyche, unable to follow Cupid who flies away on his 
wings, and falling down to earth, no doubt refers to Plato’s Phaedrus 248c, where Socrates explains the 
fact that those souls who cannot follow in the train of a god and fall to earth”. See Winkle 2011 for the 
Phaedrus in the Met. more broadly. 
475 Cf. Phaedr. 248c: ἥτις ἂν ψυχὴ θεῷ συνοπαδὸς γενοµένη κατίδῃ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, µέχρι τε τῆς ἑτέρας 
περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήµονα, κἂν ἀεὶ τοῦτο δύνηται ποιεῖν, ἀεὶ ἀβλαβῆ εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπισπέσθαι 
µὴ ἴδῃ, καί τινι συντυχίᾳ χρησαµένη λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα βαρυνθῇ, βαρυνθεῖσα δὲ πτερορρυήσῃ 
τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ… 
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Allegory of the Cave – she undergoes a κατάβασις to the underworld, driven on a quest 
by vulgaris Venus. If Psyche herself is an allegory for Lucius, then her inverted Platonic 
journey of the soul will also mirror Lucius’ misguided odyssey. Or to phrase it 
differently, Lucius is given a Platonizing myth about love and the journey of the soul – 
spoken by an anti-Platonic, drunken mock-Diotima figure – which legitimizes his own 
program of Platonic misinterpretation in the earlier books: “Soul”, similarly to Lucius, 
misconstrues her visual encounter with “Love”, and fetishizes his hair and his body parts. 
When Psyche first brings the lamp into her bedroom in the hopes of catching a 
glimpse of her mysterious husband, she feels the same emotions that the ἐραστής first 
experiences upon seeing divine beauty – fear at the sight (tanto aspectu deterrita) and 
madness (impos animi).476 But again, with a lack of restraint similar to the corrupted 
lover of the Phaedrus, Psyche cannot control her lust for Cupid. The first aspect of his 
beauty that she notices is his hair, which the old woman narrator describes with the 
following encomium: 
Videt capitis aurei genialem caesariem ambrosia temulentam, ceruices lacteas 
genasque purpureas pererrantes crinium globos decoriter impeditos, alios 
antependulos, alios retropendulos, quorum splendore nimio fulgurante iam et 
ipsum lumen lucernae uacillabat; per umeros uolatilis dei pinnae roscidae micanti 
flore candicant et quamuis alis quiescentibus extimae plumulae tenellae ac 
delicatae tremule resultantes inquieta lasciuiunt; ceterum corpus glabellum atque 
luculentum et quale peperisse Venerem non paeniteret. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 Cf. Phaedrus 251b for the description of the ἐραστής looking upon true beauty: ὅταν θεοειδὲς πρόσωπον 
ἴδῃ κάλλος εὖ µεµιµηµένον ἤ τινα σώµατος ἰδέαν, πρῶτον µὲν ἔφριξε καί τι τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν 
δειµάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ὡς θεὸν σέβεται, καὶ εἰ µὴ ἐδεδίει τὴν τῆς σφόδρα µανίας δόξαν, θύοι ἂν ὡς 
ἀγάλµατι καὶ θεῷ τοῖς παιδικοῖς. The confluence of fear, shuddering, and worship is palpable in this scene 
from C&P. Also, note the paradox in this phrase impos animi: soul is out of control of the soul. Cf. 
Graverini 2010, who is the only scholar, as far as I can tell, to recognize this intertextual connection with 
the Phaedrus. 
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She sees the pleasant hair of his golden head drenched in ambrosia; (she sees) 
curls of hair wandering over his milky neck and purple cheeks, beautifully 
arranged, some hanging in front, some behind, and with their excessive brightness 
already shining, the lamplight itself also wavered. Along the shoulders of the god 
who flies, white wings gleam dewy in the manner of a glistening flower, and even 
with the wings at rest, the soft and delicate little down-feathers ripple tremulously 
and restlessly play. The rest of the god’s body is smooth and splendid – just the 
sort that Venus would not be ashamed to have given birth to. 
 
I have retained the bold syllables from Braund’s useful close reading of this scene 
because it highlights the rhetorical delight with which Apuleius composed this passage, 
clearly demonstrating that it belongs in the same category as Photis’ Haarspiegel.477 The 
dense texture of the description is amplified by the repetition of particular sounds and 
syllables (such as em, am, [m]ul, asque, ur, gl, lu, ll, can[t]), and as Braund points out, the 
number of liquids in this passage involves an “elaborate use of the tongue when reading 
the text aloud”.478 While Braund argues that the delicate construction of this scene is 
meant to stop time for the reader, I suggest that the highly wrought description is 
composed in such a way as to emphasize that this critical moment in C&P, a recognition 
scene where the “Soul” encounters the beauty of Eros, recalls the Haarspiegel of 2.9. I 
reproduce the passage of 2.9 here in order to compare some of the sonic and syllabic 
similarities (in bold): 
Quid cum capillis color gratus et nitor splendidus inlucet et contra solis aciem 
uegetus fulgurat uel placidus renitet aut in contrariam gratiam uariat aspectum et 
nunc aurum coruscans in lenem mellis deprimitur umbram, nunc coruina 
nigredine caerulus columbarum colli flosculos aemulatur, uel cum guttis Arabicis 
obunctus et pectinis arguti dente tenui discriminatus et pone uersum coactus 
amatoris oculis occurrens ad instar speculi reddit imaginem gratiorem? Quid 
cum frequenti subole spissus cumulat uerticem uel prolixa serie porrectus dorsa 
permanat? Tanta denique est capillamenti dignitas ut quamuis auro ueste gemmis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 See Braund 1999, 182. 
478 Ibid. 
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omnique cetero mundo exornata mulier incedat, tamen, nisi capillum distinxerit, 
ornata non possit audire. 
 
 Moreover, although there is no explicit mirror mentioned in Psyche’s vision of Cupid, if 
we look closely at the description of the hair, we can see features that this ekphrasis 
shares with Photis’ Haarspiegel. The pastiche of colors blended together at one particular 
moment (capitis aurei… lacteas genasque purpureas) parallels the way in which the 
color of hair in 2.9 changes over time (cf. variat aspectum). Second, Cupid’s hair, like 
Photis’, is arranged in various knots, some hanging down in front, some in back (crinium 
globos decoriter impeditos, alios antependulos, alios retropendulos), but nevertheless, 
decoriter.479 Third, the splendor and fulgor of Cupid’s hair is so powerful that it causes 
the lamp (lumen lucernae) to flicker; similarly, in the encomium of hair, the nitor 
splendidus shines against the ray of the sun (contra solis aciem vegetus fulgurat), vying, 
in a sense, with the light source. Lastly, rather than appearing similar to bird-plumage, 
Cupid actually possesses his own plumage, which jumps around wantonly (plumulae 
tenellae ac delicatae tremule resultantes inquieta lasciuiunt) like the sparrows in Venus’ 
cortège.480 
 Now that we have seen how the rich texture of the narrator’s encomium of 
Cupid’s hair closely connects it to Photis’ Haarspiegel, it is important to see what effect 
this mystical sight has on the beholder(s). As we saw above, immediately after Lucius 
concludes the encomium of Photis’ hair, he explains how he cannot control himself, but 
leaning over (pronus in eam) Photis, he plants the sweetest kiss on the hair of her head 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 Cf. 2.9 where Photis’ hair is cervice dependulos ac dein per colla dispositos…paulisper ad finem 
conglobatos. 
480 Cf. 6.6: lasciviunt passeres. 
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(qua fine summum cacumen capillus ascendit, mellitissimum illud savium impressi). 
Psyche has a nearly parallel experience: she cannot restrain herself, but is driven wild 
with curiosity (insatiabili animo…satis et curiosa) and attacks Cupid with “passioned and 
impetuous kisses” (patulis ac petulantibus saviis). Lucius, with the tension growing from 
the long period of flirtation, tells Photis in a clear phallic reference that his bow has been 
taut ever since he “felt cruel Cupid’s arrow plunge into the depths of (his) heart” (2.16: 
ubi primam sagittam saevi Cupidinis in ima praecordia mea delapsam excepi).481 Psyche, 
on the other hand, incidentally pricks herself with one of Cupid’s arrows because she is 
trembling excessively. In another clear euphemism for sexual intercourse,482 Psyche 
fetishizes her husbands “weapons”, which leads to the paradoxical climax of the C&P 
tale: 
Sic ignara Psyche sponte in Amoris incidit amorem. Tunc magis magisque  
cupidine fraglans Cupidinis prona in eum efflictim inhians patulis ac petulantibus 
sauiis festinanter ingestis de somni mensura metuebat. 
  
In this way, Psyche willingly (though unwittingly) fell in love with Love. Then 
more and more on fire with desire for Desire, she leaned over him gazing 
passionately, and quickly covering him with wanton open-mouthed kisses, she 
was afraid that he might wake up.483 
 
These playful lines allude to the Phaedrus in a way that commentators of the 
Metamorphoses have failed to notice. Recall how the ἐρώµενος is described in the 
mirroring scene: ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν. The lexical 
oddity λανθάνω, highlighting the paradox of unconscious self-knowledge, recurs here in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 We should note here the verbal resonances here that imply a penetrative theory of vision. Recall how in 
the Phaedra-esque episode in book ten, the eyes slip down (delapsus) into the deepest heart (ad 
intima…praecordia). 
482 Met. 5.23: ut per summam cutem roraverint parvulae sanguinis rosei guttae. Cf. Braund 1999, 183, who 
suggests that this phrase “can be read proleptically as a metaphor for ejaculated semen”. 
483 Here, I have retained some of the word play from the translation in Kenney 1990a, 77. 
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what Kenney calls a “pointed oxymoron”.484 The phrase ignara…sponte, I propose, 
provides the final clue that we are meant to see here the same mirroring that occurs 
between Lucius and Photis in 2.9, that of the ἐραστής and ἐρώµενος. That is, a lexical 
item, which is present in the Phaedrus and all of the depictions of Narcissus but curiously 
absent from the Lucius-Photis Haarspiegel, is added to this strange scene of illumination 
through a vision of beauty.  
Moreover, although there is no proper mention of the speculum in this moment of 
epiphany, there is verbal mirroring nonetheless. Psyche’s reaction mirrors the appearance 
and designation of the god; this is the first time that Cupid is explicitly named in the C&P 
narrative but, as Kenney points out, “the revelation has been brought about through 
disobedience”.485 As soon as she names the god, Psyche becomes more like him and 
mimics his behavior. Apuleius’ choice of language here signifies the mirroring with his 
use of repetition and polyptoton: the fact that Psyche falls into love with love means that 
her internal, emotional state matches the god’s, whom she recognizes through his external 
appearance.486 The phrase cupidine fraglans Cupidinis is of particular importance for two 
reasons. First, the word order stresses that these two different uses of the noun cupido are 
mediated through the participle franglans, thereby providing a true textual mirror. 
Second, this verb that all commentators translate as “burning”, fraglo, was used earlier by 
Lucius in the thought-experiment of his encomium in Met. 2.8: the hypothetical bald-
headed Venus is cinnama fragrans (see p. 216 n. 460 above for the full quotation). This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 See Kenney 1990a, 171 ad. loc. 
485 Ibid. 
486 Cf. Photis’ internal state of lust just after Lucius’ Encomium of Hair (2.10): aemula libidine in amoris 
parilitatem congermanescenti mecum. Photis, like the emulous mirror, becomes equal to Lucius in love. 
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word is, furthermore, the fulfillment of Venus’ injunction to Cupid: she bid him to “let 
Psyche be possessed by the most burning passion for the worst man” (4.31: virgo ista 
amore fraglantissimo teneatur hominis extremi).  
In a classic Apuleian fashion, Psyche’s mirroring causes her to be possessed by 
the most intense love, but her possession or madness resembles that of the corrupted 
ἐραστής. This is the reason why she does not want Cupid to wake up and restrain her 
from the object of her desire. Rather, Psyche, like Lucius, has the incorrect reaction; she 
also hangs over the beloved (prona in eum) and showers him with greedy kisses (inhians 
patulis ac petulantibus sauiis). As we saw in chapter 2, pronus is a dangerous position to 
occupy when leaning over a mirror (or a beloved). Psyche’s failure to be an enlightened 
ἐραστής is emphasized by the verbal echoes from the phrase inhians patulis ac 
petulantibus sauiis: in 2.10, Photis lunges at Lucius with open-mouthed kisses that smell 
of cinnamon (patentis oris inhalatu cinnameo) and in 2.16, the adjectival participle 
petulans is used of Lucius, who is drunk and overly amorous just before his tryst with 
Photis.  
Apuleius, through both lexical and conceptual correspondences, reveals Psyche to 
be a paradigmatic model for Lucius’ misinterpretation of Plato: rather than pursue her 
beloved in a manner that would lead to the Icarian flight of the soul, Psyche fetishizes 
parts of his body – first his hair and then his “weapons”. Thus, Psyche’s assimilation to 
Lucius highlights the parallel attempts and failures at Platonic ascent. In endeavoring to 
become an ideal Platonic ἐραστής, gazing upon the beauty of the beloved and witnessing 
the Forms, Psyche ultimately reverts to the model of the wrong type of lover, one who 
lunges at her beloved with excessive desire. She, like the ἐρώµενος, experiences a kind of 
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unwitting revelation; her reaction, however, is not that of the Platonic ideal, but rather, 
that of the soul whose black horse rules over its actions.487 That is, she models yet 
another life-choice for Lucius, which turns out to be a warning about how one should (or 
should not) interact with a beloved; through fetishism and excessive curiosity, her vision 
of Cupid represents another misconstrued Platonic ideal. 
6. Isis’ Haarspiegel and Serio-Erotic Epiphany: 
	  
 Book 11 in many ways brings together all of the significant tropes that I have 
been tracing through this chapter. In Lucius’ vision of Isis, the Haarspiegel recurs in a 
similar formula – namely, in an encomium of hair parallel to the eulogy of Photis’ hair in 
book two. Lucius, as the beholder of Isis’ Haarspiegel, thus becomes a kind of 
subordinate figure to the goddess –	  a fact reinforced by the language of slavery and 
religious submission that pervades the whole final book. We shall see as we trace through 
some of the significant hair and mirroring scenes of book 11 that Lucius approaches his 
encounter with Isis in a similar manner to his vision of Photis, attempting to play the 
ideal Platonic ἐραστής visualizing divine beauty; but, in this case, we stand on a bit 
shakier hermeneutic ground, and it will be necessary to come to grips once again with 
Winkler’s “open-reading” of book 11.488  In what follows, we will see that, in this second 
encounter with a Haarspiegel, Lucius still does not look into the face of the goddess, but 
rather, gazes upon her hair, in which there is placed a mirror-like disc. In his description 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Cf. Winkle 2011, who argues that Lucius is, in fact, the black horse of the Phaedran tri-partite soul with 
his famous white horse, Candidus, who leaves in book 3 and reappears in book 11, as the partner under the 
yoke. 
488 Winkler’s “open” interpretation, in fact, begins with the problem of book 11 and the hermeneutic 
conundrum it presents to both the reader of books 1-10 (Winkler 1985) 
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of her visage, he skips from her hair to her clothes, refusing to look into the goddess’ 
eyes, the Platonic windows to the soul. Moreover, the language which characterizes 
Lucius’ relationship with Isis remains erotically charged throughout book 11: Lucius uses 
many of the same words that he said of his tryst with Photis (e.g. perfruor, voluptas, etc.) 
to depict his encounter with the goddess – a fact that has struck some readers as 
representative of a synonymy rather than an antithesis between these two figures.489 
 On the other hand, unlike in the initial Haarspiegel scene, where the object of 
Lucius’ gaze is turned around and Lucius’ epiphany represents a fetishized version of the 
ἐραστής/ἐρώµενος model of the Phaedrus, in book 11, Lucius stands face-to-face with 
the goddess. He does not try to catch a glimpse from behind or obsess over other parts of 
the goddess’ body; the object of desire is not turned around. One might see this as yet 
another instance where Lucius fetishistically gazes upon hair and other shiny and colorful 
objects in an act of “visual consumption” –	  to borrow a metaphor from Helen Morales.490 
In other words, we could see this as the same old Lucius exhibiting the same consumptive 
voyeurism and labeling it epiphany. But Lucius does face the goddess, standing vis-à-vis, 
unlike in his tryst with Photis,491 and Isis is clothed unlike the Knidian Aphrodite stance 
that Photis adopts or the “Bathing Diana” we encountered in chapter 2. One could argue 
further that it is actually inappropriate to look a goddess in the face,492 though, as the 
Groningen Commentary on book 11 points out, “one traditional element of descriptions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 See Harrison 2000; Murgatroyd 2004; van mal-Maeder 1997; Libby 2011, 303-4. 
490 See Morales 2004, 32-34 and 165-72 on the “consumptive gaze.” 
491 I must thank Adam Rabinowitz for pointing this aspect out to me when I delivered a version of this 
argument at a conference at UC Irvine, and Luca Graverini for seconding this sentiment when I discussed 
Luicius’ epiphany in book 11 with him. 
492 See, e.g., Platt 2011 on epiphanic encounters in the Second Sophistic. 
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of gods is conspicuous by its absence [here], viz. the bright and shining eyes of the 
divinity”.493  
 For the proponent of the satirical reading, we can say that Lucius plays the 
subordinate role in this scene too –	  especially considering the erotic language; and in that 
respect, he is transformed into a kind of ἐρώµενος figure in yet another faux-Platonic 
encounter. Perhaps this subordination to a divinity would bother most readers. In that 
vein, many interpreters have also found Lucius shaving his head and joyfully displaying 
his shiny bald pate at the end of the novel to be a ridiculous portrayal of a religious 
initiate.494 Indeed, considering Lucius’ and Apuleius’ obsession with hair –	  even 
disheveled hair as a symbol of a philosophical life choice –	  the shaving of one’s head 
may amount to a loss of self. It must be said, however, that the erotic language of 
religious veneration and the apparent spectacle would not trouble the religious zealot of 
Apuleius’ day or ours495; in fact, one would imagine that it not would bother those inside 
of a cult system of initiation to appear absurd to viewers outside of it, though it may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 See GCA 2015, 124, where they cite comparanda of Hom. Il. 2.297; Hymn to Aphr. 5.181; Heliod. 
3.13.2-3. 
494 Winkler 1985 compares this depiction to a scene of Aesop (vita Aesopi G87-88). O’Brien and James 
2006 put a strangely positive spin on the baldness as a reclamation of dignitas lost in the Festival of 
Laughter. Others, and most convincingly, Dowden 2006 see behind Lucius’ baldness the famous figure of 
the Socratic intellectual in the Flavian period, outlined in Zanker 1995. Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012 has recently 
given a useful assessment of the semiotics of baldness by comparison to a number of Flavian period statues 
and busts that depict anonymous bald men. She also considers the depiction of Socrates at the end of the 
Symposium (in Alcibiades’ speech) as another important image for the bald initiate here. 
495 For comparanda, one may point to the numerous erotically charged biblical metaphors for the 
relationship between the Judeo-Christian God and his people or his church (e.g. God refers to his people as 
a bride and himself as their husband (Isaiah 54:5-8; Isaiah 62:4-5; Hosea 2:14-20); God uses the language 
of sexual infidelity when his people worship other gods (Hosea 1:2); the entire book of Song of Solomon is 
an erotic metaphor for the relationship between God and his people (see, in particular, 1:2-4); Christ 
cryptically refers to himself as a bridegroom and his disciples as the guests of the bridegroom (Mark 2:19); 
throughout the New Testament, Christ is the bridegroom and the church is his bride (Ephesians 5:22-33; 2 
Corinthians 11:2-4; Revelation 19:7; Revelation 21:2, 9-10). One could find even in the language of 
Catholic veneration of Mary certain pseudo-erotic terms appropriated to a different end. 
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offend some readers’ sensibilities.496 Thus, even if the parody of Lucius is a wink 
between intellectuals and creates an in-group and an out-group, as one finds, e.g., in Old 
Comedy, it is one that only works for a group of people who are already on the periphery, 
as it were, or uninitiated in the group. To phrase it differently, while the portrayal of 
Lucius as a consumptive viewer still fetishizing the goddess’ hair provides a comical and 
even satirical image, it would perhaps not matter to the religiously fervent –	  a fact which 
leads us back to the conundrum Winkler presented to us in Auctor et Actor and which I 
suggest the “choice narrative” model solves. In contrast to Winklerian ἀπορία, I will 
suggest at the end of the chapter that Lucius’ baldness also has a different philosophical 
resonance, which may explicitly encourage the retrospective reading Winkler advocated. 
 Let us begin our analysis with Lucius’ epiphanic vision of Isis near the beginning 
of book 11. At the opening of the book, the ass-Lucius wakes up on a beach, purifies 
himself, and offers a prayer of petition to the goddess who rules the world and whose 
name he does not know. After begging for mercy from the multiply named goddess — 
one of which is caelestis Venus497 –	  Lucius encounters Isis in an epiphany. At 11.3, he 
describes his vision: 
Iam primum crines uberrimi prolixique et sensim intorti per diuina colla passiue 
dispersi molliter defluebant. Corona multiformis uariis floribus sublimem 
destrinxerat uerticem, cuius media quidem super frontem plana rotunditas in 
modum speculi uel immo argumentum lunae candidum lumen emicabat, dextra 
laeuaque sulcis insurgentium uiperarum cohibita, spicis etiam Cerialibus desuper 
porrectis ornata. Tunica multicolor, bysso tenui pertexta, nunc albo candore 
lucida, nunc croceo flore lutea, nunc roseo rubore flammida; et quae longe 
longeque etiam meum confutabat optutum, palla nigerrima splendescens atro 
nitore… 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 Cf. the famous passage from St. Paul’s epistle to the Corinthians: Ὁ λόγος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ τοῖς µὲν 
ἀπολλυµένοις µωρία ἐστίν, τοῖς δὲ σῳζοµένοις ἡµῖν δύναµις θεοῦ ἐστιν (I Corinth. 1:18). 
497 Cf. Kenney 1990b on this motif in C&P. 
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First of all her hair, extremely full, long, and gently curled, flowed down softly, 
freely strewn over her divine neck. A manifold crown, (woven) with variegated 
flowers, lightly rested on the top of her head. At its midpoint, above her forehead, 
a flat circular disc like a mirror – or rather a representation of the moon – was 
conspicuous with a white light. The disc was embraced on the left and right by 
coils of snakes rising up, with ears of wheat spreading out on top. Her robe, 
woven of thin flax linen, was multi-colored, now brilliant with white brightness, 
at another time yellow with golden flower, and now fiery with rosy redness; and 
the thing which far and away confounded my sight was a deep black cloak 
gleaming with dark brightness… 
 
The formal correspondences between this passage and Met. 2.9 are so numerous that it 
will be useful to print the description of Photis’ hair here (the conclusion of the 
encomium at Met. 2.9): 
Sed in mea Photide non operosus sed inornatus ornatus addebat gratiam. Uberes 
enim crines leniter remissos et ceruice dependulos ac dein per colla dispositos 
sensimque sinuatos patagio residentes paulisper ad finem conglobatos in summum 
uerticem nodus adstrinxerat. 
 
The parallel word choices and the playful appropriation of similar (but not exact) echoes 
demonstrate that these two passages are meant to be read in tandem. While Photis’ hair 
represents the culmination of Lucius’ desire in book 2, giving him wings (or so he 
thinks), Isis’ hair in this passage of book 11 provides a heightened version of the same 
experience. Isis’ hair is even fuller (uberrimi) than Photis’ (uberes). Moreover, just as 
Photis’ hair strangely models a two-fold style – hair half-up and half-down, dispersed 
over her neck (per colla dispositos) – Isis’ hair is curled or twisted (intorti) over her 
divine neck (per divina colla) and flows down, dispersed everywhere (passive 
dispersi).498 However, while Lucius only describes Photis’ hair, his unica cura, which has 
its closure at the top of her head in a knot (nodus astrinxerat), the narration of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 Libby 2011 reads the more pleasing sight of Isis’ hair — i.e., uberrimi rather than uberes — as a further 
descent into delusion, and therefore, as satirical. 
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epiphanic encounter with Isis encompasses her entire marvelous aspect (miranda 
species). Lucius begins at the top of Isis’ head, which is crowned (corona… 
destrinxerat).499 The entire visual experience is likewise parallel with the full encomium 
of hair in book 2. Rather than the hair that mimics (aemulatur) the flowery appearance 
(flosculos) of bird-plumage, Isis’ hair is actually adorned with a crown covered with 
various flowers (uariis floribus). The emphasis on the multicolor nature of this sight is 
also resonant of the variegated Haarspiegel of 2.9, which variat aspectum. In particular, 
we should note the recurrence of the tri-colon of temporal phrases (nunc…nunc…nunc)500 
to describe how the color changes over time: nunc albo candore lucida, nunc croceo flore 
lutea, nunc roseo rubore flammida et…palla nigerrima splendescens atro nitore.501 
Lastly, the recurrence of the mirror analogy – in this scene, with the phrase in modum 
speculi502 – provides our final correspondence. Here, however, it is not the hair that 
provides the mirror, but the whole visual experience of looking at Isis’ head, which 
culminates in a moon-disc (rotunditas) that resembles a mirror.503  
 The fact that these two passages ought to be read as parallel set-pieces should be 
clear at this point; that they both are intended to provide via ekphrasis a visual experience 
of some kind of epiphany –	  whether erotic or spiritual, parodic or serious –	  is also easy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 Note the playful recurrence of the root word –stringo, used in the case of Photis to conclude the eulogy, 
but employed here to expound upon the epiphanic experience. 
500 Cf. Met. 2.9, where the color is described in the following terms: nunc aurum coruscans in lenem mellis 
deprimitur umbram, nunc coruina nigredine caerulus columbarum colli flosculos aemulatur, uel cum 
guttis Arabicis obunctus et pectinis arguti dente tenui discriminatus et pone uersum coactus amatoris 
oculis occurrens ad instar speculi reddit imaginem gratiorem? 
501 Recall how the words nitor and etymological variants on splendidus were strewn throughout the 
Haarspiegel of 2.9. 
502 Cf. the phrase from 2.9, which is a variation on the analogy: ad instar speculi. 
503 Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 124 ad. loc. traces the origin of the rotunditas in iconographic representations of 
Isis with a sun-disk as part of her head-dress. The lunar attribute applied to this depiction of the goddess 
was borrowed from the interpretatio Graeca, found in Plutarch’s DIO 43. However, he makes no attempt 
to explain the strange analogy between this moon-disc-head-dress and the mirror. 
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enough to accept. The significance of this recurrence, however, offers readers of the 
Metamorphoses an entirely different problem. Other commentators have noticed the 
repetition of this strange formula in modum speculi, but most merely adduce this as 
evidence for the thematic parallel between Photis and Isis.504 For instance, according to 
Krabbe, the parallel hair-mirrors along with the two actual mirrors (4.31, 11.8-9) signify 
the underlying metonymy of Photis-Venus-Isis. Isis embodies a better version of Lucius’ 
earlier domineering masters, Photis and Venus, and the Haarspiegel of 11.3 is a symbol 
that retroactively gives meaning to the earlier one of 2.9.505 Libby, on the other hand, 
argues for a continuity between the characters, interpreting Lucius’ greater pleasure from 
the scene as an intensified version of his earlier delusion.506 While these readings are 
certainly a useful step forward, the fact that they reach antithetical conclusions 
demonstrates how we are still stuck in the divide between “serious” and “satiric” 
hermeneutics. If we take into account what I have argued up to this point in the chapter – 
namely, that the Haarspiegel of Metamorphoses 2.9 is primarily a refracted allusion to 
the mirroring scene between ἐραστής and ἐρώµενος in the Phaedrus – then the 
significance of the parodic representation of Lucius-as-ἐραστής in 2.9 can be imported 
into this scene as well. I shall suggest in the rest of this analysis that, just as in the 
mirroring scene between Lucius and Photis, where the allusion to the Platonic text 
ultimately serves to destabilize the proper roles of ἐραστής and ἐρώµενος by 
complicating the Platonic model, the mirror of Isis upon which Lucius gazes may have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 See GCA 2015, 132 ad. loc., who merely note that mirrors occur in other ekphrastic scenes in Apuleius 
(e.g. 2.9, 4.31). But they do recognize the underlying Photis-Venus-Isis correspondence evoked by this 
encomium of hair (see p. 124). 
505 See Krabbe 2003, 580-7. 
506 Libby 2011. 
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more bewitching catoptric effect, transforming him from a servile ass into a slavish 
devotee. Moreover, the intermediary scene of epiphany, after which Psyche is enslaved to 
the vindictive vulgaris Venus, compelled to undergo an actual κατάβασις, and only 
ironically granted an undeserved apotheosis, further reinforces Lucius’ absurd delusion 
by offering an exemplum to him (and to the reader) to which he can be compared. The 
question that Lucius’ epiphanic encounter with Isis should thus inspire in the reader, 
particularly because of its recurring Haarspiegel, is whether the Platonic dichotomy of 
vulgaris Venus and caelestis Venus holds true here. Again, just as in the initial 
Haarspiegel, where Lucius’ poor exegesis of Plato opens up alternative models of 
interpretation, here too, there is another goddess of myth that may loom over this text — 
one who cannot be seen except indirectly through mirror-gazing.  
In the passage currently under discussion, the labyrinthine and entrapping power 
of Isis is explicitly developed in the conflation of Egyptian iconography with the mirror 
trope; Isis has snakes –	  what Gwyn Griffiths identifies as the uraei of traditional Egyptian 
royal head-dress507 –	  attached to her head: rotunditas…dextra laeuaque sulcis 
insurgentium uiperarum cohibita. I contend, however, that the reference to the mirror in 
such close proximity to snakes in the hair of a goddess must at least conjure up the image 
of Medusa. If this is a fair characterization of the suggestive image, then we can begin to 
ask what the real effect is of Lucius’ epiphany. Is it a kind of death of self through 
subordination to a master figure or is it a true conversion experience? If Lucius becomes 
a corrupted ἐραστής transformed into a quadruped from his first encounter with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 See Gwyn Griffiths 1975, 125 ad. loc.: “The serpents mentioned by Apuleius are the uraei which often 
appear in a double form on the head-dress of queens and sometimes in the form of a chaplet of uraei;  
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Haarspiegel, this vision of the goddess could represent merely another iteration of an 
enslaving mirroring or a redeemed version of his original fetishism. I suggest that 
Apuleius is bringing this choice to the forefront of the reader’s mind by opening the 
conversion book of the Metamorphoses with a vision of Isis that is especially reminiscent 
of Photis’ Haarspiegel. We saw in chapter 2 of this dissertation how Lucius was fixed as 
a statue before the goddess during his initiation, dressed up as a variegated spectacle for 
all to behold. In my analysis, I proposed that Lucius recalls the Actaeon of Met. 2.4, in so 
far as he is a simulacrum of a man in a statuary ensemble in the process of transforming 
and “imaging” a goddess. Let us look at the scene that immediately follows –	  what 
scholars have considered the “first ending” of the novel508 –	  in order to see Lucius’ 
continued erotic subordination to the goddess. After the third day of festivities for 
Lucius’ initiation, Lucius remains perched before the simulacrum of the goddess for a 
few days. He describes the delight with which he cherishes the goddess as follows: 
Paucis dehinc ibidem commoratus diebus inexplicabili uoluptate simulacri diuini 
perfruebar, inremunerabili quippe beneficio pigneratus. 
 
Afterwards, having remained on that very spot for a few days, I took pleasure in 
the ineffable delight of the holy image, pledged to her, of course, because of her 
boundless favor. 
 
This passage provides us with ample evidence as to the correspondence between Photis 
and Isis, as it is a near quotation of a line we have already heard Lucius say to Photis. I 
print here the passage from Met. 3.22, where Lucius begs Photis to acquire the magical 
ointment so that he can become winged: 
magno et singulari me adfectionis tuae fructu perfrui et impertire nobis unctulum 
indidem per istas tuas pupillas, mea mellitula, tuumque mancipium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508 See Finkelpearl 2004 for a discussion of the anti-closural elements in the Metamorphoses. 
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inremunerabili beneficio sic tibi perpetuo pignera ac iam perfice ut meae 
Veneri Cupido pinnatus adsistam tibi. 
 
In an attempt to receive the benefits of the Phaedran erotic catoptrics –	  namely, Icarian 
flight –	  Lucius bids Photis to enslave him (mancipium) to herself, using the formula 
inremunerabili beneficio sic tibi perpetuo pignera. In 11.24, as he stands before Isis, a 
simulacrum gazing upon a simulacrum of the goddess, he deploys the very same formula 
using a perfect passive participle to accentuate the completed aspect of the transformation 
(pigneratus).  
 Lucius is already bound to Isis for her inremunerabilis beneficium, and once 
again, he has not gained wings, but has rather become immobilized in a kind of inhuman 
form. The verb perfruor connects this passage further with the Encomium of Hair, as it is 
the word Lucius uses to describe (rather disconcertingly) his general practice when he 
encounters a beautiful head of hair: et publice intueri et domi postea perfrui (2.8). In this 
context and in the previously cited passage from 3.22, the word clearly has sexual 
undertones.509 When we encounter this strange use of the verb – to enjoy the 
inexplicabilis voluptas of the goddess’ visage – it is difficult not to imagine that Lucius’ 
encounter with Isis is a sexually charged experience akin to his earlier rendezvous with 
Photis. We may recall from the discussion of Seneca’s de Clementia in chapter 1 the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 It should be noted that it occurs 9 times in the Metamorphoses, and 6 of them (not counting 11.24) 
explicitly or implicitly denote sexual intercourse. See 2.8; 3.22; 3.23; 6.23; 9.16; 9.28. A particularly 
interesting usage occurs in the inset adultery tale of the miller’s wife in 9.28. When the miller discovers the 
beautiful young boy, who has been secretly sleeping with his wife, the miller “laying alone with the boy, 
enjoys the most gratifying revenge for his ruined marriage” (solus ipse cum puero cubans gratissima 
corruptarum nuptiarum vindicata perfruebatur). This outrageous periphrasis for the rape of the young 
adulterer by the old man highlights a usage of this verb that could easily be classed in the realm of an 
ἐραστής/ἐρώµενος encounter. 
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strangeness of voluptas as an end point of mirroring.510 But here, again, the question 
remains whether it is a Platonic pleasure –	  the kind of metaphysical erection the soul 
experiences at visualizing beauty –	  or whether this pleasurable looking is another 
moment of delusion. In this instance, moreover, Lucius does not seem to fetishize any 
particular part of the goddess or try to catch a glimpse of her from behind, but rather, he 
worships her “like an ἄγαλµα”. We witness Lucius once again fancying himself to be a 
Platonic ἐραστής figure, even employing the same vocabulary. Now that we have seen 
how closely aligned Lucius’ experiences of Photis and Isis are, however, there is one 
final scene for us to consider: Lucius’ final state of baldness –	  his decision to sport a 
shiny dome unabashedly –	  in the concluding line of the novel. We began this chapter 
with Apuleius’ own disheveled hair as a symbol of his philosophical life choice; and 
there, we saw him attempt to compensate for his external appearance –	  which, much like 
Socrates, was not very pretty –	  by revealing his inner statue of a god (sigillum dei) a 
statue that would remind a “diligent reader” of the erotic epiphany in the Phaedrus. At 
the end of the Metamorphoses, too, Lucius has been stripped of his ugly external corium, 
which scholars have demonstrated appears quite similar to ancient depictions of 
Socrates.511 And as I demonstrated in the last chapter, an alternative to the cynical 
Actaeonic interpretation of Lucius’ statuization is that his external ass-figure has been 
replaced by a simulacrum dei. The question left for the scrupulosus lector is not only how 
closely Lucius’ encounters with the mirror have brought him to traipsing upon the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510 See again Bartsch’s discussion of voluptas (Bartsch 2006, 184-5). 
511 See Graverini 2012 and Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012 for the two most illuminating readings. 
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ὑπερουράνιος τόπος, but also whether or not the reader wants to follow him down that 
path. 
7. Lucius’ Final Baldness: Closure? 
	  
The final line of the Metamorphoses has inspired a plethora of satirical readings 
of the novel ever since Winkler elaborated on the potential significance and the 
hermeneutic multivalence of the concluding image of a baldheaded Lucius. In what 
Winkler calls an “epi-epilogue”, Lucius narrates his final activities as a thrice-initiated 
devotee of Isis and Osiris: 
Rursus denique quaqua raso capillo collegii uetustissimi et sub illis Syllae 
temporibus conditi munia, non obumbrato uel obtecto caluitio, sed quoquouersus 
obuio, gaudens obibam.   
 
Finally, with my head once again shaven completely and with my baldness 
neither covered up nor hidden, but exposed wherever I went, I joyfully carried out 
the duties of that ancient priesthood, which was established in the time of Sulla. 
 
Winkler, after illuminating what he thinks are all of the possible interpretations of such a 
sign,512 concludes: “a shaven head by itself, without further comment, instantly brings 
two things to mind for a Greek or Roman of the second century C.E.: an Isiac priest or a 
popular buffoon.”513 This binary approach proved useful for Winkler’s interpretation of 
the Met. as a kind of detective story that has no authorized interpretation but reveals 
whatever the reader would like to see. Those who prefer to see the Metamorphoses as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512 For Winkler (see Winkler 1985, 225-7), the four possible interpretations are: (1) Isiac devotees shaved 
their heads to signify conversion (see Juv. 6.533; Plut. DIO 352C), (2) people who escaped from a 
shipwreck or slavery thanked a god by deracination (see Lucian Sal. Post. 1-2; Hermotimos 86), (3) 
Baldness is just plain funny (see Eumolpos in Petronius’ Sat. 109.8-10), and (4) mime-comedians (calvus 
mimicus, µῖµος φαλακρός) shaved their heads presumably because of (3) (see Lucian Symp. 18; Alciphron 
3.7).  
513 Winkler 1985, 226. 
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strictly satire have latched onto the binary but emphasized, as Winkler himself did, the 
comic and ridiculous look of the unashamed, bald narrator.514 Recently, however, a few 
commentators have looked more closely at the particular kind of baldness and questioned 
the underlying connection between Lucius and the calvus mimicus by clarifying the 
distinctions between natural baldness and a shaven head and by comparing the Isaic 
baldness with archeological evidence of ritual baldness.515 A particular strand of 
interpretation we should note is the connection between baldness and wisdom, especially 
in depictions of Socrates amongst second century intellectuals. Graverini notes that 
Odysseus is bald at certain important moments in the Odyssey,516 and Socrates was “the 
paradigm of baldness itself”517 according to Varro, who used the intellectual almost 
proverbially: tam glaber quam Socrates (Men. 490). Similarly, Dowden, O’Brien, and 
James have preferred to see Lucius’ bald pate at the end of the Metamorphoses as a kind 
of Middle Platonist allusion to Socrates, the quintessential bald intellectual.518 
 In this conclusion, I would like to offer two new interpretations of the final line, 
suggesting another possible erotic valence that has yet to be noticed in the scholarship 
and expanding on the Socratic picture. Both of these ultimately relate to the 
ἐραστής/ἐρώµενος interaction that I have suggested lies at the core of many of the erotic 
hair-mirroring scenes throughout the novel. Let us begin with the phallic associations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 See Harrison 2000, 238-52; Van Mal-Maeder 1997, 106-8.  
515 See Graverini 2012, 82-89, whose fuller treatment of the symbolic valences of baldness in the literary 
evidence concludes that Winkler’s binary classification between religious and comic is “somewhat 
artificial” (see 86). Cf. Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012 for a very useful review of the semantic spectrum of baldness 
in both literary and iconographic evidence. 
516 Graverini 2012, 86 cites an interesting, later interpretation of Odysseus’ baldness, offered by Synesius in 
his Encomium of Baldness. There, he explains how Odysseus succeeded because his entirely bald head 
(ἅπαντα φαλακρός) was so bright that it lit up the whole room. 
517 Ibid. 
518 See Dowden 2006, 56; James and O’Brien 2006, 248. 
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baldness. In his recent discussion of Encolpius in the Satyricon, Jensson explicates a 
“recognition” scene, in which the captain identifies the baldheaded and disguised 
Encolpius not by his face, but by his genitals (Sat. 105.9).519 Jensson suggests from this 
strange scene that Encolpius’ genitals are treated as a metonymy for the man and that 
baldness was one of the primary features that signified one’s phallic nature.520 Baldness, 
among other signs, is one of the archetypal features of the phallic clown in Greek culture 
and for that reason, is closely associated with sexual activity. Aristotle attributes the loss 
of hair and eyebrows to engagement in sexual activity521 and Alcibiades, when describing 
Socrates’ similarity to a baldheaded Silenus in the Symposium –	  a depiction that became a 
cliché in Apuleius’ time522 –	  is drawing upon the same image of the phallic clown.523 
Jensson thus concludes: “when the shaven and eyebrowless protagonist Encolpius is 
recognized by his prick by Lichas, he resembles a cinaedus”.524 If we understand the 
baldheaded Lucius declaiming around Rome in light of the ἐραστής/ἐρώµενος dichotomy 
that pervades the Metamorphoses, perhaps Lucius’ baldness is meant to represent his 
continued sexual activity. Of course, I am not suggesting literal sexual activity. Rather, 
one way to read his baldness is to say that Lucius becomes a metonymy for his phallus in 
the end, as reflected by his bald pate, and that in relation to the goddess he plays the role 
of subordinate partner. His baldness displays that he has been transformed from a deluded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 See Petr. Sat. 105.9: nec manus nec faciem meam consideravit, sed continuo ad inguina mea luminibus 
deflexis movit officiosam manum et 'salve' inquit 'Encolpi'. Cf. also Eumolpus comment about Ascyltos in 
92.9: habebat enim inguinum pondus tam grande, ut ipsum hominem laciniam fascini crederes. 
520 See Jensson 2004, 239-42. 
521 See Historia Animalium 518a-b. 
522 See Zanker 1995. Cf. Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012 for the image of baldness as an allusion to the Silenus-
Socrates of the Symposium. 
523 See Jensson 2004, 240. 
524 Ibid. 241. 
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ἐραστής figure in his tryst with Photis into a cinaedus-figure, the Roman appropriation of 
the Greek ἐρώµενος.525 But even in this reading, the embedded choice is present for the 
diligent or scrupulosus reader, since we, in turn, become fetishists like Lucius, if we 
merely reduce him to one of his parts and only take pleasure in this parody. 
 The second valence of Lucius’ baldness expands on the claim that Lucius 
represents a Socrates figure, ugly on the outside with beautiful statues underneath. But 
rather than a philosophically enlightened Socrates of the Platonic sort, I suggest that 
Lucius’ final baldness can be read as another allusion to Socrates at a particular moment 
in the Phaedrus. All treatments of this final sentence of the Metamorphoses focus solely 
on the fact that Lucius is bald. No one attempts to account for the oddity of the 
surrounding phrase: non obumbrato uel obtecto caluitio. Why does Lucius highlight that 
his baldness is uncovered and why does he use this pleonasm to describe his lack of 
shame in traveling around Rome? I propose that this phrase is a gloss on a moment in the 
Phaedrus where Socrates changes his attire in order to deliver his Palinode to ἔρως. That 
is, before producing the sublime myth of the Phaedrus and announcing a redeemed 
approach to ἔρως, Socrates says (Phaedr. 243b): 
πρὶν γάρ τι παθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἔρωτος κακηγορίαν πειράσοµαι αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι 
τὴν παλινῳδίαν, γυµνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τότε ὑπ' αἰσχύνης 
ἐγκεκαλυµµένος. 
 
Before I experience some punishment for slander against Love, I will attempt to 
atone through a Palinode, with my head uncovered and not, as before, concealed 
out of shame. 
 
Socrates, too, uses pleonasm –	  the “naked” (γυµνῇ; cf. non…obtecto) and “unconcealed” 
(οὐχ…ἐγκεκαλυµµένος; cf. non obumbrato) head –	  to explain how his change of attire will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 See Williams 1999. 
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transform the content of the speech that follows this moment in the dialogue. The myth of 
the enlightened soul that is given wings through an erotic encounter is told without the 
shame of covering the head. The lack of shame is thus the impetus for both Socrates’ and 
Lucius’ choice to represent their conversion/transformation through a bald and uncovered 
head.  
 That Apuleius had this transitional moment of the Phaedrus in mind when he 
portrayed Lucius’ shameless baldness at the conclusion of the novel may be a simple 
enough proposition to accept. What it means for our overall interpretation of the novel, 
however, is an entirely different question. If we accept the intertextual relationship 
between these two passages, the problem immediately arises that the Metamorphoses 
ends after this sentence, whereas Socrates uncovers his head in the Phaedrus in order to 
deliver the famous Palinode. That is, the Met. has no Palinode, though it gestures to one 
even as early as book 1.526 The only way to see a Palinode in the text would be to adopt 
Winkler’s suggestion that the Metamorphoses invites a retrospective reading. Indeed, 
what this new intertext suggests is that we no longer need to borrow the “second reading” 
motif from the genre of detective novels, but rather, we can find a Platonic precedent for 
a retrospective reading which adopts the terms of the first reading –	  much like Socrates’ 
first speech –	  but reverses the fundamental point. That is, if the Metamorphoses does, in 
fact, invite re-reading, then the Palinode that Apuleius offers comes through the newly 
revealed significance of all of the earlier points in the novel that one encounters upon a 
retrospective reading. However, contra Winkler, this does not allow for “open” 
interpretation of the sort popular in the 1980’s model of hermeneutic ambiguity; that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 See, e.g., the interpretation of Socrates’ attempt to cross the river (Met. 1.19) in Winkle 2011. 
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because the whole process of re-reading becomes analogous to a Palinode. It is thus made 
serious by its very correspondence to the myth in the Phaedrus. 
 The final word of the novel, obibam, which scholars have interpreted as an 
ominous ending –	  arguing that the verb, which can also mean “to die”, points to Lucius’ 
metaphorical death through conversion527 –	  could instead signal a new beginning, an 
answer to the paradoxical questions Socrates asks at the very opening of the Phaedrus: 
ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν. That is, just as the Phaedrus opens with a journey outside the city walls 
–	  with Phaedrus “[traveling] on a walk outside of the city walls” (πορεύοµαι δὲ πρὸς 
περίπατον ἔξω τείχους) –	  Lucius’ joyful movement (gaudens obibam) sends us back to 
the beginning of this journey, where he starts his own Phaedran περίπατος on a journey 
towards a Platonic love.528 The serious reader, in turn, can come to this second reading as 
if coming to the Palinode, where the terms of ἔρως are entirely reconfigured. In the next 
chapter, we will see how this call to retrospective reading offers its embedded choice to 
the second reader in anticipating the image of a Marsyan Socrates in the opening line of 
the Prologue. 
	  
	  
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527 See Finkelpearl 2004, 329-30. 
528 On the opening narrative chapters of the Met. as an allusion to the opening lines of the Phaedrus, see 
Graverini 2012. Winkle 2011 approximates something close to this line of reasoning as well.	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CHAPTER 4: Embedded Choice in the Prologue of the Metamorphoses 
	  
 So far in this dissertation, we have seen Apuleius time and again work in a 
tradition of blending mirror tropes (particularly Platonic mirror tropes) to a seemingly 
parodic end. It has been one of my primary contentions throughout that Apuleius, in 
alluding to the κάτοπτρον/speculum tradition, complicates originally Platonic scenes with 
later mirroring scenes primarily from the Roman poetic tradition, all of which exist in a 
tradition of interpretation and which are already themselves in a complex intertextual 
relationship with Plato. Whether Apuleius is parodying Platonic ideals by mixing high-
minded philosophy into a “low” bawdy novel, or whether he is challenging them by 
alluding to other authorizing models as alternatives to Plato, his relationship to the 
founder of his professed philosophical school is by no means easy to decipher. The text 
that has inspired the most heated debate over Apuleius’ philosophical commitments is, 
surprisingly, not one of the Middle Platonic handbooks that Apuleius produced - such as 
de Platone et eius Dogmate or de deo Socratis - but the multi-generic and hermeutically 
playful Metamorphoses. As we saw in the introduction, recent scholarship on this text has 
largely settled on the notion that Apuleius’ application of allusion and intertext is aimed 
at unphilosophical ends – e.g., mere divertissiment and sophistic display529; to my mind, 
this reduces the complexity of Apuleius’ dense tapestry of intertexts to a rather simple 
procedure, and betrays, on the part of Apuleius scholars, a failure to grasp the 
complexities of Plato. In this final chapter, I will argue that Apuleius, by mixing Platonic 
scenes with alternative models of knowledge and by generically complicating the original 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529 For representative proponents of this view, see, e.g., Harrison 2000a; Harrison 2013; van Mal-Maeder 
1997; Sandy 1997; and May 2006. 
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scenes, is doing precisely what Plato did by simultaneously parodying Homer and 
himself in an agonistic (and satirical) game of pursuing knowledge. 
 In light of the Platonic call to an act of retrospective reading, I would like to 
return to the Metamorphoses with the tradition of the didactic text-speculum (see ch. 1) in 
mind and consider the extent to which the Prologue of the Met. alludes to the varied 
manifestations of the didactic speculum. In particular, in what follows, I will turn to what 
I suggest is a previously unrecognized intertext for the Prologue of the Metamorphoses: 
namely, the eulogy of Socrates at the end of Plato’s Symposium, in which Socrates is 
presented simultaneously as a mirror of self-knowledge to his listeners and as an archaic 
spectacle, or a θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι. That is, in Alcibiades’ speech, Socrates, who is said to 
charm his listeners with λόγοι, undergoes a metamorphosis from Satyric “images” 
(εἰκόνες) to “statues of gods” (ἀγάλµατα θεῶν). Just as with the promise that the 
narrating ego gives to his readers in the Prologue – the visual-aural experience of marvel 
at a transformation from figurae into imagines – Alcibiades’ depiction of Socrates as an 
Odysseus redivivus and as an archaic “marvel to behold” also engages with categories of 
charm and marvel, the reversal of external and internal selves, and the confusion between 
viewing and hearing. Moreover, the dressing up of words in the language of an ass, which 
has been interpreted up to this point as a parodic foreshadowing of Lucius’ 
metamorphosis, may instead invite readers to a more serious mode of listening to 
Σωκρατικοì λόγοι, which are also always hidden behind an ass-hide. 
 But, before we delve into the Prologue and look closely at the complex allusive 
language, I want to meditate on the reception of this vexed text and on the question of 
what it would even mean for this text to be didactic. Ever since Jack Winkler’s famous 
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aporetic reading of the Metamorphoses, scholars have struggled to make meaning of this 
novel without reverting back to the reductionist categories of “serious” and “satirical”, 
which Auctor et Actor left us straddling in a circus maneuver. And one of the textual sites 
of the most intense debate is the hermeneutically ambiguous Prologue, which Winkler 
labeled as a “conundrum” for its readers. From those who attempt to trace the Prologue’s 
relationship to the Greek predecessor, the Metamorphoseis of Lucius of Patrae,530 to 
those who see in it a variety of intertexts,531 genres,532 and textual games,533 the 
introductory words of the Met. have opened many troublesome cans of worms. By 
looking at the Prologue within the “mirror of the text” and the “mirror of Socrates” 
traditions, I would like to attempt to change the terminology we apply to it: rather than 
seeing it as a ‘conundrum’ – a term borrowed from literary critical categories and genres 
unknown to the ancient world (e.g., the detective novel) – I will argue again that it 
represents an “embedded choice” for the retrospective reader, that is, a choice between 
Homeric and Platonic modes of viewing, listening, and reading. The value of this 
approach lies not merely in the fact that it enables us to see hidden behind the words of 
the Prologue the two archetypal figures of fiction and subsequent models for the 
character of Lucius534 – namely, Odysseus and Socrates – but also in the fact that this 
“choice” model for reading texts possessed a significant interpretive purchase already in 
antiquity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
530 See Tilg 2007. 
531 For a sampling of views, see Trapp 2001, Gibson 2001, Gowers 2001, and Smith 2001, all in the edited 
volume on the Prologue (Kahane and Laird 2001). 
532 See, e.g., Graverini 2012 for the view that the Prologue is a negotiation of the genre of the novel. 
533 See Winkler 1985 for the view that the Prologue represents a series of textual games. 
534 See Hunter 2006; Graverini 2012; Montiglio 2007. 
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 As I explored in the introduction, the choice between the pleasurable and the 
philosophical is a topos in ancient literature that can be traced all the way back to Homer 
and Hesiod. Moreover, Hesiod’s “two roads” passage together with Prodicus’ “choice of 
Heracles” became material ripe for reworking in the Second Sophistic. In particular, we 
may call to mind again the choice outlined in Plutarch’s Quomodo Quis Sentiat, namely 
that one could approach literature, too, with a “serious” attitude towards reading, or 
merely in search of pleasure. Just as the Simonidean bee flits from flower to flower in 
search of pollen, so also some men find sentiments “worthy of seriousness” (79c8ff.: τι 
σπουδῆς ἄξιον) amidst literature that others read only “for the sake of pleasure or 
diversion” (ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα καὶ παιδιᾶς). We may compare this passage to a different 
perspective from the Second Sophistic, that of Maximus of Tyre. In his Dissertations 
(18.5-6), he discusses the enigmatic or dual nature of Socrates, whose erotic discussions 
could be either “allegorical” (αἰνίγµατα) or “ironic” (εἰρωνεύµατα). As he continues, he 
analyzes Socrates’ λόγοι, particularly his erotic speeches, as more “slippery” 
(σφαλεροὺς) and “dangerous” (κινδυνώδεις) than any allegories that Homer produced, 
whom Socrates unjustly criticized, since Socrates, too, admitted of “pleasure for the ears” 
(τῇ ἀκοῇ τὸ τερπνόν). In fact, Socrates’ charming and pleasurable stories seem almost 
“inconsistent with the life of philosophy” (πῶς γὰρ ὅµοια ταῦτα φιλοσόφῳ βίῳ;); that is, 
Socrates steers the difficult course of “using shameful words as allegories for beautiful 
deeds” (αἰνίττεται δι’ αἰσχρῶν ῥηµάτων πράξεις καλάς), of “hiding good under evil and 
revealing what is beneficial through what is harmful” (τὸ γὰρ ὑποβαλεῖν αἰσχρῷ καλὸν 
καὶ τὰ ὠφελοῦντα διὰ τῶν βλαπτόντων). 
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 Bringing these two separate views of ‘philosophers’ from the Second Sophistic 
together, we have a model of reading and a mode of speaking, both of which envision 
allegorical truths hidden behind pleasurable words. And, what is essential to my point, in 
the case of Maximus of Tyre, Socrates is the forefather of philosophical inconsistency; he 
represents a dual spectacle of pleasure and truth, particularly in matters of ἔρως. In 
Maximus’ framework, moreover, Socrates is pit against Homer as an alternative model of 
allegorizing, and at the same time, he is excused for his own mode of allegorizing on the 
grounds that he inherited it from the archaic poetic tradition (starting with Homer).535 
Thus, in the Second Sophistic, we encounter writers whose complex understanding of the 
nature of the age-old literary critical dichotomy between the “utility” (utilitas) and the 
“charm” (dulcedo) of a piece of writing not only anticipates antithetical reader-responses 
from different readers, but actually traces the ambiguity of philosophical allegory to the 
hero of Platonic dialogue. Indeed, though the question of whether writing is beneficial or 
merely pleasurable can be traced back to historiographical and rhetorical polemics that 
predate even Plato – with, e.g., Thucydides criticizing other historians’ more fabulous 
historiographical methodologies when he claims to have written something “useful” 
(1.22: ὠφέλιµα) albeit “less pleasurable for the ears” (ἐς µὲν ἀκρόασιν…ἀτερπέστερον) – 
Plato provides perhaps the locus classicus on the question of utile versus dulce at the end 
of the Phaedrus (275ff.). In a dialogue that concerns itself primarily with the power of 
ψυχαγωγία, or psychagogic rhetoric, Socrates narrates the myth of Theuth and Thamos, 
in which the divine king attempts to decipher the “benefit” (ὠφέλεια) and “harm” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 We may recall how Socrates passes off the content of his first speech in the Phaedrus onto one of the 
archaic poets. See Intro, 26 n. 69 on Phaedr. 235c3. 
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(βλάβη) of writing for its users. This story then provides an entree into a comparison of 
written and spoken λόγοι, and there, Socrates concludes that the former only offer 
pleasure (ἑορτή) and a source of play (παιδιή) for the reader. No sensible man would “in 
seriousness” (σπουδή) write speeches down, according to Socrates, because λόγοι, 
similarly to painting, cannot respond to interlocutors. The written dialogue, in turn, 
represents an εἴδωλον of the real thing.  
Just as at the end of the Phaedrus, where Plato denigrates writing – paradoxically, 
considering his voluminous output – the Republic, too, concludes with a question of 
whether Homeric poetry is “useful” (ὠφέλεια) or “harmful” (βλάβη) because of its 
pleasure. As I argued in chapter 2, the former passage from the Phaedrus alludes 
indirectly to the “mirror of poetry”, by using mirroring terminology (e.g., εἴδωλον, ἐν 
ὕδατι) and a comparison to the other mode of mimesis from the Republic, namely 
painting (ζωγραφία). Likewise, book 10 of the Republic explicitly engages with the 
“mirror of Homer” tradition as an image to challenge the allegorical value of Homeric 
poetry. Therefore, one of the oldest literary critical questions of antiquity - one which has 
perpetually bothered readers of the Metamorphoses and which Luca Graverini has 
recently shown is foregrounded in the aesthetic program of the Prologue536 - is in Plato 
already bound up with the metaphor of the mirror and the question of reading, viewing, 
and listening. 
 In Platonic epistemology, we may note, this utilitas/dulcedo dichotomy seems to 
relate to a series of other dichotomies that recur throughout the Platonic corpus: namely 
(1) whether a mode of viewing is superficial or deep, (2) whether what is being seen is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536 See Graverini 2012, 21-25. 
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physical or metaphysical, and (3) whether the viewer is inside or outside of the object 
upon which he or she gazes. In chapter 1, I explored how the philosophical mirror 
tradition in antiquity – both the Platonic self-knowledge tradition and the more 
‘superficial’ tradition of exemplary mirroring – was fundamentally intertwined with 
questions of “external” versus “internal” selves and was torn between the Platonic 
metaphysical soul as self and the self as a social construct. In the former tradition, the 
speculum provided an important metaphor for seeing the unseeable, and as such, for 
delving within or reaching behind the external reality; in the latter tradition, the 
“adornment of the self” worked by analogy to the mirror’s function for external 
adornment, appropriating a fundamentally cosmetic model for virtue. But important for 
our understanding is the fact that both traditions, through an act of reinterpretation, 
ultimately legitimize a visual activity, the primary association of which is the production 
of pleasure. Looking in a mirror, it could be argued, is either an inherently vain activity – 
i.e., only beneficial to maintaining external appearances – or an erotically charged one – 
i.e., only facilitating seduction and pleasure – or both, as in the story of Narcissus. In 
either case, it is an act of fantasy, and it only acquires a “serious” meaning after an 
“authorized” character – say, a philosopher or a religious figure – reinterprets the 
originally frivolous act. The philosopher enters the scene, and through an unforeseen 
hermeneutic claim, explains that there is something behind the external and superficial 
viewing – either a deeper self-knowledge to be grasped or a more virtuous self which 
leads to a better society. That is, the “authorized” interpreter tells the viewer that he or 
she is not a “Narcissus” or a “Hostius Quadra”, but is instead a “Socrates” or a 
“Demosthenes” – models that Apuleius claimed for himself in the Apologia. 
254	  
	  
 For my purposes, it is important to note that one could make these same 
accusations against reading literature or listening to poetry – namely, that the activity is 
vain and erotically charged – and indeed, Plato did,537 which is precisely why we see 
these Second Sophistic ‘Platonists’ attempting to tip-toe around him with overwrought 
explanations of allegory. As I discussed briefly in chapter 1, reading a book and looking 
in a mirror do have a certain subset of properties in common: prima facie, both involve 
looking into a flat surface; but more importantly, both enable the viewer to see things to 
which he or she has not been granted access; and both were viewed, at least at many 
points in antiquity, as feminizing and erotic activities.538 Indeed, the act of reading 
‘fiction’ in particular – which long held the reputation of being mere trifles for women539 
– is most similar to the frivolous mirror-gazing for the sake of fantasy. This is the reason 
why ancient readers of the Metamorphoses felt compelled to use Apuleius’ own 
programmatic statements against him540: in the act of reading, I am incorporated into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 See, e.g., the incredible passage from Republic 10, in which Socrates likens the exile of Homer to a 
break-up with a beloved who was bad for the lover. Just as men who have “fallen in love” (οἱ ποτέ του 
ἐρασθέντες) with a lover who is not “beneficial” (ὠφέλιµον) – note the recourse to the utilitas/dulcitas 
debate – they have to “chant a charm” (ἐπᾴδοντες) over themselves while listening to Homer. And 
importantly, this word ἐπᾴδειν is one of the possible Greek translations of Apuleius’ permulcere (cf. 
Schlam 1970). 
538 Cf. the multiple references to books in Aristophanes’ Frogs, and the degradation of manliness that the 
growing book-culture of Athens brings about. Of particular interest is the opening exchange between 
Dionysus and Heracles, in which Dionysus claims to be inspired with “longing” (πόθος) and “desire” 
(ἵµερος) from reading one of Euripides’ plays, and Heracles responds with a sexual joke. In Rome, we may 
see the reaction of Cato the Elder to Greek literature (e.g., at Cato ad fil. frg. 1 (cited in Plin. Nat. Hist. 
29.14)) as a similar conservative response to the feminizing effect of literature. 
539 See, e.g., the anecdote from the Historia Augusta about Septimius Severus writing a letter to the Senate, 
in which he labeled Apuleius’ Metamorphoses “old women’s nursery songs” (Alb. 12.12: neniae aniles) 
540 Macrobius categorized the Metamorphoses, along with Petronius’ Satyricon and Menander’s comedies, 
as fabulae that were written ‘only to offer pleasure to the ears’ (Somn. 1.2.8: tantum conciliandae auribus 
voluptatis…gratia) and as tales that merely ‘charm the ears’ (auditum mulcent). And on the anecdote from 
the Historia Augusta, see n. 540 above. Graverini 2012, 23-4 astutely points out that these later critics 
borrow their terminology from the programmatic claims of the Metamorphoses itself. 
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fantasy experience – or ‘immersed,’ to use a recently developed theoretical term541 – 
much as in gazing at myself and narcissistically fantasizing about a future or alternative 
“self”. In both reading a novel and gazing into a mirror, I become a voyeur of sights that I 
am normally barred from seeing542; in the former case, by peeking in through the 
novelistic window on others’ lives, and in the latter case, by objectifying myself into an 
“other” upon which I can gaze in wonder.543 But miraculously, at the end of the 
Metamorphoses, an “authorized” interpreter enters the text and reinterprets Lucius’ (and 
the reader’s) experience. Just as Apuleius the philosophus Platonicus manages to give an 
apology for his narcissistic mirror-gazing by appealing to “authorized”, philosophical 
models of mirror gazing, we readers, on the brink of watching (and enjoying) a public 
display of bestiality at the end of book 10, are, together with Lucius, absolved of our guilt 
when we read Mithras’ reinterpretation of the preceding events. The visual experience of 
entering this fantasy world and becoming immersed in its exigencies and its seedy 
underbelly is suddenly redeemed as a meaningful activity. I want to indulge in the 
pleasures of Lucius’ vision – I want the gossip and the dirty details of book 9’s adultery 
tales – but I also want another character – an “authorized” character, such as a priest – to 
enter the story and make my own voyeurism somehow acceptable or part of a larger plan. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 For the theoretical model of ‘immersion’ in reading literature, see Ryan 2001. But, perhaps the term 
‘incorporation’, which has also found its footing in art critical discussions could also be useful, especially 
considering its relationship to ‘modes of viewing’ in art. For excellent discussions of how certain sculpture 
groups and Hellenistic poems ‘incorporate’ the reader into the viewing/reading experience, see Zanker 
2004. 
542 See, e.g., Hunter 2009, 51 in speaking of “curiosity”: “There is always something slightly ‘voyeuristic’ 
about novel-reading, always the sense that we should not really be taking an interest in other people’s 
affairs”; and again, at 54: “…if readers have to be scrupulosi, then novelists must, of course, be curiosi, or 
in the language of the Satyrica they, no less than their readers, must put the oculus curiosus to the door to 
watch the spectaculum (Sat. 26.4)”. 
543 On how this works psychologically, see Bartsch 2006 (and chapter 1, 12-3). 
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I long for my consumptive viewing or my curious reading to acquire a previously 
unforeseen utilitas, just as I want to wake up the morning after eating a whole pint of ice-
cream and find out that medical science has recently discovered the health-bringing 
benefits of Ben and Jerry’s. The guilty pleasure of gazing suddenly acquires a new 
meaning, and I can begin to reframe my narcissistic act as a means to acquire self-
knowledge.  
 So, how can this participation in voyeurism and sudden redemption function in a 
didactic way? One could say that Apuleius took the very risk that Maximus of Tyre 
suggested that Socrates took: namely, “hiding beautiful truths under pleasurable words”. 
In Maximus’ eyes, this is a “strange and slippery approach” (δεινὸν καὶ σφαλερὸν τὸ 
χρῆµα), but it seems as if Socrates – or rather, Plato – may have used this approach, 
considering how impenetrable his dual nature appears; to borrow a phrase from de 
Platone, Plato’s ratio is decked out in oratio,544 and this is the very feature that makes 
Maximus wary of Socrates’ allegories. But, whereas Maximus is hesitant to endorse the 
Platonic model, Apuleius, in creating a kind of ‘anti-Socrates’ that alludes simultaneously 
to the real Socrates and a parody of the real Socrates, makes a character who does “slip 
into servile pleasures”545 through his misconstrual of Platonic philosophy, only to be 
“saved” by the grace of Isis. Maximus of Tyre’s model seems to me to present a kind of 
anticipation of Stanley Fish’s reader-response theory for Paradise Lost, in which the 
narrator makes the reader “simultaneously a participant in the action and a critic of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
544 Cf. Fletcher 2014, who uses this phrase from the de Platone as a kind of mantra throughout his text to 
support the notion that Apuleius recognized how aestheticized Plato’s philosophy was. 
545 Cf. Met. 11.15, where Lucius is said to have “fallen into servile pleasures at the slippery point of youth” 
(lubrico virentis aetatulae ad serviles delapsus voluptates). 
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own performance”.546 And this is certainly one way in which the text-speculum could 
function, as the mirror, particularly in its instantiations in the Imperial Period and the 
Second Sophistic, had the capacity to separate a ‘judging self’ from an objectified 
‘judged self’. The incorporation of the reader into the novel could have that kind of 
effect; in that case Apuleius would be re-enacting a dialectic model for interacting with 
his reader. But, another kind of didaxis happens in Apuleius’ appropriation of the 
Platonic dualism, too – namely, he teaches us a new way of reading Plato. Whereas 
Maximus of Tyre points out the inconsistency of the character of Socrates, who has one 
foot in the world of tragedy and the other in the world of comedy, Apuleius shows us 
how to read that character by playfully re-enacting the very parody that we encounter at 
the end of the Symposium. By doing so, he offers us a choice as to how we want to read 
this text. 
 
1. Modes of Viewing, Hearing, and Reading in the Prologue: 
	  
 Part of the problem that scholars have encountered in looking for an entirely 
σπουδαῖον or an ultimately γέλοιον reading of the Metamorphoses is the fact that the 
Prologue invites us to think of the succeeding novel in terms of both. More precisely, it 
promises a pleasureful listening experience – “to charm our ears” (aures permulcere) – in 
what could be considered an anti-Thucydidean gesture towards pure dulcedo without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546 See Fish 1967. 
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utilitas547; then, however, it subtly invites us readers to take a deeper look behind the 
surface of the novel.548 The Prologue opens as follows: 
At ego tibi sermone isto Milesio varias fabulas conseram auresque tuas benivolas 
lepido susurro permulceam, modo si papyrum Aegyptiam argutia Nilotici calami 
inscriptam non spreveris inspicere, figuras fortunasque hominum in alias imagines 
conversas et in se rursum mutuo nexu refectas, ut mireris. exordior. quis ille?549 
 
But I will weave variegated tales for you in that Milesian style and I will charm 
your benevolent ears with pleasurable whispering, provided that you do not 
disdain to look into an Egyptian papyrus inscribed with the cleverness of a Nilotic 
reed, that you may marvel at figures and fortunes of men transformed into other 
images and turned back into themselves by a mutual knot. I begin my prologue. 
Who is that? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547 The assessment of Michael Trapp I quoted in the introduction bears repeating (Trapp 2001, 39): 
“Whatever other functions it may perform, the Prologue to Apuleius’ Metamorphoses strikes a thoroughly 
hedonistic note, from its fifth word, Milesio (‘Milesian’) to its last, laetaberis (‘you will revel in this’)”. 
548 See Scobie 1975, 69 on susurro; Schlam 1970, 480 on permulceam; Winkler 1985, 186-7 on Aegyptiam. 
Cf. Trapp 2001, 40 who expresses his sympathies with looking for more meaning in the Prologue: “I 
sympathize with the desire to uncover a further dimension to the Prologue, and would like to do so from 
one of the same starting points. What I think I find, however, operates in a rather different way to these 
supposed allusions to mysteries yet to come. I agree in seeing the invocation of another, ‘higher’ discourse, 
but I think that - for the time being at least - it works to reinforce the promise of the entertainer, rather than 
to offset it with enigmatic hints of something deeper”. 
549 I have chosen to retain the text from Hanson’s Loeb rather than the more recent Oxford Classical Text 
of Zimmerman here, primarily because I take issue with the punctuation of Harrison 1990, restated in 
Harrison and Winterbottom 2001. I cannot say that I am fully convinced by the Vergilian parallel Harrison 
cites to the opening lines of the Aeneid (Harrison 1990). In part, that is simply because, on Harrison’s new 
punctuation, figuras fortunasque…exordior would still not be the first sentence of the Met. But, on a more 
fundamental level, the phrase arma virumque carries a far more traditional thematic announcement than 
figuras fortunasque does, at least in as much as the former phrase is a clear reference to the Homeric texts. 
Moreover, the other citations Harrison and Winterbottom use to support the construction exordior with a 
direct object always have particular objects, usually having to do with a speech or a story (e.g., causam, 
orationem, fabulam, etc.; cf. OLD 2). That it is a problematic choice to make the phrase figuras 
fortunasque the direct object of exordior is perhaps evident from the translation Harrison and Winterbottom 
themselves append to their text: “I begin a tale of men’s shapes and fortunes transformed into different 
appearances…” (Harrison and Winterbottom 2000, 11; my italics). Clearly, they are borrowing from the 
construction exordior fabulam, found, e.g., in Fulgentius (Myth. 1 praef. 3), which they cite as a parallel, 
but are not comfortable translating the text as they have punctuated it. Moreover, on Harrison’s new 
punctuation, the rhetorical joke embedded in the one-word sentence exordior is largely lost, as the verb 
now points backward rather than forward. And lastly, if we think back to the original, unpunctuated text 
that Apuleius wrote, it is difficult to imagine an ancient reader taking figuras fortunasque as the object pair 
of exordior rather than mireris, especially considering that miror is a quintessential verb of paradoxography 
and the phrase that modifies these objects is so explicitly paradoxical. One could object that the postponed 
ut makes the reading a bit jolted, but one can find parallels for this elsewhere in Apuleius (e.g., Apol. 61; 
Met. 5.29). There are indeed benefits to Harrison’s punctuation (e.g., splitting up the onerous first sentence, 
the double cretic clausula mireris, exordior, etc.), but I do not think the advantages outweigh the 
difficulties. 
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It should be pointed out here that these opening lines have inspired the greatest amount of 
debate in the world of Apuleius scholarship, both textual and literary critical, ranging 
from conjectures for a different opening550 and continual re-punctuation of the text to a 
series of intertextual debates.551 Nearly every word, it has been argued, has a significant 
allusive relationship to a literary antecedent, and of course, the “satire” camp of readers 
prefers to see only Plautus, mock-epic, satire, and the genre of Milesian tales.552 Though 
some interpreters before Winkler were willing to propose a deeper and more serious 
connection to Platonic ideas,553 those who have recently seen allusion to Plato – for 
instance, in the Phaedran reference to the Nilotic reed – now consider the Prologue’s 
relationship to Plato to be an invocation of him “not as an ally but as an adversary”.554 
The most nuanced readings tend to view the Prologue as anticipating and foregrounding 
its own charm as a way of foreshadowing the “serio-comic” nature of the novel that is to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 At ego is an unparalleled opening in Latin literature, for which reason it has been emended (Ut ego with 
a full stop at exordior Oudendorp (see Harrison 1998; Tilg 2007); en ego Hildebrand (see GCA 2007 ad 
loc.)), it has inspired textual critics to posit a lost first sentence (see Landi 1922, cited in Tilg 2014, 25 n. 
19), and most recently, it has required elaborate explanation. For instance, Morgan 2001, 161 discusses the 
dialogic nature of this opening. GCA 2007, 63 ad loc. suggests that at is merely a “colloquial particle” and 
notes that at ego is a combination familiar from dialogue and comedy. Graverini 2012 spends quite a few 
pages tracing the possible Greek antecedents to this transitional at ego (e.g., Xen. Symp. 1.1: ἀλλ᾽ ἐµοὶ), but 
eventually concludes that it is a stylistic statement that responds in a way to Callimachus’ famous dictum 
from the Prologue of the Aitia, where Callimachus compares the braying ass to the flying cicada (Ait. 1.31-
2: θηρὶ µὲν οὐατόεντι πανείκελον ὀγκήσαιτο ἄλλος, ἐγὼ δ’ εἴην οὑλ̣αχύς, ὁ πτερόεις). Lastly, Tilg 2014 
expands Graverini’s framework, arguing that Apuleius is making a programmatic statement about an 
informal style, adducing as evidence a discussion of style from pseudo-Aelius Aristides’ Peri Aphelous 
Logou and the Prologue to Eusebius’ de laudibus Constantini. He even hazards to make the bold but very 
interesting suggestion that the original Greek Onos opens with the phrase ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ, for which at ego would 
merely be a translation. 
551 See, e.g., the articles of Trapp, Gibson, Gowers, and Smith in Kahane and Laird 2001. See also 
Graverini 2012 for discussion of dense intertextuality in the Prologue. 
552 See, e.g., May 2006; Harrison 2000a; Harrison and Winterbottom 2001. Cf. the more sensitive reading 
of Dowden 2006, who sees the Prologue as a mix between Milesian tales and Platonic dialogue. 
553 See Schlam 1970; Thibau 1965. 
554 See Trapp 2001, 41 for the quotation; cf. Kirichenko 2008 for another “comic” reading of the Phaedrus 
in the Prologue. 
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come,555 but even this kind of generic interplay merely acknowledges that there exists a 
certain amount of utilitas – or at the very least, a question about utilitas – in an otherwise 
playful narrative. Ultimately, my suggestion amounts to the claim that the utilitas lies, in 
fact, in the dulcedo – that is, by showing readers the “mirror of the text” as a playful re-
enactment of a Platonic moment, Apuleius offers to us an embedded choice between 
pleasurable and philosophical reading, or between Homer or Plato. 
 To view this opening in the tradition of the didactic “mirror-text”, it would be too 
easy merely to point out that a number of terms appear – figura, imago, mutuus, etc. – 
that could feasibly double as mirroring terms (though perhaps such a superficial analysis 
is à propos in the Apuleian framework). Instead, to begin an analysis of this troublesome 
text, I focus more closely on two largely understudied verbs that hold prominent positions 
in the Prologue: (1) the mode of viewing that the text requests from its reader (inspicere) 
and (2) the promised affective response to such viewing, “marvel” (mirari). After all, the 
proviso clause modo si…non spreveris inspicere represents precisely the condition that 
Aemilianus failed to achieve in Apuleius’ concluding invective at Apologia 16. Recall 
Apuleius’ closing: if Aemilianus had read a book and then “looked into” (inviseres)556 a 
speculum, just as Archimedes, the “authorizing” model of mirror-gazing, “looked into a 
mirror often and diligently” (inspexerat speculum saepe ac diligenter),557 then he would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 I am referring primarily to the approach of Graverini 2012, who gives a very thorough assessment of 
many of the allusive structures at work in this text. Though, it should be noted that he ultimately falls in the 
same camp as Trapp and Kirichenko, as he approvingly quotes Trapp’s “adversary” claim (see p. 21 n. 58). 
556 I take inviso to be an equivalent kind of “looking” to inspicere, especially as it is parallel to inspicere in 
the mirror-gazing of Archimedes. Cf. chapter 1, 107 n. 233. 
557 It is tempting to connect the ‘diligent’ viewing of Archimedes with the scrupulosus lector, considering 
that diligenter only shows up in the Apologia 4 times, the first of which concerns Maximus “diligently 
listening” and the last two of which are in regard to Maximus’ “diligent examination” and “diligent 
reading” of Plato’s Phaedrus. That is, just as the diligent mirror-gazing of Archimedes offered to him a 
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have “marveled” (mirarere) at his own ugly face. Then, Apuleius, transitioning to 
himself, claims – “but I would not marvel” (at ego non mirer) – implying that he has 
acquired self-knowledge through mirror-gazing. In other words, already within the 
Apuleian corpus, we find a similar proviso clause – “if only you would look into” an 
object – and the same consequent response – “you would be marveling” at a spectacle 
(here, Aemilianus’ Thyestes-like face). The condition in the Apologia passage, however, 
is not a proviso clause with its promise of future fulfillment – as we find in the Prologue 
– but it is already contrary-to-fact. Therefore, from the very first line of the 
Metamorphoses, which opens with an unattested dialogic phrase at ego and promises an 
experience of “marvel” conditioned on “looking”, Apuleius’ lector scrupulosus could 
recall a previous theatrical spectacle-mirror from the Apologia, wherein one 
viewer/listener did not “look into” a text/mirror and as a consequence, failed to acquire 
the type of self-knowledge that was on offer. 
 Beyond the simple correspondence between the failed philosophical viewing and 
unfulfilled marvel of Aemilianus and the offer of a wondrous text-spectacle to the reader 
of the Metamorphoses, the verb inspicere is a marked term for philosophical viewing. We 
may remember from our brief study of this word in the introduction the illustrative 
example that appears in Horace’s ‘other Ars Poetica,’558 Epistles 1.2, in which the 
narrator transforms Homer into a philosophical teacher and Odysseus into an exemplary 
model of viewing. That is, Homer “places [Odysseus] before” (proponere) our eyes as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
kind of self-knowledge, so also, Maximus’ diligent reading of Plato gave to him a transcendent knowledge 
of the οὐράνιος τόπος. Again, the connection between looking in a mirror, listening, and reading a book 
appears in a subtle way. 
558 See again the title of Hunter 2014b. 
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“useful model” (utile exemplar) for how one should investigate the world: Odysseus 
knows how to teach readers wisdom and virtue because he “providently looked into” 
(providus …inspexit) the cities and customs of other people. As I noted before, inspicere 
is a particularly loaded translation of Homer’s ἴδεν (Od. 1.3).559 In order to make 
Odysseus into a philosophical traveler, Horace must, in a sense, enhance the verb of 
“seeing”.  
 To see more clearly how inspicere works in the Prologue, it will be beneficial 
now to consider the different types of “viewing” that take place in Apuleius and his 
contemporaries. We have already seen in this dissertation a number of ways of talking 
about “looking” into a mirror: Terence’s stern father figure in the Adelphoi advocates 
“looking into the lives of other men as if into a mirror” (Adel. 416: inspicere tanquam in 
speculum in vitas omnium) in order to take an exemplum for one’s own life; Lucretius 
describes the act of “looking down into” (4.418: despicere) mirroring water as a 
simultaneously deceptive and philosophical endeavor, which can either delude the viewer 
or offer a confirmation of Epicurean philosophy560; Narcissus “looks down at” the water 
(3.486: Quae simul adspexit liquefacta rursus in unda) in the same way that he “looks at” 
(3.477: adspicere) his lover (amans) to nourish his desire; Perseus “looks at the form of 
Medusa” (4.783: formam adspexisse Medusae) through the mirror because simulacra of 
men and beasts “had been transformed” (conversa) at the unmediated sight of her; and 
finally, Seneca uses both adspicere and inspicere, in de Ira (2.36) and de Clementia (1.1), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559 See Hunter 2014b, 34 n. 2 and Moles 1985, 35. 
560 Importantly, the only time Lucretius uses this word outside of the context of the mirror is when he 
describes the “pleasure” (suave) of the enlightened Epicurean philosopher in the programmatic passage 
from book 2; the philosopher “looks down” (DRN 2.9: despicere) from the lofty tower of philosophy at 
another’s suffering. Also relevant is the fact that there, the act of looking is related to “charm” as well as 
“pleasurable delight” (iucunda voluptas). 
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respectively, to talk about looking into mirrors. Particularly relevant to my interest is the 
fact that Seneca, when he asks Nero to “look into” (inspicere) his mirror-text in the de 
Clementia, most likely alludes to the famous passage from Terence that set the precedent 
for exemplary viewing.561 
 But, when we turn to our context in Apuleius, the lack of a reference specifically 
to a speculum perhaps opens up the question of how much Apuleius is alluding to this 
tradition of viewing in his use of this word in the Prologue. Zimmerman’s assessment 
which I quoted in the introduction bears repeating: 
Remarkably, when the reader is asked not to decline to examine this papyrus, the 
verb inspicere is used…In his Apology…Apuleius uses inspicere frequently, 
always with the connotation of scholarly enquiry, close scrutiny, and 
philosophical curiosity. For even when Apuleius talks about  inspicere in 
speculum (‘looking into a mirror’), he presents looking into a mirror as an 
eminently philosophical occupation. As actual readers we too are invited to carry 
on our careful examination of the text of the Metamorphoses, reflecting on what 
we see reflected there.562 
 
As Keulen points out, moreover, “inspicere [here] may connote carefulness in taking a 
look at something potentially treacherous”.563 One might add to these sentiments that 
inspicere is by no means a normal word for reading; in fact, in the few contexts that it 
refers to “looking into” a text, it has more to do with looking up a reference or an item of 
specialized knowledge than it has to do with reading,564 for which reason, Cavallo 
connects inspicere to the careful reading of the lector scrupulosus.565 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 See Braund 2009, 156; see also Mayer 1991. 
562 See Zimmerman 2001, 255. 
563 GCA 2007, 71 ad loc. 
564 A glance at the TLL entry for this verb in connection with scripta (TLL I.A.1.a.β) confirms that it is not a 
normal verb for reading per se, but seems more to refer to reference texts (usually litterae or libri), such as 
looking up a fact in law tables or studying the contents of a letter to develop an argument. See, e.g., Cato ad 
fil. frg. 1 (cited in Plin. Nat. Hist. 29.14): quod bonum sit illorum litteras inspicere, non perdiscere. Perhaps 
worthy of mention is the fact that inspicere in this instance is juxtaposed to perdiscere, thus opening up the 
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 First, let us consider the semantic range of the whole nexus of -spicere 
compounds connected to mirroring as they appear elsewhere in the Apuleian corpus. 
Apuleius uses all three -spicere compounds found above (inspicere, adspicere, and 
despicere) to various ends and with reference to different types of viewing. For instance, 
the verb despicere occurs five times in the Apuleian corpus, but only three of them 
concern viewing566; of those, two instances seem to allude (ironically) to Lucretius’ usage 
of this verb in book 2 of the DRN. Other than the passages in book 4, where Lucretius 
discusses “looking down” into mirror-surfaces, despicere only appears one other time in 
the DRN, that is, in the famous passage where the Epicurean philosopher “looks down” 
from the “lofty temple” (edita templa) of serene doctrine. Two figures in Apuleius’ 
corpus also “look down” from a lofty place. The first appears at the opening of book 4 of 
the Metamorphoses, after the ass Lucius must defend himself against a young man who is 
attacking him. After he lays the man out on the ground, his wife “look[s] down from a 
lofty place” (4.3: ex edito despexit) at her suffering husband, much like the hypothetical 
philosopher on a hill in Lucretius. In the end, though, in a rejection of Epicurean 
detachment, she comes down to the plain in order to fight with Lucius. In a similar ironic 
reference to Lucretius’ lofty temple of philosophy (Fl. 2), Apuleius compares the vision 
of the eyes with that of the soul in assessing the character of a man. In a fragment that has 
generally been understood as a response to Epicurean faith in the senses,567 Apuleius 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Platonic) question of whether one can look without learning. Cf. also Keulen’s further point in GCA 2007, 
71 ad loc.: “usually inspicere, in the sense of taking a look at a written text, is referred to as an 
indispensable preliminary action in order to gain knowledge of its content, like the action of opening a 
book”. 
565 See Cavallo 1996, 41 also cited in GCA 2007. 
566 Met. 6.11; Met. 4.3; and Fl. 2.24.  
567 See, e.g., Lee 2005, 66-7. 
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meditates on the difference between the vision of a human and an eagle; men cannot see 
further than a stone’s throw, as Homer says, but the eagle, which has “risen itself up high 
by its wings” (altissime sublimauit euecta alis), “looks down on all things” (cuncta 
despiciens) from its lofty heights, “discerning” (cernens) all men and beasts below “with 
one glance” (uno optutu). This is a phenomenon that Richard Fletcher has labeled “the 
‘catascopic’ flight of philosophy”, which he links to the Phaedran pursuit of Icarianism 
(discussed in the previous chapter).568 In the case of Fl. 2, though, it is important that the 
eagle is meant to establish the insufficiency of human vision over against the sight of the 
soul.569 However we conjecture that the fragment concluded, what matters here is that 
Apuleius seems to have understood what Lucretius was trying to do with his preferred 
type of “viewing”. As we will see, Apuleius chooses the theoretic model of “looking 
into” something – that is, philosophical investigation beneath the surface of reality – 
rather than Lucretius’ synoptic model of gazing down from above. 
 Adspicere also appears a number of times in the Apuleian corpus, but almost all 
of these cases have to do with superficial viewing that leads to desire – narrative and 
erotic desire of the sort we saw in chapter 2. Sometimes, adspicere refers to an encounter 
with a spectacle (spectaculum; spectamen); in these cases, it is frequently marked as 
autopsy of marvelous phenomena, emphatically highlighted with a phrase such as “with 
my very own eyes”.570 Often, rather than bringing about the “desire for learning” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 See Fletcher 2014, 125-45. 
569 The fragment begins with the anecdote that Socrates required a young man to speak before assessing his 
character on the grounds that “men must be analyzed by the vision of the eyes, but by the sight of the mind 
and the gaze of the soul” (etenim arbitrabatur homines non oculorum, sed mentis acie et animi obtutu 
considerandos). 
570 See, e.g., Lucius’ encounter with the sword swallower (Met. 1.4: isto gemino obtutu circulatorem 
aspexi); Mereo stabbing Socrates in the throat (Met. 1.13: Haec ego meis oculis aspexi); Photis looking at 
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(discendi cupido) that Aemilianus would have experienced through philosophical mirror-
gazing (inspicere), this type of viewing either occurs as a result of narrative/erotic desire, 
or inspires it in the viewer. For instance, Lucius, stirred up with curiosity at the prospect 
of hearing marvelous fabulae and “thirsty for novelty” (sititor alioquin novitatis), 
describes how he “saw” the spectacle of the sword swallower in Athens (1.4: isto gemino 
obtutu circulatorem aspexi) in order to encourage Aristomenes to tell his tale. As a direct 
result of hearing Aristomenes’ story, Lucius wakes up “generally anxious and excessively 
desirous” (anxius alioquin et nimis cupidus); excited at the prospect of being in the land 
of magic, he “curiously inspects everything” (curiose singula considerabam) at the 
opening of book 2 and notes that there was nothing in Thessaly “that was what it seemed 
to be upon looking at it” (quod aspiciens id esse crederem quod esset). Curiously, Lucius 
notes here that there may be a depth to the objects he gazes upon – there may be 
something hidden behind them – but he does not engage in the kind of philosophical 
viewing that would enable him to see it. Rather, he remains on the surface level of 
appearances, and gestures towards what he believes is beneath the rocks, trees, rivers, 
statues, and herd animals. As we saw in chapter 2, in the ekphrasis of Byrrhena’s atrium, 
auctor-Lucius invites us readers to “bend over and look down” (pronus aspexeris) into 
the mirroring water, which I argued was tantamount to an invitation to partake in 
narrative fantasy; indeed, Lucius’ ensuing conversation about the deceptive spectacle and 
his future entanglements makes him once again curiosus alioquin to see some magic. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the spectacle of Lucius’ transformation (Met. 3.25: quae ubi primum me talem aspexit…); Lucius seeing 
the ‘funereal spectacle’ of Thrasyleon (Met. 4.20: Miserum funestumque spectamen aspexi…). Psyche 
explaining to her sisters the ‘spectacle’ of her husband (Met. 5.26: conscio lumine vultus eius aspexi, video 
mirum divinumque prorsus spectaculum…). 
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Similarly, in book 3, Pamphile reveals the violence “of her magic art” (3.15: magis artis 
huius), whenever she “longingly looks at a young man of beautiful form” (citulae 
formulae iuvenem quempiam libenter aspexit); and Psyche, at 5.26, describes to her 
sisters the “marvelous and divine spectacle” (mirum divinumque… spectaculum) of her 
mysterious husband’s face and the consequent desire that came when she “saw” it in the 
light (conscio lumine vultus eius aspexi). A scene of particular interest, though, is the 
opening of Apuleius’ philosophical treatise, de Platone et eius Dogmate, in which 
Socrates, upon “seeing” (DP 1.1.23: adspicere) Plato’s face, was able to divine his 
“innermost character from his external appearance” (ingeniumque intimum de 
exteriore…facie). We may note that, in a majority of these examples, this type of viewing 
relates to form and bodies, including bodies in motion. We can compare adspicere, then, 
to the Ovidian “viewing” in the mirror, which also always relays forms and bodies (cf. 
3.477 and 4.783, above). In fact, whereas the Lucretian viewing from above is subtly 
rejected or parodied in the Apuleian model, this type of looking seems to provide a model 
of seeing opposite to inspicere. In the de Platone passage, rather than testing the 
character of Plato through discourse and discussion – as Apuleius himself recommends in 
Florida 2571 – the Socrates of this treatise looks upon Plato’s external form and somehow 
divines what is inside. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
571 Florida 2 begins with an anecdote about Socrates, in which he claims not to see a young man until he 
speaks: At non itidem maior meus Socrates, qui cum decorum adulescentem et diutule tacentem conspicatus 
foret, ‘ut te uideam,’ inquit, ‘aliquid et loquere.’ scilicet Socrates tacentem hominem non uidebat; etenim 
arbitrabatur homines non oculorum, sed mentis acie et animi obtutu considerandos. 
268	  
	  
 Alternatively, I suggest that inspicere could provide a Latin translation for Plato’s 
verbs for transcendent seeing (e.g. καθορᾶν, θεωρεῖν, θεᾶσθαι, etc.),572 and as such, 
represents a deeply philosophical viewing – one that actually looks beneath the 
appearances rather than noting the delusions and delighting in them. In the 
Metamorphoses, inspicere appears only one time other than in the Prologue - not 
insignificantly, when Psyche (‘Soul’) tries to gaze upon true beauty hidden in 
Proserpina’s box (Met. 6.19.7) in what seems to me to be yet another (unnoticed) allusion 
to the ‘Soul’ in the Phaedrus attempting to have a Platonic ascent through viewing.573 
But, putting that aside, Apuleius’ usage of this word in the Apologia always refers to 
mirror-gazing and philosophical inspection. More precisely, the concept of inspectio is 
always philosophically inflected in Apuleius,574 and either represents an “inspection” of 
the self through mirror-gazing or relates to an analysis of the outside world (e.g., through 
“inspecting” fish) in which the viewer strips away external reality. Indeed, this word 
appears at many points in the Apologia, as we saw in chapter 1, where Apuleius employs 
mock-Platonic notions of philosophical viewing in a mirror (cf. esp. the rhetorical 
conclusion at 103: ‘specula inspicis:’ debet philosophus); and if we look at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 For transcendent seeing in Plato, see Nightingale 2004; Nightingale 2005. 
573 I do not know of anyone who has argued for this, but it seems fairly reasonable to think that, in an 
allegory about the disembodied soul trying to get a glimpse at beauty - especially given the communis 
opinio that Cupid & Psyche is meant to allude to Plato’s Phaedrus - a scene where ‘Soul’ looks at beauty 
and faints out of stupefaction is directly engaging with the theme of visualizing the Form of beauty in the 
Phaedrus. It is not a stretch, therefore, to assume that inspicio in this context is meant to refer to a 
transcendent kind of philosophical viewing, as I will suggest in what follows. 
574 Cf. Hunink 2001, 59 ad loc. inspectio: “Looking in a mirror is obviously the most common form of 
using it…Meanwhile, the more common sense of ‘theoretical examination’ (OLD s.v. 3) is also relevant 
here in view of the paragraphs to come (esp. in 15-16). The double meaning is exploited in 16.6 
inspexerat.” 
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developing semantic range of the word around Apuleius’ time, it will be confirmed that 
this verb always relates to philosophical inspection, frequently in front of a speculum. 
 As a proof of this, we may look at the usage of inspicere in the works of a close 
antecedent to Apuleius in the philosophical tradition, namely Seneca. In every instance, 
the verb relates to philosophical (or divinatory)575 inspection: frequently, it refers to self-
inspection with a view to self-knowledge576; very often, it concerns a general 
philosophical investigation, as in introductory exhortations (“let us investigate”)577 or in 
directions for philosophical pursuit of knowledge578; but, perhaps the most relevant for 
our purposes, aside from the text-speculum of the de Clementia, are the citations where 
Seneca alludes to “inspecting” the true character of a man – by which he means 
penetrating deep beneath the surface level and superficial modes of defining selfhood. In 
this vein, at de Ira 3.26, Seneca exhorts his reader to “look into” the habitus of his mind 
to understand his own true character; at Epist. 22.10, he tells his reader that one must 
“look at a man’s true feelings” (si verum adfectum eorum inspicias) in order to know 
him; and most tellingly, at Epist. 76.32, Seneca explains to his reader that if one wishes to 
know a man’s true worth, one must strip away all the adornments and fancy clothes (i.e., 
social circumstances and external appearances) and “look into him naked, to see what 
sort of a man he is” (qualis sit, nudum inspice) – just as Socrates did with Alcibiades in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 The only instance of the latter is Thyestes 757. 
576 See, e.g., de Tranq. 6.1; de Brev. Vit. 2.5.7; de Benefic. 6.38.5.6;. 
577 See, e.g., the programmatic opening of de Benefic. 2.1 (inspiciamus); de Benefic. 5.2; Epist. 20.11.4.  
578 A particularly resonant example of this is in Epist. 33.5.3, where Seneca says that one cannot glean 
wisdom by merely “getting a taste of it” (degustare; e.g. by means of epitomes and such), but rather, the 
whole of philosophy “must be inspected” (tibi inspicienda sunt). This seems an interesting comparanda for 
the character Lucius we soon meet who loves to taste things without careful inspection (cf. Met. 1.2, where 
Lucius is a “thirster for novelty”, and 1.26, where he has “feasted on fables alone”). 
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Alcibiades I.579 Therefore, while inspicere could appear to be limited in this time period 
to a rather general philosophical kind of viewing – akin, perhaps, to Plato’s ἐπισκοπεῖν – 
it seems more often to relate to the deep, inner type of viewing – as in in seeing the 
metaphysical self, or soul, buried behind the layers of the social self (i.e., chapter 1). 
While there are many objects one can look at with these -spicere compounds, gazing 
upon the philosophical text-speculum and undertaking self-inspection seem to be 
accomplished primarily through the inspicere type of viewing in the second century. This 
fact could lend further insight into Seneca’s complex text-mirror in the de Clementia (see 
ch. 1), which he writes (scribere) to function as a speculum and which, he claims, will 
“give pleasure to look into” (iuvat inspicere).580 But, whereas the philosophical benefits 
of Seneca’s text-speculum, which he writes primarily for its utilitas, are also couched in 
terms of dulcedo (voluptas; iuvare), Apuleius’ use of this philosophical term is very odd 
in the context of the Prologue, where the primary type of viewing the narrating-ego offers 
is, according to most readers, dulce and decidedly inutile.581 If the purpose of Apuleius’ 
text is strictly divertissement, as the narrator seems to promise, then why not ask the 
reader to employ a more superficial type of viewing, such as adspicere? If the goal is 
only to instill in readers a desire to keep reading at a superficial level and to enjoy the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 See Alc. I 132a-b, where Socrates claims that, though Erechtheus is “fair-of-face” (εὐπρόσωπος), “it is 
necessary to see a man stripped” (ἀλλ᾽ ἀποδύντα χρὴ αὐτὸν θεάσασθαι) before one can assess his character.  
580 In the interest of precision, it should be said that the actual direct object of inspicere is bonam 
conscientiam. This is important, however, for two reasons: (1) there’s another level of conflation going on 
here, wherein the didactic narrator-mirror-text also provides a means of ‘looking at good conscience,’ or in 
other words, penetrating deep into the mind of the self, and (2) inspicere is chosen as the verb most likely 
to allude to Terence’s famous exemplary mirror of men’s lives (see Braund 2009, 156 ad loc.; Malaspina 
2001, 234 ad loc.), thus making it reasonable that inspicere is also intended to conjure up the sense of 
mirror-gazing. 
581 It is strange to me that, with the copious amount of work that has been done on the Prologue, no one 
seems to have fully recognized how charged this word is with hidden meaning. Again, Cavallo 1996, 41 
comes the closest to realizing its full import. 
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pleasure of viewing, as in the mirroring water of Byrrhena’s atrium, then why ask us to 
look behind the words of the papyrus? At the very least, we must see how Apuleius sets 
us up for a mode of philosophical viewing with this proviso clause, embedding in the 
Prologue the ambivalent status of this text and thereby, establishing an aporetic “horizon 
of expectation”. 
 If we return to the line in the Prologue, the text promises that, if the reader 
employs this kind of “philosophical viewing” (inspicere), he or she will “marvel at the 
figures and fortunes of men transformed into other images and returned back into 
themselves by a mutual knot.” In chapter 1, I considered the philosophical tradition of 
“marvel” as one of the frames of reference through which Apuleius’ invective of 
Aemilianus ought to be considered. As we saw there, in Plato and Aristotle, “marvel” can 
represent the beginning of philosophical knowledge, inspiring the intellectual curiosity 
that leads to exploration; in Platonic texts, however, there is an alternative kind of 
“marveling”, in which θαυµάζειν can refer to a kind of religious encounter with an 
awesome spectacle, such as with the Form of beauty in the Symposium or the Phaedrus. 
In the prologues of novels roughly contemporaneous to the Metamorphoses, “marvel” is 
indeed an important feature of the reader’s experience of the text. Prior to Luca 
Graverini’s 2010 contribution, ‘Amore, ‘dolcezza,’ stupore. Romanzo antico e filosofia,’ 
scholars generally understood the promise of ‘marvel’ in the Met.’s Prologue as “perhaps 
reflect[ing] a revived contemporary interest in paradoxographical literature”582; Ken 
Dowden, for instance, in his discussion of predecessors to Apuleius’ Prologue, borrows 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 GCA 2007, 73 ad. loc., who cites Mason 1978, 8 as the first proponent of such a view. See also Scobie 
1975, 71 ad loc. 
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the term Wundergeschichte to describe Apuleius’ mimesis of Lucian “doing a parodic 
piece of paradoxography”.583 Graverini responds to this interpretive school by invoking 
the philosophical tradition of wonder instead and demonstrating how allusion specifically 
to this tradition was en vogue in the Second Sophistic. Longus’ Daphnis & Chloe opens 
with the unnamed-narrator “looking” (ἰδόντα) and “marveling” (θαυµάσαντα) at a 
painting, which inspires him to write his novel as an “offering to love” (ἀνάθηµα µὲν 
Ἔρωτι); similarly, we know from Photius’ summary of Antonius Diogenes’ Incredible 
Wonders Beyond Thule584 that the main narrative seems to be inspired from an inscription 
on a cedar coffin, which read, “stranger, whoever you are, open (me), in order that you 
may learn about marvels” (Ὦ ξένε, ὅστις εἶ, ἄνοιξον, ἵνα µάθῃς ἃ θαυµάζεις).585  This 
second example, in particular, resonates well with my analysis of extraspective vs. 
introspective mirroring, in so far as the cedar coffin seems to close the object of marvel 
within itself, and must be opened up – as we will see viewers do to Socrates in the 
Symposium586 – in order to see what is hidden underneath. Similarly to the 
Metamorphoses, both of these prologues appear to straddle the line between philosophy 
(especially Platonic philosophy) and a poetic kind of marveling that can be traced all the 
way back to Homer.  
 While I believe Graverini is right to connect the mirari of the Prologue to 
philosophical marveling, I would argue that the picture is both more nuanced and more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583 See Dowden 2001, 124. The term Wundergeschichte comes from Reitzenstein 1912, 70-1. 
584 Although this text is undatable (see Morgan 2007), we may note that Photius believed it predated all the 
other novels:  Ἔστι δ’, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτος χρόνῳ πρεσβύτερος τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακότων διαπλάσαι, 
οἷον Λουκιανοῦ, Λουκίου, Ἰαµβλίχου, Ἀχιλλέως Τατίου, Ἡλιοδώρου τε καὶ Δαµασκίου. 
585 See Photius Bibl. 116. 
586 The word ἄνοιξον, derived from ἀνοίγνυµι, even shares a root verb with διοίγνυµι, the word which 
Alcibiades uses to exhort the other symposiasts to “open” (Symp. 215b3, διοιχθέντες; 221e1, διοιγοµένοις; 
222a1, διοιγοµένους) the Silenic-Socrates up in order to see the marvelous statues within (ἔνδοθεν).  
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specific. Long predating the philosophical tradition of “marvel” that leads to knowledge 
and understanding is a tradition in archaic poetry of depicting θαύµατα ἰδέσθαι, or 
“marvels to behold”; in these passages, the poet is usually describing a beautiful piece of 
craftsmanship, often something constructed by the gods (e.g., the Shield of Achilles, 
Pandora, the pseudo-Hesiodic Shield of Heracles, etc.) in an ekphrasis that incorporates 
or immerses the reader/viewer into the scene, such as the reflective Shield of Achilles.587 
As Raymond Prier has shown, “wonder” is fundamentally connected to vision in archaic 
phenomenology, and the sight of the hero often conjures up marvel in the viewer.588 In 
the Odyssey, in particular, 3 of the 4 θαύµατα ἰδέσθαι are woven garments that cover 
goddesses589; and perhaps more to my point, a recurring θαῦµα throughout the epic is the 
metamorphosis of Odysseus from old, raggedy stranger into glimmering hero – a 
spectacle that viewers witness with astonishment.590 It seems unlikely, indeed, that a 
work such as the Metamorphoses, which presents itself as an Odyssey of sorts and 
promises to “weave” together a series of variegated visual-aural experiences, would open 
with the two commands to “look in” and “marvel” without intending to alert the reader to 
the archaic, and particularly Homeric precedent. More important than allusion to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 See, e.g., Squire 2014 for a treatment of the narrative mirror of the Homeric Shield in Il. 18. 
588 See Prier 1989. See also Neer 2010. Cf. Nightingale 2004, 256, where she traces elements of what she 
calls “Platonic wonder” in Homeric and archaic wonder: “In Homer and archaic literature, thaumazein and 
its cognates are very rarely used in the sense of puzzlement, perplexity, or curiosity. In fact, thauma is 
never confined to merely cognitive experiences: archaic wonder is both cognitive and affective, intellectual 
and emotional, ranging from the feelings of reverence and awe to admiration and amazement…One quite 
complex form of archaic wonder is characterized by the feeling of reverence for something that is 
perceived as both divine and yet also kindred to the human viewer. Here, a person ‘looks with wonder’ at 
something that is both similar and different, kindred and strange.” 
589 At 6.306, Nausicaa promises Odysseus that Arete will be ‘weaving’ (στρωφάω) sea-purple wool, a 
‘marvel to behold’; at 8.366, a bard describes Aphrodite’s lovely garment, a θαύµα ἰδέσθαι, which inspires 
the bardic song; and lastly, at 13.108, the Nymphs in the grove are ‘weaving’ (ὑφαίνειν) sea-purple 
garments. 
590 See the responses of Nausicaa and the viewers of the hero in Arete’s court (Od. 8.459; Od. 7. 144-5). On 
this phenomenon, see Buxton 2009, 29-48. 
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θαύµα ἰδέσθαι tradition, though, I suggest Apuleius recognizes that Plato, too, is 
responding to this tradition when he constructs his own θαύµα ἰδέσθαι in the “mirror of 
Socrates” at the end of the Symposium. 
 As Richard Neer has argued, it is precisely that archaic poetic tradition and its 
complex relationship with statuary, or ἀγάλµατα, to which Plato responds and which he 
challenges in dialogues such as Theaetetus, Symposium, and Phaedrus, where definitions 
of philosophy or erotic love are explored through the effect that marvel has on a viewer 
of εἴδωλα or εἰκόνες.591 In this vein, Neer says of Theaetetus, the dialogue in which 
“wonder” is said to be “the beginning of philosophy” (cf. chapter 1): 
As in Phaedrus, Plato turns the traditional vocabulary of beholding to his own 
ends in order to suggest a philosophical alternative to traditional wonder. 
Theaetetus is the specimen case of the new θαύµα ἰδέσθαι.592 
 
Moreover, Moritz Schuller, in his dissertation on the mirror-of-self-knowledge tradition, 
has also convincingly shown that Socrates is portrayed by Alcibiades at the end of the 
Symposium as a θαύµα ἰδέσθαι – one that inspires marvel both through verbal and visual 
media.593 To add nuance to both of these analyses, though, we must see that “marvel” in 
Plato is ambivalent – a Janus-faced creature – and its relationship to mimesis and the 
mirror is more complicated. For instance, in Republic 10, Plato’s most famous discussion 
of mimesis, the master imitator who “makes all the things each individual craftsman 
does” (Rep. 10.596c2: ὃς πάντα ποιεῖ, ὅσαπερ εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν χειροτεχνῶν) by carrying 
around a mirror (κάτοπτρον) is first said to be a “marvelous man” (596c4: θαυµαστὸν 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591 See Neer 2010 generally, and pp. 57-68 in particular. 
592 Neer 2010, 64. 
593 See Schuller 1998, 96-119. 
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ἄνδρα) and a “marvelous sophist” (596d1: πάνυ θαυµαστόν…σοφιστήν).594 In the Laws, 
too, the Athenian discusses how if there were a contest for producing pleasure in an 
audience, people “such as Homer” (καθάπερ Ὅµηρος) would participate and the person 
to win would be the one who “produced marvels” (θαύµατα ἐπιδεικνὺς).595 Concerning 
these Platonic episodes of marvel, Penelope Murray argues that θαυµαστόν in these 
contexts “contains more than a hint of irony”,596 but I would propose that marvel and its 
philosophical value is predicated in Platonic texts on the viewer and the type of viewing 
experience he or she expects. In other words, the “mirror of Homer”, which Socrates 
implicitly refers to in resorting to the κάτοπτρον as an analogy for Homeric poetry, is 
misleading or distorting because the viewer/listener perceives the object in the wrong 
context and primarily expects mere pleasure out of the encounter. In Theaetetus, 
Symposium, and Phaedrus, the marvel that comes about through visual/aural engagement 
with a wondrous object happens in the appropriate context – e.g., in a Platonic idealized 
erotic encounter or through a dialectic encounter with an interlocutor – thereby 
transforming the marvel from uncritical, archaic wonder at beautiful objects of pleasure 
to the appropriate philosophical wonder at objects beyond perception but experienced 
dimly through perception. If Socrates at the end of the Symposium, presented as a new 
and different kind of θαύµα ἰδέσθαι, provides a mirror of self-knowledge to Alcibiades, 
as Schuller argues,597 then Plato implicitly asks the reader of the dialogue to choose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 We may also note that the conclusion of this argument is as follows: µηδὲν ἄρα θαυµάζωµεν εἰ καὶ 
τοῦτο ἀµυδρόν τι τυγχάνει ὂν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν (Rep. 10.597a11). A philosopher ought not to marvel at things 
that are “dim” (ἀµυδρός) in relation to the truth. We may compare this scene to the ἀµυδρὰ ὄργανα (i.e. our 
eyes) with which we see the “similarities” (ὁµοιώµατα) of the Forms (Phaedr. 250b1ff.). 
595 See Laws 2.658a-c. 
596 See Murray 1996, 183 ad loc. Rep. 398a4-6 on θαυµαστόν. 
597 Schuller 1998.  
276	  
	  
which type of visual/aural spectacle he or she prefers, the Homeric or the Platonic. In 
foregrounding “looking”, “listening”, and “wondering” in the Prologue of the Met., 
Apuleius re-enacts this Platonic maneuver and asks his reader to decide at the outset what 
type of visual/aural experience he or she hopes to have with this text and what kind of 
reader he or she would like to be. And this decision between “serious” and “playful” 
modes of “reading” and “viewing” is not merely a choice between Plato and Homer, but 
is, in fact, a choice that Plato forces his readers to make – especially in the case of 
Alcibiades, who represents, perhaps, a viewer that made the wrong choice when looking 
into the mirror of Socrates. 
 
2. The εἰκόνες of Socrates in the Symposium: 
	  
 Now that we have meditated on the mode of viewing and the attendant reaction of 
wonder invited in the Prologue, it is fitting to look at the elements that, I suggest, signal 
the intertextual relationship between the opening of the Metamorphoses and the closing 
of the Symposium. For the sake of seeing Apuleius’ allusive method as teaching us a way 
of reading Plato, I will focus only on the Symposium in the following pages, analyzing 
how Alcibiades’ speech represents not only a comic depiction of the figure of Socrates – 
one that we will see reincarnated in the character of Lucius – but also a parody of 
Socrates’ sublime speech on ἔρως. Underlying this thread of argument is the notion that 
Socrates implicitly represents a mirror of self-knowledge in this scene,598 and that 
Alcibiades could be considered a failed interpreter or a confused viewer. Recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598 See, e.g., Schuller 1998 and Neer 2010. 
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scholarship on the Symposium has recognized that Alcibiades’ “satyric and silenic 
drama” (τὸ σατυρικόν σου δρᾶµα τοῦτο καὶ σιληνικὸν), much like an actual satyr play, is 
parasitic on Socrates’ sublime recounting of Diotima’s description of ἔρως; that is to say, 
though he never actually heard Socrates’ speech, Alcibiades incorporates certain 
elements of it – e.g., stripping away the external appearances, marveling at the wondrous 
object beneath, etc. – but parodies them in a comic appropriation.599 Thus, in Alcibiades’ 
failed interpretation, one can find a precedent for parodies of Plato already in Plato. The 
disparate threads of this dissertation will all converge in the figure of Socrates in this 
moment of the Symposium, who provides one of the primary models for Lucius 
throughout the Metamorphoses.  
 Let us begin with an analysis of the Symposium. Just before Alcibiades bursts into 
the symposium, Socrates is finishing his sublime encomium of ἔρως through the 
mouthpiece of Diotima. This speech is a didactic text, and its utility is primarily for 
teaching listeners and readers to climb the ladder to the Forms. In other words, Socrates 
teaches us about witnessing unmediated beauty, or as Diotima says, “gazing upon 
uniform, divine beauty itself” (αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν…µονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν). Already in the 
mind of the listener/reader is the marvel of experiencing the kind of idealized Platonic 
viewing we discussed in chapter 3 – i.e., the winged flight of the metaphysical soul. 
Furthermore, the unmediated Form is most certainly a spectacle of marvel, as Diotima 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 See Bury 1932, lx-lxii for an early treatment of all of the elements from earlier speeches that Alcibiades 
incorporates into his own, particularly from Socrates’ speech. Cf. Sheffield 2001, 187-8 for an exhaustive 
list and a more up-to-date interpretation of Bury’s analyses. Important for my point, the appropriation of 
elements from Socrates’ speech was already noticed in antiquity, e.g., by Maximus of Tyre (see Phil. Orat. 
18, where he lists all of qualities Socrates shares with Erōs). It is not far-fetched, therefore, to assume that 
another Middle Platonist, Apuleius, picked up on Alcibiades’ satyr drama of Socrates’ sublime speech, and 
re-enacted it in his own work. 
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calls it a “wondrous vision” (210e: κατόψεταί τι θαυµαστὸν). This is not the type of 
philosophical marvel, though, that I discussed in chapter 1 – the wonder that leads the 
philosopher to explore and to learn, eventually dispelling the confusion. On the contrary, 
as Andrea Nightingale has shown, Plato cleverly demonstrates this to be a different kind 
of marvel – on the order of archaic marvel at a θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι, which incorporates both 
religious and erotic elements into the visual experience.600 Plato appropriates the archaic 
θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι precisely by introducing the conversation between Socrates and Diotima 
in terms of philosophical marvel: the former type of wonder, which is equivalent to 
confusion, is dispelled by Diotima’s explanation, but it is replaced, in turn, by a mystical 
kind of wonder, for which Diotima employs the language of the Eleusinian mysteries.601 
 It is in this context of the sublime, idealized Platonic vision and the marvel that 
attends such a sight that Alcibiades drunkenly bursts into the party and delivers a mock-
encomium of Socrates. In Alcibiades’ masterful parody of Socrates’ speech, Socrates 
himself becomes the object of marvel, and just as in the case of the θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι where 
“a person ‘looks with wonder’ at something that is both similar and different, kindred and 
strange” (see n. 600 below for the quotation), the great teacher is transformed into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 See Nightingale 2004, 256, where she traces elements of what she calls “Platonic wonder” in Homeric 
and archaic wonder: “In Homer and archaic literature, thaumazein and its cognates are very rarely used in 
the sense of puzzlement, perplexity, or curiosity. In fact, thauma is never confined to merely cognitive 
experiences: archaic wonder is both cognitive and affective, intellectual and emotional, ranging from the 
feelings of reverence and awe to admiration and amazement…One quite complex form of archaic wonder 
is characterized by the feeling of reverence for something that is perceived as both divine and yet also 
kindred to the human viewer. Here, a person ‘looks with wonder’ at something that is both similar and 
different, kindred and strange”. Again, Neer 2010 provides an excellent analysis of Plato’s appropriation of 
archaic marvel in his philosophical project. 
601 See Symp. 205a-b, 207c-d, and 208b-c (all cited in Nightingale 2004, 258) for the interplay with the 
former, philosophical kind of wonder. See Nightingale 2004, 259 for a description of the latter kind of 
marvel: “Here, the activity of beholding the Form of Beauty - which is the activity of theoria - is described 
as a ‘wondrous’ vision of ‘divine beauty’… This experience of wonder - what I call ‘Platonic wonder’ - 
accompanies (her italics) the vision of the Form. It includes awe, reverence, and astonishment, and is 
therefore quite different from the perplexed form of wonder”. See also Hunter 2004, 92-3. 
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ἀγάλµατα θεῶν, or “holy statues of gods”. What is the effect of Alcibiades’ abrupt and 
sudden entrance into a dialogue that, up until this point, recounted a relatively sober, 
philosophical discussion of love that reached its apex in Socrates’ retelling of the speech 
of Diotima? As Scott and Welton suggest: 
The dialogue might well have ended at the point at which Diotima holds out the 
promise that after a lifetime of following Erōs in the right way, the true lover may 
be permitted a glimpse of the Beautiful itself. Employing the language of 
initiation typical of the mystery religions, the almost ethereal passage in which 
Diotima describes how the vision of true beauty yields real virtue and a share of 
immortality is clearly the apex of the dialogue. Hence, it might have seemed 
fitting to allow the philosopher to have the last word on the matter and to have 
ended the dialogue at its highest height. But Plato does not permit the dialogue to 
end here, choosing instead to have Alcibiades…crash the party and unsettle the 
lofty mood reached just prior to the end of Socrates’ speech.602 
 
Indeed, it is precisely the inconcinnity between the sublime heights of Socrates’ speech 
and the bawdy, komastic entrance of the drunken Dionysiac figure – the mixture of 
“high” and “low” elements – that led Wilamowitz famously to call the Symposium a 
comedy and the Phaedo a tragedy.603 A more up-to-date position, which has been en 
vogue ever since Diskin Clay’s 1975 article, is that the Symposium is a tragi-comedy, or 
is “serio-comic”.604 In this vein, Richard Hunter explains: 
Alcibiades’ first words, heard from the court outside, work like a pun on the 
speeches of Socrates and Diotima…[She] has just explained the way in which 
each of us may be led toward the truly good (agathon) and beautiful, but it was 
not a flute-girl and slaves she had in mind for that role; the serious (spoudaion) 
and the metaphysical have given way to the humorous (geloion) and the all too 
physical with brilliant suddenness.605 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 Scott and Welton 2008, 155-6. 
603 See Wilamowitz 1920, 356. 
604 See Clay 1975, for an excellent analysis of how Socrates’ physical location between Agathon and 
Aristophanes mirrors his role as an intermediary between tragedy and comedy, between humans and the 
divine, and between this world and the universe of the Forms at the top of the ladder. Cf. Sheffield 2006 for 
a more recent treatment of “serio-comedy” in the Symposium. 
605 Hunter 2004, 98. 
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Falling from the sublime heights of Socrates’ account of ἔρως to the comically “low” 
satyr drama, the reader is left in a state of bewilderment, or ἀπορία, at the very end of the 
dialogue, faced with the same conundrum that Wilamowitz was trying to solve. 
 And so, with the terms of idealized viewing set out by Diotima, Alcibiades begins 
his “satyric” encomium of Socrates, which he promises to do through two εἰκόνες, or 
“images”, that Socrates will no doubt find laughable (ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα), even though 
they are meant in all seriousness (lit. “for the sake of truth”: τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἕνεκα). In the 
first εἰκών, Socrates is similar to those Silenus statues one finds in local shops, which, 
when one strips away their external covering (διχάδε διοιχθέντες), one finds ἀγάλµατα 
θεῶν hidden within their satyr-like bodies. This image, however, does not fully depict the 
complexity of the spectacle of Socrates because it only encompasses the visual element 
of the experience. A true encounter with Socrates is synaesthetic.606 To complete the 
eulogy, then, Alcibiades resorts to a second, similar but more à propos εἰκών: Socrates is 
most akin to Marsyas, the satyr famous for his mastery of the αὐλός. This analogy 
completes the picture because the marvel-inducing experience of Socrates happens not 
only through a visual encounter but also through an aural one. His likeness to Marsyas 
lies in his ability to charm his listeners: whereas Marsyas requires an αὐλός to 
accomplish his musical enchantment, Socrates needs only “naked words” (ψιλοὶ 
λόγοι).607 In turn, “marvel” at the spectacle of Socrates, as Ruby Blondell points out, 
becomes the recurrent theme of Alcibiades’ speech.608 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 See Rosen 2012 for a useful reading of the role of synaesthesia in the transcendent experience of the 
viewer in the Symposium. 
607 I am intentionally translating ψιλός here a bit provocatively only to retain what I think is some 
playfulness on Plato’s part. Clearly, in the present context, this word means something like 
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 There are numerous elements of comedy and parody in these two εἰκόνες that 
have gone largely unrecognized in the scholarship on this scene609 and that can be 
brought to bear on our interpretation of the Metamorphoses. In addition to incorporating 
features from Socrates’ preceding speech, such as the transcendent mode of viewing – 
characterized by the verbs such as καθορᾶν and θεᾶσθαι – and the attendant religious 
marvel (θαυµάζειν), Alcibiades describes Socrates’ transformation as a metamorphosis 
from images into statues. It should not be lost on readers that this marvelous individual 
changes from one mode of representation – an εἰκών – to a different kind of 
representation – an ἄγαλµα. It is true that the ἄγαλµα has religious significance, but 
nevertheless, it is still a representation that serves as an intermediary between humans 
and the divine.610 Even the medium of Socrates, through whose visage and voice we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“unaccompanied by music”; but, at the end of Alcibiades’ speech, Socrates’ words too are dressed up in a 
ridiculous outer covering, which, when it is stripped away, reveals the truth behind them. So, Socrates 
speaks in “naked” words, but indeed, ones that require the listener to strip them of their external covering to 
experience the mystifying truth behind them. We may also recall here the description ἕτερος λόγος gives of 
ekphrasis in Lucian’s de Domo: ψιλὴ γάρ τις ἡ γραφὴ τῶν λόγων (see again chapter 2, p. 129-30). 
608 θαυµαστός occurs often in Alcibiades’ speech (213e2, 215b8, 217a1, 219c1, 220a4, 220c6, 221c3, and 
222e8). In light of this, Blondell 2006, 178 concludes: “The adjective θαυµαστός, ‘amazing’, is a leitmotif 
in Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates. His baffled amazement is foreshadowed in an apparently innocent 
usage early in the dialogue, when Aristodemus answers Agathon’s opening question, ‘Where is Socrates?’ 
(174e12), with the word θαυµάζω: ‘I too wonder where he can be’ (171a1-2). Unlike Aristodemus, we are 
not in a position to send a slave to find Socrates for us. Consequently we are obliged to live with our 
wondering. And that, of course, is the beginning of philosophy”. 
609 The scholarship on this scene is too massive to summarize fully in a footnote. Some early interpreters 
saw Alcibiades’ description of Socrates as a fulfillment of the terms of erotic love set out by Diotima (see, 
e.g., Bury 1932). However, more recently, interpreters have wavered between strict parody (i.e., 
Alcibiades’ speech undercuts the idealized vision) and “serio-comedy” (i.e., the spectacle of Socrates still 
offers didaxis, despite his failure to teach Alcibiades). One of the elements that makes scholars find 
something serious behind the comedy is the comparison between Alcibiades’ out-of-control sexual-appetite 
and Socrates’ “self-sufficiency” (see Nussbaum 1986 for an early proponent of this view). For a sampling 
of opinions on this scene, see Gold 1980; Clay 1975; Nussbaum 1986; Sheffield 2001; Sheffield 2006; 
Usher 2002; Hunter 2004; Hunter 2012; Blondell 2002; Blondell 2006; Boyarin 2009; Nightingale 1995; 
Nightingale 2004; Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004; Scott and Welton 2008. 
610 On the religious elements of the ἄγαλµα in archaic Greek thought, see Steiner 2001 and Prier 1989. On 
Plato’s appropriation of the ἄγαλµα for his philosophical metaphors, see Neer 2010 and Nightingale 2004. 
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viewers/listeners experience a kind of divine marvel, can be nothing more than a 
representational medium. 
 Even more strangely, though, it is not only Socrates himself who must be stripped 
of his “external hide”, but his words, too, are all covered up in a deceptively comic and 
absurd δορά. At the opening of his encomium, Alcibiades explains his second εἰκών by 
framing Socrates’ words in the language of “charm” (κηλεῖν) and seduction. What makes 
Socrates even “more marvelous” (πολύ γε θαυµασιώτερος) than Marsyas is the fact that 
he brings about the same bewitching effects on his hearers, but “without instruments” 
(ἄνευ ὀργάνων); that is, Socrates leaves “astounded and entranced” (ἐκπεπληγµένοι 
ἐσµὲν καὶ κατεχόµεθα) anyone who listens to him or his words (σοῦ τις ἀκούῃ ἢ τῶν σῶν 
λόγων) and anyone who “lends his or her ears” (εἰ ἐθέλοιµι παρέχειν τὰ ὦτα) to him. This 
description represents a brilliant mixture of parodic and serious elements: whereas the 
language of “charm” (κηλεῖν) in Plato is primarily reserved for dangerous “alien voices” 
that lull listeners to sleep through mental indolence,611 the reaction of stupefaction and 
possession is reminiscent of the idealized lover in the Phaedrus gazing upon the beauty 
of the beloved.612 Thus, in the former respect, Socrates and his bewitching words exist on 
the same plane as the threatening Sirens – a fact that Alcibiades highlights by saying he 
plugs his ears and runs away from Socrates “as if from the Sirens” (ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν 
Σειρήνων ἐπισχόµενος τὰ ὦτα οἴχοµαι φεύγων) for fear of growing old beside him; but in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611 See, e.g., the comparison between Protagoras and Orpheus at Protagoras 315a8; Cf. Socrates’ myth of 
the cicadas in the Phaedrus (Phaedr. 259a3), which threaten to charm Phaedrus and Socrates and lull them 
to sleep like the Sirens; and more generally, mimesis in Plato has the threat of charming listeners (see, e.g., 
Rep. 607c7). 
612 Cf. Phaedr. 250a6, where the lover is ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἐν αὑτῶν γίγνονται. While the formula is 
not exactly the same, the language of possession is used elsewhere in the Phaedran description of µανία 
and is closely related to the phenomenon of being outside oneself in the Platonic framework. See Graverini 
2010 for a discussion of how novels bring about the same bewitching effect. 
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the latter depiction, Socrates also reminds the careful reader of the ἐρώµενος of the 
Phaedrus, seeing that he not only represents a divine statue, or an ἄγαλµα,613 but also 
inspires a transcendent µανία in his listeners.614 Poised somewhere between dangerous 
enchantment and transcendent encounter, Socrates’ words must be stripped of their 
deceptive appearances in order for the listener to experience the true benefit, or utilitas; 
thus, at 221d9ff., Alcibiades emends his earlier picture of Socrates as Marsyas, by 
adding: 
καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις παρέλιπον, ὅτι καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ 
ὁµοιότατοί εἰσι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τοῖς διοιγοµένοις. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλοι τις τῶν Σωκράτους 
ἀκούειν λόγων, φανεῖεν ἂν πάνυ γελοῖοι τὸ πρῶτον: τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόµατα καὶ 
ῥήµατα ἔξωθεν περιαµπέχονται, σατύρου δή τινα ὑβριστοῦ δοράν. ὄνους γὰρ 
κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόµους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ 
τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν 
τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειεν. διοιγοµένους δὲ ἰδὼν ἄν τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν 
γιγνόµενος πρῶτον µὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἔνδον µόνους εὑρήσει τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα 
θειοτάτους καὶ πλεῖστα ἀγάλµατ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντας… 
 
For there is a point I left out in the beginning – namely that his talk most of all 
resembles the Silenuses that are opened up. Should one be willing to listen to 
Socrates’ speeches, they would appear at first glance very ridiculous; on the 
outside they are dressed up with such absurd words and phrases – as if with the 
hide of a hubristic satyr. Indeed, he talks of donkeys, pack-asses, smiths, cobblers, 
and tanners; and he seems always to make the same points through the same 
words with the result that anyone inexperienced and thoughtless might laugh at 
his speeches. But, when you open them up and take a look, getting inside of them, 
first you will discover that they are the only speeches that make sense; and 
second, that none are so divine and so full of images of virtue… 
 
Socrates’ phrases and words are clothed (περιαµπέχεσθαι), as it were, in the “hide of a 
satyr” (σατύρου δή τινα ὑβριστοῦ δοράν), which is a “laughable” (γελοῖος) thing on the 
outside; in fact, the first items in the list of Socrates’ topics of conversation are donkeys 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Cf. Phaedr. 251a6 and 252d7. 
614 We may compare once again the conclusion of Alcibiades I, where Socrates hopes to “give birth” to a 
“winged love” in Alcibiades: ὦ γενναῖε, πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐµὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν διοίσει, εἰ παρὰ σοὶ 
ἐννεοττεύσας ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον ὑπὸ τούτου πάλιν θεραπεύσεται (Alc. I 135e1-2). 
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(ὄνοι) and pack-asses (κανθήλιοι), under the hides of which Socrates conceals divine 
sentiments (θειότατοι) that hold within them “images of virtue” (ἀγάλµατ᾽ ἀρετῆς). 
Socrates’ words, however, only seem laughable to the “inexperienced and thoughtless 
man” (ἄπειρος καὶ ἀνόητος ἄνθρωπος); for the one who opens them up – who sees them 
for what they are and “gets inside of them” (ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόµενος) – Socrates’ λόγοι 
teach virtue, or more precisely, train the viewer/listener to become a κάλος κἀγαθος, 
which is the consummate ideal of virtue in Athenian education.615 Alcibiades thus sets the 
terms for a mode of viewing/reading that is different for different viewers: just as 
Plutarch distinguished the “serious”, Simonidean bee reader from the one who only looks 
for pleasure from the experience, Alcibiades describes the effect Socrates has on his 
audience in opposite terms for the “inexperienced and senseless” and the one who sees 
behind the surface. “Getting inside” of Socrates’ λόγοι requires a philosophical kind of 
viewing – of the type we saw with inspicere above – that penetrates the simple exterior or 
surface-level meaning of the words. This further explication of the εἰκών of Socrates 
conveniently brings together a number of threads explored in this dissertation. The type 
of seeing Alcibiades advocates here is one that strips away the external veils and 
obscuring features of physical reality and gets at the core substance beneath, “without any 
of the mortal nonsense” (φλυαρίας θνητῆς), as Diotima says. Here we encounter the 
distinction between aesthetic and utilitarian modes of viewing. In this case, though, the 
essence of Socrates’ words, much like the man himself, represent a didactic call to virtue 
(cf. chapter 1), a fixed, immobilized statue (cf. chapter 2), and a stupefying and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615 Interestingly, Socrates’ failure to teach Alcibiades is a reason why many scholars assume that this scene 
represents yet another Apology of Socrates (see, e.g., Scott and Welton 2008, 155-66 and Hunter 2004, 
101-5). 
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transformative beloved (cf. chapter 3). It is the dual process of “looking” and “listening”, 
the synaesthetic encounter, that offers the symposiast as well as the reader access to the 
bewildering spectacle of Socrates. 
 With this passage, however, we also encounter the hermeneutic problems implicit 
in the dialogue form. The attempt at a σπουδογέλοιον pedagogy is emphasized, and the 
possibility of something σπουδαῖος or utile hiding beneath the comic and charming 
exterior is brought to the fore. There are two elements of parody worth exploring before 
we finally turn back to the Prologue of the Met. The first can be seen in Alcibiades’ 
εἰκόνες themselves. If we reconsider what we know about the hybrid nature of the satyr 
from the material record, we can see an extra layer of irony in the claim that Socrates is 
similar to one of these. We know from depictions of the satyr in antiquity that it was a bi-
form creature – a mixture of human on top and ass on the bottom.616 In addition to the 
lower donkey half, in many of the artistic renderings, the satyr has animal ears and is 
“disproportionately ithyphallic”.617 In a sense, a satyr on the outside with otherworldly 
depths inside is a perfect icon for the ἐρώµενος-Socrates because it brings us back to the 
Typhonic question we encounter in the Phaedrus – namely, whether or not one’s soul is 
multiform and beastly.618 Moreover, if we consider the lascivious and hyper-sexualized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
616 At least in Plato’s time, the hybrid satyr was composed of human and ass (see Lissarangue 1990; 
Hoffmann 1983; Hoffmann 1997; Padgett 2000; Hedreen 1992; Griffith 2006). It seems to be a Roman 
conflation that the satyr could also be half-man/half-goat, based on analogy to Pan (see, e.g., Shaw 2014, 4 
n. 17). A transitional moment for this may be the well-known Slipper-Slapper Aphrodite (100 BCE), which 
could represent a turning point in depiction of satyrs as well and could explain later conflation. However, to 
my point, Plato only knew of the half-man/half-ass satyr, and Apuleius, one would imagine, also knew of 
the artistic convention. Indeed, as I will argue shortly, the continual reference to Lucius’ excessively large 
phallus may be alluding to the ithyphallic representations of the ass-satyrs in Classical depictions (see 
Lissarrague 1990b).  
617 See Lissarrague 1990a for an excellent discussion of the sexual side of satyrs. 
618 See Morgan 2012 for the “Typhonic question” in the Phaedrus. Cf. Hunter 1997 for the Platonic image 
of Typhon in Longus and Winkle 2011 for the “Typhonic choice” in Apuleius. 
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depictions of satyrs – sometimes in pursuit of a maiden or bacchant, at other times in the 
act of copulating with an animal – then it is a powerful parody indeed to liken Socrates to 
this licentious, theriomorphic creature, since in reality, he remains chaste and in pursuit 
of virtue and a divine vision.619  
 The second and perhaps more apposite parodic element is the question of 
Homeric role-playing: that is, who is the real Odysseus, or we may even ask, who is the 
better Odysseus? Socrates, it has long been recognized,620 is portrayed here not only as an 
Odysseus redivivus, but also as an upgraded model, an Odysseus 2.0. Whereas Odysseus 
represented the quintessential journeyer in archaic thought – a man in search of his home 
and a model of nostalgia621 – Plato introduces us in the Symposium to a new traveler, one 
who does not travel the geography of this world, but has instead traipsed the realms of the 
ὑπερουράνιος τόπος.622 Just as Odysseus chooses a more Socratic life at the conclusion of 
the Myth of Er in Republic 10, so also, Socrates outdoes Odysseus in journeying in the 
Symposium. Thereby, Plato authorizes comparisons between the journeying hero of epic 
and the pilgrim philosophical model of dialogue. However, Alcibiades, too, has elements 
of Odysseus in him, especially considering that this dramatic moment directly precedes 
his own exile from home. This is certainly how he was interpreted in later antiquity, with 
Plutarch claiming that he was “of variegated fortunes” (τύχαις πολυτρόποις) and that he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 To take the irony even further, Usher 2002 compares this scene with the rape scene of Euripides’ 
Cyclops, which reverses the roles of Polyphemus and Silenus. That is, the satyr is normally the pursuer 
rather than the pursued, and Usher suggests that Plato is alluding, at least in part, to this moment from the 
Cyclops. 
620 See Blondell 2002; Blondell 2006; Hunter 2004; Hunter 2012; Montiglio 2005. 
621 On nostalgia in the Odyssey and its afterlife in Roman poetry, see Munich 2003. 
622 For Apuleius’ conception of philosophy as a version of ‘mind-traveling’, see Apol. 64 and de Mundo 
praef. 1. On the preface of the de Mundo and the ‘flight of Philosophy,’ see the analysis of Fletcher 2014. 
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“displayed many metamorphoses” (µεταβολὰς ἐπεδείξατο).623 If Socrates charms his 
listeners with the promise of (self)-knowledge into a kind of subdued inactivity, then 
Alcibiades’ choice to run from him is framed as an effort to get back home. The 
uncomfortable placeless-ness (ἀτοπία) of the philosophical journey leaves the traveler 
homeless; but Alcibiades, who later becomes homeless – like Odysseus, a man without a 
country – does not want to undertake the journey to the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος. 
 Thus, in these two εἰκόνες with their complex play on visual and aural 
phenomena, Plato brings together a number of parodic elements that, I suggest, Apuleius 
recognized and recreated in the character of Lucius. The misconstrual of the ideal 
ἐραστής/ἐρώµενος relationship, the misinterpretation of erotic and transcendent gazing, 
the failure to learn the useful lesson due to an excessive fascination with charm, and the 
stupefaction from marvel that does not lead anywhere all illuminate how one failed 
student of Socrates did not get the point. In other words, within the Platonic corpus there 
is a use of σπουδογέλοιον satire to show in a playful context exactly how far certain 
modes of viewing (or interpretation) lead us into the weeds. Alcibiades, who was known 
in later antiquity to be someone who “played and was serious at the same time” (παίζων 
ἅµα καὶ σπουδάζων),624 teaches us that Socrates is an allegory to be deciphered; and yet, 
after Alcibiades opens him up, he still fails to remain serious. In offering the sublime 
speech of Socrates and then the corresponding encomium of the Socratic spectacle, Plato 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623 See the description in Alcib. 2:  τὸ δ᾽ ἦθος αὐτοῦ πολλὰς µὲν ὕστερον, ὡς εἰκὸς ἐν πράγµασι µεγάλοις 
καὶ τύχαις πολυτρόποις, ἀνοµοιότητας πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ µεταβολὰς ἐπεδείξατο. φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ 
µεγάλων παθῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ φιλόνεικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς 
ἀποµνηµονεύµασιν. 
624 See Plutarch’s Alcibiades 2.7, where interestingly, Alcibiades is said to be half joking and half serious in 
his refusal to play the αὐλός, on the grounds that the flute makes a man unrecognizable even to his 
kinsmen. For that reason, Alcibiades concludes, the Athenians (i.e., Athena) flayed the hubristic αὐλητής. 
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compels his readers to make a choice as to how they will look upon the mirror of 
Socrates. Or to phrase it differently, he forces us to decide whether we want to follow the 
Homeric Odysseus or the Platonic Socrates. We already saw in chapters 2 and 3 of this 
dissertation how Lucius, too, fails to see himself in the mirror: the opportunity for 
acquiring self-knowledge and transcendent experience is presented to him not only in the 
mirroring water of Byrrhena’s atrium, but also in the Haarspiegel of an ἐρώµενος figure, 
a comic variant on the ‘face of the other’ tradition from the Phaedrus and Alcibiades I. 
But this opportunity, though available through the various specula he encounters, escapes 
the notice of Lucius who instead takes delight in his own delusions. In the section that 
follows, we will see how the Prologue forces retrospective readers to make a choice in 
their mode of viewing/reading – whether pleasurable or serious – and in the object of 
their gaze – i.e., Odysseus or Socrates. In light of what I argue is a complex allusion to 
the “mirror of Socrates”, we are invited to compare Lucius, the narrator, and ourselves to 
Alcibiades eulogizing Socrates. The implied question it asks, in turn, is what kind of 
viewing we would like to experience in the mirror of this character, as we gaze upon 
figurae transformed into imagines. 
 
3. Back to the Prologue: the εἰκόνες of Lucius: 
	  
 The figure of Socrates and the status of Socratic features have already been 
understood as important elements of self-fashioning in the Second Sophistic. As Paul 
Zanker demonstrated in his 1991 Sather Lectures, the traits of the intellectual in the 1st 
and 2nd centuries were very often modeled after the various descriptions of the hideous 
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looking father of philosophy, whose bald head and asinine features became exemplary 
traits for later members of the cultured elite to mimic and adopt.625 In the scholarship on 
Apuleius as well, the resemblance between Socrates and the character of Lucius has not 
gone unnoticed. The Socrates we encounter soon after the Prologue of the 
Metamorphoses could be said to represent a kind of fan-fiction version of the Platonic 
Socrates, and it has been recognized that Aristomenes’ tale provides a mise-en-abyme of 
the rest of the novel and shows to Lucius an exemplary model, which could offer “ethical 
therapy by deterrence” (cf. Terence’s speculum of other men’s lives).626 But in addition 
to the thematic resemblance between Lucius-the-character and Apuleius’ Socrates, the 
bald head and asinine features of both the Platonic and Xenophontic Socrates have also 
been considered one of the most important lenses through which to interpret Lucius’ 
prominent bald head at the end of the novel. Winkler, in his characteristic mode of 
introducing (rather than solving) hermeneutic problems, opens the question about the 
symbolic value of Lucius’ baldness; but as we saw in the previous chapter, he offers a 
fairly reductionist reading, developing his “aporetic” juxtaposition between “serious” and 
“satirical” by emphasizing that baldness would likely conjure up one of two images in the 
reader: religious devotee or mime actor (and therefore, clownish buffoon).627 In an 
updated interpretation, Dowden, James, and O’Brien – three interpreters more prone to 
see genuine Platonism in the novel – have all suggested a loose association between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 See Zanker 1995 for the seminal treatment of this, particularly in portraiture. 
626 For the phrase, see Zadorojnyi 2010, 172 (cf. chapter 1, 62 n. 150) who is discussing the role of 
exemplarity in Plutarch’s mirrors. For a very good discussion of the role of Apuleius’ Socrates as a model 
for Lucius, see Keulen 2003. 
627 See Winkler 1985, 224-7. 
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picture of Lucius, parading his bald head around Rome, and the portrait of the famously 
hideous intellectual628; but they go no further than to point out similarities.  
 Egelhaaf-Gaiser has recently posited a more specific reference point to Lucius’ 
baldness by comparing it simultaneously to the symbolic bald pate of Aesop (vita Aesopi 
G87-88)629 and the Silenic-Socrates at the end of the Symposium. She suggests (rightly, to 
my mind) that, by emphasizing Lucius’ baldness at the end, Apuleius alludes primarily to 
the “satyr play” of Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates, which offers a burlesque but 
serious depiction of the philosopher.630 But her argument depends very much on the work 
of Luca Graverini, who has provided a more nuanced reading of the Silenic-Socrates as a 
resonant model for Lucius throughout the Metamorphoses. In this excellent analysis, 
Graverini compares the two well-known physical descriptions of Socrates from the 4th 
century – i.e., the Silenus-satyr description from Plato’s Symposium and the asinine 
likeness depiction in Xenophon’s Symposium – to the elaborate narration of the asinine 
metamorphosis of Lucius in Met. 3.24; there, his ears “grow immoderately long”, his lips 
“hang down” (pendulae), and his nostrils “gape” (hiantes), all described in precisely the 
same way as Socrates’ features.631 By doing so, Graverini provides us with a useful frame 
for considering Lucius as a kind of reincarnated Socrates, stripping him of his external 
features, just as Alcibiades does to Socrates in the Symposium, and revealing a likeness to 
Socrates within. In the end, Graverini uses this to argue for the inherent σπουδογέλοιον, 
or “serio-comic” nature of Apuleius’ text. And indeed, in this regard, I am inclined to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628 See Dowden 2006; O’Brien and James 2006. 
629 It should be noted that Winkler 1985, 287 was the first to point out the similarities between Aesop’s 
symbolic baldness and Lucius’.  
630 See Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012. 
631 See Graverini 2012, 118-131; see pp. 122ff. in particular for what follows. 
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side with his refreshing move away from Winklerian hermeneutics. However, I disagree 
with him primarily on the purpose of the allusion, and in what follows, I will show that it 
is not only in the transformation scene that we find allusions to Socrates, but the “satiric” 
figure is foregrounded in the metamorphic images – the figurae transforming into 
imagines – found already in the Prologue. Rather than arguing that the Prologue functions 
programmatically as a generic statement about novelistic literature, as Graverini suggests, 
I propose that Apuleius compels the reader, just as Plato does, to make a choice about 
what type of character s/he wants to see and what mode of reading/viewing s/he would 
like to employ; in this way, he re-enacts his Platonic antecedent. 
 Let us turn back to the opening of the Met. and consider the common elements 
that it shares with the “satyr drama” of the Symposium. I have argued up to this point that 
the figure of Socrates, as eulogized by Alcibiades, replaces not only the Homeric 
spectacle – the θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι – but more specifically, the spectacle of the Homeric 
Odysseus, who morphs on a number of occasions and provides a θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι to his 
viewers.632 It has already been recognized in the scholarship on the Symposium that one 
of Plato’s apparent goals in this scene is to replace the Homeric hero with a more 
philosophical version.633 I set out to demonstrate above, furthermore, how the verb 
inspicere in the Prologue of the Met. invites readers to a deeper kind of reading – a 
philosophical viewing of the sort that strips away the external features of the text to look 
beneath the surface level. When we thus put these two features together, the request to 
“look in” in order to “marvel” seems to hover somewhere between the archaic marvel of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 See Buxton 2009, 29-48 on astonishment in the Odyssey, and in particular, p. 42-44 for Odysseus as a 
θαῦµα for viewers. 
633 See n. 620 above. 
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Homeric viewing – the tradition of θαύµατα ἰδέσθαι – and the Platonic appropriation of 
this tradition, which puts on display a more philosophical version of the wondrous hero. 
Unlike the viewers of Odysseus, who remain on the surface level when they marvel at his 
metamorphosis from the ugly and shabby stranger into the beautiful hero, Alcibiades and 
the viewers/listeners at the symposium bring about a metamorphosis of the εἰκόνες of 
Socrates by opening him up to see the statues within. That is, Socrates transforms from 
one mode of representation, εἰκόνες, into another, ἀγάλµατα, the second of which acts as 
an intermediary between humans and the divine. And the primary phenomenological 
experience of watching is “marvel” and “stupefaction” – simultaneously a fulfillment of 
and a parody on the sublime speech of Diotima. Similarly in the Prologue, the readers are 
asked to employ this type of philosophical viewing in order to experience astonishment at 
a series of metamorphoses – that is, transformations from one mode of representation, 
figurae, into another, imagines. The fact that Lucius’ metamorphosis from one mimetic 
medium to another travels the opposite journey from Socrates’ only adds to the γέλοιον 
element of the allusion. However, just as Alcibiades’ speech, on the surface level, is 
primarily meant to incite laughter through the “satiric” appropriation of Socrates’ sublime 
speech, so also, the foreshadowing of pleasurable metamorphic figurae and fortunae may 
have something hidden beneath the otherwise ridiculous surface. 
 Of course, the story is never so simple with Apuleius’ hermeneutic games, and 
Lucius’ role as an ‘anti-Socrates’ is recast as a version of the actual Socrates by the end 
of the novel. No doubt, he is the reverse of Socrates at the beginning: he is beautiful on 
the outside in accordance with the masculine ideal of the time, as Byrrhena describes him 
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in book 2634; and when we open him up, we encounter the philosophizing ass within (see 
10.33: philosophans asinus). Moreover, in perhaps the most humorous appropriation, 
Lucius does become disproportionately ithyphallic, like a satyr, as we learn from his 
continual mention of the growth of his “nature” as his only consolation for his 
metamorphosis.635 However, this is only Lucius’ first transformation, and he undergoes a 
second transformation in book 11, one that could be said to uncover ἀγάλµατα θεῶν. That 
is, as the retrospective reader knows, in the formal, public initiation, Lucius is stripped of 
his ass-hide (corium; = δορά)636 and placed on a pedestal, elaborately decorated and 
garlanded on his head. And his conversion, as described by Mithras, does seem to be 
framed in terms that we could relate, ironically, to both Alcibiades and Odysseus: 
Mithras explains that Lucius was a beautiful, talented, and educated youth who slipped 
into servile pleasures at the precarious point of a man’s age.637 Moreover, the external ass 
hide – the corium – after it is stripped off by the grace of the goddess, is replaced by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 See Byrrhena’s description at 2.2, in which she divines Lucius’ probitas from his external features: ‘En’ 
inquit ‘Sanctissimae Salviae matris generosa probitas. Sed et cetera corporis execrabiliter ad regulam sunt 
congruentia: inenormis proceritas, succulenta gracilitas, rubor temperatus, flavum et inaffectatum 
capillitium, oculi caesii quidem sed vigiles et in aspectu micantes, prorsus aquilini, os quoquoversum 
floridum, speciosus et immeditatus incessus.’ O’Brien 2002, 40-4 uses this as her primary evidence that 
Lucius is an ‘anti-Socrates’. On the physiognomic discussions of character and Lucius’ fulfillment of them, 
see again Keulen 2006. If we think back to the superficial viewing (adspicere) that the Socrates of 
Apuleius’ de Platone employs when he sees Plato, it is interesting that he is able to divine his “internal 
character” (ingenium…intimum) from his external appearance. One may say that Lucius is also a kind of 
anti-Plato, in as much as he is beautiful on the outside but lacks the internal character. Another interesting 
point of comparison between these two figures, as Richard Fletcher points out, is that both undergo a 
conversion, which leads to a journey (see Fletcher 2014). But, Lucius’ conversion happens after his 
journey. 
635 See, e.g., Met. 3.25: Nec ullum miserae reformationis video solacium, nisi quod mihi iam nequeunti 
tenere Photidem natura crescebat. Cf. also Met. 10.22. 
636 See TLL.GLOSS for corium. Cf. Flor. 3, where Marsyas’ satyr-skin is described as a corium. 
637 See Met. 11.15: nec tibi natales ac ne dignitas quidem, vel ipsa qua flores usquam doctrina profuit, sed 
lubrico virentis aetatulae ad serviles delapsus voluptates, curiositatis improsperae sinistrum praemium 
reportasti. Elsewhere, I have written about how this moment in the Metamorphoses may be an allusion to 
the conclusion of the Myth of Er, where Odysseus converts into a Socratic figure. Indeed, I think the 
question of whether Lucius is an ‘Odysseus-turned-Socrates’ or whether he is a ‘Socrates-turned-Odysseus’ 
is always at play. 
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simulacrum. As the Groningen commentators point out, when Lucius is retransformed 
into a statue in book 11, the iconography of his spectacular dress and crown is 
reminiscent of both Helios and Apollo, and the language of the scene recalls Apuleius’ 
presentation of Apollo in the contest of Apollo and Marsyas in Florida 3.638 Moreover, 
the fact that he stands next to Isis could add a third resonance, in which Lucius appears to 
be Osiris standing beside his wife.639 If Egelhaaf-Gaiser is right that Lucius’ bald head 
alludes to the end of the Symposium, then at the conclusion of the novel, he has been 
stripped of his multiple “hides” – his beautiful external appearance and his inner ass – 
only to reveal a simultaneous spectacle of simulacra deorum and the absurd looking 
Silenic-Socrates. The second reader, when he or she encounters the Prologue’s promise 
of a θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι that comprises the transformation of figurae into imagines, is thus 
invited to recall the metamorphic εἰκόνες of Socrates, whose garlanded bald head and 
half-ass/half-human exterior must be opened up for viewers and listeners to see the 
divine. 
 Before we assess what we may be meant to learn from such a complex and 
spectacular allusion to the metamorphic and mirroring θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι of Socrates, I 
would like to dwell briefly on the advantages my new reading offers to the study of the 
Prologue and the novel as a whole. If I am correct about the dense allusion in the opening 
words of the novel, a number of interpretive “conundrums” can be seen merely as threads 
that help to weave together the allusive tapestry. First of all, the synaesthetic nature of the 
opening, located somewhere between oral telling and stories written down for reading – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 See GCA 2015, pp. 404-406. Cf. Finkelpearl 2009. 
639 I must thank Luca Graverini for pointing this possible association out to me. 
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what Don Fowler has referred to as fingierte Mündlichkeit640 – can be explained as the set 
up for the allusion to the visual-aural spectacle of Socrates. In other words, the 
synaesthetic experience this text promises reproduces the multi-sensory encounter with 
Socrates: in Alcibiades’ encomium, Socrates is introduced as a visual spectacle of marvel 
– a “marvelous head” (ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυµαστὴν κεφαλήν) to look upon which transforms 
into a holy statue (ἄγαλµα); but, the εἰκών of Socrates only makes sense if it is expanded 
to cover the realm of aural experience as well. Alcibiades resorts to the “image” of 
Marsyas because of his ability to “charm” (κηλεῖν) his listeners with the pipes. The 
bewitching naked words (ψιλοὶ λόγοι) by means of which Socrates captivates “anyone 
who furnishes his or her ears to him” (cf. ἐπειδὰν δὲ σοῦ τις ἀκούῃ; παρέχειν τὰ ὦτα) 
corresponds nicely to the “pleasurable whisper” (lepidus susurrus) with which the 
narrating ego of the Prologue promises to “tickle our ears” (aures permulcere). Though 
Plato generally reserves the verb κηλεῖν for dangerously charming and bewitching 
phenomena (e.g., poetry, rhetoric, etc.),641 in this parasitically parodic appropriation of 
Socrates’ transcendent speech, Alcibiades turns Plato’s own language against Socrates. 
And Apuleius, picking up on the ambivalence of Socratic/Platonic rhetoric,642 puts in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 See Fowler 2001. 
641 Cf. the assessment of Kirichenko 2008, who attempts to connect the “charm” of the Prologue to 
deceptive mimesis in the Republic; he suggests, moreover, that this opening line alludes only to the 
Phaedrus (following Trapp 2001), but that it accentuates the written nature of the text in an anti-Platonic 
move. However, what he and others fail to take into account is the fact that Socrates himself is painted with 
the same brush with which Plato paints poetry and mimesis, for which reason the hermeneutic value of 
adopting a strict doctrinal approach to Plato has recently been called into question (see, e.g., Ferrari 1987 
on the Phaedrus; Morgan 2000; Nightingale 1995; Boyarin 2009). Moreover, to consider writing an “anti-
Platonic” move overlooks the fact that the Schriftkritik itself is another instance of Plato parodying himself 
– which is the reason why it has long bothered scholars of Plato. See, e.g., the rather extreme solution of the 
Tübingen school of Plato, which posits an “esoteric doctrine” hidden beneath the dialogues. 
642We may cite as evidence for Apuleius’ recognition of the ambivalence of Platonic rhetoric the opening of 
the de Platone, in which Apuleius tells a likely apocryphal story about Socrates’ first encounter with Plato. 
Socrates tells his followers about a dream he had, in which a swan flew from the altar of Cupid into his lap; 
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mouth of the narrator the promise of a similar “charm”.643 Furthermore, the synaesthesia 
follows the same reasoning of Alcibiades’ encomium, but in a reverse order: the narrator 
claims he will “charm” our ears provided that we “look into” his text; that is, if we direct 
our gaze to where the narrator points, we will have our ears charmed. Just as Alcibiades 
directs the symposiasts toward metamorphic εἰκόνες – “that marvelous head” (ταυτηνὶ 
τὴν θαυµαστὴν κεφαλήν; note the deictic) – which transform, in turn, into ἀγάλµατα 
θεῶν after we open them up and look inside, the narrating ego of the Prologue uses a 
deictic cue – “provided that you’re willing to look into the text” – to direct our gaze to the 
transformation (conversae) of figurae into imagines. 
 The second conundrum that the allusion solves is the dialogic opening words, at 
ego tibi, which open the novel in medias res, as it were, and for which readers have 
struggled to find a Greek antecedent.644 One of the reasons these first words of the text 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and then, upon flying away, he sang a song that “charmed the ears of men and of gods”. This swan turns 
out to be Plato, of course, which demonstrates how for Apuleius, Platonic rhetoric possesses its own 
dangerous charm. See the general solution of Fletcher 2014, who sees Apuleius’ Platonism as an 
“aestheticized impersonation of philosophy”, as evidenced by the divide between ratio and oratio in the de 
Platone. Cf. Fowler (forthercoming) ad loc. ‘charming the ears’: auditus…mulcens; cf. Metamorphoses 
1.1.2: auresque tuas…permulceam. The verb is used by Ovid to mean “to enchant magically” (cf. 
Metamorphoses 1.716, Fasti 4.551); also used by Cicero to refer to enchanting with music or speech (cf. 
On Oratory 2.315). Apuleius may be playing with the divide between philosophy and sophistry while 
discussing the fanciful dream of Socrates”.  
643 Scholars have long tried to find the appropriate corresponding Greek term for permulcere; the primary 
contenders at this point are (1) ἐπᾴδειν, the charm that one must chant over oneself to avoid the harmful 
effects of poetry (see Schlam 1970), (2) θέλγειν, the enchantment of the Sirens and Odysseus, and 
storytelling in general (see Graverini 2012; Hunter 2012), or (3) κηλεῖν, the dangerous, bewitching words 
of poetry and mimēsis (see Kirichenko 2008, discussed in n. 641 above). In a fuller articulation of my 
position on this term in Apuleius, I might point out that the ambiguity of the term and the difficulty of 
anchoring it to a specific Greek concept is precisely the point. The novel makes us choose between 
different models of mimesis at the outset by using a verb that could translate important narrative concepts in 
both Plato and Homer. 
644 See Leo 1905, 305: “incipit quasi ex medio colloquio”; cf. Helm 1931, vi.; Janson 1964, 114 n. 5; de 
Jong 2001, 201, who calls it a “dialogical monologal discourse”; Graverini 2012 has suggested the 
prologue of Callimachus’ Aitia as a possible intertext; Scobie 1975, 66. See also the assessment of GCA 
2007, 63 ad loc.: “perhaps…at is merely a colloquial particle…[and] the combination at ego is 
characteristic of dialogue and occurs very frequently in comedy, sometimes to emphasize a promise or 
proposal”. 
297	  
	  
bothered scholars, aside from the fact that they are unparalleled as an opening in Latin 
literature, is the underlying implication of a previous narrative exchange before the novel 
begins. As John Morgan notes, 
In the very first sentence, the emphatic position of At ego tibi (‘But I to you…’) 
and isto (‘that [style] of yours’) implies a previous storytelling tu mihi (‘you to 
me…’). It is not altogether obvious that the person the speaker addresses as ‘you’ 
is simply the reader. Rather we are plunged into the position of overhearing part 
of a larger narrative exchange already in progress.645 
 
Moreover, as Irene de Jong points out, there seem to be three conversational partners 
here: the narrating ‘I’ (ego), the fictive addressee/reader (tu), and an anonymous third 
conversation-partner, to whom or about whom the question quis ille? is addressed.646 
Indeed, de Jong, followed by Dowden, postulates that the Symposium provides a uniquely 
à propos model for the whole of book 1 of the Metamorphoses, considering the fact that 
Aristomenes’ fabula (1.5-1.20) is already a retelling of a version already told.647 If we 
consider these narratological conundrums in light of the opening of Alcibiades speech, 
though, we encounter the exact, same dialogic situation. Alcibiades, who has drunkenly 
burst into this Symposium quite literally in medias res, assumes that a series of previous 
speeches and interactions have occurred and so, begins his own encomium as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645 Morgan 2001, 161. 
646 See de Jong 2001, 204-5: “Who are the participants in the ‘conversation’ of Apuleius’ Prologue? I 
envisage a situation with three persons (as in the opening scene 2-20): an ‘I’ (the narrator/fictive author of 
the ensuing narrative/book), a ‘you’ (the narratee/fictive reader, the lector of the end of the Prologue), and 
an anonymous third person to whom the question quis ille? is addressed (if the addressee were the ‘I,’ it 
should have been quis tu?). What seems to happen in the Prologue is that the narrator, by way of reaction to 
something said by the ‘you’, announces that now he will tell a (particular type of) tale. At the moment he is 
about to start (exordior), he is ‘interrupted’ by the narratee asking a third person who he, the narrator, is”. 
Cf. Drews 2006, who deals with this narratological problem by suggesting that there are, in fact, two 
Prologue speakers and the speaker actually changes – in what he labels a Sprecherwechsel – after the 
question quis ille?. 
647 de Jong 2001 is the first to establish the narratological parallel with Platonic dialogue in general and 
with the Symposium in particular. Cf. Dowden 2006, who even goes so far as to compare the names 
Aristomenes and Aristodemos, suggesting that the similarity further elucidates the not so subtle allusion. 
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 Σωκράτη δ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐπαινεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὕτως ἐπιχειρήσω, δι᾽ εἰκόνων. 
 
But I will attempt to praise Socrates, gentlemen, in the following way, namely 
through εἰκόνες. 
 
If Alcibiades’ speech represents an invitation to listeners (and readers) to reinterpret 
Socrates’ sublime speech through the lens of a comic retelling, then this moment 
transforms “this marvelous head” (ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυµαστὴν κεφαλήν) of Socrates into a 
symbol of divine Eros and a commodity for visual consumption. Similarly, if I was right 
to suggest in the previous chapter that the concluding words of the novel send us back to 
the beginning for a Palinode, then this transitional opening of a speech in the Symposium 
may be a fitting model to adopt for our retrospective reading of the opening dialogic 
situation of the Metamorphoses. Just as the first lines of the Metamorphoses highlight the 
three conversational participants – a speaking subject (at ego), a listening audience (tibi), 
and a question quis ille? about a strange and marvelous third party – Alcibiades’ speech 
opens with a similar relationship between speaker, audience, and a third character. That 
is, he plays the narrating ‘I’ (δ᾽ ἐγὼ = at ego) addressing an audience and readers 
simultaneously (ὦ ἄνδρες; cf. tibi) about a strange and marvelous spectacle, “this 
marvelous head” of Socrates (ταυτηνὶ τὴν θαυµαστὴν κεφαλήν…Σωκράτη; cf. quis ille?). 
The narrator, in turn, eulogizes this fascinating visual-aural spectacle through 
metamorphic εἰκόνες in order explain the experience of marvel one receives through 
looking and/or listening. And Aristodemus, in his narration of Alcibiades’ encomium, 
retells a retelling of a speech that redefines Socrates as a parody of himself and as an 
Odysseus redivivus. It is no coincidence, then, that just after the Prologue, Aristomenes 
appears and retells a retelling of an anti-encomium, in which a fan-fiction Socrates shows 
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up as a parody of the Platonic Socrates and as an Odysseus redivivus.648 Indeed, the entire 
parody of Socrates, for the second reader of Aristomenes’ tale, becomes a parody of the 
“serious” ending that he or she has encountered in book 11 in the very same way that 
Alcibiades’ speech represents a satire of the original, idealized model of the speech of 
Socrates/Diotima. 
 In fact, in light of the opening allusion to the Symposium, even the troublesome 
question of who the narrator is – the question quis ille?, which we uncomfortably meet in 
the opening and which has long vexed interpreters of the Metamorphoses649 – begins to 
look like a question familiar from the Symposium, namely, “whose turn is it to speak?”.650 
And, depending on who the speaker is (e.g., a mock-Socrates or a mock-Alcibiades), the 
question we are compelled (unpleasantly) to confront is which version of ἔρως we hope 
to meet in the succeeding novel. Is it the πάνδηµος Ἀφροδίτη of the many – which 
Alcibiades clearly pursues in his erotic games with Socrates – or is it the οὐράνια 
Ἀφροδίτη of Diotima’s speech?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648 A fact that is highlighted explicitly – just in case the reader missed it – by Meroe’s comparison of 
herself to Calypso, abandoned by Ulysses (Met. 1.12): At ego scilicet Ulixi astu deserta vice Calypsonis 
aeternam solitudinem flebo. 
649 For a sampling of all the views on this, see the various essays from Kahane and Laird 2001, which all 
touch upon this question. Dowden 2001, for instance, enumerates at least 7 different prologue speakers: 
Aristides, Sisenna, a Plautine prologus, “a rhetorical voice making the transition from exordium (opening 
address) to narratio (telling),” Apuleius the author, Apuleius the newcomer to the literary stage, and the 
book itself.  At the conference, the organizers decided to put the matter to a vote, and concluded 
democratically (12 in favor, 4 against, and 9 abstentions) that Lucius was the Prologue speaker. 
650 For this reinterpretation of the troublesome quis ille?, I am inspired by Richard Fletcher’s conclusion in 
his recent publication, Apuleius’ Platonism (Fletcher 2014, 266-7): “…novelists do not merely ask their 
readers to expect, and to find, Platonic allegory and reference in these themes, but to understand how 
philosophising is at its very basic level a mode of fictionalisation. The question ‘who speaks’ (quis ille?, 
Met. 1.1), that is central to our understanding of the novel, now reads as a rephrasing of basic issues of 
impersonation at the heart of philosophical writing and identity”. It should be noted, however, that I take 
this “impersonation” in a very different direction, in as much as all of the speakers in the Symposium are 
different “impersonators” of a sort. 
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 Lastly, the false modesty of the narrator in describing himself as a rudis locutor – 
a facade that scholars up until now have largely seen as a mere captatio benevolentiae in 
accordance with the rhetorical conventions651 – can now be framed as a kind of ass-talk 
similar to that of Socrates. What seems at first glance to be a claim about translation for a 
non-native speaker, and what Winkler read as yet another clue for the detective to 
decipher the coming metamorphosis – rudis being etymologically linked to the braying of 
the ass (rudere)652 – can instead be seen as the ass-hide that covers the words of this tale: 
just as Socrates is always speaking of pack-asses but hides divine sentiments inside his 
words, there may be something for us behind the words of this philosophizing ass. 
 Since my own scrupulous readers may be thinking at this point, “this rudis locutor 
keeps saying that there is ‘something behind these words’ without specifying what”, it 
may be time for me to reveal my hand. I certainly would not endorse the notion that 
Apuleius hides Platonic doctrines beneath the ass-hide of the narrator’s words. Indeed, 
contra the Tübingen school on Plato and most modern scholars of Apuleius’ Platonism, I 
would not even admit that Plato did such a thing. Nor would I align myself with the 
strictly ‘open’ reading of Winkler, who claims that the auctor of this tale endorses both 
the serious and the satirical (though, for Winkler, it seems to be mostly the satirical). We 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 See, e.g., the recent commentary of May 2013, who refuses to see anything more to this generically rich 
Prologue (pp. 97-8 ad loc. ‘inexperienced speaker’): “…another captatio benevolentiae and falsely modest 
apology by the autodidact for his unusual language. In Met. 6.29.3 rudis is used again as a literary term, to 
describe a ‘simple story’ (rudis…historia), in a comically self-referential context about Lucius’ story 
becoming a novel”. 
652 See Winkler 1985, 196 for the pun. Graverini 2012, 7ff. points out the pun and connects it to the famous 
prologue of Callimachus’ Aitia (1.30-2), where he contrasts the braying of an ass to the fine whirring of the 
cicadas, and prefers the latter for his poetic program. According to Graverini, then, Apuleius is engaging 
with a kind of anti-Callimachean poetics. It should be noted, of course, that Callimachus himself was likely 
in dialogue with a kind of Platonic poetics, considering that the Phaedrus represents an Ur-text of sorts for 
the poetic image of the charming cicadas. Socrates, too, hovers somewhere between ass-braying, with his 
hide-covered words, and charming cicadas. 
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could call this tale a “choose your own adventure’ story”, where the philosophically 
minded and the pleasure seekers can both get something out of it. But I do not think that 
the philosophical lesson is the same one that Socrates and Phaedrus seek when they fight 
against the sleep-inducing Siren-cicadas; and I doubt that the mere pleasure seeker can 
entirely avoid confronting some nagging serious questions. If Alcibiades’ Socrates 
provides a mirror of self-knowledge of sorts, then what exactly is it we are meant to learn 
from Apuleius’ appropriation of this scene in the “mirror of the text”?  
 On the one hand, we could say that our involvement in Lucius’ journey, or rather, 
our participation in his voyeurism teaches us about ourselves. That is, we are given a 
chance to delight in illicit visual encounters at the safe distance of novelistic voyeurism 
and still experience a redemption together with Lucius when the priest of Isis declares 
that Lucius’ curiosity was used as a tool of Isis – what Christina Harrauer calls a 
Heilsökonomie in her unpublished commentary on book 11. If the Prologue (and 
succeeding novel) is framed simultaneously in the Odyssey-mirror tradition and the 
‘mirror of Socrates’ parody of the Odyssey, then the text invites us to enjoy the Odyssey 
and at the same time imagine the sublime ἔρως of Diotima. This is tantamount not only to 
having one’s cake and eating it, but also finding out later that cake was perfectly healthy. 
In what could be considered an ancient version of Stanley Fish’s model for Paradise 
Lost,653 we partake in a bawdier Odyssey, packed full of adultery tales and seduction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
653 As exemplified, e.g., at Fish 1967, 49: “Paradise Lost is a dialectical experience which has the 
advantage traditionally claimed for dialectic of involving the respondent in his edification. On one level at 
least the poem has the form of a Platonic dialogue, with the epic voice taking the role of Socrates, and the 
reader in the position of Phaedrus or Cratylus, continually forced to acknowledge his errors, and in this way 
moving toward a confirmation of the truth…” My version of this turns the narrating ego not only into a 
Socrates, but also into an Alcibiades or a Phaedrus, and we readers are compelled to hear the dialectic in 
the words themselves as well as in our response to them. 
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scenes; we are given a voyeuristic window into the lovemaking of this Odysseus and his 
Circes and Calypsos; but we end up seeing a reflection of ourselves in the frame, 
becoming our own critics, and concluding in redemption. This fits in well with some 
recent scholarship on novels in general,654 and it is most definitely one possible 
interpretation for the didactic value of dialectic in a Platonic dialogue. One could say, for 
instance, that Plato, too, invites readers to participate in the Phaedrus – to invest in 
Phaedrus’ speech endorsing the baser love, which is then authorized by Socrates’ first 
speech and condemned by his second. But, in the end, Socrates concludes that all of this 
was play anyway, and the reader safely returns home, having had serious seeds planted 
playfully. If Apuleius re-enacts the Platonic maneuver in the Prologue, as I have 
suggested, then he may invite the reader to a kind of dialectic encounter with this novel. 
In that case, the serious reader, flying about like the Simonidean bee and picking up 
useful sentiments, could recognize with critical judgment him- or herself staring through 
the “curious gaze” of Lucius; that is, he or she could experience a kind of “ethical therapy 
by deterrence”, as Aemilianus should have done vis-à-vis the mirror. 
 However, even if we do not imagine Apuleius to be such a sneaky moralist, 
disguising critical ratio with charming oratio, there is an alternative kind of lesson hiding 
behind these words. With the embedded choice between a serious and a pleasurable mode 
of reading working together with the serio-comic image of Socrates – itself a spectacle 
for viewers to take seriously or to take pleasure in – I would suggest that Apuleius is 
teaching us a new way to read Plato. It would be extremely beneficial for Apuleius 
scholarship if interpreters begin to ask with Friedemann Drews: “…why and in what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654 See, e.g., Whitmarsh 2002 on ekphrasis in Heliodorus. 
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sense does philosophy have to be ‘serious’?”655  In introducing Alcibiades into the feast 
and having him drunkenly parody Socrates’ speech, Plato authorizes parodies of Plato. 
Some scholars think that the depiction of Socrates represents a human approximation of 
the sublime heights of Diotima’s speech, and some argue that the picture of the satyric 
Socrates undercuts the Platonic ideal established in Socrates’ speech. But, most would 
agree that this ridiculous figure – poised somewhere between comedy and tragedy, 
between human and divine, and between lover and beloved – offers an alternative model 
of the pursuit of knowledge to Odysseus. I suggest that Apuleius, picking up on the 
parody, leaves us, too, wavering between an all-too-worldly Odysseus and an 
otherworldly Socrates. The text the Prologue announces is also a symposium of sorts – 
with feasts for the eyes and for the ears, and a whole series of inset speeches. And just as 
the reader of Plato’s dialogue finishes the “satyr drama” baffled at the spectacle, we, too, 
watch Lucius parade his bald head around Rome, experiencing a truly Platonic rather 
than a Winklerian ἀπορία. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 See Drews 2012, 109. 
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CONCLUSION: 
	  
The question of how seriously we should regard Apuleius’ Platonism and the 
Metamorphoses’ didactic value has long vexed scholarship on this slippery author. As I 
set out to demonstrate in this dissertation, the problem was not solved, but merely 
complicated with Jack Winkler’s influential, aporetic reading of the novel, which likens 
the Metamorphoses to a detective story embedding ambiguous clues for its readers. Much 
like the old Indian adage Winkler cites about the blind men holding different parts of the 
elephant, there is a cynicism to his interpretation that hides beneath the promise of an 
“open” reading. That is to say, just as only an enlightened viewer can see that there are 
blind men holding different parts of an elephant, and thus, can distinguish not only the 
elephant but also the cosmic joke on the blind men, there is a lack of sincerity in 
Winkler’s attempt to make allowances for a serious interpretation. Rather than endorse 
this cynical (and anachronistic) interpretation, I have suggested that perhaps the text is 
still an elephant, but all of us readers holding the different parts are blindfolded rather 
than blind. Perhaps the interpretive games the text plays – rather than showing us a 
spectacle of deluded fools and encouraging us to point and laugh – are meant to teach us 
how to take the blindfolds off. In this interpretation, the process of reading the text could 
then be seen as a kind of escape from Plato’s cave rather than merely a chance to take 
pleasure in the spectacle of a deluded voyeur. 
 Part of the reason we have failed to move beyond Winkler is that his aporetic 
interpretation offered us a false dilemma. After Winkler’s faux-“open” interpretation, 
readers of Apuleius continued to set up camps of “serious” versus “satirical” exegesis. In 
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the “serious” philosophical school, a few continued to keep a tally of possible allusions to 
Plato,656 discovering a new intertext every few years; others tried to harmonize Platonic 
allusions with the brand of Middle Platonism that was en vogue in Apuleius’ milieu.657 
But all those in the “serious” camp had difficulty avoiding the trap that Winkler set in 
stipulating the agenda of every reader’s experience with this text in the process of 
retrospective reading. 
It was a false dilemma from the beginning since the terms “serious” and 
“parodic”, which scholars across the disciplines have desperately tried to keep 
quarantined in their separate conceptual and disciplinary spaces,658 cannot help but bleed 
together when one encounters Platonism and its afterlife. In an effort to keep Plato in his 
lofty tower of venerable philosophy, modern philosophers have tried to shed any 
associations between Plato and Apuleius, thinking that the founder of philosophy could 
not condescend to mingle with someone so imprecise as a Latin writer from Madauros. 
On the other side of the disciplinary boundary, we classicists have invented new 
theoretical categories – such as “self-fashioning” and “generic enrichment”659 – to 
explain away any philosophical references that may seem to lift this “low”, bawdy 
entertainment into a genre that would require us to deal with those philosophers. Perhaps 
we can let religious studies departments or Egyptologists look at book 11 and appreciate 
it as a curious cultural document. But we should probably keep this book away from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656 See, e.g., see Kenney 1990a, Kenney 1990b, James 1998, Dowden 1998, Panayotakis 2001, and Winkle 
2011. 
657 See DeFilippo 1990 and O’Brien 2002. Fletcher 2014, whose work comes closest to my own 
interpretation in many ways, nevertheless uses a version of this “methodology”, at least insofar as he 
studies how Apuleius conceived of his own Platonism rather than how Apuleius wrote in a Platonic way. 
658 The one-liner from John Henderson bears repeating: “Apuleius didn’t know how Classics departments 
would compartmentalize the interface between literature and philosophy” (Henderson 2001, 189). 
659 See Harrison 2007 on “generic enrichment”.	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philosophers, since they will only complain about Apuleius’ imprecision and take away 
all of the pleasure. 
What I have tried to do in this dissertation is change the way we ask the question 
about Platonism and “serious” philosophy in Apuleius. Rather than investigate whether 
Apuleius was trying to embed some kind of secret doctrine in his bawdy novel or whether 
he was merely sprinkling a little literary flavor in for his aesthetically inclined readers, I 
have argued that “serious” and “comic” are not mutually exclusive; and more 
importantly, that Plato recognized their codependency and authorized “serio-comic” 
parody even of his own work by enacting it in the dialogues. Even Plato’s choice of form 
– a “low” conversational genre only in its inchoate phase of existence when Plato begins 
to write – represents a blend of different genres rather than a fixed genre. Plato uses 
poetry and prose; he alludes to Homer and tries to outdo him; and essential to my point, 
the sublime heights of Platonic philosophy are often brought down by a comically 
confused interlocutor. So also, Apuleius mixes into his generically “low” text allusions to 
epic and elegiac poetry; he blends in philosophical scenes from tragedy, and pits Homer 
against Plato in a competition for philosophical models. In a kind of reversal of Plato, just 
when we think the Metamorphoses cannot get more ridiculous, the ass begins to 
philosophize and we are forced to rethink how seriously we read this text. 
To phrase the problem differently, we may meditate on the guiding metaphor 
Richard Fletcher adopts for his recent monograph on Apuleius’ Platonism, namely the 
notion of a literary “body” of philosophical thought. In the opening of Apuleius’ 
philosophical treatise on Plato, de Platone et eius Dogmate, Apuleius describes Plato’s 
construction of a body of work: after inheriting different “branches of philosophy” (de 
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Plat. 1.3: philosophiae membra) from “diverse schools of thought” (de diversis officinis; 
lit. “workshops”), Plato constructed a corpus, which he then made perfect and admirable 
“by filing [it] down with reason and dressing it up in the most honorable guise of lofty 
speech” (cum ratione limando tum ad orationis augustae honestissimam speciem 
induendo). Ratio and oratio, in turn, become the fundamental binary for Fletcher’s 
interpretation, and the production of a “nuanced brand of aestheticized philosophizing”660 
happens somewhere in between. My question – one that I pose in my forthcoming review 
of Fletcher’s book – is: what kind of a corpus did Plato construct? Is it a beautiful and 
well-proportioned body, such as those we find in the idealized figures of Classical Greek 
sculpture? Or was it a hybrid body, misshapen and malformed? Perhaps Apuleius’ 
metaphor in de Platone would point to the former, with the word honestissima suggesting 
a very beautiful form. But I think the history of interpretation – of which I take Apuleius 
to be a distinguished representative – would see the corpus of Plato’s work as fitting into 
the latter category.  
In fact, the Phaedrus foregrounds such “misshapen” interpretation of Plato’s texts 
by resisting unified readings.661 It constantly reopens the question of whether writing (or 
the soul) is hybrid or uniform.662 Plato’s lack of generic or coherent uniformity is 
precisely what led one scholar recently to liken the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues to the 
Fat Rabbis of the Babylonian Talmud and to argue that both represent examples of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660 Fletcher 2014, 11. 
661 Fish’s Self-Consuming Artifacts (Fish 1972) gives a useful answer to the vexed question of the “unity of 
the Phaedrus”. 
662 Socrates’ famous refusal to rationalize a myth (Phaedr. 229c-230a) ends with the question of whether he 
is a hybrid creature (see Morgan 2012 on the “Typhonic question” and Hunter 1997 on its reception in later 
literature). The Palinode begins with what Kathryn Morgan calls a “theriomorphic image” (Morgan 2012) 
in as much as the metaphysical soul is a hybrid (246a-b). Cf. Phaedr. 264c, where Socrates compares a 
speech to a living creature, which must have all of its parts well-fit together (i.e., must not be a hybrid). 
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Menippean satire.663 Apart from the anachronism, the point nevertheless stands that the 
mixture of σπουδαῖον and γέλοιον elements in Plato makes it difficult simply to reduce 
Plato to a body of doctrines, as many philosophers have tried to do. If we spend all of our 
time “smoothing out” the rough edges of Plato’s corpus – to use Apuleius’ metaphor – 
we end up changing the “body”, transforming it from the notoriously fat, satyr-like 
Socrates into some kind of idealized ἄγαλµα that we are likely to misconstrue or 
misunderstand. One may even read Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium as doing 
precisely that: transforming Socrates into a kind of commodity that one can treat simply 
as a holy ἄγαλµα. But Plato’s Socrates, seated between Aristophanes and Agathon at the 
Symposium, has one foot in the world of tragedy and one in the world of comedy.664 
Indeed, in the greatest homage a student could pay, Apuleius re-enacts Plato’s own 
generic multiplicity and hermeneutic ambiguity, presenting readers with a Platonic rather 
than Winklerian ἀπορία. 
In this dissertation, I have shown that Apuleius’ works – particularly the 
Metamorphoses – reveal a studied engagement with Plato on a much deeper level than 
was previously thought. Rather than finding a series of disconnected allusions to Plato, 
constructed only for divertissement and unmoored from any significant interpretive 
context, I have shown that Apuleius’ allusive technique is a highly adept reinterpretation 
of Plato. He refracts Platonic allusions through Roman poetry or contemporary literature, 
as Plato himself did with Greek poetry and with his own contemporaries. He also puts 
Plato in conversation with Homer, pitting Socrates and Odysseus against each other as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
663 Boyarin 2009. 
664 See Clay 1975 for this point.	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exemplary models of philosophical travelers in search of knowledge – a technique Plato 
authorizes at many points in the dialogues (e.g., in the myth of Er, when Odysseus 
chooses a more Socratic life).665  
But perhaps most importantly, Apuleius constructs a novel that masquerades as 
merely a pleasurable text, but suddenly changes the hermeneutic terms and demands a 
reinterpretation. Just like the Phaedrus – a dialogue that begins with some playful, 
euphemistic banter outside the walls of Athens but wanders unexpectedly into the realm 
of sublime transcendence – the Metamorphoses promises mere divertissement when 
Lucius embarks on his own journey outside the walls. Only after the text gives quite a bit 
of pleasure to the reader, it jarringly forces him or her into an unforeseen mode of 
exegesis. Perhaps the proportions of “pleasure” and “seriousness” are different in the 
Metamorphoses. But we should also note that the Phaedrus strangely ends with a claim 
to have been “playing” all along and “sowing speeches for the sake of pleasure”. 
Moreover, similarly to the Republic – with the myth of Er representing a call to start the 
text over again and undergo a process of “cyclical reading”666 – the Metamorphoses 
sends the reader back to the beginning for a retrospective reading, which invites the 
reader to reconsider his or her relationship to the text. Beyond his technique of allusion, 
the very act of inspiring a second reading has its roots in Plato rather than in narratology. 
Thus, hermeneutic ambiguity, instead of revealing the meaninglessness of texts, can serve 
a didactic function in forcing the reader to rethink positions and interpretations. This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
665 See my forthcoming paper on this scene in Republic 10 and its relationship to the conclusion of the 
Metamorphoses. 
666 See Halliwell 2013 on “cyclical reading” and the myth of Er’s unforeseen “eschatological authority”, 
which sends the reader back to the beginning for a reconsideration of the questions in the dialogue. 
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the process of taking the blindfold off and realizing that the corpus we are holding onto 
is, in fact, an elephant. 
In chapter 1, we saw this version of Platonism on display in the alternative models 
of life-choices posed to the audience in the Apologia. Specular gazing in that text 
straddles two opposing traditions of catoptrics – the Platonic self-knowledge tradition and 
the cosmetic adornment tradition. The reader is thus presented with the same choice 
Alcibiades faces in Alcibiades I, namely whether to gaze into the mirror of a ‘Socrates’ 
figure – in this case, Apuleius – or (ironically) to look upon a hideous figure with even 
more hideous insides. And that choice, I noted, is intimately connected to reading – 
whether one choses to read books and how one does so.  
Moving from the ethical-philosophical to the aesthetic tradition of mirror-gazing, 
I analyzed in chapter 2 how Apuleius takes to heart the Platonic challenge to consort with 
the courtesan mimesis. The erotic power of the speculum lies in its ability to tell stories 
and inspire the imagination. Then, I demonstrated how this plays out in the 
Metamorphoses, with Lucius indulging his curious imagination at every turn. At that end, 
I argued, the reader is invited to reconsider his or her own relationship to this text and to 
question his or her willingness to imagine the sights Lucius describes. Imagination can be 
dangerous and can trap you into participating in voyeuristic curiosity. But one can also 
learn from the danger Lucius undergoes and decide whether or not to follow Lucius 
further down his path. 
In chapter 3, we encountered a similar Platonic, erotic mirroring – namely, that of 
the ἐραστής and ἐρώµενος from the Phaedrus. But here, too, Lucius misconstrues the 
terms of the idealized Platonic encounter and gets himself caught in a number of 
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questionable trysts. Watching Lucius fumble his way through Platonic exegesis in book 
2, though, gives the reader an opportunity for identification and criticism. It, therefore, 
causes a recollection of the goal of the original Platonic scene. In Lucius’ experience of 
Isis’ Haarspiegel, in turn, the reader is once again given a choice between serious and 
pleasurable reading. Lucius is face-to-face with the goddess and he does not seem to 
fetishize particular body parts in the same way that he does with Photis. However, he 
does still focus on her hair and fail to look into her eyes. One can choose to see this as a 
“serious” conversion and a correct reading of Plato, or one can continue to read for 
parody and pleasure. 
Lastly, in chapter 4, we considered how Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates as a 
mirror for viewers is reenacted in the Prologue of the Metamorphoses. Just as Socrates is 
transformed from εἰκόνες into ἀγάλµατα θεῶν in Alcibiades’ speech, so also, we are 
promised a spectacle of transformation from figurae into imagines. Moreover, in book 
11, we encounter a vision of Lucius dressed up as a simulacrum dei – the precise 
translation of ἀγάλµατα θεῶν. Through this refracted allusion to the end of the 
Symposium, the text invites us to consider how we want to relate to the main character of 
this novel – i.e., as a teacher through negative exemplum or as a commodity for visual 
consumption. Furthermore, it reminds us of the Platonic models of love – the sublime 
ἔρως of Diotima’s speech and the parody of love we encounter in Alcibiades’ speech – 
and it offers us a choice between the two. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I have used the mirror as an organizing 
principle for understanding Apuleius’ method of allusion. This has yielded great results 
not only for recognizing Apuleius’ engagement with Plato through the lens of a Roman 
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poetic and philosophical tradition but also for tracing a history of ancient interpretation of 
Plato. In this way, I believe this dissertation will be a useful resource not only for 
Apuleius scholars and experts in the Second Sophistic but also for Plato studies. That is, 
by identifying a method of ancient criticism of Plato – particularly in the work of a self-
proclaimed Platonist – I believe that I have shown an alternative approach to interpreting 
Plato, which lends credence to the continental-philosophical school of interpretation. But 
more importantly, I think the mirror and its many manifestations in Apuleius give us 
access to a technique of serio-comic allusion to Plato, which can do more serious 
philosophical work than Apuleius scholars have been willing to acknowledge. 
As I consider how to re-conceptualize this dissertation for a monograph, I plan to 
expand the bounds of my research to a larger conceptual category, which can encompass 
the work I have already done with the mirror, such as “vision” in the Metamorphoses. 
While I argued in the introduction that the speculum was the locus of choice in the 
Apologia, I believe that visual encounters more broadly construed throughout the 
Metamorphoses can be seen as “choice narratives”, which offer the possibility for a 
“conversion to philosophy”. Moreover, I plan to explore the deeper relationship between 
choice and conversion, as conversion may represent a series of choices or a process rather 
than a “Heracles-at-the-crossroads” kind of a moment. That is, perhaps Lucius stands at 
the crossroads with every visual encounter that titillates his curiosity. Everything he sees 
proffers a choice between pleasure and philosophy, and his decision to indulge his 
curiosity time and again strangely leads him down an alternate, more “serious” path. But 
the philosophical aspect of the novel comes into play when the reader is shown the same 
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visual pleasures that Lucius sees and forced to make his or her own choice. Perhaps that 
is where a “conversion to philosophy” is held out as a potential path. 
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